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Foreword
Eight years ago the global food crisis caught most governments and academic
researchers unprepared. The crisis triggered not only extensive research on drivers
of international food price shocks and volatility but also many policy interventions
and tentative institutional reform at the global and national scale. Despite the efforts
of national governments and international organizations in recent years to halve
the number of hungry people by 2015, about 800 million people still suffer from
undernutrition and many more from micronutrient deficiencies. This impedes health
and contributes to conflicts and sluggish economic development. Ending hunger
completely by 2030 as aimed for in the Sustainable Development Goals requires
a much stronger political commitment. Moreover, it needs a solid scientific base
for understanding the threats to food and nutrition security and their complex
interactions with social, environmental, and political factors. Globalization has
created a highly interconnected world where resources, information, and policies
are not constrained by national borders. Economic shocks spread quickly over entire
industries and sectors. At the same time, environmental risks triggered by climate
change, biodiversity loss, land degradation, and water scarcity as well as political
conflicts will increasingly become a force of disruption, threatening the reliability of
our global agricultural and food production system. Drastic price changes are often
the first signs indicating upcoming crises and recent calm agricultural markets can
be deceptive and lead to unjustified complacency.
Analyzing Food Price Volatility and its Implications for Food Security and Policy,
edited by Matthias Kalkuhl, Joachim von Braun, and Maximo Torero, is devoted to
the stability dimension of food security and in particular the causes, consequences,
and remedies related to extreme events in food markets. Volatility is a measure of
risk and uncertainty which, in turn, is the antagonist of security. Price volatility is
an intrinsically market-related economic concept. The economics of this book is,
however, carefully embedded into the political, agricultural, climate, and nutritional
domains. This makes the book an important contribution for the ongoing political
agenda of the international community to reduce undernutrition and enhance food
and nutrition security.
The first chapter, which is written by the editors, provides a comprehensive
overview of the recent debates, concepts, and literature and serves as an overview of
the subject of the book. Subsequent chapters emphasize the global and multi-market
v
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dimension of food markets and policymaking. Traditionally, harvests, stocks, and
income were considered as the major determinants of food prices. Recently, new
drivers emerged that are rooted in closer integration of food markets with energy
and financial markets. Several chapters provide new evidence on these intensified
linkages and explore the role of speculation. Another important topic of this excel-
lent book is the role of policy as a tool to reduce volatility or to increase the capacity
to cope with volatility and the potential or real consequences of poorly designed or
implemented policies. The distortive trade restrictions in 2008 and 2010 provided a
dramatic lesson. With unreliable international markets, some governments sought
to become more self-sufficient—an often expensive way to reduce vulnerability
to international market shocks. Chapter authors develop a promising third-way
alternative between reliance on international market and autarky: regional trade and
storage cooperation. While the economic gains of this alternative are high for Africa
and Southeast Asia, political and institutional challenges prevail that need to be
overcome. Trade integration and storage cooperation may be a catalyst for improved
regional policy coordination and cooperation.
The concept of food security centers on the individual and its capability to satisfy
basic nutrition and health needs. Consequently, the impact of market volatility
on households is the subject of empirical analyses in several countries that were
highly exposed to the international price shock in 2008. Besides household, farmers,
traders, and communities deal with volatile prices at the local level and develop
strategies to cope with volatility and reduce its negative impacts. By combining
microeconomic and macroeconomic analyses, the book provides a comprehensive
perspective on the manifold interactions of markets, people, and policymakers.
The book is outstanding in its methodological diversity and wide sectorial
and geographical range. The contributions range from descriptive, empirical, and
computational economic to simulation-based works. As such, it is a must-read book
to guide researchers and research-oriented practitioners in governments, NGOs, and
international organizations as well as students of agricultural, food, and nutrition
policy.
Analyzing Food Price Volatility and its Implications for Food Security and Policy
is one of the most comprehensive and interesting collections of applied state-of-the
art research on food security, risk, and uncertainty, and it will influence the research
and action agendas for many years to come.
Ithaca, New York Per Pinstrup-Andersen
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Part I
Introduction
1Volatile and Extreme Food Prices, FoodSecurity, and Policy: An Overview
Matthias Kalkuhl, Joachim von Braun, and Maximo Torero
1.1 The Relevance of Food Price Volatility
Price volatility describes the magnitude of price fluctuations or the risk of large,
unexpected price changes. The risk of extreme price events can intensify and
contribute to broader social risks in terms of food security, human development,
and political stability. The aim of this book is to investigate the causal relationships
between and the drivers of price volatility and extreme price events, in particular
their implications on food and nutrition security. This book also aims to investigate
the experiences with and implications of national and international policies aimed
at preventing and mitigating volatility.
The economic history of food price crises has been studied in detail by Abel
(1966). He found that the causes of food price crises had changed with changing
political and economic contexts, such as the transmission of crises from agriculture
to urban settings, and the prevalence of regional crises changed due more or less
to the integration of markets. Analyses of the global food price crises of the 1970s
focused on production and trade shocks (e.g., Valdes 1981), and the broader concept
of food security evolved. Revisiting food price volatility in our age is necessary
because of further contextual changes and advancements in methods of studying
cause and effect.
M. Kalkuhl () • J. von Braun
Center for Development Research, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany
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Concern about food price volatility is closely connected to the concept of food
security, i.e., its four pillars of food availability, economic and physical access
to food, food utilization, and stability (vulnerability and shocks) over time (FAO
1996, 2015). The slow progress in reducing hunger and malnutrition and the role
of volatile agricultural markets in the food crises of 2007/2008 and 2010 fueled
concerns about the stability and reliability of the global food system. This book,
however, emphasizes that the abovementioned four dimensions of the food security
concept should be viewed not only as four separate building blocks but also as
a system of complex dynamic interactions. Price shock-related food and nutrition
insecurity may undermine the resilience of poor people and low-income countries
and thus exacerbate economic insecurity, often eroding societal cohesion.
Food policy is a sensitive political issue, and it is becoming increasingly so
as the world becomes more urbanized with increased concentrations of political
voice near power centers. Moreover, food policy is affected by strong normative
beliefs not only about goals—like food security—but also about instruments to
achieve these goals. Recommendations about how to deal with volatility need to
consider the specific policy context (Pinstrup-Andersen 2015). When food prices
rise, the power of political leaders may become contested. Rising onion prices
changed election outcomes in India.1 Increasing food prices caused thousands of
protesters to take the streets of Port au Prince (in 2008) and Algiers (in 2011).2
Rising food prices led the Haitian prime minister to resign from office in April
2008 and fueled the protests for a political change in several Arab countries. The
2007/2008 crisis also generated social and political turmoil in Bangladesh, Côte
d’Ivoire, Egypt, Indonesia, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. Several other countries saw
violent food riots, demonstrations, or social unrest as a result of rising food prices.
Beyond the anecdotal evidence and the correlation between international prices,
excessive price spikes, and food riots depicted in Fig. 1.1, recent empirical research
suggests a causal relationship between food prices and social unrest (Bellemare
2015). Many governments of developing countries are held responsible for ensuring
a certain degree of food security and decent living conditions. When these basic
requirements are eroded, governments could quickly lose their legitimacy, and
unrests and protests could arise especially in urban areas, where coordinating a
collective protest action is easy. Thus, the scope of the protests could also broaden
and trigger the demand for deeper institutional and political reforms (Costello et al.
2015).
As food prices are a sensitive political issue, it is not surprising that governments
and the G20 aim to quickly respond to increasing prices. Much of this response has
been only partly effective—or it even contributed to increasing volatility elsewhere
[see Martin and Anderson (2012) for the case of trade policies]. This is partly
based on a collective action failure to coordinate policies such that they re-enforce
1http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-07-25/for-indias-inflation-crisis-see-onion-prices
2http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12134307 and http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/
apr/09/11
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# Food riots in Africa (Right Axis)
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Fig. 1.1 Food prices, excessive volatility, and social unrests. Note: Average share of days with
excessive price spikes for maize, wheat, and rice futures returns as reported by IFPRI’s NEXQ
model (see explanation below in the text). All values per quarter. Source: Own illustration based
on data from foodsecurityportal.org (excessive volatility), Social Conflict in Africa Database
(SCAD)3, and FAO
rather than neutralize each other. On the other hand, increasing integration of local
agricultural markets into global markets and of agricultural markets into broader
financial asset markets makes it more difficult to identify the causes of extreme
events. The traditional agricultural supply and demand fundamentals seem to have
only little explanatory power for recent price movements. Energy prices and biofuel
demand, interest rates and monetary policy, financial investments and speculation,
sudden trade restriction, or lack of information are some of the factors which are
considered to be important determinants of agricultural markets in recent times.
Without a proper understanding of the causal relations, excessive volatility can-
not be reduced effectively. This book presents research on these causal relationships,
their relevance, and policy implications to provide a better information base for
political decision makers at the national and international level.
1.2 Understanding the Linkages Between Food Security, Price
Volatility, and Extreme Events
1.2.1 The Concept of Food Security
Food security is commonly defined as a state whereby “[ : : : ] all people, at all times,
have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet
their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO 1996,
paragraph 1). The definition of nutrition security goes even beyond that of food
3We thank Regine Weber for preparing the SCAD data.
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security by postulating that “[a] person is considered nutrition secure when she or he
has a nutritionally adequate diet and the food consumed is biologically utilized such
that adequate performance is maintained in growth, resisting or recovering from
disease, pregnancy, lactation and physical work.” The Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs) of the post-2015 development agenda give food and nutrition security
a high priority. Despite the efforts of governments and international organizations,
the number of people affected by food and nutrition insecurity remains high, with
780 million people undernourished and about two billion malnourished (FAO 2015).
On an operational level, food security is conceptualized by the four dimensions:
availability, accessibility, utilization, and stability [see also Upton et al. (2015) for
new approaches to conceptualize food security measurements]. The availability
of food, measured by the total food supply, and access to food, measured—for
example—by real income of households (relative to food prices), are necessary
but not sufficient conditions to ensure food security. Hence, they should not be
considered as the only determinants of food security; they are only a subset of a
much broader list of causal determinants of food security (von Braun 2014). What
ultimately matters for the well-being and health of individuals is the extent to which
each person is able to meet their dietary needs (including micro- and macronutrients)
and qualitative or subjective food preferences. This ability—subsumed under the
utilization dimension—is affected by intra-household allocation and distribution
decisions, cultural or behavioral values, and complementary factors like diseases
or other circumstances that require specific diets. While utilization is the decisive
dimension for food security on the individual level, it is difficult and expensive to
measure, which hinders the use of indicators focusing on food availability (e.g., per
capita calorie supply) or accessibility (e.g., share of households with insufficient
income to meet food and nutrition demands).
The first three dimensions of the standard food security framework focus on
issues at different socioeconomic scales. The fourth pillar emphasizes the temporal
dimension—the stability of the conditions that enable individuals to meet their food
demand. The stability can be affected in various ways: harvest fluctuations (that are
often moderated by trade and storage), fluctuations in real income affecting access
to food and nutrients, and fluctuations in disease burdens (e.g., due to pandemics or
floods). In any of these cases, changes in food prices are likely to signal changes in
food security conditions. As prices are endogenous outcomes of underlying market
forces, they cannot be a fundamental cause of changing food security conditions—a
qualification that should be kept in mind and is highly important for policymaking.
High prices could signal expectations of low food availability, which could severely
threaten food security as policy intervention is limited in the short run (at least
if the scarcity arises on a global scale). High prices could, however, also signal
increasing demand for food, to which policymakers can better respond with a wide
set of instruments ranging from trade policies, taxes targeted at wealthy consumers
to transfers targeted at poor consumers. As poor people spend around two-third of
their income on food, a change in food prices implies a change in real income; the
direction of the change in real income depends on a household’s trade position:
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Net sellers of food benefit from price increases, while net buyers would experience
declining real wages in the short run.
Temporary deficiencies in food access can lead to long-term, irreversible nutri-
tional damage, especially among children. For example, across several Latin
American countries, simulations of the 2007/2008 price increases showed important
reductions in calorie intake at both the national and the household levels, especially
for children from poor households below the age of two, a critical period for a
child’s growth and development (Robles and Torero 2010). In all of the Latin
American countries studied, poorer households with consumption levels that were
already below the calorie adequacy threshold showed greater reductions in calorie
intake. The long-term effects are especially detrimental to the already vulnerable
populations. Other empirical work confirmed significant nutritional impacts of
short-term disruptions in food security: Higher food prices increased the instances
of underweight children in Mozambique (Arndt et al. 2012); the prevalence of
childhood stunting increased in El Salvador after the 2008 food price increase (de
Brauw 2011); harvest failures and adverse weather events have been associated with
impeded child growth in Zimbabwe (Hoddinott and Kinsey 2001), reduced weight
in children in Côte d’Ivoire (Jensen 2000), and decreased blood concentration of
vitamin A and vitamin E in mothers in Zambia (Gitau et al. 2005). The deterioration
of nutritional status has, in turn, long-term impacts on health, stature, and cognitive
capabilities (Victora et al. 2008). Malnutrition in the form of insufficient micronu-
trient intake increases the probability of lifetime disabilities, such as blindness due
to vitamin A deficiency (Black et al. 2008).
Despite the heterogeneity in linking prices to changes in underlying food security
determinants, there are three reasons why prices are so important for understanding
and assessing food security risks: First, they are closely linked to several causal
factors of food security (supply, real income, cross-market linkages); second, they
are observed more frequently and less costly to collect than most other food security
indicators; and third, prices convey expectations about future changes and risks by
a large set of market participants, which allows researchers to exploit the large
information processing capacity of markets (Fama 1970). These three features
make price dynamics a crucial element for understanding food security risks. It
is therefore the main objective of this book to understand the stability dimension
of food security from the lens of agricultural market linkages and food prices by
studying their trends, changes, extreme spikes, and volatility. Chapter 2 provides a
detailed overview of several techniques for decomposing price series and calculating
volatility for empirical analysis. In the following section, we will briefly explain the
different concepts of volatility used in this book.
1.2.2 Food Price Volatility
In a broad sense, volatility captures the idea that prices fluctuate around a rather
stable long-term price or price trend (Hull 2012). These short-term fluctuations
may refer to daily, weekly, or monthly prices. Periods of excessively high or low
8 M. Kalkuhl et al.
commodity prices are often associated with crises as they pose a challenge to
producers, consumers, and policymakers. The concept of volatility captures the idea
of price fluctuations in two different ways: in a historical (ex-post) perspective and
in a forward-looking (ex-ante) perspective.
Ex-post volatility measures realized variability; it refers to unconditional volatil-
ity measures that do not control for lagged prices or lagged volatility. Ex-post
volatility is also typically calculated over a longer time horizon consisting of
several price observations. In contrast, dynamic models of conditional volatility use
available information at time t to provide a forecast of price volatility at time t C 1.
As conditional volatility measures change over time, they are dynamic and forward-
looking and thus able to represent changing risk perceptions.
Table 1.1 lists several measures of volatility which are grouped into two
basic approaches: (1) ex-post, or unconditional measures that assume a constant
variance in the data generating process, and (2) forward-looking (conditional or
dynamic) measures which use changes in past prices and variances to forecast
future variances. Although there is some difference between unconditional volatility
measures when considering inflation and trends, the two ex-post indicators are
correlated and not fundamentally different (Huchet-Bourdon 2011). With respect
to forward-looking volatility measures, Generalized Autoregressive Conditional
Heteroskedastic (GARCH) methods are widely used (Hull 2012). They estimate
volatility conditional on past shocks and volatility. Multivariate GARCH models
also allow volatility (risk) spillovers from other markets or commodities to be
considered (see, e.g., Rapsomanikis and Mugera 2011; Hernandez et al. 2014).
The risk of price changes can also be derived implicitly from financial market
data (Prakash 2011). Put and call options give holders the right to sell or buy a
security (e.g., a commodity futures contract) at a specified price. The higher the
expected volatility (risk of price changes), the more valuable an option becomes
because it gives the right (but not the obligation) to sell or buy at a pre-defined
price. Using the Black–Scholes option pricing formula and other observable data
(the exercise price, current price, risk-free rate, and maturity of an option), it is
possible to calculate the volatility which the market is expecting. As the Black–
Scholes formula rests on the strong assumption of log-normally distributed returns
with constant variance, it is questionable whether the formula is an accurate measure
of the market expectations on volatility. Duan (1995), for example, reconstructed
the original option pricing model to incorporate conditional volatilities. The last
column in Table 1.1 lists nonparametric volatility models that do not assume a
specific functional form for estimating volatility; these models are therefore even
more flexible and precise in forecasting volatility than parametric GARCH models.
An example of nonparametric models is the one developed by Martins-Filho et al.
(2015).
The choice of the “right” volatility measure depends on the context, data
availability, and research question. Ex-post volatility can easily be calculated for
time series with a low number of observations and/or missing observations (both
issues plague most price data from developing countries). Unconditional measures
can provide an appropriate tool for studying the impact of realized past shocks.
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As unconditional volatility measures assume a constant variance, they do not
explicitly model how volatility evolves over time or how future price risks might
be. Unconditional models are therefore of limited use when forecasting volatility or
price risk or when modeling risk perceptions of forward-looking agents is required.
In contrast to ex-post measures, they typically require more data and elaborate time
series models, which may limit their applicability when data is sparse. However,
the choice of the appropriate volatility measure also depends on how agents form
their expectations about future price risk. While the rational expectation framework
provides a useful benchmark, expectation formation in information-constrained
environments, which is often the case in developing countries, might substantially
deviate from this model.
1.2.3 Extreme Events
Extreme events refer to “unusual” events that are unlikely to occur frequently and
whose occurrence can have major adverse impacts. The condition that extreme
events are rare (or have been rare in the past) is important: Because their occurrence
lies outside the sphere of normality, it is difficult (and expensive) to prepare for
and cope with them (Sarris 2014). This difficulty does not only refer to individuals,
firms, or public institutions (governments) but also to markets that are not always
able to provide insurance against extreme events (e.g., Jaffee and Russell 1997).
A common way to conceptualize extreme events is to relate them to higher-order
quantiles of a probability distribution, as illustrated in Fig. 1.2. Typically, events
outside a certain quantile (gray-shaded area) are classified as extreme events. As
they are so rare, even in countries with developed financial systems, insurances
are not available. Whenever (private) insurances are not available, public insurance
through government programs or policies might increase welfare. This includes also
the case whereby a government alters the shape of the probability distribution, for
example, due to public stockholding programs that prevent extreme price shocks.
As insurance is costly and can be impaired by moral hazard and adverse selection
problems, not all events should be covered by insurance (or not all volatility should
be reduced through government intervention). This is indicated by the risk retention
layer, in which households or societies can handle price changes. In practice, it is
often challenging to determine the thresholds between the risk layers and optimal
levels of interventions. They depend on risk preferences, development of insurance
markets, self-insurance and coping possibilities, and the costs of insurance.
A common threshold used in statistical analysis is, for example, the 95 %
quantile. This means, on average, only 5 % of the observed price changes will be
above that threshold. Given the critical threshold, classifying an event as extreme
requires knowing the variance of the probability distribution, i.e., the volatility.
This is where the different concepts of volatility discussed above become relevant.
Depending on the volatility measure used, a significant price increase, such as a
30 % increase within 1 month, may or may not be considered as excessive. With the
aim of developing a statistically consistent measure of excessive volatility, Martins-
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price changes
extremely highextremely low mean
relative frequency
risk retention layer
market insurance layer
markets break down
distress and crises 
markets break down
distress and crises 
Fig. 1.2 Risk layers and extreme events. Source: Own illustration based on World Bank (2005)
and Sarris (2014)
Filho et al. (2015) have developed the nonparametric extreme quantile (NEXQ)
model that identifies extreme price variability based on a dynamic evolution of
daily returns over time using historical data going back to 1954. The model is then
combined with the extreme value theory to estimate higher-order quantiles of the
return series, allowing any particular realized return (i.e., effective return in the
futures market) to be classified either as extremely high or not.4
1.3 Conceptual Framework of Volatility, Food Security
Impacts, and Policy Responses
Various chapters of this book deal with specific subsets of underlying causes of
food price volatility and impacts on food security. Figure 1.3 depicts the broader
conceptual framework embracing the subsequent analyses. As already mentioned,
food price volatility is deeply related to markets where goods and services are
exchanged and where prices are formed. Food markets cannot be considered in
isolation: Spatially separated markets are linked through trade; food markets are
influenced by commodity, asset, and financial markets; and these, in turn, influence
4The application of this volatility measure to most relevant agricultural futures contracts is
publicly available under www.foodsecurityportal.org/policy-analysis-tools/excessive-food-price-
variability-early-warning-system
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Exchange on international and local markets
National governments  &  international institutions (FAO, WFP, G20)…
Producers
Commercial farmers
Subsistence farmers
Consumers
Wage earners
Subsistence farmers
Public goods & services
Infrastructure & information
Social protection
Public stocks
Inputs
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Energy
Capital
Processors
Food & feed
Bioenergy
Weather and pests
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Energy prices
Labor market shocks
Macroeconomic shocks
Impact on risk copingImpact on market riskImpact on risk management
Financial investors
Financial market shocks
Asset prices
Governmental institutions
Policy misbehavior
Intermediaries & private services
Traders & stockholders
Insurance companies & banks
Commodity (futures) exchanges
supply… frame…
Fig. 1.3 Conceptual framework of the casual impacts of price volatility. Source: Own illustration
trading and allocation decisions of actors that also engage in food markets. Because
of the complex interlinkages and interactions between several actors and economic
sectors, food prices are not the mere result of farmers’ supply and consumers’
demand, and price volatility is not solely determined by harvest and income shocks.
Food and feed processors form part of the agricultural value chain, as do biofuel
refineries. Seeds, fertilizers, crop protection, and machinery are important inputs
in the agricultural production process which increase productivity but may also
increase financial risk because input investments have to be paid out of uncertain
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harvest revenues (Dercon and Christiaensen 2011). Governments and parastatal
institutions intervene in markets by changing tariffs, imposing export restrictions or
by holding stocks, and selling or buying grains (Demeke et al. 2009). Discretionary
intervention can increase uncertainty and, thus, volatility.
The recent price booms led to a large debate on the role of speculation on
commodity futures markets in contributing to price spikes. Speculation should not
be mistaken for illegal market manipulation; it rather describes risky economic
activities (buying, selling, or investing) which are associated with the expectation of
future gains. Agricultural commodity prices are inherently volatile due to uncertain
production and demand. Futures markets are a tool to hedge against this risk as it
allows sellers as well as buyers to agree on a fixed price for a (physical) transaction
that takes place in the future. Thus, farmers can already sell their harvest at planting
time at the (then prevailing) price stipulated in a futures contract, which reaches
maturity after the harvest. The futures contract therefore transfers the price risk
from the farmer to the buyer of the contract. If the buyer is a commercial trader or
physical hedger (who trades physical grains or processes them), they typically also
want to reduce exposure to price risk by fixing the price in advance. The buyer (as
well as the seller) can, however, also be a non-commercial trader who accepts the
price risk because they are speculating that the price change would be favorable.
It is often believed that such speculation reduces price volatility because rational
profit-maximizing investors’ buy contracts when prices are low and sell when prices
are high. For example, this view was prominently adopted by Friedman (1953).
However, economic theory is not unambiguous regarding this point, even under
the assumption that speculators are rational and profit maximizing (see Hart and
Kreps 1986). Other critics of speculation have referred to price developments that
are beyond market fundamentals, so-called bubbles, that are caused by irrational
or (trend-following) herd behavior or otherwise caused large inflows of speculative
money (e.g., Masters 2008; UNCTAD 2011).
Agricultural commodities have become part of a diversified portfolio of financial
investors. According to BarclayHedge, Commodity assets under management have
increased from US$41.3 billion in 2001 to US$330 billion in 2012 and 2013
(World Bank 2015). The so-called “financialization” hypothesis claims that volatile
liquidity flows and rebalancing of portfolios have caused commodity markets to
be more exposed to shocks and price movements at other financial markets (Basak
und Pavlova 2014). Holding grains for financial portfolio diversification may not
necessarily increase grain price volatility (Vercammen and Doroudian 2014), and
empirical studies have yet to reach a consensus about the impacts of speculation
and financialization on volatility (Brunetti et al. 2011; Irwin and Sanders 2012;
Tadesse et al. 2014); however, some studies have found indications of volatility
transmission (Tang und Xiong 2012). While this debate continues, it is important
to note that futures markets (that involve also the participation of risk-loving
speculators as contracting party to risk-averse hedgers) are crucial to coordinate
supply and demand over time. By doing so, they generally tend to reduce volatility
(Jacks 2007), although they might also create the opportunity for exacerbating price
spikes in extreme market conditions.
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Because of the increasing market interlinkages across spatial and sectoral scales,
understanding market risks and price volatility has become more complex. There is
also the popular notion that market integration increases volatility, but there is little
compelling evidence supporting the notion: Volatility of international commodity
prices is not high compared to historical levels (see Chap. 2 by Díaz-Bonilla and
Jacks et al. 2011). Also in African countries, volatility has not increased in the
last decade (Minot 2014). Linking spatially separated markets, trade allows excess
supply to be exported and grains to be imported in times of need. Diverting grains to
biofuel production can reduce volatility and help stabilize food prices if conversion
quantities are anticyclical to food prices.
However, export markets for all staple commodities—rice, maize, wheat, and
soybeans—are highly concentrated in a few countries or very thin (i.e., only a
small share of production is traded). In the case of both maize and rice, the top
five producers account for more than 70 % of the global production, and the
top five exporters account for about 80 % of total world exports. For wheat, the
top five producers and exporters account for about 50 and 60 % of the global
production and exports, respectively. These high levels of concentration imply that
the world’s capacity for coping with geographical risk is limited. Any weather shock
or exogenous shock to production in these countries will immediately have an effect
on global prices and price volatility.
Although market integration may reduce rather than increase volatility, it
increases volatility spillovers. This makes it more difficult to respond to volatility
and crises as causal effects become more complex and interlinked with the wider
macroeconomic environment. Policy response cannot focus only on storing and
releasing grains for balancing supply and demand, e.g., using public stocks.
Governments affect the performance of markets through the infrastructure and
information services they provide (Kornher and Kalkuhl 2013). By affecting
inflation, interest rates, and exchange rates, monetary policy influences commodity
storage, trade, and financial investments (Frankel 2006). Contract enforcement,
rule of law, and effective government administration create the conditions for
intermediaries to provide insurance and capital, thereby facilitating resource
allocation and risk assessment (Levine et al. 2000; Conning and Udry 2007).
Governments’ commitment to predefined trade principles allows private traders and
stockholders to operate and smooth prices by exploiting arbitrage possibilities.
Finally, social protection schemes could increase the resilience of households to
cope with price and income shocks. Although social protection schemes and access
to insurance markets have no direct impact on volatility, they reduce the negative
welfare impacts of volatility and thus the need to reduce volatility by other measures.
Figure 1.3 focuses on the causal linkages between policies, markets, and agents.
For greater clarity, the figure omits several feedback effects from volatility to the
economy that are nevertheless relevant. Volatility itself influences the behavior
of governments, producers, consumers, processors, and traders who might have
difficulties in coping with excessive volatility. This can, in turn, lead to further policy
misbehavior and misallocation of resources. Increased volatility may signal risks
and thereby serve as a disincentive to investors, reducing the generally positive price
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response in production. The sensitivity of political systems and regime changes
to food prices has been mentioned. An example of an empirical analysis of the
sensitivity can be found in Bellemare (2015).
Commodity price volatility and macroeconomic market risk can have severe
long-term impacts on economic growth and development (Ramey and Ramey 1995;
van der Ploeg and Poelhekke 2009), in particular in countries with underdeveloped
financial institutions (Aghion et al. 2009). Food insecurity and insufficient nutrition
reduce health status and human capital, affecting labor productivity and economic
output (Fogel 1994; Behrman and Rosenzweig 2004; Gyimah-Brempong and
Wilson 2004; Weil 2007). Higher price volatility is also associated with greater
potential losses for producers and poor subsistence farmers: Because high volatility
implies large, rapid changes in prices, it becomes more difficult for producers to
make optimal decisions on the allocation of inputs into the agricultural sector.
Consequently, in a period of high price volatility, producers may use fewer inputs
like fertilizer and high-quality seeds in their production, and they may dampen their
investments in areas that improve productivity—which could adversely affect their
income and the overall availability of food.
1.4 Contribution and Contents of the Book
In the subsequent chapters of this book, the problem of volatile food prices is
approached from different perspectives to provide a comprehensive treatment of
the subject at different geographical, political, and economic scales. This multilayer
approach implies some overlap of specific topics: The role of policies, for example,
is addressed in almost all chapters; likewise, the analysis of drivers and impacts of
food price volatility cannot always be clearly separated due to various bidirectional
linkages at different scales. Nevertheless, we choose to structure the book and
the discussion of its content in five parts, starting with this introductury chapter
as the first part. The second part focuses on the causes, drivers, and international
policy responses that moderate or accelerate volatility. The third part provides in-
depth analyses of specific market interlinkages between asset classes, commodities,
and spatially separated markets. The fourth part of this book elaborates on several
case studies analyzing the role of governments or supranational regional bodies to
manage price volatility. The final part sheds light on how households, traders, and
communities are affected by volatility and how they cope with price volatility and
price shocks from a microeconomic perspective.
The book combines policy-relevant and applied research questions with
advanced empirical and quantitative analysis methods. It differs from other relevant
editions, which have focused mainly on international agricultural commodity
markets (Piot-Lepetit and M’Barek 2011), or on theoretical and methodological
works with little empirical analysis (Munier 2012). The scope of this book goes
beyond a recent book by Chavas et al. (2014) by including microeconomic analysis,
case studies, and explicit policy analysis. The book approaches the topic from a
variety of ways, from on-the-ground field research to high-frequency time series
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analysis, and involves researchers who are close to political decision processes.
Finally, it provides policymakers and applied researchers not only with answers to
urgent questions related to food price volatility but also with tools and concepts to
analyze and mitigate volatility in related contexts.
Part II: Food Price Volatility at International-Level Food Commodity Markets
The second part of the book analyzes international agricultural markets, price
volatility, and policy responses on an international level. It thus provides a broad
overview of the major determinants and impacts. Chapter 2 by Eugenio Díaz-
Bonilla examines different techniques to decompose price dynamics into long-
term trends, medium-term cycles, spikes, and volatility for further analysis. It
also describes ways to scale price developments by using appropriate deflators
related to inflation, exchange rates, or national welfare impacts. Chapter 3 by
Getaw Tadesse, Bernardina Algieri, Matthias Kalkuhl, and Joachim von Braun
examines the drivers of prices of the three major food commodities—wheat, maize,
and soybeans—using monthly data from 1986 to 2009. It combines agricultural
fundamental variables typically used in empirical analyses (production, demand,
stocks) with newly emerging determinants of commodity prices like energy prices,
speculative activities, and financialization linkages. Unlike existing work that used
only agricultural fundamentals (typically on an annual basis) or financial market and
futures market data (on a weekly basis), the large set of variables allows the relative
contribution of these two groups of drivers to international price spikes and price
volatility to be explored.
In Chap. 4, Joe Glauber and Mario Miranda develop an intra-annual rational
equilibrium trade and storage model for the global soybean market. The model
considers the different seasonal production patterns in the Northern and Southern
Hemispheres. Fitting their model to historic production and trade data and using
USDA forecasts for future trends, they show how international trade exhibits
increasing seasonal patterns. A more balanced production in the Northern and
Southern Hemispheres further reduces volatility. Finally, the intra-annual modeling
exercise cautions against the practice of summing up ending stocks from several
countries with different seasonal production to obtain an aggregate indicator of
global stocks. Chapter 5 by Will Martin and Maros Ivanic discusses the impact
of food price spikes on poverty rates for different time scales. In the short run,
price increases lead to increased poverty rates in most countries as many poor
households are net buyers of food. In the medium to long run, higher commodity
prices may also lead to higher wages due to agricultural–labor market linkages.
This, in turn, would also reduce poverty for many net buyers of food who are wage
receivers, leading to lower poverty rates in most countries and on the global scale.
Anticyclical trade-related policies have been used by many countries to insulate
their domestic markets from international shocks; these policies are collectively
ineffective. Countries should instead establish or expand safety nets to provide
assistance for adversely affected households.
Continuing with policy analysis, Maximo Torero discusses the role of the G20
in responding to the international food crisis in Chap. 6. He reviews the prevailing
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policy approaches to deal with volatile prices before the 2007/2008 crisis and the
new proposals that emerged during and after the crisis. These measures focus on
improving the information base by employing new instruments to make trade more
reliable or market tools to hedge against international price shocks. Both physical
and virtual emergency reserves are considered as potentially effective measures to
prevent crises, but the technical and political aspects of implementing such reserves
remain challenging. In Chap. 7, using national crop calendars from major global
crop producers, Mekbib Haile, Matthias Kalkuhl, and Joachim von Braun construct
a global panel data set on acreage, yield, and production response to international
prices prevailing at the respective planting time. The empirical analysis confirmed
that globally, producers respond positively to own crop prices and negatively to
competing crop prices and price risk (volatility). Applying the empirical model
to the recent price and volatility developments revealed that the global supply
response to higher crop prices was substantially weakened by high fertilizer prices
and price risk. Hence, excessive volatility also has negative long-run consequences
for global production expansion, which in turn may contribute to high prices and
high vulnerability of the global food system to harvest shocks.
Chapter 8 by Antoine Bouët and David Laborde focuses on trade policy and,
more specific, export taxes in times of food crisis. Export restrictions are both
a response of exporting countries to high international food prices and a driver
of additional international price increases. The authors elaborate on the different
motives behind applying export taxes and analyze and assess their quantitative
role in the 2007/2008 food crisis. Although anticyclical trade policy is a rational
individual choice to insulate domestic prices from international prices, collective
action by different countries partly neutralizes this effect while leading to large
market distortions. As existing WTO rules and legislation are not capable of solving
this collective action failure, alternative mechanisms need to be implemented, e.g.,
on a plurilateral base or by introducing a Pigouvian tax that reflects the external
social costs of anticyclical trade policy.
Part III: Commodity and Financial Market Linkages
The third part provides in-depth analyses of specific market interlinkages by ana-
lyzing volatility spillovers and transmission of price spikes between different asset
classes (beyond commodities) or between countries (for specific commodities).
Chapter 9 by Stephanie-Carolin Grosche and Thomas Heckelei calculates the
directional spillovers of intraday volatility between agricultural, crude oil, real
estate, bond, stock, and currency markets. The authors examined how market
spillovers evolved since 1999; index-linked exchange-traded products have increas-
ingly gained popularity since then. While overall cross-asset spillovers hardly
changed during the period of the first financial crisis and during downturn in equity
markets between March 2000 and December 2003, the market experienced a strong
increase in volatility spillovers during the second crisis period between July 2007
and December 2012. The higher degree of market integration and interaction also
affected agricultural commodities, in particular corn and wheat. Focusing on the
wheat sector, Bernardina Algieri analyzes in Chap. 10 the role of weather events,
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grain stocks, monetary policy, speculation, and financial markets. A vector error
correction analysis was used to confirm that a multitude of factors, including
speculation (measured by Working’s speculation index), monetary policy, oil prices,
and global demand changes, are decisive for the wheat price formation. In Chap.
11, Carlos Martins-Filho and Maximo Torero develop a nonparametric model to
analyze the impact of volatility on international markets on relative food prices in
developing countries. They found that higher international wheat price volatility
is often associated with higher relative domestic bread prices and cereal prices,
while international maize price volatility affects relative meat prices in developing
countries. As the direct welfare impacts of volatility are difficult to measure, their
approach provides a useful alternative way to study the welfare impacts of excessive
volatility.
In Chap. 12, Matthias Kalkuhl combines comprehensive price transmission
analysis with data on poverty rates in countries to examine the exposure and
vulnerability of the global poor to international price spikes. The analysis relies on
an alternative grain prices index that consists of prices of the major domestic staples
and is therefore a relevant proxy for food expenditures of the poor. The consideration
of a large set of international reference prices, including prices of futures contracts
at major exchanges, allowed for the identification of the markets that are relevant
for price transmission in a specific country. Mapping transmission elasticities onto
poverty rates showed that a large share of the global poor lives in countries where
international market shocks have significant impacts on domestic food markets.
Chapter 13 by Francisco Ceballos, Manuel A. Hernandez, Nicholas Minot, and
Miguel Robles employed a multivariate GARCH to analyze the transmission of
price volatility from major international commodity markets to domestic food
products in 27 developing countries. The results indicate that African countries
exhibit on average higher domestic price volatility. Volatility transmission from
international to local markets is heterogeneous among commodities and countries.
Maize prices showed the highest volatility transmission to Africa, rice prices to
Asian country, and wheat prices to Latin America. The analysis suggest that not
only do prices adjust through spatially separated agricultural markets but also price
risks—i.e., the likelihood of experiencing strong future price changes—of local food
markets are affected by international markets.
Part IV: National and Regional Policy Response to Volatility
The fourth part of this book contains studies analyzing the role of governments
or supranational regional bodies in managing price volatility. In Chap. 14, Shweta
Saini and Ashok Gulati describe the role of Indian agricultural policies in increasing
domestic grain production and providing affordable food for poor people. These
policies could temporarily isolate domestic prices from international price spikes in
2007/2008, but prices co-move over longer periods of time as India also frequently
trades grains. The current policy reform agenda focuses on implementing the right
to food, as formulated in the National Food Security Act, and on fostering further
productivity increases. Both could contribute substantially to reducing hunger and
malnutrition globally.
1 Volatile and Extreme Food Prices, Food Security, and Policy: An Overview 19
Based on the idea of risk pooling, Lukas Kornher and Matthias Kalkuhl examine
how West African countries within the ECOWAS region can benefit from coordi-
nated grain stocks in Chap. 15. Compared to the situation whereby each country
establishes its own grain stock to balance against harvest shocks, a regionally
coordinated or joint reserve could compensate equally for harvest failures with
substantially lower stock-to-use ratios. This reduction in reserve size by more than
one-third indicates the huge cost reduction potential of regional storage cooperation.
However, agreeing on cost sharing and stock allocation rules may pose a political
challenge in international negotiations. The chapter also emphasizes that the cost
saving resulting from cooperation is large when emergency reserves are small
(aimed at ensuring food supply for a targeted population of poor households), while
the cost saving diminishes when buffer reserves are large (aimed at stabilizing prices
in both directions). Chapter 16 by Ousmane Badiane and Sunday Odjo provides an
in-depth trade analysis of three African Regional Economic Communities, including
COMESA, ECOWAS, and SADC. Large benefits from diversification, a result of
low correlation of yield shocks within regions, exist mainly for the COMESA and
SADC region and to a smaller extent also for the ECOWAS region. High tariffs
and high transportation costs due to poor infrastructure have impeded trade flows
within Africa despite generally favorable conditions for specialization and product
differentiation in agricultural production. Using a CGE model to simulate the impact
of policies on reducing trade costs and increasing yields emphasizes the large
potential to not only increase regional trade but also make trade more reliable.
Chapter 17 by Irfan Mujahid and Lukas Kornher presents a case study of
the regional rice emergency reserve the member countries of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It first describes the historical and recent
development of the joint emergency reserve, which culminated in the creation of
the East Asia Emergency Rice Reserve (EAERR). To be able to maintain food
security for at least 2 months after a supply short fall, the storage cooperation of
ASEASC3 countries reduces the required rice stocks by roughly 44 %. Due to the
higher transportation costs arising from centralized storage, cost savings amount to
around 40 % compared to individual emergency reserves. As shown by the authors,
the relative benefit of cooperation decreases when more countries join the reserve
due to decreasing marginal impacts of diversification. This may limit the inclusion
of India into the regional reserve: The coordination and implementation costs may
eventually exceed the benefits of cooperation.
In Chap. 18, Jan Brockhaus, Jikun Huang, Jiliang Hu, Matthias Kalkuhl, Joachim
von Braun, and Guolei Yang analyze the impact of market price signals, weather
shocks, and irrigation on grain production in China. Using province-level data, they
found that Chinese farmers in general respond well to price signals. This implies that
higher domestic demand for rice, wheat, and corn can, to a large extent, be met by
increasing domestic supply. The authors also identified the months of a marketing
year that are crucial to predict farmers’ response to market prices, which is important
for estimating grain supply in the short term. Furthermore, heat stress and droughts
reduce production. This dependency on weather events despite the expansion of
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irrigation could become an important challenge against the background of climate
change.
Maximo Torero provides a detailed assessment of the policy recommendations
by international organizations in Chap. 19. He distinguished between the short-
term and long-term policies that were postulated by key actors of the international
community. Contrasting the policies with economic theory led to a refined conclu-
sion regarding the role of trade policies implemented by small countries: These
policies are effective and produce only small beggar-thy-neighbor effects which
have been emphasized a lot in later policy debates. A comprehensive analysis of
policies implemented by several developing countries shed light on the impact
of international organizations on national policies and the importance of a solid
scientific work to policy recommendations.
Part V: Impacts of Excessive Price Spikes and Volatility
The final part of the book examines how households, traders, and communities
are affected by and how they cope with price volatility and price shocks from a
microeconomics perspective. Chapter 20 by Mekbib Haile and Matthias Kalkuhl
explains that farmers’ price expectation formation is a result of a cost–benefit
decision process on the (costly) acquisition of information. Using empirical data
on expected and realized prices of Ethiopian smallholder farmers, they found that
the use of information technologies, in particular mobile phones and radios, reduces
price forecasting errors and thus improves the crop and input allocation process
at planting. Likewise, infrastructure which reduces the effective distance between
households and markets improves the price formation process. The chapter therefore
provides alternative ways to reduce the negative impact of price volatility without
the need to stabilize prices.
Anna d’Souza and Dean Jolliffe analyze the impacts of the 2007/2008 wheat
price shock on Afghan households in Chap. 21. Using an unconditional quantile
regression which accounts for heterogeneous impacts of wheat price increases,
they found that extremely food-insecure households (the lowest decile) hardly
reduce food consumption even when food prices increase, while households in the
second to 10th decile reduce food expenditures and calorie intake at an increasing
rate. Apart from calories, protein and micronutrient intakes are reduced as well.
Households cut back on not only food expenditures but also non-food consumption,
in particular health, grooming, and communication. They also increasingly purchase
food on credit when prices of wheat flour increase.
In Chap. 22, Raymond Jatta explores the impact of community food reserves on
local food security in the Gambia. Using a propensity score matching technique
under a partly randomized development intervention program, he found that
community reserves improve subjective indicators of food security. Furthermore,
communal food reserves reduce seasonal price variability as part of the excess
demand after harvest is stored for the lean season when prices are typically high.
Chapter 23 by Lukas Kornher presents insights from a survey on grain traders in
Ghana. Most traders store grains to exploit seasonal price fluctuations and, thus,
aim to clear their stocks before the new harvest sets in. The trading and storing of
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grains are driven by different motives and strategies, but decision making seems
to be influenced by risk aversion, policy uncertainty, and imperfect information on
agricultural markets. The analysis emphasizes the need to further develop models of
heterogeneous trader types in the context of information scarcity.
1.5 Implications for Policymaking
The main policy message of this book is volatility matters, and there is a lot which
can be done about it. Volatility matters because volatile food prices are closely
linked with the stability dimension of food and nutrition security. Extreme price
shocks are associated with insufficient micro- and macronutrient intake, which
negatively affects health and mortality and impedes the physiological and cognitive
development of children (Black et al. 2013). Undernutrition, in turn, reduces
labor productivity and economic growth.5 The risk of future price shocks reduces
investments in agricultural production, which has negative long-run impacts on food
supply. Volatile food prices increase political risks which could induce governments
to adopt ill-designed ad hoc market interventions.
Volatility did not only matter in 2007/2008 and 2010 at the global level, but it is
also still a highly relevant issue today at regional and country level, despite declining
global food prices. Many of the underlying structural problems leading to volatile
agricultural markets since 2007 have not been properly addressed. Emerging risks
from other domains—extreme weather events due to climate change, conflicts and
political instabilities in the Middle East and Africa, and the ongoing use of expansive
monetary policy leading to low interest rates—could lead to new sudden extreme
events. The international community and many governments have yet to develop an
effective risk management strategy to be well prepared for future crises.
Based on the analysis and evidence of this book, policymakers can address the
problem of volatility with three major strategies:
1. Policies to reduce excessive volatility: embracing open trade, flexible bioenergy
policies, grain reserves, and regulation of commodity markets
2. Social protection and nutrition policies to alleviate chronic and acute undernour-
ishment; insurance markets
3. Redesigning international institutional arrangements and organizations for food
security to address collective action failures
For policymaking, it is not about choosing one of the policy instruments proposed
here, but rather a portfolio of policies that best addresses the relevant issues.
The weights of such a portfolio will be context dependent: Countries with high
5Various studies investigate the link between nutrition, health, labor productivity, and growth, inter
alia, Fogel (1994), Behrman and Rosenzweig (2004), Gyimah-Brempong and Wilson (2004), Weil
(2007).
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administrative capacity, for example, could rely more on social protection, while
others may opt for rule-based storage policies. In any case, policies between
countries and domains need to be coordinated to produce synergy and to avoid any
possible offsetting effects.
1.5.1 Policies to Prevent and Reduce Excessive Price Volatility
Volatility is a natural phenomenon of the market economy, whereby prices respond
to changes in demand and supply. Perfectly stable prices do not provide incen-
tives for storage or supply adjustments due to prevailing situations of scarcity
or abundance. Excessive volatility can, however, also be driven by exaggerated
trading behavior, suboptimal grain storage, uncoordinated trade policies, excessive
speculation, financial and energy market spillovers, and a lack of information.
These issues provide areas for policy intervention to improve the functioning of
agricultural markets and to avoid calamities during food crises.
1.5.1.1 Agricultural Markets: Information, Transparency,
and Regulation
Improving the information base on global agricultural markets and increasing
the transparency of commodity (futures) markets have been important goals of
the international community, including the G20 and the UN (De Schutter 2010;
UNCTAD 2012). The Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS), established
in 2011 as a G20 initiative, still leaves a lot of room for uncertainty as there are
major differences between the estimates from different sources, especially related to
grain stock levels. Countries therefore need to increase their commitment to sharing
high-quality information. Several price monitoring and early warning systems have
been established by international organizations to detect any upcoming crises on
food markets.6 Nevertheless, high-frequency and high-quality price data is still
not available for many developing countries, and a comprehensive information
platform that harmonizes the different information and indicators and that also
incorporate bottom-up information is still unavailable. Investment in additional
price data collection could further improve these tools.
Possible ways to curb excessive speculation are (1) increasing the transparency of
actors and transactions by introducing appropriate reporting obligations, (2) intro-
ducing position limits, (3) imposing transaction taxes, and (4) influencing prices and
price expectations directly by intervening in commodity markets through physical
and virtual reserves.7 Agricultural commodity markets should not be exempted
from the relevant regulation of banking and financial systems because grains and
6Important examples of such systems are FAO Global Information and Early Warning System and
the WFP Price Monitor for domestic prices, IFPRI Excessive Food Price Variability Early Warning
System for international prices, and FEWS NET for local harvest conditions.
7More in von Braun and Torero (2009)
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oilseeds markets are closely connected to speculative activities in financial markets.
As commodity exchanges are linked globally (Hernandez et al. 2014), much
coordination is necessary to harmonize regulation. Excluding food commodities
completely from speculative transactions, however, could be counterproductive
as it impedes the price identification process and could even increase volatility
(Santos 2002; Jacks 2007). An important alternative is therefore to strengthen
responsible investment approaches of the financial sector, which include food secu-
rity risk management strategies for imposing temporary restraints on commodity
markets.
1.5.1.2 Stocks, Trade, and Regional Cooperation
In general, two modes of storage policy regimes could be considered: buffer stocks
and strategic reserves. The former involves buying and selling at all times and
attempting to stabilize farm gate and consumer prices. In doing so, additional supply
is provided to the market when prices exceed a predetermined ceiling. On the other
hand, whenever prices are low, governments act as a buyer of last resort. Buffer
stocks aim at benefiting producers and consumers, by far the largest lobby group
in developing countries, and buffer stocks are thus often backed by the population.
Although large public buffer stocks can effectively stabilize prices,8 they also have
high fiscal costs, crowd out private storage, and are hardly compatible with free
trade principles as subsidized grains would leak out.9 In contrast, strategic reserves
hold stocks for emergency situation only in order to supply the most vulnerable
people with food during periods of food shortage or price hikes. In doing so,
strategic reserves are very efficient in overcoming temporary supply shortages
without distorting local markets substantially.
Facilitating trade has great potential to stabilize food supply, as indicated in
Chaps. 4, 5, 8, 15 and 16. The larger the world market, the lower the price variations
needed to balance demand and supply. A more open trade and stock release policy
of India and China, two countries sitting on large grain stocks, could play a
key role in improving global food security. More trade liberalization in general,
and in particular by these two nations, could improve the global food security
situation. Further cooperation can be achieved by building independent regional
or international grain reserves (which include other nutritious foods) exclusively
for emergency response and humanitarian assistance. Regional policy bodies, such
as ASEAN, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, and African
regional and subregional bodies, have partly implemented joint reserve policies,
which constitute a step in the proposed direction. As Chaps. 15, 16, and 17 will
show, regional cooperation has a strong potential to reduce costs compared to
national approaches. A regional set of arrangements, however, remains suboptimal
as the full diversification potential could only be exploited under global cooperation;
8See, e.g., Kornher and Kalkuhl (2013), Serra and Gil (2013), Mason and Myers (2013), and Jayne
et al. (2008).
9See Kozicka et al. (2015) for the case of India.
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such arrangements may also run into problems of trust in regions with one or two
dominating regional powers. Hence, regional cooperation should be seen as one
promising step toward building a sustainable global architecture of trade and storage
cooperation, including coordinated risk management.
1.5.1.3 Biofuel Policies, Energy Prices, Climate Change,
and Technological Change
Climate change is strongly connected to food security and price volatility. Weather
events affect agricultural commodity prices (Chap. 10), and extreme droughts
and floods do not only affect food production but also the health conditions and
disease environment that further interacts with the food system (Wheeler and von
Braun 2013). Mitigating climate change, however, also affects food systems due
to emission reduction in the agricultural sector, which is linked to changes in land
use and cultivation systems. These trade-offs can best be addressed by policies that
directly target GHG emissions and foster investments in adaptation, infrastructure,
and technological advancement in seeds.
Energy prices have been shown to be an important determinant of food price
spikes and volatility; they affect not only production and transportation costs but
also demand for bioenergy, which is competing with food production for crops
(Chaps. 3 and 10). Current biofuel policies are ill designed for two reasons: (1)
Mandates or minimum quotas create an inelastic demand as they provide little
flexibility in reducing biofuel production when food prices are high; this, in turn,
can increase food price volatility due to supply variability (Beckman et al. 2012),
and (2) biofuel subsidies tend to reduce energy prices and therefore increase energy
demand, which leads to inefficient carbon emission reductions compared to a carbon
tax or emissions trading scheme (Cui et al. 2011; Kalkuhl et al. 2013). Second-
generation biofuel technologies may further increase the land efficiency of biofuel
production and therefore lessen the trade-off between energy and food production
(IPCC 2011).
1.5.2 Social Protection and Nutrition Policies
Actions related to agricultural production, trade, and reserves are necessary but not
sufficient for overcoming the food and nutrition security crisis, which not only is
an acute problem but also exacerbates a chronic global problem. As agricultural
markets will always exhibit volatile prices due to random production shocks, health
and nutrition risks have to be addressed through social protection and responsive
health services. Most of these actions are carried out by national governments, but
international support for these investments is also needed, especially in the least-
developed countries (Morris et al. 2008). Setting priorities in this area requires a
sound metric for targeting actions and measuring progress. Policy actions in three
priority areas are called for: (1) Expand social protection and child nutrition action
to protect the basic nutrition of the most vulnerable; (2) take protective actions
to mitigate short-term risks (such actions would include cash transfers, pension
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systems, and employment programs); and (3) adopt preventive health and nutrition
interventions to avoid long-term negative consequences.
Cash transfers are associated with lower cost of delivery than in-kind transfers,
but the latter may have a lower inclusion targeting error, as the fact of being a
beneficiary is more visible. The costs of a social transfer program depend on the
scope of coverage and efficiency of the program. Social transfer programs rarely
account for more than 1–2 % of a country’s GDP, even in countries with generous
social protection systems. Safety net programs in Mexico and Brazil cost around
0.5 % of their GDP (World Bank 2012). India is an example of a big scale food
subsidy program associated with high fiscal cost (food subsidy amounts to close
to 0.8 % of the GDP) and additional economic costs due to market distortions. A
challenge in social transfer programs is their responsiveness to crises: Programs
need to be upscaled as the size of vulnerable population and individual needs
increase in times of crisis. This requires not only upfront investments in monitoring
and targeting but also potential macro-insurances on the government level to
secure public funding. Low-income countries typically lack the organizational and
fiscal capacity of such macroeconomic responses and therefore need to resort
to the second best option of addressing the social consequences of food price
shocks. International finance organizations and development banks should play a
more significant role in building preparedness and rendering assistance in creating
economically efficient social protection for low-income countries’ coping with
extreme food price events.
In addition to nutrition-specific approaches, governments can improve the
functioning of the financial sector with the focus on improving access of the poor to
financial services. These measures are aimed at preventing income instability due to
price volatility. Access to futures markets, credit, savings, and insurance could be an
important buffer to protect the poor farmers and consumers from the effects of food
price volatility. These tools are important for both food producers, in times of price
drops, and food consumers, during price hikes. These instruments can support the
poor in other critical situations not directly related to price volatility and thus have
additional co-benefits. However, the poor often have problems accessing financial
instruments as they do not have enough credibility, assets for collateral, or the means
to pay for insurance. Thus, increasing access to financial services should become an
important priority.
1.5.3 New International Institutional Arrangements
International extreme food price volatility calls for global governance action that
requires institutional arrangements, which are currently lacking. Actions to shape
a well-functioning global institutional architecture for food that is capable of
delivering international public goods for food and nutrition security are overdue.
A legitimate, nimble, and innovative set of strategic bodies to help coordinate the
actions of others (i.e., some of the existing international organizations) is needed:
a platform that can facilitate global action as well as government-to-government
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networks while including private sector industry and civil society actors. Such
a platform should have legalized political authority to watch over and broadly
facilitate public goods delivery to support global agricultural development and
food and nutrition security. A candidate could be a truly independently governed
Committee on World Food Security (CFS). Global nutrition policy needs an
organizational home and not split among currently five agencies. Additionally, to
better mitigate and respond to emergency food crises, the World Food Programme
(WFP) needs to be supported by getting a reliable global food store and funding that
permits flexible response. Furthermore, the current and future challenges of food
and nutrition security require a strong mechanism for implementing science- and
research-based assessment as a permanent institutional arrangement. A global body
tasked with this could be mapped along the lines of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), but with less emphasis on achieving (political) consensus.
The body needs to have a perspective on the coming two to three decades as the food
situation is filled with both uncertainties and opportunities. The system should be
redesigned step by step. The steps could be guided by cost-effectiveness assessments
while adhering to the principles of legitimacy with accountability, effectiveness,
and inventiveness. Leadership is required to meaningfully implement this redesign
option. The leadership could come from developing countries via the UN and the
G20, which could play a key role in initiating the change.
1.6 Implications for Future Research
This book provides insights into and some answers to volatility-related food security
analysis. It also points to new research questions and directions for future research.
Some of these are methodological and conceptual, while others refer to practical or
political implementation issues. A challenge faced when researching into the drivers
and impacts of volatility is to better establish causality and link empirical analysis
to economic theory and structural (equilibrium) models. In the following section,
we underline the main areas we have identified for future research.
Linking Extreme Events and Excessive Volatility to Social and Human Welfare
The methodological discussion about the different ways to measure volatility and
extreme events at the beginning of this chapter could not give a satisfactory answer
as to which concept of volatility and which threshold for extreme events are the
most suitable for welfare analysis. Future research should therefore concentrate on
how households, firms, and governments anticipate volatility and form expectations
about risk and on finding out the extent to which anticipated shocks differ from
unexpected shocks in terms of social and human welfare.
Game Theoretic Modeling of Cooperation in Food Security Trade and storage
cooperation have been identified as strategies to increase resilience in food systems.
Cooperation is, however, not always in the interest of individual countries (Chap. 8).
Additionally, a free rider problem can arise when emergency reserves are established
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by some countries or regions which also stabilize prices in other countries. The
problem may be addressed within a game theoretic framework that explicitly
models the objectives of individual countries, their interactions, and evolving
strategies. There are a few important policy questions to answer: What institutional
arrangements (e.g., sanctioning mechanisms) can facilitate cooperation and avoid
collective action failure? Can a subset of countries (a coalition) also achieve large
improvements or is full participation necessary? Which countries are necessary for
such a coalition?
Analyzing Regulatory Policy Instruments in Agricultural Commodity Markets
Speculation and financialization affect commodity prices (Chaps. 3, 9, and 10),
yet it is unclear how permanent or temporary position limits and transaction
taxes would influence price formation, volatility, and spillovers in agricultural
commodity markets. Agent-based models can provide a framework for analyzing
policy instruments in a setting whereby agents follow predefined behavioral rules
(Grosche and Heckelei 2013). This, in turn, requires further research on the behavior
of commodity traders and investors.
Understanding Expectations and the Value of Information Forming expec-
tations about future prices and volatility is crucial for making production and
storage decisions that involve large time lags. Apart from the classical approaches
presented in economic theory (naïve, adaptive, and rational), how expectations are
actually formed and how access to information can help to improve the expectation
formation process are not well understood. Chapter 20 provides an initial attempt to
understand these questions, but further analysis with broader data sets is needed to
quantify the benefits of access to different types of information. A high degree of IT
penetration in the developing world, which includes farmers in remote areas, may
reduce market information constraints, even for the poor. This emerging change in
information infrastructures needs to be factored in, and potential interventions in
information services need to be further explored.
Integrating Risk and Volatility into Models with Longer Time Horizons
Integrating a short-term concept like volatility into agricultural and economic
equilibrium models with longer time horizons remains a challenge. Volatility
is investigated using time series models (with high-frequency data) or rational
expectation equilibrium models. Both classes of models can hardly represent global
trade flows and trade policies, welfare changes, and (potentially endogenous) long-
term trends in technological change. Advancing model integration in this direction is
important not only for better understanding the impact of market risks on long-term
developments but also for properly integrating climate change risks into agricultural
economic models.
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Part II
Food Price Volatility at International Food
Commodity Markets
2Volatile Volatility: ConceptualandMeasurement Issues Related to Price
Trends and Volatility
Eugenio Díaz-Bonilla
2.1 Introduction
It is obvious that prices are crucial variables (although certainly not the only
ones) in making decisions pertaining to production and consumption. Producers
and consumers are affected by both price levels and changes in price levels
(variability or volatility). In the case of agricultural and food policies, there have
been several debates about adequate price levels of food products and ways of
reducing price volatility to a degree that does not interfere with the signaling effects
of prices for economic decisions. Those policy issues revolve around balancing the
interests of producers and consumers in increasingly differentiated societies in both
industrialized and developing countries.
In the 1990s, policy debates focused on global price levels and whether they
were too low. The last two price spikes in 2008 and 2011 have led to renewed
concerns about the impacts of high food prices and shifted the focus back on
food price volatility. The effects of changes in price trends on food production and
food consumption (a discussion about price levels) are different from the effects
of changes in volatility around those trends (cycles and extreme events), but both
aspects are related. Policy analyses about those developments require clarifying
some existing questions about both price levels and their variability (Díaz-Bonilla
and Ron 2010), such as what to measure (including the appropriate time frame and
currency) and how to measure (for instance, how to characterize trends given the
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existence of different detrending methods; see, for instance, Canova 1998, 1999).
The next section reviews in general several topics related to the impacts of price
trends and variability. Then, the main section, divided into separate subsections,
discusses different issues related to what to measure and how to do it. The final
section concludes this chapter.
2.2 Price Levels and Price Variability
Price levels affect producers’ profits (and therefore their incentives to produce) and
food costs to consumers (and consequently their purchasing decisions and economic
access to food). Therefore, much of the debate regarding different policy approaches
to agricultural production and food security revolves around a traditional policy
dilemma (Timmer et al. 1983): high prices to support production or low prices to
help consumption. High agricultural prices and food prices should normally lead
to more future production, improving future physical availability, while making
consumption more costly and reducing economic access. The reverse is true for low
agricultural prices and food prices, which would worsen availability but improve
economic access.
Therefore, in the short run, high food prices benefit producers (all things else
being equal), while low food prices help consumers. But in the medium to long
term, high food prices may positively affect even net food buyers if higher food
prices generate dynamic economic processes that raise employment rates and/or
wages (in both rural and urban areas) by amounts that more than compensate
for the greater cost of food. Ivanic and Martin (2014) and Headey (2014) have
discussed the different short-, medium-, and long-term impact of price changes.
For example, higher agricultural and food prices may lead to increased investments
from the private and public sector in agricultural production and in rural areas; this
positively affects employment and wages. If, as argued in different studies, growth
in agricultural (and food) production has a large and positive multiplier effect on
the rest of the economy (Haggblade and Hazell 2010; Haggblade et al. 2007),
and appears to be more effective in reducing poverty than growth in other sectors
(Christiaensen et al. 2010; Eastwood and Lipton 2000), then higher agricultural and
food prices do not generally pose a dilemma in policymaking because they lead to
more employment opportunities and higher wages, particularly for lower-income
producers and workers. There may also be some positive dynamic effects if a policy
leads to investments in productivity, thereby reducing production costs and prices in
the medium term, even though it increases food prices in the short term.
The opposite may also happen: farmers shielded by highly protective policies
and pampered by subsidies may not need to invest to attain their desired profit
levels; therefore, protection and subsidization may lead to fewer investments and
lower productivity (see, for instance, Fan 2008; Mogues et al. 2012; Allcott
et al. 2006). Also, higher agricultural and food prices may increase wages and
production costs in other productive activities. Consequently their external and
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internal competitiveness may be affected, leading to an overall reduction in domestic
production and employment (see Díaz-Bonilla 2015).
Both high prices and low prices result in supply and demand adjustments if
markets operate normally and if price signals are transmitted properly to producers
and consumers. Higher prices should eventually lead to higher production and lower
consumption; both effects would push prices lower (and vice versa in the case of
lower prices).
Those who take the perspective of poor producers prefer high food and agri-
cultural prices, arguing that the agricultural sector’s multiplier effect has important
benefits for employment and poverty alleviation; a small subset of those analysts
gravitate toward protection and price support through government policies. Those
who take the perspective of poor consumers emphasize the importance of low food
prices because of their positive effect on urban and rural poverty and malnutrition.
They usually suggest lower levels of protection and consider the use of some types
of consumption subsidies. But governments need to take into account the welfare of
both producers and consumers when considering the short-term impacts as well as
the medium- to long-term dynamic effects.
This policy dilemma has led to a variety of policies in developing countries,
with very mixed results. A government might try to keep producer prices high and
consumer prices low through subsidies and market interventions, but the developing
countries that have tried such an approach usually find the policies unsustainable.
This is mostly caused by fiscal costs, the distortions generated in production and
trade when not using market prices, and the usually inequitable distribution of costs
and benefits.
The debate about price volatility differs from the previous discussion on price
levels.
It has been argued that price instability generates uncertainties about the true
price level for producers and consumers, and therefore, production and consumption
decisions may lead to suboptimal outcomes compared with those attained under
more stable price conditions. For producers, price volatility may reduce invest-
ments and cause production to shift toward lower-risk, but also less productive,
technologies (although World Bank 2005 estimated that these effects may not be
significant). High and variable food inflation and price spikes affect consumers
negatively because of reduced or uncertain access to food. This is particularly true
for poor and vulnerable households, whose incomes do not adjust with inflation and
which do not have assets to stabilize their consumption patterns.
There may also be negative macroeconomic impacts, such as balance of payment,
public deficits, and declining total investment because of uncertainty all of which
may also have second-round effects on poverty and food security (Timmer 1989).
It is also important to consider the political impacts—an increase in food prices
could lead to social unrest and riots. However, some have noted that high price
shocks (spikes), which are only one form of (asymmetric) volatility, rather than
volatility in general, seems to motivate political riots and unrest (see Barrett and
Bellemare 2011). Persistent food inflation also tends to generate political problems,
but in many cases, sustained inflation (in contrast with price shocks) is the result
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of macroeconomic difficulties that may not be related to developments in food
markets.1
It is therefore crucial to define “stability” and “volatility,” polar opposites of
each other. In the context of monetary policies, the idea of price stability has usually
been interpreted as inflation in the range of 0–2 % per year. However, more recently,
when evaluating policies to confront the effects of the 2007/2008 financial crisis, it
has been suggested that price stability could be redefined as annual inflation that
does not exceed 4 % (Blanchard et al. 2010). A “stable” annual inflation of 2 %
means that the nominal price level is permanently increasing. For example, at 2 %
annual inflation, the price level will increase almost 50 % in nominal terms in 20
years; at 4 %, the price level will more than double over the same period. In other
words, stability in price levels and stability in the rate of change of those price levels
(i.e., stability of inflation) are two different concepts.
In the case of food and agricultural prices, the notion of stability for producers
refers mainly to price levels, while for consumers, the main problems are associated
with high and persistent food inflation.
When considering stability of price levels, it is important to distinguish between
the trend, potential changes in that trend because of the emergence of a new trend,
and the variability or volatility around those trends. The last concept, in turn,
may include both a reasonably smooth business cycle movement and shorter-term
volatility surrounding the business cycle, which may or may not reach extreme
values (such as in the case of price spikes or crashes). Smooth and predictable
price movements that are part of the economic business cycle (as in the case
of macroeconomic models of inflation that consider the gap between actual and
potential GDP) may be more easily anticipated. Therefore, such variability may
be incorporated ex ante into economic decisions. Further volatility, in excess of
the trend and cyclical movements, tends to have shorter durations and may cause
price shocks, leading to prices falling outside the range of trends or normal cycles,
depending on the time horizon utilized. Those extreme price events may be defined
by their frequency (e.g., those that only happen 10 % of the time historically) or by
their magnitude (those that drastically deviate from the trend, such as by multiples
of the standard deviation). These extreme price events are usually unanticipated, and
they tend to cause economic and political disruptions.
In summary, not all types of what is commonly called “volatility” are the same,
or have the same effects on production and consumption decisions; therefore, it
is necessary to differentiate between price trends, their potential changes, business
cycle variability around those stable or changing trends, and shorter-term variability,
particularly in the event of extremely high (spikes) or low (crashes) prices.
1Hazell et al. (2005) argue that a nontrivial part of domestic price variability in agricultural and
food products is related to macroeconomic factors (see also Dorosh et al. 2009; Rashid and Lemma
2011 in the case of Ethiopia).
2 Volatile Volatility: Conceptual and Measurement Issues Related. . . 39
2.3 Different Measures and Concepts
Before analyzing how to define trends and volatility, it is necessary to discuss several
data and measurement issues related to the variables of interest (here, food prices),
as discussed immediately.
2.3.1 Prices in Real or Nominal Terms
The first question is whether trends and volatility are analyzed in nominal prices or
in real (also called constant or inflation-adjusted) prices. In the case of the latter, an
appropriate deflator must be identified, such as the export unit value index (EUVI)
for advanced economies, the US Consumer Price Index (CPI), or the US Producer
Price Index (PPI).
Figure 2.1 shows the IMF index for food and beverages in nominal terms with
two different deflators: the EUVI and the US CPI.
The behavior of the nominal food index is different from the two real food
indices, while the last two indices also behaved differently.
The nominal variable shows a large increase in the early 1970s, reaching a plateau
that lasted until the early 2000s. Then the index experienced another sharp hike,
which is more drastic than the increase in the early 1970s, possibly arriving at a new
plateau. In the plateau lasting from the mid-1970s to the late 1990s, the nominal
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index showed a cyclical pattern and a relatively flat linear trend, with price peaks in
1974, 1980, and 1996. As the nominal index was climbing up to the second plateau,
it peaked in 2008 and 2011.
The cyclical pattern during the plateau between 1980 and the mid-2000s appears
to be influenced by, among other things, the global business cycle: When the
world economy was growing faster, overall income and demand grew as well, and
therefore, nominal prices went up. The opposite is true when there was slack in the
global economy. This is a common pattern identified in the macroeconomic analysis
of the business cycle and the behavior of variables such as wages and prices (see
Rotemberg and Woodford 1999). Figure 2.2 shows the trends (using a Hodrick–
Prescott filter) in world growth and food price increases.
The large increase in nominal prices in the first half of the 1970s was not
exclusive to food products. Most commodities, including metals and energy, also
experienced a nominal price upswing. This suggests that there was a common
macroeconomic cause. In this case, the cause was related to the demise of the
Bretton Woods monetary system of fixed exchange rates in the early 1970s, whereby
the US dollar was strongly devalued against gold (see, for instance, Díaz-Bonilla
2010). In the 2000s, prices of metals and energy started rising in the earlier part
of the decade, pushed by global growth and other macroeconomic factors; this was
followed by the price increase of agricultural and food products, mostly happening
in the second part of the decade (Díaz-Bonilla 2010).
The indices in constant 2005 prices, on the other hand, plateaued in the 1960s
and 1970s, peaking once in 1973–1974 when deflated by the EUVI and twice when
deflated by the US CPI (a larger peak in 1974 and a smaller one in 1979). Then both
indices show a decline in real terms, but showing different patterns of decline. The
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Table 2.1 Price volatility in
nominal and real terms
Volatility Nominal Real EUVI Real US CPI
1960s 3:4 2:8 3:9
1970s 21:3 17:1 21:4
1980s 6:7 5:0 7:0
1990s 7:2 6:4 6:9
2000s 9:9 6:4 9:1
2010s 10:2 7:4 9:8
Source: Author calculations based on data from
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The
period of 2010s includes 2010–2014
index deflated by the US CPI shows an earlier and steeper decline compared with
the index deflated by the EUVI. Both indices show a trough in the late 1990s and
early 2000s, and they have recovered moderately since then. The recovery, however,
is clearly of smaller magnitude than the steep increase of the nominal index, and
the indices have yet to reach the levels in the 1970s. Even the large peaks of the
nominal indices in 2008 and 2011 appear far smaller when expressed in real prices (a
discussion of the causes of those patterns can be found in Díaz-Bonilla 2010, 2015).
Since 2011, all indices, both in nominal and real terms, appear to have reached a
new plateau. A key question is what the future trends in nominal and real prices
would be from 2015 onward (more on this below).
Moving the discussion from trends to price volatility,2 Table 2.1 shows a
common measure of price volatility based on the standard deviation (SD) of a series
constructed as ln pt ln pt1, where t represents the time period (which may be days,
months, years, and so on), pt refers to prices in levels, and ln is the natural logarithm
(see, for instance, Gilbert and Morgan 2010; G20 2010). In this case, t is defined
as one year, and the table presents the average of the annual SD for each decade. It
should be noted that ln pt  ln pt1 is an approximation of the growth or changes in
prices (which may be also called price “inflation” and could be negative) between
two consecutive periods. Therefore, the measure utilized here reflects the volatility
of annual price inflation.
All three variables show that volatility was low in the 1960s when exchange rates
were stable; volatility became higher during the multiple shocks in the 1970s, and
then it declined in the 1980s and 1990s (but remained higher than the levels in the
1960s). The measured volatility increased somewhat in the 2000s and the first half of
the 2010s in the cases of nominal prices in US dollars and real prices when deflated
by the US CPI. The index deflated by the EUVI showed no changes in the 2000s
and a small increase in the 2010s.
This section shows that it matters whether trends and volatility are expressed in
nominal or real terms and which deflator is used.
2This measure can be applied to any variable and not only prices.
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2.3.2 World Prices: InWhat Currency?
As noted before, developments in world macroeconomic conditions need to be
considered when analyzing price movements (see, for instance, Díaz-Bonilla 2010,
2015). In particular, exchange rate movements strongly influence nominal world
food prices (as in the case of the breakdown of the Bretton Woods monetary system).
Figure 2.3 shows the inverse relationship between the US dollar (measured as
the effective nominal exchange rate against major currencies) and the IMF nominal
index of food products. 3,4
The figure shows that the relative value of the US dollar fluctuated significantly,
with peaks in the mid-1980s and the early 2000s, while the nominal food index
moved in the opposite fashion. This implies that the currency used must be
considered when analyzing food prices.
Figure 2.4 compares the evolution of nominal food indices in US dollar terms and
special drawing rights (SDRs), a quasi-currency issued by the IMF. Being a basket
of four major currencies (the euro, Japanese yen, pound sterling, and US dollar), it
represents a more stable measure of value than the US dollar alone.
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3Mundell (2002), among others, pointed out the inverse relationship between the value of the US
dollar and the price of commodities in that currency.
4The nominal food index is obtained from the IMF/IFS database. The US exchange rate is the
index for major currencies in nominal terms calculated by the Federal Reserve. Major currencies
include the euro, Canadian dollar, Japanese yen, British pound, Swiss franc, Australian dollar, and
Swedish krona. There is also a broader index that considers more than 20 currencies (including the
major currencies already mentioned). The indices can be calculated in nominal or in price-adjusted
terms. The chart shows the same pattern if presented using the price-adjusted index for the broader
set of currencies.
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Table 2.2 Price volatility in
US dollars and SDRs
Volatility SDRs USD
1960s 3:4 3:4
1970s 18:8 21:3
1980s 6:9 6:7
1990s 7:1 7:2
2000s 8:0 9:9
2010s 8:0 10:2
Source: Author calculations based on
data from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). The period 2010s goes
from 2010 to 2014
It is clear that the latest price surge, even in nominal terms, is less pronounced
when calculated in SDRs. The 2008 price spike in SDRs was at or below the
levels observed in the 1970s and 1980s, while nominal prices in the US dollar
have been above historical averages during the latest price shocks, influenced by
the depreciation of the US dollar from its peak in the early 2000s. Only after the
price increase in 2011, the SDR index moved slightly above the values in the early
1980s.
Moving to the discussion of volatility, Table 2.2 shows the same measure of
volatility as Table 2.1, comparing the nominal price indices in the US dollar and
SDRs. Price volatility seems to be much less pronounced when prices are measured
in SDR terms than in US dollar terms, suggesting that at least some food price
volatility observed was influenced by additional instability in exchange rates, which
is affected by general macroeconomic factors.
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The results above highlight the importance of taking into consideration the
currency utilized in the pricing, which is affected by exchange rate fluctuations.
2.3.3 Domestic Prices andWorld Prices
In the earlier sections, the discussion focused on the different measures of world
food prices. However, food security at national level is affected by domestic price
volatility, which is correlated with world price volatility to different degrees in
different countries. Price transmission from international to domestic prices can be
limited because of several factors, such as domestic policies, high transportation
costs, limited infrastructure, consumer preferences, and exchange rate variations.
Other sections of this book are devoted to the discussion of price transmission.
It is important to note that as in the case of world prices, it is important to
distinguish between nominal and real prices. The value chain level at which prices
are measured also plays a role. Even if global food price changes are transmitted to
the domestic economy (defined by some particular market level), their final effect
on a consumer will be determined by the degree of integration between the local
market in which the consumer participates and the national food market utilized as
reference. In many developing countries in particular, there are clear distinctions
between urban consumers, who may be more integrated with national markets, and
rural consumers, who may have weaker links to national markets. Therefore, trends
and volatility may differ when considering prices at the farm gate, wholesale, or
consumer levels.
2.3.4 Time Horizons
The discussion of price volatility also requires the definition of a time horizon that is
adequate for the purpose of the analysis. For instance, should data be analyzed daily,
monthly, quarterly, annually, or at even longer intervals? Using annual values (as is
the case so far) would obscure shorter term volatility: Daily, weekly, or monthly
price movements may respond to several transitory causes that might cancel each
other out during the course of the year. Still, these changes may be relevant for
certain economic agents and their production and consumption decisions, therefore
affecting their food security.
For instance, for consumers that are wage earners, the adequate interval may be
a quarter or a month, in line with the timing of salary payments. For producers of
annual crops, what matters may be the variability of the annual prices, while other
producers, such as dairy farmers (who deliver daily), may be affected by shorter-
term volatility. The level of development of futures markets and hedging instruments
are also important when considering the appropriate frequency of analysis. In poor
developing countries, daily and monthly price variability in futures markets does
not drastically affect small-scale farmers’ decision-making (with regard to crop
production and marketing) because they do not have access to the futures markets.
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On the other hand, farmers in more developed countries may use futures market
information to enter into different contracts and therefore find volatility information
at daily or monthly intervals relevant for their business.
2.3.5 The Selection of Food Indices and Food Prices
The choice of food indices or food items is another aspect that deserves attention
when analyzing food price volatility. This is because the final effect of food price
volatility on food security at the national level will depend on the dietary preference
of individual countries.
According to the food balance sheets calculated by the FAO (FAOSTAT 2014),
Indonesia is a clear example of the importance of considering country-specific
dietary preferences. Rice, a storable produce, accounts for (using 2009 data) around
48 % of the calories and 40 % of the proteins consumed on average (these values
were 56 % and 53 %, respectively, in 1980). The situation in India is somewhat more
diversified than in Indonesia, with wheat and wheat products accounting for 21 %,
and rice about 29 %, of the total calorie intake on average in 2009. On the other
hand, many African countries show a consumption structure that shows a variety of
products, including some (such as cassava and yams) that are difficult and costly to
store. In 2009 in western Africa,5 the average calorie consumption comprises the
following: 5.4 % wheat and wheat products; 12.6 % rice, 9.1 % maize, and maize
products; 10 % millet and millet products; 9.1 % sorghum and sorghum products;
8.7 % cassava and cassava products; and 7.9 % yams (see Díaz-Bonilla 2014).
The analysis of price movements may focus only on the most basic food
staples (such as rice and wheat) as they represent an important portion of the
dietary requirements in developing countries, and especially in the most vulnerable
countries. However, as noted, some poor regions depend on several products
for basic calories. Furthermore, access to a minimum level of food calories is
insufficient to achieve food and nutrition security; dietary diversity also plays a role
in nutrition security (Arimond and Ruel 2006). Therefore, to more comprehensively
analyze the effects food price volatility, the price evolution of various food items
should also be taken into consideration.
Also, if the analysis of price movements focuses on the impact of price volatility
on general economic variables at the national level (in contrast to food security
concerns), world food indices, such as those calculated by the IMF (used in this
chapter), the World Bank, and the FAO, may not reflect the impact of price changes
on a specific country because every individual index for those countries would
5Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
and Togo.
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Fig. 2.5 Terms-of-trade index, median value (2000 D 100), 1980–2011. Source: Author’s calcu-
lations based on World Bank (2014). Note: This corresponds to the median values for 36 countries
for SSA, 17 for LAC, 6 for MENA, and 12 for Asia
have its specific basket of exports and imports.6 Figure 2.5 shows an indicator that
better reflects that composition: the terms of trade for different developing regions,
corresponding to the median values for 36 countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA),
17 in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), 6 in Middle East and North Africa
(MENA), and 12 in Asia.
The terms of trade differ across regions, showing different responses even during
the price spikes in 2008 and 2011. This indicates that the composition of exports
and imports is different for every region. For instance, oil constitutes a great portion
of export in MENA, and metals and oils have a strong presence in SSA; therefore,
MENA and SSA saw a larger improvement in their terms of trade than LAC, which
has a more diverse export basket. In MENA and SSA, higher food prices were more
than compensated for by the price increase of other commodities, highlighting the
importance of analyzing developments in all commodities at the same time and not
focusing only on some of them. On the other hand, the developing countries in Asia,
whose import structure relies more heavily on commodities, showed a decline in the
terms of trade because the price of all commodities and not only food increased.
6The food price indices calculated by the IMF, the World Bank, and the FAO, although sharing
broadly similar trends, are somewhat different in their coverage, in the weights they use to
aggregate the prices of individual commodities, and in the representative world prices selected
for some of them. Therefore, while the IMF index shows an increase in nominal prices of about
107 % between 2003 and 2011, this figure is 121 % for the World Bank and 135 % in the case of
the FAO. It would be useful if the international organizations could present a single index.
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2.3.6 Trends and Volatility: Different Approaches
As already mentioned, a common measure of volatility is the standard deviation of
price changes (or inflation) within a specific period, which may be defined in days,
months, years, and so on.
It was also noted that ln pt  ln pt1 is a proxy for nominal inflation for the period
t, which is defined as one year in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 (annual inflation). However,
monthly inflation is often used (see, for instance, Gilbert and Morgan 2010; G20
2010, which use monthly price changes). It has been argued that using standard
deviations of log prices is a better measure than other potential metrics because it
avoids the issue of defining trends (see Gilbert and Morgan 2010).
In some instances, it may be enough to evaluate this measure of volatility.
However, by not considering trends and changes in trends, key elements may
be missed when analyzing relevant policy responses. In macroeconomics, a few
studies have already noted that many crucial variables, such as GDP, seem to
exhibit variable trends (see, for instance, Stock and Watson 1988, focusing on the
US economy; Aguiar and Gopinath 2004, analyzing emerging markets). Also, the
factors and policies affecting trends and changes in trends are usually different
from those affecting the variability around the trends (although there may be cross
effects).
If we accept the argument that both the variability of a trend and the variability
around the trend need to be considered, then it is crucial to identify methods
of decomposing price movements into trend variability (explained by long-term
factors), variability around the trend (partially related to the business cycle), and
shorter-term variability that lies beyond both trends and cycles (which may include
extreme events such as spikes or crashes) (see Díaz-Bonilla and Ron 2010; Tadesse
et al. 2014). The best methods of separating trends and cycles have been long
debated in applied macro-econometrics, with different approaches leading to differ-
ent results about such decomposition (see, for instance, Canova 1998, 1999, 2007).
In the following section, trends and cycles will be discussed firstly; then the issue
of extreme events will be examined in further detail.
2.3.7 Trends and cycles
In relation to trends and cycles, three different detrending methods are used to
demonstrate the different results that can be obtained from the methods. The three
methods are as follows: the lineal trend (LT) (Fig. 2.6), the Hodrick–Prescott (HP)
filter (Fig. 2.7),7 and the asymmetric Christiano–Fitzgerald (CF) filter (Fig. 2.8).8
7The HP filter is calculated with a lambda of 100. Compared to the CF, the HP does not capture
the turn at the end toward a plateau.
8The CF filter is the full sample asymmetric specification with the underlying variable considered
to be non-stationary (as indicated by the tests on the nominal food price index) and cycle periods
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Fig. 2.6 Lineal trend
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Fig. 2.7 Hodrick–Prescott filter. Source: Author calculations based on data from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF)
The cycle in the respective figures is obtained by subtracting the value of the
trend from the nominal value of pt at the same period t.
between 2 and 8 years. This specification allows the values at the beginning and end of the time
series to remain in the calculations. In contrast, other band pass filters with fixed lags lose the values
at the extreme ends of a time series because of the lags. As noted, the Hodrick–Prescott filter also
has problems capturing the trends at the beginning and the end of a series. The advantages and
limitations of the different filters, neither of which are perfect, are discussed in detail in Canova
(2007). Canova (1998) also gave a more detailed comparison of different detrending methods using
macroeconomic series.
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Fig. 2.8 Christiano–Fitzgerald filter. Source: Author calculations based on data from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF)
Several observations can be made about the figures above: First, regardless of the
method applied, the price volatility between the late 1950s and the first half of the
1970s was lower compared to the rest of the series. Second, the LT has the problem
of being constant during the period considered, even though tests have shown9 that
there were structural breaks in the trend. Both the HP and the CF were able to
capture changes in trends, although they show slightly different results. There are
no conclusive tests to determine which method captured the “correct” trend. Third,
the HP, which usually has problems detecting changes at the end of a series, signals
a continuation of the upward trend, while the CF is already pointing to an inflection
point in the upward movement. Fourth, regardless of the method applied, the three
detrending methods show larger increases in the mid-1970s than in the more recent
price spikes. Finally, the CF filter considers the trough in the 1990s as a change in
trend, while the LT and, to a lesser extent, the HP evaluated the period as a down
cycle.
Table 2.3 presents a measure of volatility different from that shown in Tables 2.1
and 2.2. Here volatility is calculated as the decade average of the percentage
deviation (in absolute values) of the food index from the trends calculated using
LT, HP, and CF.10 For comparison, the table also includes the measure of volatility
9A simple test, not shown here, was conducted on the stability of the coefficient of a trend variable
with the following equation: y(t) D a C b  y (t  1) C c  lineal trend. Y(t) is the nominal index
for food prices, in both original value and log form. Tests on the coefficient c of the lineal trend
variable showed structural breaks in both cases of prices in normal values and in natural log.
10The calculation for Table 2.3 is as follows: First, calculate [y(t)  trend(t)]/trend(t); t is defined
as 1 year. This is the value of the deviation from trend, which is then expressed as percentage of
the trend. Second, take the absolute value of that percentage for every year. Third, calculate the
average for the decade. Conceptually, this is similar to the coefficient of variation calculated as
the standard deviation of a variable divided by the average of that variable over a certain period.
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Table 2.3 Different
indicators of volatility Volatility HP CF LT
StDev of LN
prices
1960s 5:1 6:1 20:6 3:4
1970s 17:2 13:8 31:1 21:3
1980s 5:1 4:5 20:4 6:7
1990s 7:4 4:3 9:6 7:2
2000s 8:7 5:2 20:8 9:9
2010s 5:6 3:8 22:4 10:2
Source: Author calculations based on data
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
without the trend that is shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 (called “StDev of LN prices”
here).
First, using a fixed trend for the whole period (LT) leads to higher estimates of
volatility (a log-linear trend would produce qualitatively similar results). Second, all
of the measures of volatility indicate higher volatility in the 1970s. However, to the
extent that the HP and CF filters allow for the extraction of trends, the implied
volatility around those trends is lower than those in the case of “StDev of LN
prices.” This last measure basically uses a different lineal trend for every decade
(the average for the period), which although it avoids the problem of the LT of
applying the same lineal trend for several decades, will still not capture changes
in trends occurring within a decade. Third, as an extension to the previous point,
because food prices increased at a slower rate in the 2000s than in the 1970s, the HP
filter and particularly the CF filter regard part of the total volatility calculated using
“StDev of LN prices” as changes in trend.
In summary, it is important to keep in mind that for any kind of analysis of
price series, assumptions about trend behavior and the corresponding detrending
method will affect the conclusion about price variability. When using measures
that ignore trends, changes in underlying trends (which is usually related to more
permanent factors) may be wrongly characterized as changes in volatility. Also,
policies that address changes in underlying trends are different from those used to
confront changes in volatility.
2.3.8 Shorter-termVariations
Until now, the discussion has focused on trends and cycles. However, as already
noted, there are different forms of volatility that are conflated in the measure that
uses the standard deviation of inflation, the latter measured as the difference of
prices in logs (which corresponds to StdDEV of LN prices in Table 2.3) (i.e., the
The main difference between the measure utilized in this chapter and the concept mentioned in the
previous sentence is that in the latter, the trend is assumed to be a flat lineal value for the period,
while in Table 2.3, the trend may be changing during that period.
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Fig. 2.9 Trends, cycles, and spikes. Source: Author calculations based on data from the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF)
difference of prices in logs). An increase in volatility measured this way may be due
to (a) changes in the longer-term trend, (b) a medium-term cycle, and (c) shorter-
term volatility, which in some cases may reach the level of extreme events. Points (a)
and (b) have already been discussed in the previous sections. Identifying short-term
volatility is also a topic relevant to policymaking, particularly if volatility reaches
the level of an extreme event.
Understanding the causes of an extreme price event is essential for designing an
appropriate policy to react to the event. To do that requires differentiating between
the three elements of volatility mentioned above. For instance, the policy approach
to changes in price trends (point a), linked to significant long-term modifications
of underlying income growth and demographic trends, may be different from the
policy approach to demand-side macroeconomic forces driving the business cycle
(point b). Weather problems, sudden changes in trade policies of systemically
important countries, and abrupt shifts in financial conditions (all of which would
affect short-term volatility in prices) may require yet other policy approaches.
However, as before, such decomposition of the three aspects (trends, cycles and
shorter-term variations) faces the problem of how to differentiate them.
Figure 2.9 presents a possible decomposition using the HP filter (for another
approach to the decomposition, see Tadesse et al. 2014).
The smoothness of the variable resulting from the HP filter can be modified
using different values of the penalty parameter (let us call it lambda) in the HP
optimization algorithm. Applying the HP to a variable, the larger the lambda value,
the smoother the series is; if lambda approaches infinity, the series is a lineal trend.
Here, the lambda value of 100 is used for calculating the trend and 6.25 for the
cycle (see Ravn and Uhlig 2002 for a discussion of how to adjust the HP filter).
Then short-term volatility is the difference between the actual price pt and the value
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of the HP filter at t representing the business cycle level expressed as a percentage
of the value of the HP filter which, in turn, stands for the trend level.
In the 1970s, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of exchange rates
and a series of supply and demand shocks led to a steep upward adjustment in
nominal food prices and other commodities. From then until the mid-2000s, nominal
food prices were oscillating around that new plateau, in part affected by the global
business cycle (as already discussed). The nominal prices bottomed out between
the late 1990s and early 2000s, a period in which price declines were deeper
and more extended than the previous lows. This was the result of a series of
financial crises–starting with the 1997 Asian financial crisis and ending with the
2002 Argentine crisis—which reduced demand and/or increased supply of food (and
commodity) products. The early 2000s saw the decline in global growth and the last
cycle of the US dollar peaking (see the discussion about the macro factors in the
1970s and the 2000s in Díaz-Bonilla 2008, 2015). However, until about 2005, the
nominal increase was in line with previous nominal cycles.
In the second part of the 2000s, there are at least two events to consider: first,
the trend was moving upward since hitting a nominal bottom in the late 1990s and
early 2000s and second, the price spikes occurred in 2008 and 2011. As discussed in
another study (see Díaz-Bonilla 2010), the peak of the 2008 spike was smaller, and
reaching it took place over a longer period of time, when compared with the spike
in the early 1970s. In the 1970s, there was an almost 200 % increase in the index of
nominal food prices in about 5 years, while in the 2000s, the increase was less than
140 % over almost 9 years. If extreme high price events are defined as those being
more than two standard deviations from the average, only the price spikes in 1974
and 2008 can be considered as an extreme price event (the 2011 shock was less than
two SD from the average). Figure 2.9 also shows the smaller food price spikes in
the late 1970s (related to the second oil shock) and in the second half of the 1980s
and mid-1990s (more related to weather events) (see a discussion in Díaz-Bonilla
2010).
This book analyzes different reasons for the more recent price spikes in 2008
and 2011. The decomposition discussed in this chapter points to a component of
that volatility: the potential change in the medium-term trends of nominal and real
prices. Having reached another plateau in the 2010s, food prices in nominal terms
may remain at that level (with likely fluctuations similar to those seen as prices
reached the plateau in the 1970s). However, if nominal prices stay at the new plateau
with oscillations, prices in real terms will decline. This would imply a reversion
of the small upward trend shown in Fig. 2.1, probably returning to the long-term
decline in real terms since the 1980s (a discussion of scenarios is in Díaz-Bonilla
et al 2014; Díaz-Bonilla 2015). The analysis of changes in these medium- to longer-
term events requires the variability of trends to be disentangled from the cyclical
and temporary components of overall price volatility.
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2.3.9 Expected and Historical Volatility
All the measures of volatility discussed so far have been based on historical data,
which are the actual realization of the variables of interest. However, economic
agents base their decisions on the expected value of the relevant variables, in this
case food prices (Torero 2012). That expected values may follow some backward-
looking and adaptive rules of thumb or be based on more sophisticated modeling of
future scenarios. In the case of commodities with future markets, volatility can be
calculated using future prices. However, only in the case of perfect foresight would
ex post realized values of prices and their volatility coincide with ex ante expected
values.
Furthermore, in this line of analysis, it can be argued that “true” volatility (the
expected volatility) in the context of economic decisions is only the difference
between the expected price at time t C 1 that is forecasted at time t and the realized
price at time t. On the other hand, the difference between the expected price at
time t C 1 that is forecasted at time t and the realized price at time t C 1 is the
unexpected volatility, which by definition is not included in a farmer’s economic
decision-making. In turn, these two measures are different from the calculations
based on the realized price difference between t and t C 1. Therefore, according to
this view, the expected prices should be first estimated when calculating volatility.
This opens the broader issue of how expectations are formed and modeled, which
will not be discussed here (see, for instance, Triantafyllou et al. 2013).
2.3.10 Scaling the Shocks
The previous sections about trends and volatility have not yet discussed the impact
of price changes on countries, producers, and consumers. Analyzing this impact
requires not only trends and volatility to be properly characterized but also the
relevant shocks to be properly scaled by macroeconomic variables, such as GDP,
exports or fiscal accounts (at country level), and household income or consumption
(at producer and consumer levels). An example of such scaling at country level is a
series of studies conducted by Bela Balassa in the early 1980s to analyze different
global economic shocks in the 1970s, including the price events during that period
(see, for instance, Balassa 1984, 1986).
In the case of food prices, a possible indicator of the size of a price shock at
country level may be obtained by dividing food imports by total exports (i.e., how
much of the income from all exports a country needs to pay for the food import bill).
This seems to be a better proxy for affordability and the potential burden on the
balance of payment at national level than other indicators, such as the net food trade
position (Díaz-Bonilla et al. 2000).11 Figure 2.10 presents this indicator evaluated
11Like any other indicators, this indicator has its limitations. First, it reflects not only food prices
but also other price and income effects on food imports and total exports. Also, in theory, if
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with data on agricultural products (a broader category than food products alone) of
several aggregates of countries: least developed countries (as defined by the UN),
net food importing countries (as defined by the WTO, with some implications on
trade negotiations), and low-income food-deficit countries (a category defined by
the FAO).
The price shock in the 1970s clearly affected those groups of countries more than
the 2008 price shock (at the time of this writing, data for 2012 was still unavailable;
therefore, the effects of the 2011 shock cannot be evaluated). Of course, this
indicator should also be calculated at country level and not only for the aggregates
of countries.
2.4 Conclusions
This paper has argued that the analysis of volatility may benefit from differentiating
between trends, cycles, and shorter-term events. And if so, it is important to clarify
quantities of food imports decline significantly because of high international prices, the indicator
may not change at all, but domestic prices and welfare would still be affected. It should, however, be
noted that food items are usually relatively price inelastic. Furthermore, at the level of aggregation
of total food imports, results are even more muted because of substitution effects across different
items. For instance, in the case of LDCs as a whole, quantities of food imports declined by 1.3 %
in 2008 when compared with 2006, while world food prices increased by about 33 % during the
same period, according to the IMF index. This translates into an uncompensated point elasticity of
about 0.04 between those years. Finally, it should be noted that the ratio in Fig. 2.10 is not used
as a welfare indicator, but it is a proxy for the economic burden of high food prices at the BOP
level.
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how trends are defined and measured and whether shocks can fall outside a “normal
range” (which also requires “normal” to be defined). Different approaches to tackle
those issues were discussed.
Regardless of whether price data are decomposed into trends, cycles, and shorter-
term events, there are also various data issues to consider when analyzing volatility,
for instance, (a) whether it corresponds to those of world markets or domestic
markets; (b) if the focus is on world prices, it is necessary to define the currency of
quoted prices (such as the US dollars, euros, SDRs, and so on); and (c) if a volatility
analysis is centered on domestic prices, then the markets relevant to price formation
and measurement must be identified along the value chain (production, processing,
and distribution) that link primary producers to final consumers. It is also important
to clarify whether volatility is analyzed using nominal prices or real prices; in the
case of the latter, an appropriate deflator must be identified (such as the EUV index
for advanced economies, the US CPI, or other nominal indices). In addition, it is
crucial to identify whether the analysis focuses on specific commodities or broader
aggregates of commodities. Finally, it is necessary to explicitly define the time
period when determining volatility. Whether the time period is annual, seasonal,
monthly, or even daily depends on the purpose of the analysis. For instance, if the
analysis focuses on consumers, the time period (monthly) may be shorter than when
the analysis focuses on producers. This is because producers make decisions based
on longer time frames (at least yearly for planting decisions of many crops and even
longer for investment decisions).
Irrespective of the way volatility is defined and measured, identifying its impact
on nations, producers, and consumers requires (a) proper scaling of changes in
prices; (b) taking a systemic view of trends, cycles, shocks, and crises; and (c)
considering all macroeconomic cross effects (fiscal, monetary, inflation, exchange
rates) of increases in all commodity prices (not only food) and other world variables
(such as in Balassa 1984, 1986).
The price shocks in 2008 and 2011 focused the attention of the public and
policymakers on price volatility. However, the results obtained from decomposing
data into trends, cycles, and shorter-term volatility also suggest that there is a need to
determine whether price variations respond to cyclical and shorter-term movements
or whether they rather result from a changing trend reflecting adjustments in long-
term fundamentals that need to be properly understood.
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3Drivers and Triggers of International FoodPrice Spikes and Volatility
Getaw Tadasse, Bernadina Algieri, Matthias Kalkuhl,
and Joachim von Braun
3.1 Introduction
The global food system recently showed exceptional developments in international
commodity prices. In 2007–2008, the nominal prices of almost all food commodities
increased by more than 50 %. Three years after the 2007–2008 global food price
spikes, food prices surged again in 2010–2011 (Fig. 3.1). Though the two events
were different in terms of the commodities affected,1 a strong correlation was found
among most food prices. More importantly, prices of all food commodities soared
above the long-term average, with an adverse impact on poor people in developing
countries (Conforti 2004; Dawe 2008; Dorosh et al. 2009; Hernandez et al. 2011).
Indeed, the sudden increase in international food prices and its transmission to
domestic prices led to rising inflation rates, which mainly affect the poor because
they spend a large share of their income on staple foods. Volatility causes economic
uncertainty and may result in lower investment, especially in small businesses which
This chapter is a language-edited version of our open-access article published in 2014 in the journal
Food Policy, 47, 117–128
1The sugar price index was lower than its historical average during the first food price crisis (2007–
2008) but reached a historic high in 2010–2011. Rice prices were the highest during the first high
price episode but were lower than most other cereals during the second crisis.
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Fig. 3.1 FAO food price indices from January 2004 to November 2011. Source: FAO (2011)
lack access to credit. Although food grains are regarded mainly as commodities on
the global market, they constitute the basic food of the poor and the “currency” of
the poorest two billion people in the world.
Faced with rising food insecurity, social unrest, and accelerated inflation driven
by food prices, developing and advanced countries as well as the international
community began responding with a new sense of urgency. For instance, the G20
agenda of 2011 addressed food security. Nonetheless, although the price crises in
2007–2008 and 2010–2011 have led to some policy changes, the sense of urgency
about preventing human suffering has not yet translated into comprehensive actions
to stabilize world food supply and demand.
Unstable food prices at national and regional levels are not a new phenomenon.
Some consider the 2007–2008 price spike part of normal price instability caused by
temporary shocks (Díaz-Bonilla and Ron 2010). In fact, average price volatility did
not differ significantly between the 1970s and the late 2000s, but the nature of the
volatility and its causes may be different. Traditional market fundamentals—that is,
supply and demand factors—were found to be inadequate to explain the extreme
price spikes in 2007–2008 and 2010–2011.
In the past few years, many studies have investigated the causes of and solutions
to soaring food prices (Abbott et al. 2009, 2011; Gilbert 2010; Roache 2010). They
have identified a set of drivers of food price upsurges, including biofuel demand,
speculation in commodity futures markets, countries’ aggressive stockpiling poli-
cies, trade restrictions, macroeconomic shocks to money supply, exchange rates,
and economic growth. The relative importance and actual impact of these causes
have been widely discussed. While there is a certain consensus regarding how
weather, biofuel production, and export restrictions affect food commodity markets,
the dispute surrounding speculation on the commodity food markets is far from
settled. Most of the empirical studies focus primarily on using the Granger-causality
test to explain the role of speculation in price returns or volatility (Irwin et al. 2009;
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Robles et al. 2009; Gilbert 2010). Another strand of research seeks to identify bubble
behavior—that is, explosive increases in prices—in commodity markets during
the period 2007–2008 (Gilbert 2009; Phillips and Yu 2011; Shi and Arora 2012).
The Granger-causality test, however, has been criticized for presuming a time-lag
structure that might be too long to allow any reaction on the liquid financial market
to be observed (Gilbert and Pfuderer 2012; Grosche 2012). Analyzing bubbles may
be useful for identifying abnormal price behavior, but it does not explain the causes
of the observed price increase.
This study goes a step further by examining the impact of speculation and
agricultural fundamentals on price spikes and volatility. Price spikes are the short-
term ups and downs of prices following short-term shocks, and volatility is the
variability of price around its trend. From a welfare perspective, the distinction
between price spikes and volatility is more important than trends in overall price
levels. This is because price spikes and volatility are the primary indicators of food
crises.2 Furthermore, this distinction is also essential for differentiating between
factors that cause risks to poor consumers and those that cause uncertainties to
agricultural investors. We argue that a food crisis is more closely related to extreme
price spikes, while long-term volatility is more strongly connected to general price
risks.
In particular, this study provides empirical evidence about the quantitative
importance of widely discussed determinants of commodity prices. In our empirical
analysis, we consider agricultural supply shocks, stock-to-use ratios, demand shocks
[energy prices and gross domestic product (GDP)], and futures market shocks (spec-
ulative activity in commodity futures trading and financial crises). The empirical
analysis is carried out using three models: (1) a price spike model in which monthly
food price returns (spikes) are estimated against oil prices, supply shocks, stock-
to-use ratios, demand shocks, and the volume of speculative futures trading; (2) a
volatility model in which annualized monthly variability of food prices is estimated
against yearly observable variables, such as supply shocks, stock-to-use ratios,
economic growth, the volume of speculative futures trading, oil price volatility, and
a financial crisis index; and (3) a trigger model that estimates the extreme values
of price spikes and volatility using quantile regression. The methodology will allow
us to shed light on the formation of price spikes and price risks, rather than simply
considering the so-called high food prices. The food commodities whose prices are
investigated are wheat, maize, and soybeans.3 The rest of the paper is organized as
follows: Sect. 3.2 presents the conceptual framework of the approach. Sections 3.3
and 3.4 describe the setup of the adopted models and the variables included in
the empirical analysis. Section 3.5 discusses the econometric results. Section 3.6
presents the conclusion of this study.
2Although there is no universal definition of “food crisis,” here it is understood as an abrupt and
unanticipated change that affects people severely and negatively.
3We do not include rice because of its different international market patterns.
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3.2 Conceptual Framework
Recent literature has identified the determinants of food price hikes as biofuel
demand, speculation in commodity futures markets, and macroeconomic shocks.
These determinants represent both the demand and the supply side of the world food
equation. In an attempt to distinguish how different factors affect price changes,
three groups of potential causes have been singled out: exogenous shocks, also
called “root” causes; “conditional” causes; and “internal” drivers (Fig. 3.2). Root
causes, such as extreme weather events, oil price shocks, production shocks, and
demand shocks, are independent core factors affecting food price fluctuations. They
are exogenous because the possibility of a causal relationship between the agricul-
tural sector and root causes is minimal. Exogenous shocks are expected to generate
food price spikes and volatility, and the magnitude of their impacts depends partly on
the political and economic environment of a given country. In other words, a second
group of factors related to specific political and economic conditions—labeled
here as conditional drivers—can dampen or exacerbate exogenous shocks. Some
of these factors (such as a high concentration of production or low transparency
in commodity markets) are time invariant and rather difficult to measure; they are
Fig. 3.2 Stylized framework of the causes of global food price volatility and spikes. Source:
authors’ elaboration. Note: Exogenous shocks are the “root” causes of price volatility and price
spikes. The extent to which exogenous shocks translate to food price changes depends on the
market conditions and political environment of a given country (“conditional” causes). Food price
shocks can further be amplified by nonlinear endogenous responses (“internal” causes) to food
price shocks. The factors in italics are not considered in our econometric analysis as they are time
invariant or as there is no appropriate quantitative indicator available
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therefore not considered in the empirical analysis in this chapter. The third group of
causes consists of factors that are triggered by the same price dynamics, and these
internal causes are endogenous shock amplifiers and include discretionary trade
policies, speculative activities (driven by price expectations), and declines in world
food stocks. The present study focuses primarily on exogenous shocks because they
may be the major root cause that stimulates the emergence of the other factors. At
the same time, special attention is given to speculation and food stocks, which are
(partly) endogenous factors.
This categorization of drivers comes with a caveat: the line between endogenous
and exogenous causes is very subtle. There are multiple and complex interactions
between the factors, and the drivers influence each other through various linkages
and feedback loops. For example, restrictive trade policies induced by price
increases have further contributed to price surges. Likewise, low US stock-to-use
ratios have been considered an important factor in increasing price volatility. Low
stock levels are, however, caused by reduced government activities in public storage
(exogenous) as well as current supply and price expectations (endogenous), as
highlighted by Piesse and Thirtle (2009). Furthermore, the UNCTAD 2011 Report
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 2011) indicated that there could be some
correlations among different factors. For example, extreme weather may render
financial investment in commodity futures more attractive. However, empirical
evidence suggests that the correlation among these variables is not strong.
Figure 3.2 shows that extreme weather events such as droughts and floods—
exacerbated by global warming—are considered a root cause of global food price
fluctuations because they cause crop failure and reduce global food supply, which
consequently causes food prices to increase. In this analysis, we used short-term
global food supply fluctuation and its projection as an indicator of extreme weather
changes.
Another root cause consists of oil price shocks, which affect grain commodity
prices in a number of ways. On the supply side, a rise in oil prices exerts upward
pressure on input costs such as fertilizer, irrigation, and transportation costs. The rise
in costs in turn leads to a decline in profitability and production, with a consequent
rise in commodity prices. On the demand side, higher crude oil prices induce a
higher derived demand for grains destined for biofuel production—maize, soybeans,
and other grains such as wheat—thus resulting in higher prices of these grains. The
demand for biofuels has been further facilitated by indirect and direct subsidies and
biofuel mandates.
Both the United States and the European Union, for instance, have adopted
mandatory blending policies that require a sharp increase in biofuel usage. Studies
have shown that higher biofuel demand and energy mandates have a large impact on
food prices (Mitchel 2008; Chen et al. 2010; Chakravorty et al. 2011). A further
linkage between oil and agricultural prices operates through index investments.
Tang and Xiong (2012) found an increasing correlation between futures prices of
agricultural commodities and oil after 2004, when significant index investments
started to flow into commodity markets. The two authors highlighted that the
correlation with oil prices was significantly stronger for indexed commodities than
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off-index commodities because oil is an important index constituent (Basak and
Pavlova 2013).
The third root cause is the high demand for food crops coming mainly from
emerging markets, primarily China and India. Krugman (2010) noted that rising
commodity prices are a sign that “we are living in a finite world, in which the
rapid growth of emerging economies is placing pressure on limited supplies of raw
materials, pushing up their prices.” In addition, economic development and income
growth are changing not only the quantity of food demanded but also the structure
of demand for food commodities. As dietary patterns move away from starchy foods
toward meat and dairy products, there is an intensifying demand for feed grains that
drives their prices up (von Braun 2011).
One of the other root causes of price increases is economic shocks, such as
the depreciation of the US dollar, the currency of choice for most international
commodity transactions. These shocks put upward pressure on demand from
commodity consumers and producers not trading in US dollars.
While there is a certain consensus on the impact of some root causes (such as
oil prices and extreme weather conditions) on food prices, the debate about some
internal causes is still open. In particular, it is highly debatable whether speculation
has exacerbated food price volatility. Two conflicting hypotheses prevail: the perfect
market hypothesis and the speculative bubble hypothesis. The first, sometimes
referred to as the “traditional speculation” hypothesis, argues that speculation helps
to stabilize prices by facilitating increased liquidity and improving price discovery
in the market. The second hypothesis claims that speculation tends to generate
spikes and instabilities because of a herd mentality in commodity exchanges. The
UNCTAD (2011) report elaborated the different types of herd behavior in detail
and explained how they can drive prices far away from their fundamentals. The
basic mechanism is that traders base their decisions on past price trends rather than
new information on market fundamentals. This situation makes it difficult for other
market participants to distinguish between fundamental causes of price increases
and the causes driven by herd behavior, thereby impeding the role of speculation
in price formation. Even informed traders may not be willing or able to intervene
to correct prices if they can benefit from a potential bubble or if their arbitrage
possibilities are limited. Herd behavior can therefore reinforce price increases,
which may also lead to excess correlation if bubbles spill over to related markets.
Despite some arguments against the importance of speculation in causing the
2007–2008 food price hikes (Irwin et al. 2009; Wright 2011), empirical evidence
shows the possibility of the speculative bubble hypothesis (Robles et al. 2009).
An increase in speculative activities raises the volume of futures trading, with a
consequent increase in futures prices and inventory accumulation. This will then
translate into an increase in spot prices. However, skepticism remains about the
link between volume of futures trading and futures prices. According to some
economists (such as Krugman 2008), speculation is a random bet, whereby traders’
buying and selling futures cancel each other out and hence do not have a significant
impact on futures prices. This theoretical skepticism is supported by a lack of
empirical evidence on the accumulation of inventory, especially in 2007–2008,
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when prices increased steeply. If speculative actions were responsible for the rise
in food prices, private inventories should have accumulated. On the contrary, a
substantial decline in global food stocks was registered. This fact has been used
to justify the assumption that speculation plays an insignificant role in causing
food price spikes (Krugman 2008). However, wheat and maize reserves in the
United States did not decline substantially during the 2007–2008 crisis (they
declined substantially after the crisis). And even when stocks decline because of
supply shortages and high prices, grain releases could have been higher without
speculation. This can be answered only by conducting an econometric analysis and
not simply by comparing stocks over time.
Another aspect of financialization refers to investors’ increasing use of
commodity futures contracts as part of their portfolio diversification strategy,
particularly when other asset classes become less attractive. This has produced rapid
growth in commodity index investments in recent years. According to the capital
asset pricing model, an optimal portfolio should include assets with low or negative
correlation with riskier high-return assets (such as equity). This strategy reduces the
overall portfolio risk. Hence, investors may choose commodity futures not because
they expect increasing commodity prices, but because commodity futures have the
potential to reduce their overall portfolio risk. In this view, commodities become
attractive if alternative assets (such as real estate, bonds, metals, and gold) become
too risky or expensive. This process can have significant economic consequences
for food commodity markets. On the one hand, the presence of commodity index
investors can facilitate the sharing of commodity price risk; on the other hand, their
portfolio rebalancing can spill price volatility across commodity markets (Tang and
Xiong 2012).
Both the theoretical and empirical skepticism require further explanations and
empirical analysis. The existing literature uses different approaches for identifying
empirical evidence. For instance, storage modeling and price threshold analyses
have been used to evaluate accumulation of stocks motivated by speculation
(Tadesse and Guttormsen 2011); Granger-causality analyses have been adopted to
investigate the relations between futures prices and spot prices (Robles et al. 2009).
In this study, we explore the price effects of (1) an “excessive” volume of futures
contracts based on the disaggregated position of futures traders and (2) a financial
crisis index developed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). The two financial variables,
together with a set of other fundamental drivers, may shed light on how different sets
of exogenous and endogenous variables affect price spikes and volatility. Our study
differs from other existing studies because it considers fundamental-based drivers
and financial market-based factors of price changes.
Other internal factors are (1) restrictive trade policies and (2) declining world
food stocks. A host of authors (Yang et al. 2008; Headey 2011; Martin and Anderson
2012) have shown that a sequence of export restrictions and bans implemented by
countries such as India, Thailand, China, and Russia caused panics in international
markets and exacerbated price increases. Trade restrictions are designed to curtail
the effects of higher global prices on domestic prices and to protect consumers.
From a country’s perspective, restrictive policies seem to have the desired effect:
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Domestic prices are shielded from the full impact of a steep price increase. However,
restrictive policies affect the world market negatively. When many countries restrict
exports, so much food disappears from the global market that prices rocket higher
than without government intervention. Inventory stock levels have a crucial role
in commodity pricing and at the same time are affected by commodity prices.
When prices are low, rational firms tend to store some units of the commodity, and
total demand equals demand for current consumption plus demand from inventory
holders. Thus positive inventory implies that total demand is more elastic than
demand for current use. When prices are high, storage is unprofitable, inventory
goes to zero, and total demand equals current-use demand.
3.3 Estimation Methods
We differentiate between price spikes, volatility, and trends. Since trends are
somewhat anticipated long-term price changes that have little relevance to food
crises, this study focuses only on price spikes and volatility.
A price spike is a large, quick, and temporary rise or fall in price following
a short-term shock. Price spikes can cause crises for consumers, investors, and
farmers. Food price spikes are usually measured using the logarithm of period-over-
period prices. Expressed as a formula:
d ln Pt D ln

Pt
Pt1

; (3.1)
where t D m  y, m denotes the month, and y denotes the year. To capture the
contemporaneous correlation of shocks across commodities, a seemingly unrelated
regression has been used to estimate spikes of maize, wheat, and soybean prices.4
The model is specified as:
d ln Pt D ˇRt C "t; (3.2)
where d ln Pt is a I  1 vector of price spikes (returns) with I number of commodities
identified as i D 1, 2, 3, : : : I; Rt is a vector of explanatory variables that include
monthly supply shocks, oil price spikes, economic shocks, beginning stock-to-use
ratios, and excessive volume of speculative futures; and "t D I  1 is the error term
where cov

"it; "jt
 ¤ 0 for i ¤ j. Some of the Rt are commodity specific, such
as supply shocks and excessive volumes of speculative futures, whereas others are
commodity nonspecific.
4Using a standard ordinary least squares model, however, gives similar results: signs and
significances, as well as the order of magnitude of the coefficients, remain the same.
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Monthly supply shocks are measured as log ratios of the US Department of
Agriculture forecasts on global production d ln Xt D ln

Xt
Xt1

, as the USDA
forecasts are widely recognized and play an important role in the price formation
process, which is influenced by monthly information on the available grain supply
in the current agricultural year. Economic shocks are calculated using the same
equation with monthly interpolated global GDP per capita (nominal). The stocks-to-
use ratio is the relationship between the beginning stocks (of the current agricultural
year) and consumption as forecasted by the USDA. Oil price spikes are estimated
using the same procedure as in the case of food commodity spikes (Eq. 3.1).
We have hypothesized that the effect of speculative activities on commodity
price dynamics depends on the extent of deviation between noncommercial and
commercial trading activities. However, many observers, including the US Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), have recognized that the distinction
between commercial and noncommercial is elusive, and hence it can be misleading
to measure speculation relative to hedging. One problem is that small speculators,
who may be influential as a whole, are exempted from certain reporting obligations.
Another shortcoming is that categorizing traders as noncommercial does not allow
for differentiating traders who speculate based on fundamentals from those who
engage in “irrational herding” (UNCTAD 2011). Both issues can lead to an underes-
timation of the impact of speculation due to irrational herding. Nevertheless, the data
on this broad classification of traders constitute the only publicly available source
and therefore provide the only possibility for approximating excessive speculation.
Previous studies (Irwin et al. 2009) have used the Working index to measure
the impact of speculation on food prices. The Working index tries to measure
speculation intensity relative to hedging activity. It is, however, insensitive to the net
positions of speculators—that is, whether they are net long or net short. Because, as
mentioned above, excessive net long speculation leads to price increases (and exces-
sive net short speculation leads to price decreases), we prefer to give equal weight
to commercial and noncommercial trading activities and to measure speculation
based on the deviation between the two types of trading activities. In a perfectly
competitive commodity market, there should be no deviation between commercial
and noncommercial trading activities. To meet commercial traders’ demand for
hedging, an equal number of noncommercial traders’ contracts is necessary at
most.5 However, we have observed a significant difference between commercial
and noncommercial positions. This could be associated with the existence of a
significant number of unsettled noncommercial positions for an extended period
of time, motivated by speculation and the increasing use of food commodities as an
asset class. Thus, using the excessive open interest of speculative futures seems
to be a more appropriate way of capturing the speculative effect than using the
5Fewer noncommercial traders are necessary if commercial traders can already match their
different short and long hedges, i.e., when a producer makes a contract with a processor.
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Working ratio. Technically, the extent of excessive speculative activities in month
t is expressed as:
ESVt D
PNt
dD1 Œ.NCLd  NCSd/ .CLd  CSd/
Nt
; (3.3)
with Nt denoting the number of days d in month t in which CFTC position data are
available. As the trading position data are published every Friday for the preceding
Tuesday, only four to five observations are available per month. NCL is the open
interest of noncommercial long positions in a trading day, NCS is the open interest
of noncommercial short positions in a trading day, CL is the open interest of
commercial long positions in a day, and CS is the open interest of commercial short
positions in a day.
Price volatility is a long-term price movement indicating the risk associated with
price changes. It is usually measured in terms of price dispersion from the mean.
Realized total volatility is measured in terms of the coefficient of price variations
(CV), which captures both monthly and yearly variability. The normal coefficient
of variation captures only the monthly price variability in a year. However, the
mean price changes from year to year, and thus inter-year price variability cannot
be captured. To capture both changes, we divided each year’s standard deviation by
the mean price of the entire sample. This allows us to measure variability relative to
a common price level.
CVy D
P12
mD1

Pm  Py
2
PT
tD0 Pt
T
12
; (3.4)
where y indicates year, m month, and t month by year.
This metric does not measure the direction of price changes but rather evaluates
price risks. This means that high variability does not necessarily reflect high prices.
Realized total volatility is the sum of high- and low-frequency volatility (Peterson
and Tombek 2005; Karali and Power 2009; Roache 2010). While high-frequency
volatility is related to price spikes, low-frequency volatility is related to the cyclical
movement of agricultural prices. Since high-frequency volatility is already modeled
in the price spikes equation, we do not disaggregate volatility into its high- and low-
frequency components. Instead we attempt to explain the realized total volatility
using the percentage of annual standard deviation from the long-term average price.
Volatility is estimated using a panel regression in which commodities are
represented as panels and years as time variable. Two alternative specifications
have been adopted: ordinary least squares (OLS) and feasible generalized least
squares (FGLS). The first, which assumes no heterogeneity across commodities,
is expressed as:
Viy D ˛ C ˇ0Xiy C "iy; (3.5)
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where i and y denote commodities and years, respectively, and X consists of the
aforementioned explanatory variables—that is, supply shocks, volatility of oil price,
global nominal economic growth rates, beginning stock-to-use ratios, excessive
speculative futures volume, and an annual financial crisis indicator (an alternative
to speculation). The supply shock variable is defined as the normalized deviation of
total annual production from its long-term trend; this is to account for the market
size of each commodity. Normalized supply shocks are given by SS D jQtHQtjHQt ,
where Qt is the world production for each specific commodity and HQt is the
Hodrick–Prescott smoothed production time series. The results derived from the
production series using the Hodrick–Prescott filter have a similar distribution to
those obtained using other time-series filters, such as Baxter-King, Butterworth, and
Christiane-Fitzgerald. However, the Hodrick–Prescott filter is preferred to the others
because it considers extreme values (Baum 2006). All the variables in this equation
are measured annually.
The FGLS specification with fixed effects controls for heterogeneity among
commodities and is expressed as
Viy D ˛ C ˇ0Xiy C i C "iy; (3.6)
where i denotes the fixed effect.
A price trigger model has been designed to complete the empirical assessment
and to account for endogenous shock amplifiers. The impact of a price trigger at
high prices might be different from that at low prices. When prices are getting
high, markets are expected be more sensitive to a shock than when prices are
low. This effect is sometimes referred to as the tipping effect. The tipping effect
is estimated using a quantile regression in order to capture the effect of explanatory
variables at lower and upper tips of the response variable (Koenker and Hallock
2001). Put differently, it measures how an explanatory variable affects the  th
quantile of the response variable as opposed to the mean value of the response
variable in OLS. It gives a comparison of the effect at the upper and lower tail
of the price distribution. Equations (3.2) and (3.4) are estimated at the  th quantile,
where  2 f0:05; 0:15; 0:25; : : : ; 0:95g. If a variable is significant and has a higher
effect at the upper tail, the variable indeed triggers price changes. In the price spike
equation, the lower quantiles represent negative values, and the upper quantiles
positive values. In the volatility equation, both the lower and upper quantile are
positive values, with the upper quantiles denoting higher values.
3.4 Data
The nominal prices of maize, wheat, soybeans, and crude oil were obtained from
the World Bank database (World Bank 2011). We used current prices quoted as
“US No. 2 yellow f.o.b.” for maize; “US HRW” for wheat, “c.i.f. Rotterdam” for
soybeans, and “average spot prices of Brent, Dubai, and West Texas” for crude oil.
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Nominal prices were chosen because of the lack of an accurate consumer price index
for deflating world prices. Although different sample periods are used for different
analyses, most of the datasets are based on data from 1986 to 2009. Position data
before 1986 are unavailable.
Data for annual supply shock estimation were collected from the FAO (2011)—
specifically, annual production data of the major producing countries. Data for
monthly supply shocks were obtained from the world agricultural supply and
demand estimates published monthly by the USDA.6 Open interest of futures
trading of the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) was obtained from the CFTC
for maize, wheat, and soybeans.7 The CFTC reports disaggregated open interest
of futures trading positions into long and short and spread by commercial and
noncommercial participants. Since a spread represents the equal value of long
and short positions, it is not included in our calculation of excessive speculative
activities.
3.5 Results and Discussion
3.5.1 Determinants of Food Price Spikes
Table 3.1 presents the results of the seemingly unrelated regression estimates for
different time periods. Production is led by 1 month as markets are assumed to
anticipate supply shocks shortly before the USDA publishes its estimates; this is a
result of private market research and information acquisition.8 As expected, price
spikes are negatively correlated with (anticipated) supply shocks and positively
correlated with economic growth (demand) shocks. The results show the positive
and significant effect of excessive speculative activities on food price spikes,
although the anticipation of supply and demand shocks is already controlled for. The
extent of excessive speculation is significant both before and after 2000; however,
the effect is stronger after 2000. A strong belief exists among financial practitioners
that speculative activity became detrimental only after 2000, when commodity
markets were deregulated and financialization intensified (UNCTAD 2011). For
example, Gheit (2008), Masters (2008), and Frenk (2010) among others, argued
that since the introduction of the 2000 Commodity Futures Modernization Act,
“speculative money” has been flowing into commodity derivatives, which in turn
drives commodity spot prices up and down far beyond their fundamental values.
Our results, together with the research of Gilbert (2010) and Henderson et al. (2012),
provide further evidence of this claim.
6Data are available at http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/MannUsda/viewDocumentInfo.do?
documentID=1194 (accessed February 18, 2013).
7Data are available at http://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/CommitmentsofTraders/
HistoricalCompressed/index.htm (accessed February 18, 2013).
8The anticipation effect vanishes, however, for a lead of 2 or more months.
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Table 3.1 Seemingly unrelated regression results on food price spikes (coefficients and z-values)
1986–2009 1986–1999 2000–2009
Maize price spike
Production shock (%), led 0.8607*** 0.8124*** 1.1293**
(3.84) (3.46) (2.23)
Speculation (1000 contracts) 0.000070*** 0.000072*** 0.000086***
(8.00) (7.34) (4.73)
Beginning stock-to-use ratio 0.0004 0.0005 0.0016
(0.84) (0.96) (1.11)
Oil price spike (%) 0.0146 0.0623 0.0958*
(0.44) (1.59) (1.69)
GDP shocks (%) 1.2333* 0.2324 1.8303*
(1.73) (0.23) (1.67)
Constant 0.0204** 0.0208** 0.0439
(2.12) (2.04) (1.54)
Wheat price spike
Production shock (%), led 1.4537*** 0.2039 2.7769***
(2.93) (0.39) (3.21)
Speculation (1000 contracts) 0.000206*** 0.000295*** 0.000387***
(5.37) (7.40) (3.44)
Beginning stock-to-use ratio 0.0006 0.0020 0.0032**
(0.64) (1.60) (2.17)
Oil price spike (%) 0.0375 0.0631* 0.1277**
(1.05) (1.70) (2.13)
GDP shocks (%) 2.0971** 0.1329 2.5479**
(2.42) (0.12) (2.02)
Constant 0.0034 0.0674** 0.0799**
(0.15) (2.48) (2.27)
Soybean price spike
Production shock (%), led 0.3413** 0.3218 0.4052**
(2.45) (1.08) (2.45)
Speculation (1000 contracts) 0.000083*** 0.000080*** 0.000136***
(5.98) (4.99) (3.66)
Beginning stock-to-use ratio 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001
(0.47) (0.16) (0.13)
Oil price spike (%) 0.0614** 0.0155 0.1514***
(2.07) (0.44) (2.98)
GDP shocks (%) 1.9804*** 1.5647 1.6171*
(2.92) (1.45) (1.68)
(continued)
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Table 3.1 (continued)
1986–2009 1986–1999 2000–2009
Constant 0.0204* 0.0157 0.0145
(1.87) (0.98) (0.71)
R2 0.24 0.32 0.21
N 304 167 137
Note: Dependent variable: maize, wheat, and soybean price spike. ***, **, * denote that the level of
significance is at 1, 5, and 10 %, respectively. Values in parentheses are t-values. All variables refer
to monthly data; spikes and shocks (in %) denote therefore the deviation of that variable from the
level in the previous month. Production shocks are led by 1 month as significance and explanatory
power increases. The coefficients for production shock, oil price shock, and GDP shocks can be
interpreted as elasticities (percentage change of commodity price due to a percentage change of
the respective explanatory variable). Speculation refers to the excessive speculation index given in
Eq. (3.3)
Table 3.2 Historic quantitative impact of speculation on price spikes
Maize (%) Wheat (%) Soybean (%)
Price spike due to one standard deviation
increase in speculation
2:2 1:6 1:4
Average monthly price spike due to
speculation during July 2007 and June 2008
3:2 0:2 1:8
Compound (12-month) price spike due to
speculation during July 2007 and June 2008
37:9 2:5 22:1
Note: The first row was calculated by multiplying the standard deviation of speculation by the
respective speculation coefficient in Table 3.1 for the full sample. The second row was calculated
by multiplying the average monthly speculation volume between July 2007 and June 2008 with
the respective speculation coefficient in Table 3.1; for the third row, the value of the second row
was multiplied by the number of months (12)
Although the coefficient of speculation variable is smallest for maize and largest
for wheat, the variation of speculation is much larger for maize than for wheat.
Table 3.2 shows the impact that one standard deviation change in speculation has on
spikes, showing that maize price spikes are more affected by speculation than wheat
price spikes. Regarding the role of speculation in the 2007–2008 crisis, excessive
speculation predicts that, all other things being equal, maize price increased by
approximately 38 % within the 12 months following July 2007, but wheat price
increased by only less than 3 %. These numbers must, however, be treated with
caution because not only is speculation caused by exogenous (financial market)
events, but it is also endogenous to price expectations. By considering anticipated
information on market fundamentals, speculation could be endogenous to other
factors that influence price expectations, such as export bans. These factors are
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difficult to control for. Financial market shocks, however, clearly constitute a part of
the exogenous elements in the speculation variable.9
The results further suggest that anticipated production fluctuations play an
important role in causing short-term food price spikes. Supply shocks measured
using USDA monthly forecasts were found to be statistically significant in most
of the estimations. Production shocks were included to represent extreme weather
conditions or flood outbreaks, which could lead to supply shortfalls in one part of
the world and higher price expectations in other parts of the world. For example, a
flood in Australia may affect the amount of food supply from Australia as well as
farmers’ and traders’ price expectations in Europe or the United States. These effects
were expected to cause temporary price spikes. The results confirm that expectations
on production influence prices. Thus, short-term price spikes are partly created by
information about supply relating to weather events.
Oil price spikes have increasing effects on food price spikes over time (Table 3.1).
Before 2000, the effect was insignificant or negative (in the case of wheat). After
2000, however, it became positive and statistically significant for maize, wheat, and
soybean prices. As mentioned above, oil prices are linked to food prices through
demand (biofuels), supply channels (cost of production), and increased index fund
activities. The significant impact of oil prices on food prices in recent years suggests
that demand factors and financialization dynamics are more relevant in explaining
price increases than supply factors. The United States accounts for about 40 % of
the world’s maize production. In 2010, about 40 % of the total US maize harvest
was consumed by ethanol producers (USDA 2013). Increasing demand for biofuel
affects prices through not only a direct conversion of food crops to feedstock,
but also the reallocation of production resources (such as land and water) to the
production of biofuel commodities. Reallocation of production resources affects
non-biofuel food commodities as well. The link between oil and food prices is
a more important factor in causing short-term food price spikes than the actual
scarcity caused by biofuel demand. When energy prices are linked to food prices,
political, environmental, and commercial shocks can easily translate to food crises.
Stock-to-use ratios are insignificant, except for wheat since 2000; low wheat stocks
increased the magnitude of price spikes.
9There are two standard approaches to dealing with endogeneity: lagging variables and instrument
variables. In our case, both are problematic. A 1-month lag is already too long for data on
speculation; financial markets operate on a daily basis, and speculative activities in the preceding
month should not have any impacts on price spikes. Selection of appropriate instrument variables
that explain speculation volume due to financial market shocks should be guided by a portfolio
model, such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). This model, however, considers complex
relationships between expected returns, variances, and covariances among many different assets,
which cannot be subsumed under a linear combination of a few financial market variables.
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3.5.2 Food Price Volatility
A panel analysis is used to quantify the relative importance of supply, demand,
and financial shocks in affecting food price volatility. The explanatory variables
included in this volatility equation are the same as for food price spikes, except for
two differences. First, the variables are measured on an annual basis. For example,
the normalized supply shock, the GDP growth, and the beginning stock-to-use ratios
are calculated using annual data; excessive speculation is calculated based on the
number of marketing days in a year; and oil price volatility is measured based
on annual coefficients of variation. Second, the financial crisis index developed by
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) is also included in the equation. This index combines
measures of banking crises, foreign debt defaults, domestic debt defaults, inflation
crises, and exchange rate crises. The index serves as a proxy for financialization
and speculation in the commodity futures market, and hence speculation and the
financial crisis index are used as alternatives.
The different estimates of the models are presented in Table 3.3. A comparison
of the effect of an excessive volume of futures trading and the financial crisis
index on volatility indicates the importance of commodity-specific and common
economic factors in affecting food prices. The result clearly shows the insignificance
of futures trading on volatility, which is in contrast with the results of the price spikes
estimation. This underlines the importance of distinguishing between volatility and
spikes in this type of analysis. Conversely, the effect of the financial crisis index is
significant and robust across all specifications, implying that the financial crisis is
more relevant in explaining food price volatility than excessive futures trading.10 It
is worth noting that in terms of elasticity, a 1 % increase in the financial crisis index
caused price volatility to rise by about 0.40 % in the OLS estimation and 0.35 %
in the FGLS estimation. The positive relationship between the financial crisis index
and food price volatility implies the significance of food commodities as financial
instruments. When banks, sovereign debt, and exchange rates experience a crisis,
the food market will enter a crisis too.
The normalized supply shock variable has a statistically significant effect on
food price volatility when the restriction of homogeneity is imposed. The variable
was determined not to be significant when the restriction is relaxed. This could
be because heterogeneous production shocks can offset each other (because of
geographical variation) without affecting price volatility. In the presence of homo-
geneity, extreme weather events exert an effect on food crises and agricultural risks.
The results show that when significant, oil prices and GDP—which can be
regarded mainly as demand-side shocks—are more meaningful in explaining food
10We also estimated the models using the lagged values of the speculation and financial crisis
variables. Although this is a convenient way to technically correct for endogeneity, the economic
sense behind this choice is questionable because it implies that 1-year lagged financial variables
can influence current price volatility. For this reason, we prefer to consider only the current values
of all the variables.
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price volatility than market shocks (speculative volumes and financial crisis) and
supply-side shocks (Table 3.3). This is because the marginal effect of oil price
and GDP growth on food price volatility is higher than that of speculation and
supply shocks. Specifically, a 1 % increase in oil price volatility caused food price
volatility to rise by 0.42–0.45 % when the model controls for speculation. When
the financial index is included, volatility rose by 0.43–0.50 %. A 1 % upsurge in
global growth rates generated an increase in food price volatility of 0.56 and 0.45 %
when the model controls for speculation. The variable becomes insignificant when
considering the financial crisis. The importance of oil prices in explaining food
price spikes and volatility suggests that food and energy markets have become more
interwoven.
The variable stock-to-use ratio turns out to be insignificant in explaining food
price volatility. As described in the theoretical section, the effect of exogenous
shocks depends on the economic and political environment. If the stock-to-use ratio
is low in times of financial and environmental shocks, exogenous shocks may well
have a greater impact than when stocks are high. As we control for exogenous
shocks in the models, the direct impact of stocks on volatility might vanish. This
may suggest that the stock-to-use ratio is an amplifier or intermediate variable that
reflects the effect of supply and demand shocks on food price volatility.
In sum, the determinants of price spikes and price volatility are somehow
different, at least in terms of the degree of significance and the magnitude of
marginal effects. Market-related shocks (speculation) affect price spikes much more
than demand- and supply-side shocks. In contrast, demand-side shocks (oil prices
and GDP) lead to higher price volatility than market- and supply-side shocks.
3.5.3 Food Price Trigger
Recent discussions about food prices noted the possibility of a tipping point where
the market may stop responding “normally” to market changes, opting instead to
exaggerate and overreact. In order to identify triggers and test the tipping-point
hypothesis, we estimated a series of quantile regressions for both the price spike
and the volatility equations. The quantile regressions indicate the price or volatility
levels at which the dynamics of price spikes and price volatility change (or whether
the dynamics estimated in Tables 3.1 and 3.3 are robust for all price and volatility
levels). In the price spike equation, the effects of oil prices, speculative futures
trading, and supply shocks are compared at both higher and lower prices. In the
volatility equation, the effects of supply shocks, oil price volatility, and the financial
crisis index are compared at both lower and higher volatility. The tips in the price
spike and price volatility equation are therefore different. In the price spike equation,
the upper tip denotes the highest price, but in the price volatility equation, a high
quantile signifies high volatility.
The results are presented in Figs. 3.3 and 3.4. The figures show the marginal
effects of the explanatory variables on the response variables at different level
of quantiles. The line graphs indicate point estimates, and the shaded regions
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Sects. 3.3 and 3.4. Note: The middle line shows the coefficient which explains price spikes using
(a) oil price shocks, (b) production shocks, (c) excessive speculation, and (d) stock-to-use ratios.
The quantile regression shows the coefficients for different quantiles of commodity price spikes.
At low quantiles, the corresponding coefficient shows the impact on price spikes when price spikes
are low; at high quantiles, the corresponding coefficient shows the impact on price spikes when
price spikes are already high. Shaded regions are the 95 % confidence intervals, and the line in the
middle is the coefficient
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show the 95 % confidence intervals. A variable is defined as a trigger if the
confidence intervals do not include zero values in the shaded region and if the
line graph is visibly increasing (a positive relationship between food price and
variable) or decreasing (a negative relationship between food price and the variable)
as the quantile increases. The results of triggering price spikes are mixed. Of all
the variables included in the price spike equation (Fig. 3.3), the trigger effect is
evident only when maize or wheat production experiences a shock, or when there
is speculation on maize. Other variables such as oil prices and stock-to-use ratio
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have no trigger effects, as depicted by flat and insignificant marginal values over
quantiles.
The effect of production shocks on price spikes generally becomes stronger as the
quantile increases, except in the case of soybeans. This result could imply that the
USDA production forecasts have a larger impact on price movements when prices
are high rather than low. Thus, production shocks are a significant contributor to
food price spikes.
The u-shaped curve visible in the quantile regressions for speculation sug-
gests that speculation is more important in times of extreme price dynamics. An
increasing price trend, driven by changes in fundamentals (commodity demand
and supply), gives rise to market nervousness, causing speculators to overheat the
market. Speculation is also observed to have a strong impact on price spikes at lower
quantiles of price spikes. This is an indication of the stabilizing effect of speculation
when markets are calm. When markets are flooded, since the lower spike quantiles
are negative values, an increase in speculative activities restores market prices. In
sum, speculation has the capacity to create price hikes and reduce price slumps.
The results from the volatility quantile regression suggest the importance of oil
prices in triggering food price volatility (Fig. 3.4). The effects of supply shocks,
stock-to-use ratio, and global GDP growth also increase over quantiles, but they
are all statistically insignificant. The evidence also shows that financial crises and
speculation do not necessarily trigger volatility, in contrast to price spikes as shown
in the quantile analysis above.
Oil prices have remained a primary factor in causing extreme volatility in food
prices. Apart from being affected by production costs and biofuel-related demand,
food price volatility is also affected by oil prices through a real income effect. This
is because of oil prices’ dominant impact on the overall economy. The trigger effect
may be associated with the interaction between these effects. All the effects are
evident at the higher level of food prices.
3.6 Conclusion
This study has investigated the main drivers of food price spikes and volatility for
wheat, maize, and soybeans. It has also shown how these factors trigger a crisis
when there are extreme price changes. The analysis has indicated that exogenous
shocks as well as the linkages between food, energy, and financial markets play a
significant role in explaining food price volatility and price spikes.
In addition to demand and supply shocks, speculation is an important factor
in explaining and triggering extreme price spikes. Excessive speculation is more
strongly associated with price spikes at extreme positive price changes rather
than negative price changes. This implies that the stabilizing effect of speculation
(generated through price discovery) is smaller than its destabilizing effect (generated
through creating market bubbles).
The results also confirm that supply shocks are reflected in price spikes and that
oil price shocks affect price risk more than they affect food crises. The effect of oil
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prices on food price spikes has become significant only in recent years. Financial
crisis exerts a strong impact on food price volatility, which confirms that the link
between financial and commodity markets is becoming stronger.
On the basis of the empirical results, it seems opportune for policymakers to
prevent excessive speculative behaviors in the commodity market in order to reduce
price spikes and prevent short-term food crises. In this context, policymakers could
put caps on trading in extreme market situations or impose a tax on food commodity
futures trading, along the lines of the Tobin tax. Designing flexible biofuel policies
that are responsive to the food supply situation can also help stabilize prices and
reduce volatility spillovers from oil markets in times of a food crisis. Recent changes
in the US biofuel mandate, for example, include flexibility mechanisms that allow
for relaxing the blending requirement in a certain year if compensated for in another
year.
Improving the market information base would further help all market actors to
form their expectations based on fundamentals and to detect shortages early. While
the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS), an initiative of the G20, strives
for higher transparency, contributions from some of the member states are still
insufficient.
Recently, many countries are increasing their national grain stocks to reduce
domestic volatility and import dependency, leading to an increased grain scarcity
and in turn higher grain prices in the short term. International levels of storage,
however, are only one of the options to reduce volatility, and they turned out to be
mostly insignificant in our analyses. One reason might be the lack of cooperation
between countries: The governments which build stocks only for their citizens tend
to complement storage policies with trade restrictions, effectively withdrawing their
stocks from the global grain market. Such failure to act collectively needs to be
addressed in regional and global trade talks. The international consequences of
national stock-holding policies should also be discussed during these talks.
Besides policies to reduce volatility and prevent extreme price spikes, govern-
ments can improve the resilience of producers and consumers to price changes. This
can be achieved by supporting contract farming and price insurance mechanisms on
the production side and by enhancing safety nets and access to financial services on
the consumer side.
Governments and their international associations such as the G20 should there-
fore carefully analyze all available options for preventing food price spikes and
volatility—from interventions in financial markets to biofuel policies—and they
should also facilitate market information.
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4The Effects of Southern Hemisphere CropProduction on Trade, Stocks, and Price
Integration
Joseph W. Glauber and Mario J. Miranda
4.1 Introduction
The past 35 years have witnessed a rapid expansion of grain and oilseed production
in the southern hemisphere, particularly in South America. Expanded land use and
increased productivity have propelled southern hemisphere exports from accounting
for about 20 % of world soybean exports in 1980 to over 50 % in 2010 (Fig. 4.1).
Over the same period, southern hemisphere maize exports grew from 18 to 33 %
and wheat exports from 15 to 25 %. Over this period, Brazil has become the world’s
largest soybean exporter and the second-largest maize exporter.
Projected grain and oilseed trends by various forecasters (USDA 2015; FAPRI
2014; FAO-OECD 2014) point to expected continued growth by southern hemi-
sphere producers over the next 10 years. Moreover, to meet world food needs by
2050, FAO concludes that much of the needed production gains will have to come
from South America and sub-Saharan Africa where there remain potential supplies
of arable land and where yields lag potential (Bruinsma 2011; Alexandratos and
Bruinsma 2012).
The growth of southern hemisphere production is significant, not only for the
increased supplies to meet world food needs but also because it effectively shortens
the crop growing cycle by 6 months. Since production seasons for most grains
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Fig. 4.1 Share of global soybean exports. Source: US Department of Agriculture Production,
Supply, and Distribution Database
and oilseeds are largely counter-seasonal to the northern hemisphere, southern
hemisphere producers can react rapidly to production shortfalls in the northern
hemisphere. For example, in response to the widespread North American drought in
the summer of 2012, Brazilian producers planted a record of 15.8 million hectares
of maize, which provided needed supplies to a tight world market and helped to
reduce price volatility.
What is less well understood, however, is the effect of the growth of southern
hemisphere production on trade, inventories, and pricing. For example, how do
shifts in production and consumption affect intraseasonal patterns of trade between
the northern and southern hemispheres? Are there stronger incentives to hold stocks
in one hemisphere and does this vary seasonally? How are seasonal price patterns
affected in importing and exporting countries when the share of production and
consumption shifts between hemispheres? Lastly, how closely are prices integrated
between exporting and importing markets when new supplies are available to the
market every 6 months?
Our objective is to gain a clearer understanding of how cross-hemispheric
shifts in agricultural production over the past two decades have affected trade
patterns, global price relationships, and stockholding. In our running example, the
commodity is soybean, and the major producer-exporters are the USA and South
America (Brazil and Argentina).
4.2 TheModel
Consider a storable agricultural commodity called “beans.” The global bean market
consists of two major exporting countries (i D 1; 2) and the rest of the world or,
more simply, the “world market” (i D 0). Beans are produced, consumed, and stored
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in the two exporting countries. Although production and stockholding may occur in
the rest of the world, the rest of the world is treated as a net consumer of the exports
generated by the exporters.
Time t is measured not in years but in semiannual periods. Harvesting occurs in
the period after planting. Exporter i D 1 plants in odd periods and harvests in the
subsequent even period; exporter i D 2 plants in even periods and harvests in the
subsequent odd period. The model is driven by a single exogenous random variable
eyti and random new production in period t in exporting country i. Since planting
periods alternate between the two exporting countries,eyit is zero if i D 1 and t is
odd or if i D 2 and t is even.
The model features the following endogenous variables: pti, market price, year t,
region i D 0; 1; 2; cti, consumption, year t, country i D 1; 2; qti, availability at
beginning of year t, country i D 1; 2; xti, exports to the world market, year t, country
i D 1; 2; and zti, ending stocks, year t, country i D 1; 2. Market equilibrium is
governed by the following six sets of relations:
Material Balance. Each period t begins with predetermined quantities of beans
available in each of the two exporting countries; these quantities must either be
consumed, exported, or stored:
qti D cti C xti C zti; i D 1; 2: (4.1)
Trade Balance. Total exports to the world market must meet the demand for
imports in the rest of the world at the equilibrium world price:
xt1 C xt2 D ˛0  ˇ0pt0: (4.2)
Here, ˛0 > 0 and ˇ0 > 0.
Regional Demand. The quantities consumed in each of the exporting countries
must meet the demand for consumption in those countries at the local equilibrium
prices:
cti D ˛i  ˇipti; i D 1; 2; : (4.3)
Here, ˛i > 0 and ˇi > 0.
Spatial price equilibrium. Competition among profit-maximizing exporters guar-
antees that arbitrage profit opportunities from exporting are eliminated in each of the
exporting countries:
xt0  0 ? pt0  pti C i; i D 1; 2: (4.4)
Here, i indicates the unit cost of exporting to the rest of the world from country
i D 1; 2. Also, the symbol ? indicates that both inequalities must hold and at least
one must hold with equality.
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Intertemporal Price Equilibrium. Competition among expected profit-
maximizing storers guarantees that expected arbitrage profit opportunities from
storing are eliminated in the exporting countries:
zti  0 ? ıEtptC1;i  pti C ›i; i D 1; 2: (4.5)
Here, ›i indicates the unit cost of storing between periods in country i D 1; 2
and ı is the biannual discount factor.
Availability. The quantities available at the beginning of next period in each of
the exporting countries equal the sum of the quantities stored in the current period
and new production:
qtC1;1 D
8
<
:
zt1 CeytC1;1 t odd
zt1 t even
(4.6)
and
qtC1;2 D
8
<
:
zt2 t odd
zt2 CeytC1;2 t even:
(4.7)
We assume that the model is annually stationary. That is, although model
parameters may vary across semiannual periods within years, they do not vary
from year to year. We also assume that new productions are serially and spatially
uncorrelated, stationary, and lognormal distributed with means yi > 0 and standard
deviations i > 0 in the country i D 1; 2.
4.3 Numerical Solution Strategy
Under the specified assumptions, equilibrium market prices are functions of the
availabilities in the two exporting countries:
pti D
8
<
:
f1i .qt1; qt2/ ; t odd
f2i .qt1; qt2/ ; t even
; i D 0; 1; 2 (4.8)
so that under rational expectations,
EtptC1;i D
8
<
:
EQy1 f2i .zt1 Cey1; zt2/ ; t odd
EQy2 f1i .zt1; zt2 Cey2/ ; t even:
; i D 1; 2: (4.9)
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The equilibrium price functions f are characterized by a system of functional
equations that do not possess a known closed-form solution. However, the price
functions may be computed to any desired degree of accuracy using collocation
methods for standard functional equations. In particular, we construct finite-
dimensional approximations of the form
fi .q1; q2/ 
X
jD1;2;:::;n
cijj .q1; q2/ (4.10)
for i D 0; 1; 2, where the cij are a set of 3n coefficients to be determined and
the j are cubic spline basis functions. The coefficients are fixed by requiring the
price function approximants to satisfy the equilibrium conditions, not at all possible
points in their domain, but rather at n prescribed collocation nodes. This poses a
finite-dimensional root-finding problem that may be solved using standard nonlinear
equation methods, such as the Newton’s method or function iteration (see Miranda
and Fackler 2002).
4.4 Model Simulations
The global market is simulated using Monte Carlo methods to assess the impact
of key model parameters on the performance of key model variables. Generally
speaking, we are interested in the effects of (a) shifts in global production, (b)
changes in market integration, and (c) synchronicity of production on intra- and
interannual price variability and stockholding.
Our simulations are designed to address two major questions. First, how does
producing half of the world’s yearly bean output in period 1 and half in period 2
affect carryout compared to a world where most of the bean production takes place
in one period or the other? Presumably, if production is split equally between periods
(and thus equally between exporting countries), carryout in the exporting country
would be lower during the harvest period than if the country were the dominant
producer. Second, how does this scenario affect inter-seasonal price differences?
With one dominant producer, inter-seasonal price differences show full carrying
charges. Does this hold when both countries are of the same size or will bean prices
in one country rise only to fall when the harvest from the other country enters the
market?
Base case model parameters are initially calibrated to reflect the global soybean
market conditions in 2014 with quantities and prices normalized to 1 (see Table 4.1).
More specifically, in the model, expected annual world production equals 1, and
total annual world demand at a price of 1 equals 1. The semiannual discount factor
ı is assumed to equal 0.975.
Table 4.2 shows the average soybean production, consumption, and exports
during the periods 1990–1994, 2000–2004, and 2010–2014. In addition, it shows
the average production, consumption, and exports in the period 2020–2024; these
figures are obtained through simulation under expected prevailing conditions
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Table 4.1 Base case
parameters Parameter USA
South
America
Rest of the
world (ROW)
A1990–2004 0:163 0:117 0.220
A2000–2004 0:130 0:144 0.260
A2010–2014 0:093 0:152 0.255
A2020–2024 0:079 0:159 0.263
ˇ 0:20 0:20 0.25
d 0:10 0:10 0.10
K 0:01 0:01 –
 0:15 0:15 –
¶1990–1994 0:489 0:301 0.210
¶2000–2004 0:396 0:441 0.163
¶2010–2014 0:333 0:507 0.160
¶2020–2024 0:295 0:575 0.130
 y 0:18 0:18 –
Table 4.2 Production and consumption shares in the four scenarios
1990–1994 2000–2004 2010–2014 2020–2024
Global production (mil tonnes) 116:8 192:1 274:3 344:2
Global consumption (mil tonnes) 116:6 188:1 265:8 342:6
Share of global production
USA (%) 48:9 39:6 33:3 29:5
South America (%) 30:8 45:2 52:3 57:5
ROW (%) 20:3 15:2 14:3 13:0
Share of global consumption
USA (%) 32:5 25:9 18:6 15:7
South America (%) 24:2 30:1 31:7 31:8
ROW (%) 43:2 44:0 49:7 52:5
Production as a percent of consumption
USA (%) 150:4 156:2 184:8 188:9
South America (%) 127:2 153:1 170:4 181:6
ROW (%) 47:2 35:3 29:7 24:8
Source: USDA, PSD Database, and ERS. 2015 International Long-Term Projection to 2024
according to the US Department of Agriculture’s International Baseline Projections
(2015).
Three major trends have characterized the soybean market over the past 20 years.
First, production and consumption have expanded rapidly. Over the period 1990–
1994 to 2010–2014, global soybean production and consumption increased by over
4 % per year. Over the next 10 years, soybean production and consumption growth
is expected to decline to about 2.5 % annually, even though the figure is still strong
compared to growth rates of other grains.
Second, the growth in soybean production has occurred largely in South America.
While the USA accounted for almost half of the world’s soybean production during
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the period 1990–1994, by 2010–2014, it accounted for only about one-third of
the global production. Over the same period, South American production rose
from 30.8 % of the global production in 1990–1994 to over 52 % in 2010–2014.
Production in the rest of the world (ROW) fell from about 20 % of global production
in 1990–1994 to about 14 % in 2010–2014.
Lastly, growth in soybean consumption has occurred largely in South America
and ROW. The US share of global soybean consumption fell from 32.5 % in 1990–
1994 to less than 19 % in 2010–2014. During the same period, the ROW’s share of
the global consumption grew, and its share of global production declined, causing
the self-sufficiency rate (production divided by consumption) of the ROW to fall
from 47 % in to under 30 %.
In the simulations that follow, we consider four stylized scenarios corresponding
to historical production and consumption shares for the three regions. In the first
scenario (“1990–1994”), global production shares were calibrated to reflect 1990–
1994 historical levels where roughly 49 % of the world’s soybeans were produced in
the USA and 31 % in South America. In the “2000–2004” scenario, the global share
of the US production declined to 40 %, while South America accounted for 45 %
of the world’s production. In the “2010–2014” scenario, soybean production in the
USA accounted for about 33 % of global production, while soybean production
in South America rose to 52 %. Lastly, we consider a scenario taken from the
US Department of Agriculture’s 10-year agricultural baseline projections (“2020–
2024”), in which the US share of global production is projected to be 30 %, while the
South American share is projected at 58 % (USDA 2015). While simulations under
these stylized scenarios should not be interpreted as historical, they are structured
to reflect the growth of South American soybean production so as to simulate the
impact of that growth on global trade flows, inventory, and pricing relationships.
4.5 Impact of Shifting Production on Trade
Table 4.3 shows the simulated effects of shifts in regional production and consump-
tion on seasonal trade flows between the USA and South America and the ROW. As
production shifts to South America, trade shifts as well. In the 1990–1994 scenario,
in which US soybean production accounted for about 49 % of the global production,
the global share of US exports amounted to almost 71 %. As production shifts to
South America, the US production share falls to about 30 % by 2020–2024 and the
export share falls to about 35 %.
Over the same period, as soybean consumption grew faster than production in
the ROW, imports from the two major production regions to the ROW grew as well,
and the imports are higher in fall. Our highly stylized model assumed that the ROW
consumes its domestic production prior to importing.1 As self-sufficiency rates fall
1In reality, many importing countries import year round due to insufficient domestic production,
high transportation costs, or other factors.
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Table 4.3 Effects of shifts in production on trade patterns
1990–1994 (%) 2000–2004 (%) 2010–2014 (%) 2020–2024 (%)
Share of total exports
USA 70:7 47.0 42.0 35.1
South America 29:3 53.0 58.0 64.9
Share of ROW imports
Fall 19:5 30.2 34.2 35.1
Spring 80:5 69.8 65.8 64.9
Share of spring exports
USA 66:4 39.5 31.3 17.2
South America 33:6 60.5 68.7 82.8
Share of fall exports
USA 88:6 64.4 62.5 63.4
South America 11:4 35.6 37.5 36.6
Share of US exports
Fall 24:4 41.4 50.9 69.9
Spring 75:6 58.6 49.1 30.1
Share of South American exports
Fall 7:6 17.2 22.1 21.8
Spring 92:4 82.8 77.9 78.2
to less than 25 % in the 2020–2024 period, 35 % of ROW total imports are estimated
to occur in the fall compared to just 20 % in the 1990–1994 period.
In the 1990–1994 period, the USA dominated the soybean trade, accounting for
two-thirds of spring exports and almost 89 % of fall exports. Over three-quarters of
US exports occurred in spring. By contrast, South American exports occur largely
following their harvest in the spring with less than 8 % of total exports occurring in
the fall.
Increased ROW imports in the fall and increased South American production
in the spring led to a pronounced shift in the pattern of exports from the United
States and South America. In the 2020–2024 period, South America dominates the
soybean export market in spring, accounting for almost 83 % of global exports. US
exports continue to dominate the fall; however, South American exports account for
almost 37 % of total trade in the fall compared with only 11 % during the 1990–1994
period.
How do the simulated results compare to empirical data? Figure 4.2 shows
the seasonal pattern of actual soybean imports to China from the 2009/2010 to
2013/2014 marketing years. The data mirror the simulated results. While the
seasonal import pattern is less pronounced in the empirical data, China, on average,
tended to import more soybeans in the second half (55 %) than in the first half of a
year, when domestic crops in China are harvested. Chinese imports from the USA
mostly occur following crop harvest in the USA in late fall and continue through
to early spring. As the South American crop begins to be harvested in late winter
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Fig. 4.2 Monthly China soybean imports by origin. Source: Global Trade Information System
and early spring, importers shift their attention to that region as their source of
soybeans.
4.6 Effects of Shifts in Production on Regional Stocks
As South American soybean production takes up a larger share of global production,
a larger share of global stocks are held in that region (Table 4.4). In the 1990–1994
period, US carryout stocks accounted for almost 93 % of global fall carryout stocks.
This reflects the fact that production occurs during the fall in the USA, and carryout
of old crop soybeans in South America is low.2 While South America accounts for
the majority of soybean carryout in spring (following harvest), US old crop carryout
still accounts for almost 32 % of the total stocks. During the 2020–2024 period,
however, South America accounts for over 92 % of the global carryout in spring
and 25 % in fall.
With the shift in production from the USA to South America, the time at which
global supplies are tightest (measured by the stocks-to-use ratio) shifts as well.
In 1990–1994, when US production accounted for the majority of global soybean
production, global supplies in late summer (i.e., before harvest of the new US crop)
marked the seasonal low point of available soybean supplies in the world. In the
simulations, carryout in spring accounted for an average of 48.5 % of the total spring
use, while the stocks-to-use ratio in fall averaged 84 %.3
2Here we are talking about speculative stocks, that is, stocks held because the expected return from
storing the crop equals or exceeds the costs of storage.
3Stocks-to-use ratios are typically calculated as ending stocks as a percent of total annual use.
Here, we separate use by period (fall vs. spring) to more accurately reflect available intraseasonal
supplies.
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Table 4.4 Effects of shifts in production on stocks
1990–1994 (%) 2000–2004 (%) 2010–2014 (%) 2020–2024 (%)
Share of spring stocks held by
USA 31:9 16.4 6:9 7:8
South America 68:1 83.6 93:1 92:2
Share of fall stocks held by
USA 92:7 85.3 77:7 74:9
South America 7:3 14.7 22:3 25:1
Global stocks to use
Spring 48:5 58.1 60:7 63:8
Fall 84:1 65.6 53:7 42:8
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Fig. 4.3 Monthly ending stocks of the major exporters (the USA, Brazil, and Argentina). Source:
USDA, based on monthly crush and export numbers from Oil World and Global Trade Information
System
As supplies in South America grow, the low point in the year for available
supplies is when South American supplies are at their lowest levels, that is to say, at
the end of the fall quarter before new crops are harvested. In the simulated results
for the period 2020–2024, for example, global fall carryout stocks account for 43 %
of total use, while global spring carryout stocks (i.e., just prior to harvest of the US
crop) account for 64 % of total use.
Empirical data again support the simulated findings. Figure 4.3 shows soybean
stocks in the USA, Brazil, and Argentina from September 1998 to September 2014.4
Initially, soybean stocks tended to be lowest in September just prior to the US har-
vest. Stocks fell throughout winter until the South American crops became available.
4Monthly soybean stocks were calculated using monthly crush and export numbers. Production
was allocated across months based on harvest progress reports from exporting countries.
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With the South American harvest, available soybean supplies increased in spring but
then fell again to a low point in September. As ROW imports increase in fall, and
South American production increases, the pattern becomes more pronounced, with
stock levels in March falling to similar (or lower) levels than in September.
The ratio of stock level to consumption is often used as an advanced indicator
of abnormal market conditions (see, e.g., Bobenrieth et al. 2013). Typically these
metrics are constructed based on northern hemisphere production cycles with
carryout stocks measured when northern hemisphere stocks are lowest. Our analysis
suggests that, at the very least, such metrics tell only a partial story for crops with
significant southern hemisphere production.
4.7 Effects of Shifts in Production on Soybean Price
Integration
Spatial arbitrage ensures that prices in the exporting countries differ from the world
price by the cost of storage (Enke 1951; Samuelson 1952; Takayama and Judge
1971; Fackler and Goodwin 2001). Thus, if transportation costs to the world market
are the same in both exporting countries, prices must be the same in both exporting
countries, even though they do not trade with each other. This is true, however, only
if both exporting countries are guaranteed to export in both periods. If in any period,
one country exports, but the other does not, then the link is broken and prices could
diverge. The question is whether this is possible or likely.
In the stylized model presented here, we measure the degree to which the prices
in one region are linked with prices in the other region with a simple correlation
statistic. Table 4.5 shows the correlation between prices in the USA, South America,
and the ROW in the fall and spring periods. Note that in the 1990–1994 period, when
US exports accounted for 70 % of total global exports, the correlation coefficient for
US prices and ROW prices is close to 1 in both the fall and spring periods. South
American prices were more closely correlated with the prices in the ROW during
the spring period, when the exportable supplies were at their highest level (and they
account for about one-third of total world exports). By contrast, South America
accounted for just 11 % of the total exports in fall, and the correlation coefficient
with the prices in the ROW fell to 0.708.
Table 4.5 Effects of shifts in production on regional price correlations
Region/time period 1990–1994 2000–2004 2010–2014 2020–2024
USA–ROW/fall 0.999 0.996 0.999 1.000
USA–ROW/spring 1.000 0.967 0.952 0.856
South America–ROW/fall 0.708 0.735 0.737 0.863
South America–ROW/spring 0.946 1.000 1.000 1.000
USA–South America/fall 0.707 0.733 0.737 0.862
USA–South America/spring 0.946 0.967 0.952 0.856
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As South American soybean production increases relative to the USA, US prices
remain closely correlated during the fall period. This reflects the fact that US prices
remain linked with ROW prices through trade. Recall that by 2020–2024, the US
exports almost 70 % of its goods in fall as compared to the 1990–1994 period when
over three-quarters of the exports from the USA occurred in spring. The correlation
between US and ROW prices falls to 0.856 in the spring reflecting the fact that
the USA is uncompetitive in ROW markets. With South America emerging as the
dominant supplier to the ROW in the spring period (accounting for 83 % of total
exports), the correlation between prices in South America and the ROW is 1.0.
Figure 4.4a shows that monthly export prices of soybeans from the USA,
Brazil, and Argentina were closely correlated between 1990 and 2014. The simple
correlation matrix suggests correlation coefficients of 0.99 or higher for the three
time periods. Expressing the US Gulf price as a percentage of the prices in Brazil or
Argentina, however, reveals a more seasonal pattern: US prices tend to fall relative
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Fig. 4.4 (a) Soybean export prices. Source: USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service, Oilseeds: World
Markets and Trade. (b) US price as a percentage of prices in Brazil and Argentina, average 2005–
2014. Source: USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service, Oilseeds: World Markets and Trade
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to southern hemisphere prices in fall, during harvest time in the USA, and rise in
spring, during harvest time in the southern hemisphere (Fig. 4.4b).
A large body of literature has emerged that has examined price movements
to test market efficiency and the degree to which markets are integrated (see
Ravallion 1986; Mundlak and Larson 1992; Fackler and Goodwin 2001; Fackler
and Tastan 2008). These studies have used time series and other empirical methods
to examine how tariffs, transportation costs, exchange rates, and other transaction
costs affect market integration. Our analysis suggests that intraseasonal timing of
production is also an important factor. Previous studies about the soybean market
noted how the seasonal aspect of soybean production affects price transmission
between southern and northern hemispheres’ producers and import markets, such
as the EU (Margarido et al. 2007; Machado and Margarido 2004).
4.8 Carrying Costs Among Northern and Southern Exporters
In a market determined by one supplier, prices tend to rise throughout the marketing
year, reflecting the costs of holding the crop over a period of time (Lowry et al.
1987; Miranda and Glauber 1993; Williams and Wright 1991). Those carrying
costs can be indirectly measured by examining the spread between futures contracts
(Williams 1986). In this paper, futures spreads are constructed using closing futures
prices from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), the Bolsa de Comercio in
Rosario, Argentina (Bolsa), and the Dalian Commodity Exchange in China (DCE).
To compare the array of futures prices at a given point in time, we averaged the
daily closing futures prices in October of each year sampled for the November
through September futures contracts. To compare the contracts across time and
exchanges, we normalized the spreads by expressing all of the contracts in terms
of the November contract.
Figure 4.5a shows the spreads for CME soybean futures. For the most part, the
spreads exhibit the expected pattern: future contracts show positive carrying charges
through the marketing year, reflecting carrying costs. As the arrival of new crops on
the market approaches, prices weaken and can show negative carrying costs (often
referred to as backwardation). The exceptions to this pattern are the 2012/2013
and 2013/2014 marketing years, which were characterized by tight US supplies
following the drought in 2012 and large expected harvests in South America. As a
result, futures contracts exhibit backwardation throughout the marketing year. That
pattern reverted to the more typical pattern in 2014/2015 following the large soybean
harvest in the USA and the rebuilding of US soybean stocks.
Consistent with results from the storage model, closing prices in Argentina for
the same period reflect the fact that southern hemisphere harvest starts 6 months
after the northern hemisphere harvest (Fig. 4.5b). Bolsa futures show backwardation
from November through May and subsequently positive carry in the months
following harvest. The pattern resembles that of the CME, except out of phase by 6
months.
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Fig. 4.5 (a) Soybean futures—Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Source: Chicago Mercantile
Exchange. (b) Soybean futures—Bolsa de Comercio de Rosario. Source: Bolsa de Comercio
de Rosario (Argentina). (c) Soybean futures—Dalian Commodity Exchange. Source: Dalian
Commodity Exchange (China)
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Figure 4.5c shows the same array for DCE futures taken from the same period.
As discussed earlier (Fig. 4.2), China largely imports soybeans from the USA in the
first part of their marketing year and then switches to importing from the southern
hemisphere after crops are harvested there. All else equal, one would expect that
there would not be large incentives to store since one could purchase lower cost
soybeans when new supplies become available in the other hemisphere. Many of
the years in the limited data sample exhibited this pattern (e.g., 2007, 2009, 2012,
2013, and 2014). In some of the years considered here (2005, 2006, 2010, and 2011),
the pattern of DCE futures exhibited a similar pattern to that of CME, with futures
showing positive carry throughout the marketing year. Lastly, backwardation was
present throughout the 2008/2009 market year.
Two factors may help explain the anomalies. First, China’s domestic soybean
consumption grew by over 8 % annually over 2005–2014; imports grew annually by
11 % over the same period. Strong carrying charges may reflect, in part, the demand
for current supplies to meet future consumption. Second, China introduced a price
support for soybeans beginning 2008 to keep market prices high throughout the
marketing year (Gale 2013). From 2009 to 2012, soybean support prices were raised
steadily. While the Chinese authorities have signaled their intent to experiment with
more direct (income) support measures that allow prices to be determined by market
forces, price supports continue to have the potential of distorting intraseasonal price
relationships.
4.9 Effects of Production Shifts on Price Variability
How has the production growth in the southern hemisphere affected price variabil-
ity? Assuming yields are uncorrelated between northern and southern hemispheres,
global exporter yield variability could be expected to decline when production in
the southern hemisphere approaches levels similar to those in the USA. Lower
production variability would mean more stable prices. However, in the scenarios
considered here, those effects are likely to be small. Figure 4.6 shows how global
exporter yield variability is affected by the share of production from southern
hemisphere exporters. From 1990 to 1994, South America accounted for about 38 %
of total production among global exporters. By around 2020–2024, South America
is projected to account for almost two-thirds of production among global exporters.
Within this range, global yield variability in exporting regions does not vary much
(Fig. 4.6).
Nonetheless, shifts in production are estimated to have profound effects on
intraseasonal price variability in importing and exporting regions. Table 4.6 shows
the simulated standard deviation of prices in the fall and spring periods in the three
regions. For the exporting countries, prices are more volatile in the second half of
their crop year, when supplies are tighter; this result is consistent with the findings
of Lowry et al. (1987).
Price variability in the ROW is largely tied to price variability in exporting
regions. During the 1990–1994 period, in which the USA accounted for over 70 %
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Table 4.6 Effects of shifts
in production on price
variability
1990–1994 2000–2004 2010–2014 2020–2024
Standard deviation
USA
Spring 0.332 0.342 0.363 0.406
Fall 0.254 0.230 0.244 0.318
South America
Spring 0.341 0.321 0.342 0.348
Fall 0.400 0.419 0.439 0.411
ROW
Spring 0.332 0.321 0.342 0.348
Fall 0.254 0.233 0.245 0.320
of global exports and was the dominant exporter in both spring and fall, ROW price
variability is roughly equal to US price variability (as measured by the standard
deviation). Because of this, price variability in the ROW tends to be higher in spring
than fall. As the ROW becomes more reliant on imports from South America in
the spring period (almost 83 % by 2020–2024 compared with 34 % in 1990–1994),
ROW spring price variability is tied to its counterpart in South America. ROW price
variability continues to be tied to its counterpart in the USA in fall, during which the
USA supplies the majority of exports to the ROW. The simulation results suggest a
small increase in price variability over the 30-year period which may reflect, in part,
the increasing reliance on imports to meet the consumption in the ROW.
Lastly, as mentioned earlier, production is assumed to be exogenous with respect
to price in our stylized model. In models with price-responsive supply, a supply
shock in one region would affect plantings in the other region, allowing for more
rapid adjustment (see, e.g., Haile et al. 2014; Lybbert et al. 2014). When such
models are applied to the sample, the growth of South American production would
likely show a more significant role in reducing price volatility.
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4.10 Conclusions
The growth of southern hemisphere production has increased global supplies of
grains and oilseeds, helping to meet the large growth in global demand witnessed
in the past 30 years. The structural model presented in this paper gives important
insights into intraseasonal patterns of storage, trade, and market prices that have
accompanied the growth in southern hemisphere production, patterns that are
generally not captured in annual models. Applying the model to the global soybean
market, we show how increased production share in the southern hemisphere
has resulted in more pronounced seasonality in exports between exporters in the
northern and southern hemispheres. The analysis also suggests that the shift in
production means that from a global perspective, the crop “season” has shortened
from 12 to 6 months. With a new crop available every 6 months, stock levels in
March are as relevant as those in September in indicating supply availability. While
trade and storage link market prices across time and space, the analysis suggests
that seasonal trade patterns can also disrupt price integration or, more accurately,
result in a more seasonal pattern of integration. Failure to recognize those patterns
can obscure and bias analyses of global food security, potentially exaggerating the
impact of shortages or surpluses when they occur in one hemisphere but not in the
other.
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5Food Price Changes, Price Insulation, and TheirImpacts on Global and Domestic Poverty
Will Martin and Maros Ivanic
5.1 Introduction
Changes in food prices have extremely important impacts on poor and vulnerable
households. Although some households benefit from higher food prices, others are
adversely affected, depending whether they are net buyers or sellers of food and the
extent to which their incomes adjust to food price changes. Low-income households
tend to spend a large share of their incomes on staple foods, making them potentially
vulnerable to food price increases. Policymakers in many countries respond to food
price changes—and particularly food price increases—by insulating their countries
from these developments. Exporters often achieved this insulation by restricting
export, whereas importers most commonly respond by reducing import barriers.
While individually rational, these responses create a collective action problem—
each country’s actions contribute to a further rise in world prices—exactly the
problem that they are individually trying to avoid.
Our concern in this chapter is with the impact of food prices and policies on
the poorest in the society. We focus on the impacts of food price changes on
individual households, particularly on those living near the poverty line. One very
simple indicator of the effect at the household level is the change in the number
of people living below the poverty line. We focus primarily on the World Bank’s
standard measure of poverty, which is defined as US$1.25 per day in international
purchasing power. An economic shock that increases the number of people below
the poverty line is clearly an adverse development. We then consider governments’
policy responses to economic shocks and their effects on the welfare of individual
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households, and hence on the number of households below the poverty line. Finally,
we discuss the implications of countries’ trade policy choices—initially from the
viewpoint of an individual country and then from the viewpoint of all countries.
5.2 Effects of Food Price Changes on Poverty
One widely accepted measure of the short-run effect of a small change in a
commodity price on household welfare is given by the household’s net trade share
for that good, as defined by Deaton (1989). A household that is a net seller of a
good benefits when the price of that good rises. By contrast, a household that is a net
buyer is put at a disadvantage when the price rises. This is only an approximation as
demand can respond very quickly, but given the magnitude of the relevant demand
elasticities, the associated second-order impact is quite small. Therefore, the first-
order measure is a good approximation. Essentially, this is the same measure that is
used here for determining the effect of a change in prices on national income (see
Martin 1997 for a fuller discussion). The concept of short run used in this analysis
is the length of time in which other effects, such as output adjustment or effects on
wages, do not arise. Some analyses, such as that by Ravallion (1990), suggest that
much of the longer-run impact is felt after 3 years.
At the household level, there are some important stylized facts that influence the
likely effect of this measure. Perhaps the oldest of such stylized facts is that poor
households spend a large share of their incomes on food. This might suggest that the
poor are always put at a disadvantage when food prices rise. However, this need not
be the case because most of the world’s poor population live in rural areas, and the
majority of them earn their living from agriculture. Nevertheless, many farmers in
developing countries are also net buyers of food. Thus, the short-run effect of food
prices on poverty becomes an empirical question that can be resolved only by using
detailed data on the income sources and expenditure patterns of households.
A great deal of evidence shows that short-run increases in most food prices, other
things equal, raise the poverty level in most developing countries (see, for example,
de Hoyos and Medvedev 2011; Ivanic and Martin 2008; Ivanic et al. 2012; Jacoby
2013; Wodon and Zaman 2010). This is often the case even in countries that are
net food exporters and therefore benefit from the terms-of-trade effect of the shock
(see Ferreira et al. 2013, for Brazil). In some countries, such as Vietnam, where
agricultural resources are relatively evenly distributed, higher prices of key products
such as rice may lower the poverty level (Ivanic and Martin 2008). Similarly, higher
milk prices appear to lower poverty in Peru. This is because the milk producers are
much poorer than their customers. The net increase in poverty associated with a
food price rise does not mean that all people are adversely affected. For example,
Ivanic et al. (2012) found that although higher prices resulted in a net increase in
the number of people living in extreme poverty by 44 million in 2010, 68 million
people fell below the poverty line, and 24 million rose above it.
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Once markets are given more time to adjust to changes, two additional factors
need to be considered. First, changes in food prices may result in changes in factor
returns. Second, changes in the output patterns of poor households may occur. The
factor return which is most likely to affect poor households is the wage rate paid
for unskilled labor sold by the households outside their farm (Lasco et al. 2008;
Ravallion 1990). The effect on wage rates is likely to be much more important when
the product is (a) very labor intensive; (b) has a large share of output, as with rice in
Bangladesh; and (c) involves intensive use of intermediate inputs.
5.2.1 Short-Run Effects
The available evidence suggests that the full effect of food price changes on wage
rates and output volumes takes time to materialize. A useful measure of the short-
run effects of higher food prices on poverty considers only the direct impact on
incomes due to the initial net trade position of households. The sign of this measure
is an important building block of longer-term measures that also consider wage rates
and output change effects. These measures are, of course, potentially vulnerable to
mismeasurement of the initial production or consumption levels of the households—
an issue which requires further research (Headey and Fan 2010, p. 72; Carletto
2012). The measures should also take into account a small second-order impact—
the ability of consumers to adjust their consumption in response to price changes.
Given the low value of compensated demand elasticities in small countries, this
refinement makes very little difference to the estimated impacts. Table 5.1 presents
the results of a simulation analysis of these short-run effects based on survey data
from 31 countries (Ivanic and Martin 2014a). Two key features of this analysis
need to be taken into account. First, these results are based on a broad food price
index, rather than price changes for any particular food. Second, they are based on a
specific type of price change—one that results from shocks outside the developing
countries studied. This is a realistic approach for analyzing an event such as the food
price shock in 2006–2008, which was primarily caused by external factors, such as
the sharp increase in demand for foodstuffs from the biofuel sector in industrial
countries (Wright 2014).
Table 5.1 shows that increases in food prices adversely affect the poor in most
countries except Albania, Cambodia, China, and Vietnam; in these countries, a 10 %
increase in food prices reduces the poverty level. Strikingly, the relationship between
poverty effects and food price changes is frequently highly nonlinear. In Albania
and Vietnam, food price changes have favorable impacts on near-poor net sellers
of food; some of them rise above the poverty line when faced with a small food
price increase. In contrast, net buyers of food are negatively affected by larger price
increases, resulting in them falling below the poverty line. For most countries, the
effects are monotonic, but the relationship between price change and poverty is
frequently nonlinear. The poor population in countries, such as India, Indonesia,
and Pakistan are severely affected by price changes.
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Table 5.1 Short-run poverty
effects of food price
increases, changes in percante
points of people with income
below US$1.25 per day
Country Survey year 10 % 50 % 100 %
Albania 2005 0:1 0.7 4.8
Armenia 2004 0 1.3 4.9
Bangladesh 2005 1:4 9.7 18.1
Belize 2009 0:5 3.2 8.6
Cambodia 2003 3:0 10.1 14.9
China 2002 1:3 4.0 3.2
Côte d’Ivoire 2002 1:1 7.2 17.6
Ecuador 2006 0:3 2.3 7.2
Guatemala 2006 1:4 9.7 27.2
India 2005 2:6 14.2 25.8
Indonesia 2007 1:7 10.2 25.2
Malawi 2004 0:7 3.1 5.7
Moldova 2009 0 1.1 7.9
Mongolia 2002 1:4 8.7 21.6
Nepal 2002 0:5 3.2 6.8
Nicaragua 2005 1:1 5.8 17.4
Niger 2007 0:6 6.9 17.1
Nigeria 2003 1:0 5.6 9.8
Pakistan 2005 2:7 14.0 27.5
Panama 2003 0:3 2.5 8.0
Peru 2007 0:2 1.5 6.9
Rwanda 2005 1:1 4.4 8.5
Sierra Leone 2011 2:4 12.5 22.1
Sri Lanka 2007 1:8 11.6 29.1
Tajikistan 2007 0:8 8.7 28.1
Tanzania 2008 1:9 8.2 14.5
Timor-Leste 2007 1:9 10.0 20.1
Uganda 2005 0:7 3.8 8.7
Vietnam 2010 0:4 2.1 12.8
Yemen, Rep. 2006 2:0 13.4 33.2
Zambia 2010 1:1 6.0 12.5
World 0:8 5.8 13.0
Source: Based on survey data collected by the authors
The results presented in Table 5.1 were used to represent the global effects of
price changes on poverty. The study followed the sampling methodology outlined
in Ivanic et al. (2012). The global impacts are presented in the final row of the table.
They provide a useful summary of the effects of price changes: global poverty rises
despite a decline in poverty in important countries such as China and Vietnam.
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5.2.2 Longer-Run Effects
As noted above, the longer-run effects of food price change differ from the short-
run effects for two main reasons: (a) the effects of food price changes on wages
and (b) the change in output volume resulting from the food price increase (i.e., the
supply response). In our earlier work about the effects of food prices on poverty,
we focused on the short-run effects, taking into account potential short-run wage
changes (Ivanic and Martin 2008).
In our more recent work, we have also examined the longer-run effects, consid-
ering both changes in wage rates and changes in the quantities of output supplied
(Ivanic and Martin 2014a). In this chapter, we wanted to assess the implications of
food price changes on the wage rates of unskilled labor. The goal is to capture the
impacts of price changes for a range of commodities; therefore, we could not rely
on the type of econometric models used in Ravallion (1990). Instead, we developed
a model, which is similar to the production module of the Global Trade Analysis
Project (GTAP) model, for each country. These models are very similar in structure
to the workhorse Heckscher–Ohlin model used in international trade theory (Caves
and Jones 1973, pp. 182–185): The output in each sector is determined by the level
of a composite factor input, and the substitution between factors that constitute the
composite factor input follows a constant-elasticity-of-substitution technology. The
version we used also considers the real-world phenomenon of intermediate inputs,
which magnify the impacts of output-price changes on factor returns.
In medium-run analyses, all factors except labor are fixed in each sector, and
changes in output come about through intersectoral movements of labor. In the
longer run, we took into account movements of labor and capital in a manner
consistent with the Heckscher–Ohlin model of trade, modified to make allowance
for the real-world imperfect mobility of land between sectors. The resulting
elasticities of wage rates with respect to the prices of agricultural goods vary by
country, but they are typically around unity for increases in all agricultural prices.
To remain consistent with the economy-wide analysis which is used to estimate
the wage effects of food price changes, we used the structure of the GTAP general
equilibrium model to represent the response of households, which allocate their
available resources between the commodities that they produce.
The impacts of commodity prices on wages (Stolper–Samuelson effects) used
in this analysis were derived from simulation models for individual economies
rather than the direct estimation of statistical relationships. This is the only feasible
approach given our need to assess the impacts of price changes by a specific
commodity and at the global level. In an important study, Jacoby (2013) developed
similar simple simulation models of the production side of the economy (in his
case, for regions in India). He showed from first principles that the impacts of food
price changes on wages depend upon key parameters, such as the importance of a
commodity in labor demand, and the share of intermediate inputs in production. He
also tested whether the impacts of food prices on wages were consistent in scale
with econometrically based estimates. The study concluded that the impacts were
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consistent with the estimates and that the test used in the study has considerable
significance.
The price elasticities of wages used in our study average slightly above one
for a broadly defined food group, which includes not just basic staples but also
processed foods (Ivanic and Martin 2014a, p. 36). As expected, the price elasticities
of unskilled wages tend to be relatively large with respect to food prices for the
most important commodities. In many cases, the commodities with the greatest
impact are dominant staples like rice in Bangladesh and cassava in Nigeria. The
group “Other Processed Foods” is more important in many cases because this is
a large commodity group and the models take into account the labor used in food
processing.
When considering a much wider coverage of foods, the results from our study
are consistent with those from Jacoby (2013) for India using cross-sectional data
and the global results in Headey (2014). Ravallion (1990), and Boyce and Ravallion
(1991) estimated that the elasticity of the agricultural wage rate in Bangladesh to
the price of rice was 0.22 in the short run and 0.47 in the long run. The long-run
elasticity is quite similar to the estimate of 0.4 used in Ivanic and Martin (2014a)
for rice in Bangladesh. Lasco et al. (2008) found a largely similar long-run estimate
of 0.57 for rice in the Philippines.
Headey’s (2015) analysis found that food prices had a considerably smaller
impact on urban wages in Ethiopia, with preferred elasticities of around 0.3. This
result may suggest the presence of barriers between urban and rural markets for
unskilled workers. Assessing the implications of higher food prices on wages, Ivanic
and Martin (2008) suggested that the overall poverty impact of higher food prices
would likely only be slightly affected by such barriers. The barriers are significant
in rural areas, where the population tends to be poorer; the benefits of higher wages
for net-labor-selling households are concentrated mostly in these areas. When the
barriers are not significant, the benefits of higher wages for unskilled workers are
spread across more of the low-income population.
In a study about barriers to agricultural exports, higher agricultural prices
(including processed agricultural products such as wine) were found to have a very
large impact on wages in Moldova (Porto 2005), with an elasticity of 2.9. Using a
symmetry relationship to estimate the parameters, another econometric study found
that the food prices had a lower impact on wages in six African countries than
the estimates used in this study (Nicita et al. 2014). This resulted in the long-run
relationship between food prices and poverty being essentially the same as the short-
run relationship for these countries.
Considering the global estimates shown in the first column in Table 5.2, global
poverty rises in the short run with increasing food prices. When prices increase
by 10 %, global poverty is estimated to rise by 0.8 % points. The rate of increase
grows faster as the food price rise increases because so many households near the
poverty line spend extremely large shares of their incomes on food. When the food
price shock increases fivefold from 10 to 50 %, poverty is predicted to rise by
5.8 % points, and doubling the price shock from 50 to 100 % more than doubles
the estimated global poverty estimate to 13 % points.
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Table 5.2 Global poverty effects of general food price increases, changes in percante points of
people with income below US$1.25 per day
Scenario (%) Household group Short run Short run C wages Medium run Long run
10 All 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.4
50 All 5.8 3.9 4.8 5.8
100 All 13 5.7 7.6 8.7
Source: Ivanic and Martin (2014a)
It is important to understand what causes the simulation results for the short run
and the long run to be different, as shown in Table 5.2. The second column shows
the results obtained after adding the impact of wage changes to the direct impact of
higher food prices. Since selling unskilled labor is a very important source of income
for many poor households, and the impacts of higher food prices on wages are found
to be substantial for unskilled workers in many countries, it is not surprising that
higher wages have important, favorable impacts on poverty. The results obtained
for the medium run, in which farmers are able to change their outputs of food
commodities, is quite similar to the results in the second column. This implies that
the ability to adjust output and transfer labor between agriculture and other sectors
has a much smaller impact than the impact of wage changes emphasized by Jacoby
(2013). In the longer-run scenario, in which all factors are mobile, the importance of
adjustment responses increases, but they remain quite small relative to the impacts
of higher wages resulting from food price changes.
5.3 Policy Responses
A widely observed policy response from developing countries, and historically from
today’s industrial countries, to fluctuations in world food prices is to insulate their
domestic markets from these changes. When prices surged in 2007–2008, many
developing country exporters used export restrictions to lower their domestic prices
relative to world prices. Even more countries lowered either their import or their
consumption taxes on food (Wodon and Zaman 2010, p. 167). But this response is
not confined to instances of sharp price increases. For staple food commodities, such
as rice, domestic markets are more or less constantly insulated. Figure 5.1 shows the
strong inverse relationship between the world average rate of protection for rice and
the world price—a relationship that is consistent with the consistent stabilization of
domestic prices relative to world prices.
However, the dynamic response pattern for key agricultural commodities appears
more complex and interesting. Developing countries tend to adopt an extremely high
degree of insulation against rapid changes in food prices but, if these changes are
sustained for a period of time, to pass them through domestic markets. This pattern
is clearly shown in Fig. 5.2 for the average food price, which takes into account the
prices of rice, wheat, maize, edible oils, and sugar. In the case of price increases, this
policy seems to be particularly suitable for managing the adverse impacts of higher
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food prices on the poor in individual countries. But after a while, food prices can
feed through into wages, and producers are able to respond by increasing supply,
therefore allowing the beneficial impacts of higher food prices on the poor to be
noticeable.
This policy approach is, for individual countries, an effective way to stabilize
their domestic prices. Using trade measures to stabilize domestic prices is very likely
to be less costly than using storage policies alone. However, the widespread usage
of the approach creates a serious collective action problem. If every country seeks
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to reduce its price by the same amount, the domestic price is unaffected (Martin
and Anderson 2012). The mechanism is simple—export restrictions in exporting
countries push up world prices, as do import duty reductions in importing countries.
Martin and Anderson (2012) pointed out that the problem is akin to everyone in
a stadium standing up to get a better view of a game. Their analysis suggests that
almost half of the increase in world rice prices between 2006 and 2008 was the result
of countries’ attempting to insulate their markets against the increases in world
prices, thus creating a serious collective action problem. Countries that prefer not to
use export controls or import barrier reductions in response to a rise in prices may
feel compelled to do so because of the actions of other countries, thereby further
amplifying the increase in world prices.
In reality, different countries insulate to different extents, and insulation might
reduce poverty if the countries which are the most vulnerable to a surge in food
prices insulate their domestic markets to a greater degree than the others. For
instance, if developing countries insulated their domestic markets and therefore
forced the adjustment onto developed countries (which are much more capable of
managing this problem), the global poverty effects of a food price surge might
be reduced. There are, however, no guarantees that all interventions follow this
pattern. Historically, some of the most enthusiastic users of price insulation have
been relatively wealthy countries, such as members of the European Community
with its pre-Uruguay Round system of variable import levies. To learn whether the
pattern of interventions during the 2006–2008 price surge actually reduced poverty,
Anderson et al. (2014) examined the actual interventions used and assessed their
effects on global poverty, taking into account the effects of the interventions on the
world price. They concluded that the interventions appeared to reduce the poverty
level by around 80 million people, as long as the effects of the trade interventions
on world prices were not taken into account. Once the effects were considered, the
intervention generated a small and statistically insignificant increase in world prices.
Many countries try to use a combination of trade and storage measures to reduce
the volatility of their domestic prices. In principle, the combination of trade and
storage measures is potentially more effective than trade or storage measures alone
(Gouel and Jean 2014). Gautam et al. (2014) found that the combination of trade
measures, which are beggar-thy-neighbor approaches, and storage measures, which
might be beneficial to the neighbors, reduces—but does not eliminate—the adverse
effects of one country’s policies on food price volatility in the rest of the world.
Implementing these policies tends to be extremely expensive; the policies are also
likely to include rigidities that frequently cause them to collapse (Knudsen and Nash
1990).
The central role of the WTO is to deal with collective action problems that
affect the level of world prices and/or their volatility. The use of bindings on
import tariffs reduces the extent to which importing countries can depress world
prices by discouraging imports. The Uruguay Round introduced important measures
to discourage the insulation of domestic markets against world price changes, a
practice that exacerbates price volatility. The reforms include banning variable
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import levies and subjecting administered prices to discipline both the market access
and domestic support pillars.
Because of its mercantilist focus, the WTO has done very little to discourage
the use of export restrictions—from the point of view of an exporter, any export
restriction imposed by another exporter represents an export opportunity. While
quantitative export restrictions are subjected to a general proscription under Article
XI of GATT, export taxes are not constrained except in limited instances, such
as restrictions negotiated under WTO accession agreements. But unless all export
restrictions are disciplined, they are likely to contribute to upward pressure on
food prices in times of crisis, making it difficult for other exporters not to follow
suit and for importers to refrain from lowering domestic prices through duty and
tax reductions—all of which put further upward pressure on world prices while
being collectively ineffective in dealing with the problem. Importantly, constructive
suggestions for binding and progressive reduction of export taxes have been put
forward (see the discussion in Anderson et al. 2014), but there has not been enough
attention on dealing with this collective action problem. Instead, the focus lies on
maintaining countries’ rights to contribute to the problem.
5.4 Recent Developments in Poverty Reduction
A question about the impact of food price increases on poverty, highlighted by
Headey and Fan (2010) and Headey (2011), is that poverty appears to have declined
sharply between 2006 and 2012 despite food prices rising substantially during that
period. If the short-run impacts of higher food prices were as adverse as suggested
by short-run simulation studies, then how could poverty have continued to decline
between 2006 and 2012? Recent studies about the difference between the short- and
long-run impacts of food price changes, and the pattern of transmission of food price
increases may offer an explanation for this question.
A recent study by the authors (Ivanic and Martin 2014b) found that price
transmission was very low in the initial phase of a food price increase. This
reduced the adverse impacts of higher domestic food prices on poverty while
exacerbating the increase in world food prices. With a sustained increase in world
prices, domestic prices begin to rise over a time frame in which wage responses
are able to take effect. When the results on world food price changes, food price
transmission and food price impacts on poverty are brought together, as in Table 5.2,
we found that the food price increases between 2006 and 2012 were likely to have
contributed substantially to the large reduction in poverty observed over this period.
According to projections, poverty will have declined by 8 % between 2006 and
2015; to which food price increases may have contributed 5 % points. Clearly, these
numbers should be interpreted with caution, particularly because the figure for 2015
is only a projection (Fig. 5.3).
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5.5 Conclusions
This chapter has examined the critical issue of the short- and long-term welfare
effects of food price changes, and the associated policy responses. It has focused
on the effect of food price changes on individuals and households. As shown by
Ferreira et al. (2013) for Brazil, many people may be adversely affected by food
price changes even when their country as a whole benefits from the change. The
evidence surveyed here strongly suggests that a rise in food prices will result in a
net increase in poverty in the short run. Inevitably, some net sellers of food are able
to rise out of poverty, while some net buyers of food fall into poverty. But, in most
countries, the number of people falling into poverty is greater than the number of
people rising out of poverty.
The chapter has also examined the emerging evidence about the longer-run
effects of food price changes on poverty. There are two important differences
between the shorter- and longer-run effects. In the case of longer-run, wages have
time to fully adjust to the change in prices, and producers have the opportunity to
adjust their output levels and output mix to the change in prices. Here, the evidence
suggests that higher food prices tend to lower poverty in most countries—frequently
by substantial margins. It is important to note that the results considered here for
both the short- and the long run are related to changes in food prices that are purely
exogenous to developing countries. In developing countries, if a price increase is
due, in whole or in part, to a decline in productivity, estimates of the effect on
incomes will need to consider the direct adverse effect on incomes of the decline in
productivity.
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The concluding section of this chapter has reviewed the policy options for
developing countries when dealing with the problem of food price volatility. As
noted, the most commonly adopted response—insulating domestic markets against
changes in world market prices—introduces a collective action problem. This
problem renders domestic market insulation ineffective in stabilizing most prices
and in mitigating the adverse poverty effects of price surges. Complementing trade
policy measures with storage measures alleviates, but does not solve, this collective
action problem. It also poses a serious challenge in terms of management, cost, and
sustainability. There is a strong case for first-best policies based on creating social
safety nets at national level and also for efforts to diminish the collective action
problem through agreements that restrain the extent of beggar-thy-neighbor policy
responses.
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6Alternative Mechanisms to Reduce Food PriceVolatility and Price Spikes: Policy Responses
at the Global Level
Maximo Torero
6.1 Background
The food price crisis of 2007–2008 saw a steep rise in food prices, which brought
food security to the forefront of global attention. In June 2010, food prices started
rising again; between June 2010 and May 2011, the international prices of maize
and wheat roughly doubled. Food prices peaked in February 2011. According to
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the spike in
2011 was even more pronounced than in 2008 (see, for example, the evolution of
maize prices in Fig. 6.1, which exceeded the levels of prices in 2008 even when
adjusted for inflation). Moreover, recent increases in price volatility are not in line
with historical data (dating back to the late 1950s) and have particularly affected
wheat and maize in recent years. For soft wheat (used for cakes and pastries), for
example, there were 207 days of excessive price volatility between December 2001
and December 2006 (an average of 41 days a year), whereas there were 395 days
of excessive price volatility between January 2007 and June 2011 (an average of 88
days a year), as shown in Fig. 6.2.
The 2007–2008 food price crisis led to economic difficulties, particularly for
the already poor population. Despite the varying level of price transmission from
international to local markets among regions, it generated social and political
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Fig. 6.1 Inflation-adjusted prices of agricultural commodities and oil, 1990–2011 (weekly data).
Note: corn is U.S. no. 2 yellow, wheat is U.S. no. 2 hard red winter, rice is white Thai A1 super,
soybeans is U.S. no. 1 yellow, and crude oil is spot price from Cushing, Oklahoma WTI. Source:
FAOSTAT Online, Grain Council, and U.S. Energy Information Administration
turmoil in many countries. In addition, food price spikes and excessive volatility
worsened the problem of hunger by increasing poverty (see Chap. 1 of this book
for a detailed review of the nutritional impacts). The effects of high and volatile
food prices are also particularly harmful for countries with high net food imports,
and high food inflation affects countries with large numbers of poor people, such as
China, India, and Indonesia.
As long-term solutions to the food price crisis are sought, it is important to
understand the root causes of the problem. The crisis was triggered by a complex set
of long- and short-term factors, including policy failures and market overreactions.
In this respect, Table 6.1 shows a more complete discussion of the different demand-
and supply-side factors that contributed to the 2007–2008 food price crisis.
As shown in Table 6.1, outside of traditional fundamentals, an important factor
contributing to the crisis may have been the entry of significant financial resources
into futures markets, including food commodity markets. This large financial inflow
of resources may have contributed to a price spike during the first 6 months of
2008 and also later in 2010. It is important to note that there is no consensus
among experts on this; there is, however, significant discussion surrounding the
possibility that channeling financial resources through commodity futures markets,
by speculators in particular, may have triggered the food crisis. Establishing
theoretical and empirical linkages between future prices and spot prices is not easy,
and testing causality is even more complex (for the theory on the topic, see Sanders
and Irwin 2010 and see Chap. 1 for a detailed discussion).
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Fig. 6.2 Excessive food price volatility for hard wheat. Note: This figure shows the results of
a model of the dynamic evolution of daily returns based on historical data going back to 1954
(known as the Nonparametric Extreme Quantile (NEXQ) Model). This model is then combined
with extreme value theory to estimate higher-order quantiles of the return series, allowing for
classification of any particular realized return (that is, effective return in the futures market) as
extremely high or not. The blue line is a logarithm of the observed daily return (rate of increase
of prices from 1 day to the other) on investment. The red line represents a level below which
returns have a 95 % probability of occurring (i.e., the higher-order return estimated by the NEXQ
model). When the blue line (return) exceeds the red line (95th percentile), it is characterized as an
excessively large return. One or two such returns do not necessarily indicate a period of excessive
volatility. Periods of excessive volatility are identified based on a statistical test applied to the
number of times the extreme value occurs in a window of consecutive 60 days. Source: Martins-
Filho et al. (2010). See details at http://www.foodsecurityportal.org/soft-wheat-price-volatility-
alert-mechanism
Today’s agricultural markets have three key characteristics that increase price
responses to any of the drivers behind the causes of rising prices and volatility. First,
export markets for all staple commodities—rice, maize, wheat, and soybeans—are
highly concentrated in a few countries or very thin (that is, only a small share of
production is traded). In the case of both maize and rice, the top five producers
account for more than 70 % of global production, and the top five exporters account
for about 80 % of world exports. For wheat, the top five producers and exporters
account for about 50 and 60 % of global production and exports, respectively.
These high levels of concentration imply that the world’s capacity in coping with
geographical risk is limited. Any weather shocks or exogenous shocks to production
in these countries will immediately have an effect on global prices and price
volatility. Second, the world’s maize reserves and restricted wheat reserves are now
at historically low levels. To function effectively, the market requires a minimum
level of grain reserves to serve as a buffer against sudden changes in supply or
demand. These reserves are needed because the supply of and demand for grain
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are not very responsive to price changes in the short term. When prices go up, for
example, it is difficult for farmers to immediately produce more or for consumers to
immediately consume less. As a result, any supply shocks, caused by events such as
a drought or flood, can lead to price spikes and hoarding by farmers seeking to take
advantage of higher prices in the future. In both 1973 and 2007, global grain stocks
hit record lows, prompting the global food crises. Insufficient stocks can lead to
large price increases and a breakdown of functioning markets. In 2007–2008, grain
stocks were only about 60 million tons (2.7 % of global production) lower than in
2004–2005. But as evident in prices rising sharply in 2007–2008, this difference
in grain stocks was enough to cause serious problems in the market, especially for
commodities whose production is concentrated in just a few countries, such as rice
(Timmer 2010). Third, appropriate, timely information on food production, stock
levels, and price forecasting is sorely lacking. When this information gap leads to
overreactions by policymakers and traders, it could result in soaring prices.
In summary, despite the recent literature regarding the potential causes of the
2007–2008 and 2010 crises, we do not yet have a definitive causal diagnosis that
analyzes all the potential causes on a quantitative basis. As a result, it is even more
difficult to analyze the potential policies that are necessary to avoid such a crisis in
the near and long-term future. However, the general consensus is that this episode
and what has been happening since October 2010 highlight the need for more
research into the architecture of international financial and agricultural markets so
that we can identify proper mechanisms for reducing price spikes and extreme price
volatility, especially given the extreme impacts they have on the livelihoods of the
poor (Sommer and Gilbert 2006; Bakary 2008; Brahmbhatt and Christiaensen 2008;
OECD 2008; UNCTAD 2009; von Braun 2008a–c; von Braun et al. 2008; World
Agricultural Outlook Board 2008; Headey and Fan 2010; HM Government 2010).
The new global reality involves both higher and more volatile prices—two
different conditions with distinct implications for consumers and producers. For
several decades, the dominant approach to managing food price volatility has been
to stabilize income without affecting prices. The idea behind this approach is that
prices guide behavior, so any attempt to change prices damages this mechanism
of resource allocation. At the same time, the “natural” insurance that comes from
the negative correlation between harvest size and price level stabilizes producers’
incomes—in particular in closed economies. Thus, any effort to stabilize food prices
reduces the correlation between prices and harvests and disrupts the existing natural
equilibrium. Under this strategy, private insurance and hedging instruments, along
with public instruments targeting vulnerable households, are used to manage risk
and stabilize prices. However, in the changing global economy, local prices are
becoming less correlated to local harvests, and prices do not always convey the
appropriate information to economic agents. Mechanisms to reduce excessive price
volatility then become essential in eliminating the endogenous component of price
instability without affecting the natural price instability component.1
1For more information, see Galtier (2009).
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In the short term, both the supply of and demand for grain are very inelastic.
Droughts, floods, or any other severe weather shocks can have significant impact
on country-level supply because grain production is so sensitive to weather events.
Combined with demand inelasticity, any supply shocks can lead to price spikes
and hoarding behavior by farmers trying to take advantage of higher prices in the
future. At a regional level, on the other hand, grain production is less affected by
weather, and shortages in production in certain areas can be compensated for by
higher production in other areas. As a result, international trade can reduce the
need for large national-level grain reserves. However, because so many countries
had reduced their public grain reserves by 2007, when prices began to rise, many
governments had no mechanism for stabilizing their grain markets. A few countries
did have sufficient reserves but did not want to sacrifice those reserves to stabilize
the global market. Governments in a few exporting countries further worsened the
situation by temporarily establishing export barriers and reducing import barriers;
thus, by adding upward pressure on commodity markets, global market stability was
sacrificed in order to stabilize domestic prices.
Variable temperatures, changes in precipitation patterns, and increased occur-
rence of extreme weather events brought about by climate change, such as droughts
and floods, will increasingly affect the global food supply. As a result, the global
community will have to increasingly deal with the issues prompted by the food
price and financial crises of recent years as prices are increasingly affected by both
supply and demand issues around the world. From these crises, it is evident that
governments will find it difficult to deal with these issues at a national level.
A careful analysis of the different policies that could be implemented to reduce
or diminish the effects of increasing price volatility, and especially to reduce the
probability of significant price spikes, is therefore necessary. The price spike episode
of early 2008 clearly highlighted the need to modify the institutional architecture
of international financial and agricultural markets to address their effects on the
livelihoods of the poor. This chapter reviews the most prominent policy proposals
aimed at reforming international agricultural markets and addressing price volatility
at the international scale.
6.2 Review of Policies Proposed/Implemented to Reduce Price
Volatility Before 2007
Physical reserves have been used at national, regional, and international level
at different times throughout history to control price spikes and reduce price
variability. For decades, large countries, such as China and India have kept a
significant level of physical reserves because of their size and the effects that their
entry into world markets would have on prices during harvest shortfalls. The US
operated a farmer-owned reserve for several decades. The farmers received loans
and money as reimbursement for their storage costs; in exchange, they were required
to follow stipulations concerning when the stored grain could be sold. The farm bill
passed in 1996; however, it virtually eliminated physical grain reserves.
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Many African countries, including Burkina Faso, Mali, Mozambique, Niger,
Ethiopia, and Tanzania, established national-based food security reserve stocks
between 1975 and 1980. During the time, agriculture was heavily managed, and
because global grain prices were extremely high, many of these governments did
not trust world markets to be secure sources of grain during an emergency. However,
it proved to be quite difficult to accurately estimate how much grain was actually
needed in these reserves. There was a tendency to overestimate the amount of
grain needed in an emergency (Rashid and Lemma 2010). Quantities were based
on estimates of normal consumption; in reality, however, people facing hunger
eat less and often switch to cheaper foods, which then make up some of the
shortfall. There were a number of other difficulties which eventually led to the
disappearance of these food security reserve stocks in most countries, including
the use of the reserves in normal market operations by the parastatals, insufficient
resources to replenish reserves, and the unwillingness of donors to support these
activities. Interest in the establishment of strategic grain reserves was revived
following the liberalization of the cereal markets during the structural adjustment
of the 1990s. Governments attempted to insure against the failure of the private
sector during this period, but many of the experiences in managing these reserves
were similar to previous attempts at operating grain reserves. Mismanagement,
corruption, damaged donor relations, and erroneous estimates of consumption and
production plagued governments as they tried to manage these reserves.
Interest in regional reserves also increased after the last food price spike in 1973–
1974. The FAO (1980) noted the establishment of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s Food Security Reserve (which was never operational)
and also a proposal by CILSS (Inter-State Committee on Drought in the Sahel) to
establish a regional reserve in the Sahel. The FAO provided technical assistance
to support these initiatives. The idea of creating a regional food reserve for
Mediterranean countries was also put forward, but it was not until the recent
food crises that the ASEAN initiative was reactivated. To ensure food security in
the region, ASEAN has established various cooperation programs, one of which
is the East Asia Emergency Rice Reserve (EAERR). The EAERR is a regional
cooperation program between the ten ASEAN member states, China, Japan, and
the Republic of Korea. Specifically, it is an initiative of the ASEAN Ministers
on Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministers of Agriculture of the People’s
Republic of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (AMAF Plus Three) to provide
food assistance, strengthen food security in emergencies caused by disasters, and
alleviate poverty. The EAERR is therefore a mutual assistance system through
which rice stocks are shared between the 13 countries. It also aims to contribute to
price stability of rice in the region (Chap. 17 by Irfan Mujahid and Lukas Kornher
estimate the benefits of the EAERR through risk pooling). The EAERR plans to
develop a proposal to upgrade the pilot project to a full-fledged scheme among the
ASEAN Plus Three countries. The ASEAN Plus Three Agreement on Emergency
Rice Reserve is currently being drafted for this purpose. However, the realization of
a permanent scheme is subject to internal consultation, further assessment, and the
evaluation of the outcomes of the pilot project. For a mechanism like the EAERR
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to work, political support from the ASEAN Plus Three countries is necessary. The
EAERR pilot project is closely related to the ASEAN Food Security Information
System (AFSIS) project and the work of the ASEAN Food Security Reserve Board
(AFSRB)2 in establishing food security in the region.
International commodity agreements (ICAs) (see Gilbert 1987, 1996) were
established to stabilize individual commodity prices at the global level after the
Second World War. However, most of these agreements collapsed, and by the early
1960s, only the agreements for wheat, sugar, coffee, tin, and olive oil remained.
Although opinions differ as to why these agreements were not successful, the ICAs
mostly played a peripheral role in stabilizing prices. The ICA on rubber actually
had procedures to deal with increases and decreases in its price bands, but because
it followed market prices for the most part, it was only able to smooth, not stabilize,
prices. The cocoa and sugar agreements were simply too weak to accomplish their
objectives, while the tin agreement was trying to hold prices at levels which were too
high without the necessary financial backing. The agreement on coffee was arguably
the most successful in raising and stabilizing prices before it lost consumer support
and collapsed. Although some of the governing bodies of the ICAs still exist,3 these
days they mostly assist the respective industries by publishing relevant statistics and
studies rather than stabilizing prices.
Price stability and a stable supply of wheat were maintained during the early
years of the International Grains Council (previously the International Wheat
Council). However, this is most likely due to the relative stability of the supply
and demand during this time; the agreements broke down during the 1973–1974
food crisis. Prompted by the price shock, international interest in grain reserves
was reignited, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) organized discussions on the possibility of establishing international
grain reserves (Wright and Bobenrieth 2009). The idea was to hold stocks nationally
while managing them internationally, but issues of trigger price levels, stock
levels and contributions, and special provisions for developing countries caused the
discussions to fail, and the proposed international grain reserve was not established.
6.3 Review of Policies Proposed as a Result of the 2007–2008
and 2010 Food Price Crises
Following the food price crisis of 2007–2008 and the events since October 2010,
there have been numerous proposals aimed at preventing such events from occurring
again. The proposed plans address a range of ideas for improvement, including
2The AFSRB is an ASEAN mechanism for sharing of rice stocks in times of shortage, particularly
through the trigger of a collective operation of the committed ASEAN Emergency Rice Reserve
(AERR). Currently, the total quantity of the AERR is 87,000 metric tonnes for emergency
purposes.
3Coffee (ICO); cocoa (ICCO); cereals, oilseeds (IGC); sugar (ISO); jute (IJSG); rubber (IRSG);
bamboo, rattan (INBAR); tropical timber (ITTO); cotton (ICAC); olives, olive oil (IOOC).
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physical reserves at different levels, virtual reserves, improvements in information
and coordination, and trade facilitation. Several proposals have been made for
storage: emergency reserves for food aid, internationally coordinated public grain
reserves, and national and regional stocks. More than ten proposals have been put
forward with the aim of preventing price spikes and price volatility in the future.
These proposals can be grouped as follows: (a) information and research, (b) trade
facilitation, (c) reserves and stocks, (d) financial instruments, and (e) regulatory
proposals.
6.3.1 Information
There are two key proposals for improving information and coordination in order
to increase market confidence and relieve temporary disruptions in supply. First,
Wright (2008, 2009) and Evans (2009) proposed an international food agency (IFA);
second, Martins-Filho et al. (2010) proposed an early warning mechanism (EWM)
to identify price abnormalities.
Wright (2009) argued that confidence in markets could be increased if there
were more and better information regarding stocks. Similarly, Evans (2009) and
Wright (2008) proposed the creation of an IFA, modeled after the International
Energy Agency (IEA),4 which would report on stock levels and develop protocols
for international collaboration to improve the global response to shortages and
help prevent the onset of market panic. Two potential criticisms are central to
this proposal. First, many international agencies are not optimistic that better
information regarding existing stocks and their evolution can be generated without
considerable effort, international coordination, and costs. This is even more relevant
given the current lack of appropriate information regarding public holding of stocks
by key producer countries such as China and India; there are also much stocks held
by private enterprises which consider their stock levels as commercial secrets. The
lack of appropriate information on and knowledge of the holders and the type of
stocks at a given time calls into question the development of the IFA as proposed
by Evans (2009). Second, it is unclear how emergency response protocols could
be agreed upon at such levels of asymmetry of information or which mechanisms
would be used to identify critical levels of stocks which would necessitate the IFA
to call for a collaborative international response. Resolving both of these problems
could be extremely costly, although the availability of information on physical
stocks at the global level could by itself help to reduce price volatility.
4The IEA was established in 1974 in the wake of that commodities spike. It reports on public and
private petroleum stocks in OECD member states and has developed protocols for international
collaboration in assuring supplies reach a member country should there be a disruption to their
import market (Wiggins and Keats 2009a, b).
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Martins-Filho et al. (2010)5 proposed a model for estimating conditional quan-
tiles for log returns of future prices (contracts expiring between 1 and 3 months)
of hard wheat, soft wheat, corn, and soybeans. This fully nonparametric model
identifies the cases in which the values of the realized returns (log returns of future
prices contracts expiring between 1 and 3 months) are higher than the forecast
95 % conditional quantile for the log return on the following day based on a model
that includes daily returns since 2001. When this event happens, it means that the
realized return is an abnormality, and we expect it to fall under the 95th percentile
return on the following day. This additional market information could in itself
help to reduce potential asymmetry of information among buyers and sellers and
therefore helping to reduce extreme price volatility. One main caveat of the model
is that it is currently operating only for commodities traded in the futures market,
but the framework can also be extended to spot markets if better price information
existed.
The G20 has clearly understood the need for better information and has agreed
to launch the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) to encourage major
players in the global agrifood market to share data, enhance existing information
systems, promote greater understanding of food price developments, and advance
policy dialogue and cooperation. AMIS, in a way, captures both of the proposals
explained before. If properly linked to existing global, regional, or national early
warning systems for food security and vulnerability, AMIS could substantially
improve countries’ capacity to make appropriate decisions regarding food security
matters and help reduce price volatility. However, as the UN Special Rapporteur
on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter (2010), has already pointed out, without
the full participation of the private sector, the information will be incomplete. So
far, private companies are merely urged to participate in AMIS. Support should
be provided to build national and regional capacity to develop and implement
transparent and publicly accessible food security monitoring and information
systems.
6.3.2 Trade Facilitation
Other proposals aim to facilitate trade in order to reduce risks in grain trading when
supplies are low and to avoid disruptions in grain market. Sarris (2009) proposed
a type of food import financing facility (FIFF) that would alleviate financing
constraints as well as an International Grain Clearinghouse Arrangement (IGCA)
to ensure the availability of staple food imports. This international clearing house
would reduce the risk of exporters reneging on contracts when supplies are tight by
guaranteeing contracts for grain deliveries. Finally, Wright (2009) and Lin (2008)
5For further details see http://www.foodsecurityportal.org/sites/default/files/Martins-
FilhoToreroYao2010.pdf
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took a different approach to trade facilitation (TF) with plans to prevent export bans
in order to avoid any disruption of supplies.
The FIFF was initially proposed to the IMF in the early 1980s by the World Food
Council and the FAO, and it was implemented in May 1981, although as mentioned
it raised several questions about its possible effect on world grain prices. The facility
could create a significant increase in demand for grains in developing countries in
years of tight supply and thus could put strong upward pressure on prices. Moreover,
despite its existence, the facility has not been used in the last 10 years, not even
during the 2007–2008 crisis. According to Shaw (2007), “terms for accessing the
facility were set too high to make it attractive or acceptable.” When countries have
existing balance of payment weaknesses, they cannot access the FIFF without a
parallel fund-supported adjustment program. If this facility is to be used more as a
humanitarian instrument as a result of the price crises, it clearly seems to be targeting
more on emergency situations rather than directly on reducing price volatility. In
addition, the facility is susceptible to significant governance problems and costs,
and it would be necessary to develop an independent FIFF without IMF-attached
conditionalities (for further details, see Huddleston et al. 1984; Valdés 1981; Adams
1983).
On the other hand, the IGCA proposal, as mentioned by Wiggins and Keats
(2009a, b), looks somewhat similar to the International Commodity Clearing House
(ICCH) proposed in 1949. Wiggins and Keats pointed out that at that time, the
world food situation was characterized by commodity surpluses in areas with strong
currencies (particularly the US dollar), while countries with weaker currencies and
insufficient supplies could not afford imports. This led to the ICCH proposal: a
public corporation to be housed in the FAO with a budget of US$5 billion. The initial
proposal covered half a dozen main functions, which included the coordination and
negotiation of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, but given its complexity
and the requirement need to transfer power to multilateral organizations, it was
rejected by FAO member nations.
In the current revision of the IGCA proposal, as explained by Wiggins and
Keats (2009a, b), grain trade contracts (between countries or private entities) in
the medium- and long-term would be guaranteed. It would be housed in an existing
institution, such as an international bank or multilateral financial institution, and
would function as a holding body for a “good faith margin” contributed by the buyer
and the seller in any particular contract. These amounts, posted as margins, could
be borrowed from international banks or other multilateral financial institutions.
To guarantee availability of physical supplies, the IGCA would invest its financial
reserves in physical stocks of grain in locations of excess supply or in the form of
futures contracts in organized commodity exchanges. Any commitments in futures
taken out as insurance on a particular contract could be liquidated upon execution
(physical delivery between buyers and sellers) of said contract.
As in the initial proposal, and in addition to the governance issues, the key
questions are: how large would these margins have to be, and who would invest
in them? Will it require international support? If so, how will this be coordinated,
especially during times of tight global supply? In addition, it poses two more
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key problems: first, the need to have a global storage mechanism in place and
its necessary international governance; second, the need to specify any triggering
mechanism that will make it effective, i.e., when the grain guarantee would be
executed.
Finally, in the case of Wright (2009) and Lin’s (2008) proposal, the most difficult
part would clearly be persuading countries to commit to the IGCA and then adhere
to it during a food crisis. When facing the choice between breaking international
agreements and protecting their citizens by ensuring national food security, some
countries are likely to impose export bans, regardless of any punitive actions against
protective trade policies. Moreover, as shown by Martin and Anderson (2010),
and Bouet and Laborde (2009), if export taxes are raised in a large agricultural-
based economy, world food prices will rise (through a reduction in world supply),
which will hurt small net food-importing countries. The reduction of import duties
has exactly the same effect: an increase in world prices through an expansion of
demand in world markets. Furthermore, when export taxes are augmented in large
food-exporting countries and import duties are reduced in large food-importing
countries, small food-importing countries would be affected economically; thus,
the solution is not only a facilitation of trade but also the understanding of the
effects of different trade policies could have and to understand the importance of the
required governance to prevent large countries from implementing policies aimed at
maintaining constant domestic food prices. The costs of insufficient cooperation in
and regulation of (binding process) such policies in a time of crisis is an extremely
complex issue, and it is unclear whether the WTO dispute resolution mechanisms
could be used effectively (see also Chap. 8 of this book by Bouët and Laborde).
6.3.3 Reserves and Stocks
There have been several proposals regarding physical reserves: (1) emergency
reserves (ERs) (von Braun and Torero 2008); (2) international coordinated grain
reserves (ICGRs) (Lin 2008; von Braun et al. 2009) and rice reserves (Timmer
2010); (3) regional reserves (RRs) by regional associations of governments; and (4)
country-level reserves (CRs) by multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank.
The ERs is a modest emergency reserve of around 300,000–500,000 metric tons
of basic grains—about 5 % of the current food aid flows of 6.7 million wheat-
equivalent metric tons—which would be supplied by the main grain-producing
countries and funded by a group of countries participating in the scheme. These
countries would include the Group of Eight Plus Five (G8C5) countries (Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK, the US, Brazil, China, India, Mexico,
and South Africa) and perhaps other countries. This decentralized reserve would
be located at strategic points near or in major developing country regions and
make use of existing national storage facilities. The reserve, which would be used
exclusively for emergency response and humanitarian assistance, would be managed
by the World Food Programme (WFP). The WFP would have access to the grains
at precrisis market prices to reduce the need for short-term ad hoc fundraising. To
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cover the cost of restoring the reserve to its initial level (i.e., the difference between
the post and precrisis price multiplied by the quantity of reserves used by WFP),
an emergency fund should be created, and its level maintained by the participating
countries. The fund should be accompanied by a financing facility that the WFP
could draw from as needed to cope with any potential increase in transport costs, as
experienced in the 2008 crisis. This arrangement could also be defined under a newly
designed Food Aid Convention. It should be solely for humanitarian purposes rather
than the reduction of excessive price volatility. Following this initiative, the G20
has proposed studying the feasibility of a global humanitarian emergency reserve
through a pilot implementation in West Africa under the leadership of ECOWAS
and the support of the WFP.
The other three mechanisms had been proposed as ways to mitigate excessive
price volatility. A combination of the proposed reserve systems would likely be
necessary, but country-level reserves should be thought of as a strategic reserve
rather than food stock held by marketing board/parastatals. Enforcing floor and
ceiling prices by marketing boards or parastatals has always involved holding phys-
ical stocks of grains; there is significant evidence that these measures would distort
markets (Rashid and Lemma 2010). Strategic grain reserves are different from such
stocks. Strategic reserves were introduced in many countries because marketing
boards failed to address shocks, such as the prolonged droughts in the countries
of the Sahel region; however, they cannot be thought of as mechanisms to reduce
international price volatility. Moreover, three key challenges arise when maintaining
these types of strategic reserves: the determination of optimum stock levels, the level
of costs and losses associated with these reserves, and the uncertainties that strategic
reserves could cause in the market place. Not only is the process of determining
optimum stock levels politically challenging, but reserves are also highly dependent
on transparent and accountable governance. In addition, predicting supply, demand,
and potential market shortfalls can be extremely difficult. Physical reserves also
require financial resources and must be rotated regularly; in African countries, the
costs of holding a metric ton of food ranged from US$20 to US$46 (Rashid and
Lemma 2010). The countries that need reserves most are generally those which are
least able to afford the costs and oversight necessary for maintaining them. The
private sector is better financed and better informed and has more political power,
which puts it in a much better position to compete than most of the governments that
would be managing these reserves. Finally, the uncertainties that strategic reserves
can introduce into the marketplace can be problematic.
With respect to the coordination of global reserves and regional reserves, in
addition to high storage costs (both opportunity and effective costs when creating a
new physical reserve) and the fact that the creation of reserves will put more upward
pressure on prices during times of tight supply, there are several other concerns that
need to be taken into account. First, similar to the security provisions of the IEA,
the key challenge would be to develop a governance structure such that member
countries would honor their commitments to the reserves even when markets are
under stress. Second, the global or regional reserves would clearly require trigger
mechanisms to determine when to release stocks to calm markets in times of stress.
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Such mechanisms are a necessary condition for a reserve to operate as a tool to
reduce extreme price volatility. In addition, it is imperative to keep the trigger
mechanisms highly transparent. The model proposed by Martins-Filho et al. (2010)
could be a solution to address the need for transparency. Finally, a physical reserve,
whether regional or global, would not resolve the problem of interlinkages within
the financial, energy, and food commodity markets; the problem could be extremely
relevant if excessive speculation is indeed a cause of extreme price spikes.
6.3.4 Financial Instruments
There are two major proposals linked to the use of financial instruments: (1)
the virtual reserves proposed by von Braun and Torero (2008, 2009a, b) and (2)
a toolbox of market-based risk management tools, such as physical or financial
commodity price hedges, insurance and guarantee instruments, and counter-cyclical
lending, which can play an important role in helping vulnerable countries mitigate
and manage the risks associated with excessive food price volatility. The toolbox
was proposed in the Paris G-20 meeting and is still in its planning stage.
The proposal of virtual reserves is a safeguard mechanism to manage risk through
the implementation of a virtual reserve which is backed by a financial fund and is
aimed at calming markets during extreme price volatility. The concept has been
widely used by central banks for inflation targeting and dirty flotation of the
exchange rates.
The virtual reserve concept incorporates a global market analysis unit (GMAU),
which has two functions. First, and perhaps most importantly, the GMAU is an early
warning mechanism based on a model [see Martins-Filho et al. (2010) for details
about the model] that forecasts changes in returns for key staple commodities in
the futures market and identifies when a price abnormality occurs or when a price
spike appears imminent. When this price abnormality happens, it means that the
realized return is an extreme value and there is a high probability that it will fall
under the 95th percentile return on the following day or days; on the other hand,
if the realized return remains over the 95th percentile, it could imply the formation
of a price spike. The announcement of a potential price spike alerts the market to a
higher likelihood of an intervention in the futures market, which will immediately
increase the discount rate of potential short-term investors. If there is evidence of
an emerging price spike despite this alert, the GMAU will indicate that returns are
significantly above their normal. Finally, an autonomous technical committee would
then decide whether to enter the futures market. This intervention would consist of
executing a number of progressive short sales (that is, selling a firm promise—a
futures contract—to deliver the commodity at a later date at a specified price) over
a specific time period in futures markets at a variety of market prices in different
futures months until futures prices and spot prices decline to levels within the
estimated price bands. The GMAU would recommend the price or series of prices
to be offered in the short sales.
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This increase in the supply of short sales will reduce spot prices and should
help to significantly reduce extreme price volatility by reducing the probability
of abnormal returns. In other words, the intervention will create a backwardation
in the market (the situation in which, and the amount by which, the price of a
commodity for future delivery is lower than the spot price or a far-month future
delivery price is lower than a nearby month future delivery price). Reducing these
abnormal returns would minimize potential second-round effects (such as export
bans, export restrictions, or reduction of import tariffs), given that spot prices would
again become consistent with market fundamentals; therefore, lower spot prices
would not result in the accelerated use of available supplies. All futures contracts
will ultimately be settled either through liquidation by offsetting purchases or sales
(the vast majority of agricultural futures contracts are settled this way) or through
delivery of the actual physical commodity. In this respect, the virtual fund will
only stand for delivery if there is a need to realize the futures sales, in which
case the fund will be used to obtain the necessary grain supply to comply with
futures contract delivery requirements and calm the markets. Usually, this action
would not be necessary and the whole operation would remain virtual because
the signal will deter speculators from entering. Questions would remain about
the price, the amount of short sales, and the duration of the intervention in the
futures markets; answering these questions would require political consultation and
continuous market monitoring and research.
The innovative concept behind the virtual reserve is the early warning alert
system provided to markets and regulators. The presence of the system alone
is likely to deter short-term financial investors from entering this market; the
probability of a real intervention is minimal. Nonetheless, the committee must be
ready to trade grain when necessary and to assume the potential costs of buying
back contracts at a higher price than they were sold for. In that sense, a clear financial
commitment is needed to give the correct signal to the market. The size of the initial
commitment is still being studied. A comprehensive cost–benefit assessment of the
system must look beyond agricultural markets and also include food security and
poverty considerations.
The key advantages of the virtual reserve compared to a physical reserve are
that (1) it involves a signaling mechanism, (2) it does not put more stress on
commodity markets, (3) it does not incur the significant storage and opportunity
costs of a physical reserve, (4) it resolves the problem of the interlinkages between
the financial and the commodity markets, and (5) its effect on markets would be
minimal because it is only a signal.
There are some critics of the virtual reserve concept. First, some have questioned
whether rising futures prices actually lead to increased spot market prices; however,
several studies suggested that changes in the futures prices of certain commodities
generally lead to changes in spot prices.6 In addition, the recent analysis by Her-
nandez and Torero (2010) complements these earlier studies by examining causal
6See Garbade and Silber (1983); Brorsen et al. (1984); Crain and Lee (1996).
6 Alternative Mechanisms to Reduce Food Price Volatility and Price. . . 131
relations in the current decade with a much more developed futures commodity
market. Their analysis used both linear and nonparametric Granger causality tests
and identified a causal link in all cases. The results indicated that spot prices are
generally discovered in futures markets. In particular, they found that changes in
futures prices in the markets analyzed led to changes in spot prices more often than
the reverse case. Thus, from a policy perspective, these findings support the viability
of implementing a global virtual reserve to address grain price abnormalities
through signals in the futures market and, if necessary, market assessment in the
exchange of futures.
Wright (2009) also argued that it would be difficult for the responsible parties to
be certain that markets are out of equilibrium and that the proposed interventions
would not do more harm than good under any given circumstances. In this sense,
the model developed by Martins-Filho et al. (2010) has made significant progress
toward the capacity to predict price abnormalities, as previously explained. There
has also been significant concern regarding the size of the financial funds necessary
to ensure the success of the signal given by the virtual reserve. In that respect, the
virtual reserve requires a coordinated commitment from the group of participating
countries. Each country needs to commit to supplying funds, if needed, for
intervention in grain markets; this does not imply effective expenditure. Therefore,
the resources needed are promissory rather than actual budget expenditures. Further
analyses are required to determine the size of this fund because commodity
futures markets allow for high levels of leverage. This commitment cannot be
compared with budgets allocated for R&D. First, it is a commitment rather than
an expenditure; second, the size of this commitment should be significant enough
to provide a strong signal to the market. It is noteworthy that similar activities have
been implemented by central banks, such as the dirty flotation of the US dollar, a
practice whereby the US central bank uses reserves to maintain the target limits
of appreciation or depreciation of the currency within a certain range. Finally,
there is also a question of the governance behind the virtual reserve mechanism.
Clearly, reaching an agreement on the arrangements of the virtual reserve would
not be easy and may require a high-level United Nations task force to analyze the
way forward. Yet similar institutional arrangements have been made in the past;
examples include the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the
Food Aid Convention (FAC), the IMF Cereal Import Facility, and the IEA. The
IFAD was established as an international financial institution in 1977 and was a
major outcome of the 1974 World Food Conference in response to the food crisis
of the early 1970s. The FAC, which was first signed in 1967 and have since been
renewed five times, is the only treaty under which the signatories have a legal
obligation to provide international development assistance.
With respect to the toolbox of risk-coping mechanisms, there are basically two
initiatives being implemented. First, the International Finance Corporation (IFC)’s
new Agriculture Price Risk Management (APRM) product will allow producers and
consumers to hedge against downside or upside price risk on a pilot basis by using
a financial intermediary with both global reach and expertise in Latin America.
Efforts to introduce the APRM product will be supported by two other financial
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intermediaries focusing on lower income countries in sub-Saharan Africa, North
Africa, and the Middle East. In addition, other multilateral and regional development
banks are exploring their interest in risk-sharing by using APRM facilities in order to
take advantage of APRM’s operational infrastructure. Nevertheless, as the literature
has pointed out, the pickup rate of these insurance tools and their cost effectiveness
still needs to be assessed. Second, the World Bank has developed a proposal to
facilitate governments’ access to risk management markets by providing assistance
in structuring and executing financial and physical commodity risk hedging, and
in building the legal/regulatory/technical capacity required for using these tools.
The impact and process of this mechanism need to be evaluated to ensure its
effectiveness, viability, and sustainability.
6.3.5 Regulatory Proposals
Since late 2005, a number of serious problems have plagued the futures and cash
markets for grains (corn, soybeans, and wheat). The most dominant problem is lack
of price convergence between cash and futures prices (see, for example, Garcia et al.
2014 and Adjemian et al. 2013). There seem to be several factors related to the
uncoupling of cash and futures prices. The first concerns delivery certificates, which
are issued by warehouses to those holding a long position in the futures market
until the contract expires. The problem in this case is that the parties holding long
positions are not using these certificates to take delivery but are holding them, in
part because of the value the certificates retain. The second problem is that actual
delivery is not occurring. Many market participants believe that the lack of load-out
is contributing to the lack of convergence in futures and cash prices. Because the
demand for delivery is diminished, storage facilities have less space available. This
raises a concern about storage rates, which should be reviewed to ensure that they are
kept at the right levels. An incorrect storage rate could contribute to the uncoupling
of cash and futures prices. Proposed solutions for the lack of price convergence
include changing the storage facility fees, changing the futures contract to a cash-
settled contract, changing the design of the delivery instrument, compelling load-out
(i.e., compelling entities with long positions to stand for delivery), and reviewing
trading patterns of fund traders to ascertain their effect on the market.
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and other agencies of the
US government and the European Commission, along with the futures industry,
have reviewed proposals and implemented seasonal storage rates, limits on the
number of delivery certificates an entity can hold for noncommercial purposes, and
an additional issue of the Commitment of Traders report to increase transparency. If
these structural changes do not significantly improve the price convergence between
futures and cash prices, then a cash-settled contract must be seriously considered. In
any regard, exchanges and regulators cannot afford to continue pursuing solutions
at a slow pace. These problems began in late 2005, and so far very few structural
changes have occurred.
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Despite these regulatory measures being seemingly complementary to many
of the proposals described above, a major problem hindering any regulatory
mechanism in futures exchanges is the level of linkages between the main futures
commodity markets. If activities in different future exchanges mutually influence
each other, then regulations implemented in an exchange would merely transfer
the problem to another exchange; this again requires managing the complexity of
multicountry coordination, as in the case of the virtual reserve or any global or
regional reserves.
Possible solutions to address potential excessive speculation include imposing
stricter speculative limits and larger margins, phasing out existing position limit
waivers for index traders, imposing additional restrictions on index traders, investi-
gating index trading in other agricultural markets, and strengthening data collection
on index trading in nonagricultural markets.
To summarize the analysis of all proposed alternatives, Fig. 6.3 classifies the
major proposed initiatives based on their cost (horizontal axis) and their effec-
tiveness in reducing price volatility (vertical axis). It is important to mention that
only these two dimensions are used because the major objective of this chapter is
to identify the existing mechanisms proposed and their effectiveness in reducing
price volatility. In that respect, some of these initiatives, such as the emergency food
reserves (von Braun and Torero 2009a, b) and the food import facility (Sarris 2009),
have objectives other than reducing price volatility; therefore they were ranked
low in that dimension. This does not mean that they are ineffective in meeting
their core objective. On the other hand, policies such as the virtual reserves (von
Braun and Torero 2009a, b), the internationally coordinated grain reserves (Lin
2008), the regional reserves (such as the ASAEN), and the International Grain
Clearance Agreement (Sarris 2009) were ranked higher in terms of effectiveness in
reducing price volatility, although they vary significantly in the amount of resources
needed for their implementation and in the amount of additional research required
to implement them properly.
6.4 Conclusion
The international food price crises of 2007–2008 and 2010 led to economic
difficulties for the poor, generated political turmoil in many countries, and could
have severely affected confidence in global grain markets, thereby hampering the
market’s performance in responding to fundamental changes in supply, demand, and
the costs of production. More importantly, food crises could result in unreasonable
or unwanted price fluctuations, which could harm the poor and cause long-term,
irreversible damage to the body because of malnutrition, especially among children.
The food crises highlighted the need to modify the architecture of international
financial and agricultural markets in order to address the problem of price spikes.
Appropriate global institutional arrangements for preventing such market failures
are missing. A global solution to prevent excessive price volatility in food markets
may be costly, but given the losses caused by food price crises like those in
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(1) ER
High effect in reducing price volatility
Low effect on reducing price volatility
Fig. 6.3 Proposals for reducing price volatility. Note: The vertical axis refers to the potential effect
in reducing price volatility and the horizontal axis to the costs required for its implementation.
(1) ER D emergency reserve, von Braun and Torero (2009a, b), it requires US$7.5 Mpa but is
to alleviate requirements of WFP during food scarcity and not to reduce price volatility. (2)
ICGR D internationally coordinated grain reserves, Lin (2008), it implies opportunity costs and
coordination costs (approx. US$1.05 Bpa) and it could have an impact in reducing volatility but
high risks of coordination failure, requires capacity to predict price spikes, and not necessarily
effective to tackle speculation in futures market. Timmer (2010) proposes a similar idea only
for rice given how concentrated this market is we expect it to have a higher effect in reducing
volatility in this specific commodity. (3) RR D regional reserves as the one of ASEAN, it implies
opportunity costs and coordination costs; depending on the market share on the commodities
of the countries involved, it could have an impact in reducing volatility, but very high risks of
coordination failure, and could distort market prices, patronage problems, and other principal
agent problems. (4) CR D country level reserves, this could imply significant relative costs at the
country level, significant distortions, and little effect on volatility given low effect over international
markets. (5) VR D virtual reserves, von Braun and Torero (2009a, b), it requires US$12–20 B, risk
of coordination failure, requires capacity to predict price spikes, could be effective in tackling
speculation in futures market, requires certainty that markets are out of equilibrium to avoid
distortion of interventions. (6) DFIF D diversion from industrial and animal feed uses, Wright
(2009), it implies opportunity costs, could distort market efficiency, and necessarily effective
to tackle speculation in futures markets. (7) IS C IFA D better Information on Storage and
International Food Agency (Wright 2009), very low cost not clear effectiveness in reducing price
volatility (8) IGCA D International Grain Clearance Arrangement, Sarris (2009). Not too costly,
not clear how it will operate, not clear size of margins, not clear if it will work when stocks
are tight, and not necessarily effective to tackle speculation in futures markets. (9) FIFF D food
import financing facility, Sarris (2009). Similar to IMF’s food import facility, could be costly,
possible moral hazard problems, and not effective to tackle speculation in futures markets. (10)
EWM D early warning mechanism. (11) TF D trade facilitation—Wright (2009) and Lin (2008)
2007–2008 and 2010, such solution would still have large positive net returns.
Clearly, some of the key drivers behind the excessive price volatility can be
directly addressed by, for example, revising biofuel policies through curtailing
biofuel subsidies, making mandates flexible and liberalizing biofuel and feedstock
trade. Another way to address the problem is by increasing and diversify global
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productivity and production in order to raise the number of countries that export
staple foods and, at the same time, increase aggregate global reserves to the
minimum critical level needed.
On the other hand, the incentives for excessive financial activity in the food
commodity futures markets, which is one of the causes of price volatility, could be
reduced by (1) changing regulatory frameworks to limit the volume of speculation
versus hedging, (2) making delivery on contracts or portions of contracts compul-
sory, and (3) imposing capital deposit requirements on every futures transaction.
These regulatory measures could be implemented on a case-by-case basis or as a
platform through an international “alliance of commodity exchanges.” Therefore,
there is a need to discuss exchange regulation and the role of speculative traders,
and this discussion must include the issue of international harmonization of any
regulatory policy to increase the probability of successful policy implementation.
There is also a clear need to improve the quality of information on and forecasting
of price spikes for any of these potential policies to work properly. AMIS could be
an important option for addressing this issue.
Several of the proposals that are specifically for reducing price volatility or the
effects of the price crises require significant and quick investment in further research
into their implementation and potential risks and benefits. In addition, many of
them have different objectives and therefore could substantially complement each
other. For example, the following three proposals complement each other: (1)
von Braun and Torero’s (2009a) proposal of emergency humanitarian reserves
and a financial instrument to reduce the incentives for excessive speculation, (2)
Lin’s (2008) proposal of an international coordinated regional reserve,7 and (3)
Wright’s (2009) proposal of providing better information regarding storage and the
development of an international food agency. Moreover, the institutional design of
the virtual reserve concept included a specialized research unit that would not only
improve information regarding storage but also enhance the capacity of monitoring
the probability distribution of price spikes and the periods of excessive volatility
(similarly to what is being implemented through AMIS). While the proposed actions
will entail costs, the modest costs of the required organizational elements must be
balanced against the benefits of more effective international financial architecture.
The benefits include the prevention of economic hardship and political instability,
improved market efficiency, and stronger incentives for long-term investment in
agriculture.
All other proposals focused on different objectives and do not seem to have
the potential to significantly reduce price volatility; nevertheless, they may have
positive effects on other issues, such as trade financing (Sarris 2009) and the long-
term effects of some of the variables behind the changes in supply and demand
fundamentals (Wright 2009).
In the meantime, we observed a diverse set of policy actions being taken: many
countries try to build up costly national reserves, others focus on increasing self-
7See von Braun et al. (2009) for a joint proposal.
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sufficiency, and still others engage in FDI to secure national food security through
transnational land acquisition rather than trade because of lost confidence in trade
owing to uncertainty surrounding volatility. In addition, some countries are pressing
for more regulation of exchanges, which would not prevent extreme price spikes and
could even further distort markets. All of these policy actions threaten to move food
agriculture further away from efficient market designs. A more promising step may
be regional coordinated reserves, as recently planned by ASEAN. Nevertheless, a
global problem needs global institutional responses.
A clear message from all these proposals is that comprehensive research is
needed to provide the decision-making body with independent and trustworthy
information on possible alternatives for coping with the new global scenario of price
spikes and excessive price volatility. All of these alternatives would clearly benefit
from improved information availability. At the same time, improving information
availability would allow for better evaluation of the costs and benefits of each
proposal.
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7Worldwide Acreage and Yield Responseto International Price Change and Volatility:
A Dynamic Panel Data Analysis for Wheat, Rice,
Corn, and Soybeans
Mekbib G. Haile, Matthias Kalkuhl, and Joachim von Braun
7.1 Introduction
After about three decades of low and relatively stable prices of staple food
commodities, the world has experienced a surge in the prices of many of these
commodities since 2005. Such high prices are typically expected to bring about
a supply response by which producers allocate more land to the agricultural sector
and increase investment to improve yield growth (OECD 2008). The higher prices
were, however, accompanied by higher volatility (Gilbert and Morgan 2010). Price
volatility introduces output price risk, which has detrimental implications for pro-
ducers’ resource allocation and investment decisions (Sandmo 1971; Moschini and
Hennessy 2001). Because agricultural producers in many developing countries are
often unable to deal with (Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986) and are unprotected
from (Miranda and Helmberger 1988) the consequences of price volatility, they are
exposed to the effects of international agricultural market price instability to the
extent that the instability is transmitted to local markets. Yet Bellemare et al. (2013)
pointed out that reducing commodity price volatility could benefit wealthier rural
households more than poorer ones.
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This study analyzes the supply responsiveness of the key world staple food
commodities—namely, wheat, corn, soybeans, and rice—to changes in output
prices and volatility. It assesses how global food commodity producers allocate
cropland and how their production decisions are affected by changes in price
levels and volatility. These are fundamental questions for designing policies related
to agricultural growth and food supply. Additionally, the study provides relevant
information on how quickly current scarcities in global food supply, which are
indicated by high prices, can be overcome by increasing production in the short
term.
The literature about estimating supply response to prices has a long history
in agricultural economics (Houck and Ryan 1972; Lee and Helmberger 1985;
Nerlove 1956). Nevertheless, there are various reasons for the renewed interest in
the research about supply response. The majority of the previous empirical literature
concentrated only on a few countries, without having to estimate the worldwide
supply response to international prices. Furthermore, the impact of price volatility
and price risk is rarely considered because the small number of observations limits
the use of additional explanatory variables or because price risk has not been
considered as an important factor at the global level. The prices of many agricultural
commodities have become more volatile after 2005, resulting in new interest in
the impacts of price risk and volatility on (global) food security. The current study
addresses this debate from the supply-side perspective, that is, it attempts to assess
the extent to which price risks reduce production and supply response to increasing
price levels.
Many existing econometric analyses focused on national supply responses to
domestic prices. In contrast, this paper investigates the worldwide aggregate supply
response to international market prices for the key world staples. In doing so, this
article makes the following major contributions: First, it provides updated short-
and long-term supply elasticities, which indicate how major agricultural commodity
producers have responded to the recent increase in global food prices and volatility.
This reveals to what extent the global agricultural system is responding to emerging
global food scarcities. Second, some empirical evidence suggests that acreage
adjustments constitute the largest share of the supply response to output price in
the short run (e.g., Roberts and Schlenker 2009), and therefore, both acreage and
yield responses are estimated to examine this finding. And third, this study evaluates
whether the recent increase in prices and price volatility poses an opportunity
or a challenge to the aggregate agriculture sector in general and, in particular,
agricultural producers. To this end, we use simulation analyses to assess the overall
impacts of the agricultural commodity price dynamics on the worldwide supply of
the aforementioned key staple crops during the 2006–2010 period.
This study differs from a related work by Haile et al. (2014) in terms of
methodology and research question. They employed several time series models to
investigate annual and intra-annual global acreage response, whereas the current
study uses a panel econometric modeling approach that makes use of data in
which international prices are assigned to the corresponding planting season of the
respective country and crop. Thus, this paper estimates global supply response of the
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aforementioned agricultural commodities by employing a newly developed multi-
country, crop- and calendar-specific, seasonally disaggregated panel data with price
changes and price volatility applied accordingly. This is an alternative approach
to modeling heterogeneous seasonal planting patterns on the global scale, which
has the advantage of using a larger number of observations without sacrificing
the underlying nature of the monthly time resolution of production decisions. In
addition, this study investigates not only acreage but also yield supply response to
prices and price risk. The joint consideration allows us to make inferences about the
global production response (as the product of acreage and yield response), which
is relevant for policymakers. Finally, and importantly, this article assesses the net
impacts of the recent agricultural commodity price dynamics on acreage, yield, and
production of the key interest crops.
7.2 Related Literature
This study builds on the extensive agricultural economics literature about the
estimation of agricultural supply response. Elasticities in a supply response model
refer to the speed and size of adjustments in desired output relative to expected
output prices. Neither the desired output nor the expected price is observable,
however. The empirical literature employed different types of proxies for these
variables, which could affect the results obtained. We provide a brief review of the
literature with respect to the alternative proxies for these two variables.
In terms of the proxy for expected output prices, the literature did not provide
unambiguous evidence regarding which expectation model should be used for
empirical agricultural supply response estimation (Nerlove and Bessler 2001;
Shideed and White 1989). Expectation formation hypotheses, widely applied in
the supply response literature, include naive expectation (Ezekiel 1938), whereby
expected prices are assumed to be equal to the latest observed prices; adaptive
expectation (Nerlove 1958), whereby farmers are assumed to revise their expec-
tations depending on past errors; and rational expectation (Muth 1961), which
assumes that expectations are consistent with the underlying market structure
and that economic agents make efficient use of all available information. Other
research has focused on modeling supply response by using quasi-rational price
expectations (Holt and McKenzie 2003), which is consistent with price prediction
from a reduced-form dynamic regression equation. Futures prices are also used as a
proxy for price expectations (Gardner 1976).
The naive and adaptive expectation hypotheses have been criticized because they
are backward-looking (Nickell 1985); in other words, they ignore that the dynamics
of price expectations of decision-makers can influence futures prices. Although the
rational expectation hypothesis can be forward-looking, it implies that economic
agents make efficient use of all available information, which may not be the case
when some information is costly or difficult to process (Chavas 2000). Additionally,
the rational expectation hypothesis is not supported by some experimental and
survey datasets (Nelson and Bessler 1992). It is also doubtful whether futures
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prices are applicable as a proxy in supply analyses for countries where farmers are
unable to make any futures transactions and have no access to information from
exchange markets. Moreover, some empirical evidence showed that heterogeneous
expectations coexist among agricultural producers (Chavas 2000).
Following Nerlove (1958), several empirical supply response models employ the
adaptive expectation hypothesis and its variants. Askari and Cummings (1977), and
later Nerlove and Bessler (2001), provided a thorough review of such literature.
Some recent examples are Yu et al. (2012), Vitale et al. (2009), and de Menezes
and Piketty (2012). Aradhyula and Holt (1989) employed the rational expectation
hypothesis to investigate broiler supply in the USA; Eckstein (1984) and Lansink
(1999) applied it to estimate crop acreage elasticities using aggregate agricultural
data and farm-level data, respectively. Moreover, other empirical applications
showed the relevance of the quasi-rational expectation approach in their supply
models (Holt and McKenzie 2003; Nerlove and Fornari 1998). Lastly, Gardner
(1976), Lin and Dismukes (2007), Liang et al. (2011), and Hausman (2012) are a
few examples of studies that used harvest-time futures prices as a proxy for farmers’
price expectations during planting season.
The empirical agricultural supply response literature has often used acreage,
yield, or production as a proxy for desired output supply. Several studies preferred
to use acreage when modeling output supply response (Coyle 1993; Haile et al.
2014) because acreage, unlike observed output, is not influenced by external shocks
that occur after planting. However, acreage elasticities may only serve as a lower
bound for the total supply elasticity (Rao 1989) because the latter depends also
on how yield responds to prices. Several studies estimated both acreage and yield
responses to prices (Weersink et al. 2010; Yu et al. 2012). When how supply
responds to output prices is trivial (via acreage or yield), total observed production
is another proxy used in the literature to estimate output supply response (Coyle
1999). Because “external” factors such as weather and pest shocks—which usually
happen after farmers make their production decisions and are hardly predictable,
such that farmers are unable to consider them when making production decisions—
influence total observed production, the estimated supply response may not reflect
how farmers actually respond to prices.
There is, however, another proxy used in recent studies—total caloric production,
which is the sum of the caloric value of specific crops (Roberts and Schlenker
2009, 2013). This proxy implicitly assumes that the crops in the caloric aggregate
are perfectly substitutable, which is less plausible as it assumes identical land and
other input requirements for each crop. This ignores the possibility that producers
might switch crops as a result of changes in relative prices by shifting out land
from “low-demand” crops. This is supported by literature that showed acreage
expansion of “high-demand” crops such as corn (Abbott et al. 2011; Goodwin et al.
2012). Such aggregation excludes intercrop acreage and other input shifts, which,
by definition, implies that aggregate output elasticities are likely to be smaller than
crop-specific elasticities. This is consistent with several empirical studies that found
statistically significant cross-price elasticities of crop acreages. Hendricks et al.
(2014), for instance, concluded that most of the acreage response to prices of corn
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and soybeans in the USA occurs through substitution rather than area expansion.
Moreover, aggregation of crops conceals any implications for and effects of crop-
specific policies with respect to changing intra-commodity price relationships.
On the other hand, output supply can be estimated at the plot or farm level,
whereby farm size, soil quality, and other farm characteristics can be controlled
for; at the household level, which enables better understanding of farmers’ supply
behaviors; or at larger aggregation scopes (such as at national, regional, or global
levels), which have methodological limitations to capture the effects of contextual
factors but still enable sufficient measurement of supply responsiveness. Yet, the
estimation of aggregate agricultural supply response to changing price incentives
has crucial implications for economic growth and poverty alleviation in economies
in which the agricultural sector constitutes a sizable share of the national income.
Although there are several farm- and micro-level studies (e.g., Lansink 1999;
Vitale et al. 2009; Yu et al. 2012) and quite a few national-level studies (e.g., Barr
et al. 2009; de Menezes and Piketty 2012), global-level studies are scarce. Never-
theless, cross-country analyses are conducted using a certain group of countries to
determine the role of prices on agricultural supply. Peterson (1979), for instance,
found agricultural supply in developing countries to be fairly responsive to crop
prices (estimated long-run elasticities range between 1.25 and 1.66). On the other
hand, using a sample of 58 countries between 1969 and 1978, Binswanger et al.
(1987) found that agricultural supply responded weakly to price incentives but
strongly to non-price factors. A more recent cross-country study by Subervie (2008),
based on a sample of 25 developing countries between 1961 and 2002, found a rather
small, but statistically significant, aggregate supply elasticity of 0.04. Findings from
Imai et al. (2011), which used data from a panel of ten Asian countries, and other
crop-disaggregated studies that found much larger supply elasticities hinted that
such aggregation of crops could result in small supply elasticities.
The other scope is when supply is aggregated across countries and crops.
Two related studies by Roberts and Schlenker (2009, 2013) estimated the caloric-
aggregated world supply and demand of staple crops—corn, wheat, soybeans, and
rice—and found supply elasticities in the range of 0.06–0.12. They used lagged
weather shocks, which are approximated by deviations of yield from trend, to
identify the supply elasticity of agricultural commodities. Hendricks et al. (2015)
replicated Roberts and Schlenker’s analysis and found little difference between
their estimates, which controlled for the realized yield shock, and those of Roberts
and Schlenker, which used weather shocks in the previous year as an instrument
for potentially endogenous expected prices. These authors also suggested that
using planted acreage as a dependent variable can reduce this endogeneity bias
in the supply elasticity estimates. In line with this suggestion, Haile et al. (2014)
aggregated the global acreage of staple food to estimate crop-specific world supply
elasticities. The elasticities were found to fall in a range between 0.03 (for rice) and
0.34 (for soybeans).
This study differs from the literature discussed above in terms of the level of
aggregation employed for the dependent variables and the proxy used for expected
prices. Besides using crop acreage, yield and production as alternative proxies for
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the desired output supply, these variables are aggregated at the global level for
each crop. Nevertheless, the aggregation retains the panel feature of the data, which
enables us to control for heterogeneity across countries. For example, we made use
of the country- and crop-specific planting and harvesting seasons to identify the
suitable proxy for price expectation in each country and for each crop.
Our proxy for expected prices differs from those used in the literature. In this
study, we used world prices during planting season as a proxy for the prices
anticipated by farmers in each country; in other words, we estimated the crop supply
response to changes in world prices rather than to specific domestic prices. Thus,
unlike the commonly understood agricultural supply response, which estimates
how output supply responds to changes in the domestic prices in the producers’
own countries, we estimated the responses (in terms of production, area, and
yield) to changes in international prices. These two supply response estimates are
identical under the assumption of complete transmission of international prices to
domestic producer prices. However, they could be different in case of incomplete
price transmission—an argument which is supported by the literature (e.g., Kalkuhl
2014). Finally, with the exception of Subervie (2008), none of the abovementioned
cross-country panel studies and, to our knowledge, no worldwide aggregated supply
response studies, except Haile et al. (2014), have accounted for price volatility (price
risk) in the respective supply models.
7.3 Conceptual Framework
The literature on supply response has gone through several important empirical and
theoretical modifications, and two major frameworks have been developed. The first
approach is the Nerlovian partial adjustment model, which allows for analyzing
both the speed and the level of adjustment from the actual output to desired output.
The second framework is the supply function approach, which is derived from
the profit-maximizing framework. The framework requires detailed input price
data and simultaneous estimation of input demand and output supply equations.
However, input markets—in particular land and labor markets—are either missing
or imperfect in many countries. Moreover, our main interest lies in the output
supply function. Thus, the econometric approach used in the present study is in line
with the partial adjustment framework, and the approach is enhanced with dynamic
response, alternative price expectation assumptions, and the introduction of price-
risk variables.
Models of the supply response of a crop can be formulated in terms of output,
area, or yield response. For instance, the desired output of a certain crop in period
t is a function of expected output prices and a number of other exogenous factors
(Braulke 1982):
Qdt D ˇ1 C ˇ2pet C ˇ3Zt C "t (7.1)
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where Qdt denotes the desired output in period t; p
e
t is a vector of the expected
price of the crop under consideration and of other competing crops; Zt is a set
of other exogenous variables, including fixed and variable input prices, climate
variables, and technological change; "t accounts for unobserved random factors
affecting crop production with zero expected mean; and ˇi are the parameters to be
estimated. Output (determined by area and yield) adjustments are usually delayed
by one or two agricultural production cycles because of a lack of resources. To
account for such time lags in agricultural supply response, it is important to apply
a dynamic approach. A supply response is usually a two-stage process. Because
harvest-time prices are not realized during the time of planting, producers make
acreage allocation decisions conditional on expected prices at the first stage. As in
the production equation above, the desired area to be cultivated for a certain crop at
time t(Adt ) is determined by expected own-crop and competing crop prices and other
non-price factors:
Adt D ˛1 C ˛2pet C ˛3Zt C "t (7.2)
Given the acreage allocation for each crop, farmers then determine crop yield based
on other inputs and climate conditions. During the growing period, they may make
revisions to their production practices by adjusting their input quantity, input quality,
and crop protection. Hence, the desired yield of each crop is defined similarly to Eqs.
(7.1) and (7.2) except that the output price vector includes only the crop’s own price.
It is important to emphasize that we used international prices instead of domestic
prices for our empirical analysis. Given a price transmission elasticity , we can
substitute the domestic log price pet with the transmitted international price p
e
t D
 pe;intt in Eqs. (7.1) and (7.2). This substitution gives:
Qdt D ˇ1 C ˇ2 pe;intt C ˇ3Zt C "t D ˇ1 C Qˇ2 pe;intt C ˇ3Zt C "t (7.10)
and
Adt D ˛1 C ˛2 pe;intt C ˛3Zt C "t D ˛1 C Q˛2 pe;intt C ˛3Zt C "t (7.20)
which are structurally equivalent to Eqs. (7.1) and (7.2). The estimated supply
response elasticities Qˇ2 and Q˛2, however, implicitly consider the imperfect transmis-
sion of prices from international to domestic markets. Hence, the supply response
concept used in this paper is an aggregate response that consists of two parts:
the (imperfect) transmission of global prices to domestic producer prices and
the genuine supply response to expected domestic producer prices. The latter is
typically estimated in conventional supply response models.
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7.4 Data
The econometric model relies on a comprehensive database covering the period
1961–2010. The empirical model uses global- and country-level data in order
to estimate global production, acreage, and yield responses for the key staple
crops in the world. Data on planted acreage were obtained from several relevant
national statistical sources,1 whereas harvested acreage, production, and yield for
all countries were obtained from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of
the United Nations. Area harvested serves as a proxy for planted area if data on the
latter are unavailable. International spot market output prices and different types of
fertilizer prices and price indices are obtained from the World Bank’s commodity
price database. All commodity futures prices were obtained from the Bloomberg
database. The 32 countries or regions included in this study, with the rest of world
(ROW) aggregated into a separate entity, are reported in Table 7.6 in Appendix.2
A producer may choose to cultivate different crops at planting time. Therefore,
it is worthwhile to consider price, price risk, and other information available to the
farmer during the planting season. Accordingly, we used crop calendar information
to identify the major planting seasons in each country in order to obtain country-
specific spot and futures prices, measures of price risk and yield shocks, and input
prices.3
Because actual prices are not realized during planting, we modeled farmers’ price
expectations using the available relevant information about world spot and world
futures prices during planting. In the empirical model, own-crop and competing
crop spot prices observed in the month before the start of planting are used since
they contain more recent price information for farmers. Alternatively, harvest-time
futures prices quoted in the months prior to planting are used. The use of these two
price series to formulate producers’ price expectations makes our supply response
models adaptive as well as forward-looking. Because planting pattern varies across
countries and crops, both the futures and spot prices of each crop are country
specific. For countries in the ROW, we used annual average spot and futures prices.
The degree of transmission of international prices to national markets, , can vary
between countries (so do the “genuine” supply elasticities ˛2 and ˇ2). Comparisons
of the global and national supply response elasticities from the literature indicated
that price transmission from world to domestic prices is imperfect or absent in some
countries. Consequently, producers’ response to international price changes and
volatility—which is the focus of this study—is expected to be smaller. Nevertheless,
1Data sources are available in Table 7.6 in Appendix.
2Countries with a global acreage share of less than half a percent are grouped in the rest-of-world
category.
3The crop calendar for emerging and developing countries is obtained from the Global Information
and Early Warning System (GIEWS) of the FAO, and the crop calendar for the advanced economies
is from the Office of the Chief Economist (OCE) of the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA).
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empirical evidence shows that world prices are a significant source of variation
in domestic prices (Mundlak and Larson 1992). Recent empirical literature also
shows that domestic markets are integrated into world markets mostly through the
adjustment of domestic prices to deviations from the long-run domestic-world price
relationship (Baquedano and Liefert 2014; Kalkuhl 2014). Estimating the country-
specific transmission elasticity would allow us to decompose the supply response
into its transmission component () and its “genuine” supply response (˛2 and ˇ2)
for each country. However, as this is empirically cumbersome and requires long
price series that are difficult to obtain for the country studied in this paper, we
empirically estimated the average global response to international price changes,
disregarding any possible heterogeneity in the price transmission and the “genuine”
supply response.
We included own and cross volatility of international spot prices in order to
capture output price risk. For price volatility we used the standard deviation of the
log returns (that is, first differences instead of levels of log prices) in order to use
the de-trended price series. The price-risk measures show country-specific output
price variability in the 12 months preceding the start of the planting season of each
crop in each country. Table 7.1 presents international price volatility along with
the respective average real prices for all four crops. The volatility of world prices
of these crops, measured by the moving standard deviation of monthly logarithmic
prices, was higher in the recent decade relative to earlier periods, although it was
not as high as in the 1970s. Any high degree of collinearity between the price level
and volatility of a crop might be of concern for our empirical estimation; therefore,
we computed both the Pearson’s rank and Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient
for each crop, establishing a relationship between their own price and their own-
price volatility. The correlation coefficients are positive and statistically significant
in all cases, with wheat and corn exhibiting the highest Pearson’s rank (Spearman’s
rank) correlation coefficients of 0.51 (0.53) and 0.45 (0.56), respectively. Further
collinearity diagnostic analyses of all price and volatility variables, such as the
Table 7.1 International price volatility and levels for wheat, corn, soybeans, and rice
Price volatility Price level
Period Wheat Corn Soybeans Rice Wheat Corn Soybeans Rice
1961–1970 0.062 0.069 0.082 0.104 258 220 467 594
1971–1980 0.157 0.122 0.175 0.194 267 210 502 598
1981–1990 0.089 0.135 0.121 0.125 182 140 320 331
1991–2000 0.131 0.127 0.080 0.136 149 113 256 285
2001–2010 0.153 0.142 0.148 0.127 191 133 323 328
2001–2005 0.113 0.107 0.132 0.086 160 111 273 236
2006–2011 0.214 0.193 0.163 0.160 227 169 384 423
Note: Price volatility is measured by the standard deviation of logarithmic monthly prices using the
World Bank international prices. Prices are in real 2005 US dollars per metric ton. The figures in
each row refer to average values of the annualized volatilities and prices over the respective decade
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variance inflation factor (VIF), indicate that multicollinearity is not a serious
problem in our data.
We included yield shocks calculated as deviations from country- and crop-
specific trends in our empirical supply models. The deviations may have been
caused by weather shocks, pest infestations, or other factors; our assumption is that
these deviations from the yield trends could serve as proxy for producers’ yield
expectations. Following Roberts and Schlenker (2009), the yield shocks are the
jackknifed residuals from separate yield-on-trend regressions for each crop in each
country. A positive deviation entails good yield expectations, implying a positive
effect on crop supply. We aggregated the crop yields across the remaining countries
in the ROW to generate yield shocks for each crop.
Fertilizer price indices are used as proxies for production costs in this paper. The
weights used by the World Bank shows that the fertilizer price index considers the
prices of natural phosphate rock, phosphate, potassium, and nitrogenous fertilizers.
The fertilizer price index is also crop and country specific, depending on the planting
pattern of a crop in a country. The fertilizer price index in the month prior to the start
of planting was used in the calculations.
7.5 Econometric Model
Given the above theoretical model and assuming there are K countries observed over
T periods, the supply functions of the four crops can be expressed generally as
Qikt D iQik;t1 C
4X
jD1
˛ijpjk;ti;k C
4X
jD1
'ijvol. p/jk;ti;k C 	i1wik;ti;k C 	i2YSik;ti;k
C
it C ik C uikt
(7.3)
where Qikt denotes the total production (or area under cultivation) of crop i
(1 D wheat, 2 D corn, 3 D soybeans, and 4 D rice), pjk;ti;k denotes a vector of either
spot or futures prices that are used as a proxy for expected own-crop and competing
crop prices at planting time, vol.p/jk;ti;k is a vector of the volatility measures for
own-crop and competing crop prices, wik;ti;k refers to prices of variable inputs (such
as fertilizer), YSik;ti;k refers to a yield shock for each crop, 
it are time dummies to
account for some structural changes or national policy changes, ik denote country-
fixed effects to control for time-invariant heterogeneity across countries, and uikt is
the idiosyncratic shock.  i, ˛ij, 'ij; 	i1, and 	i2 are parameters to be estimated. The
parameter ˛ij can, for instance, be interpreted as an own-price supply elasticity if
j D i and as a cross-price supply elasticity if j ¤ i. The subscript k denotes the
country. The subscripts i and k on t indicate that the lag lengths of the following are
country and crop specific: the relevant futures and spot prices, output price volatility,
input price, and yield shock variables.
As discussed above, the seasonality of agricultural cultivation in different coun-
tries enables us to construct international prices that are country-specific variables
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at the seasonally appropriate time according to a country’s crop calendar. This
approach is more precise than assuming all countries face the same yearly output
prices. This is particularly important because planting decisions in the early months
of a calendar year (or marketing year) in some countries affect the annually averaged
prices and would cause an endogeneity problem in any global supply response
models that use annual data. Likewise, if planting decisions are made later in a
calendar or marketing year, an average annual price will contain past prices that
dilute the information signal that more recent planting-time prices could convey.4
Taking the lagged annual average price is not a good solution because producers
adjust their price expectations according to more recent information (Just and Pope
2001).
As described in the conceptual model, the yield equation is specified similarly
to Eq. (7.3) except that the output price and price volatility vectors do not include
the price and volatility of competing crops. There is a subtle difference between
the acreage response and yield response models in terms of the yield deviation
measures used as proxies for yield expectations. In acreage response models, the
yield deviation measures are derived from the harvest period prior to planting, but in
yield response models, these measures are derived from the harvest in the previous
year. Consequently, the deviations in the yield response models are lagged, whereas
they are not necessarily lagged in the acreage response models if the prior harvest is
in the year of planting. We therefore excluded these variables from the regressions
of the production and yield response functions because they are, by definition,
correlated with the respective lagged dependent variables.5 All quantities and output
and input price variables (except for price volatilities, which are rates) are specified
as logarithms in the econometric models. Hence, the estimated coefficients can be
interpreted as short-run elasticities.
Applying ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation to a dynamic panel data
regression model, such as in Eq. (7.3) above, results in a dynamic panel bias because
of the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the country-fixed
effects (Nickell 1981). Since current acreage is a function of the fixed effects (k),
it is obvious that lagged acreage is also a function of these country-fixed effects.
This violates the strict exogeneity assumption, and hence the OLS estimator is
biased and inconsistent. An intuitive solution to this problem is to transform the
data and remove the fixed effects. However, under the within-group transformation,
the lagged dependent variable remains correlated with the error term, and therefore,
the fixed-effects (FE) estimator is biased and inconsistent. While the correlation
between the lagged dependent variable and the error term is positive in the simple
OLS regression, the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is biased
downward in the case of the FE estimator (Roodman 2009a, b).
4See Haile et al. (2014) for global intra-annual planting and harvesting patterns.
5The yield shock variables are not statistically significant in the acreage response models, and we
omit them from the final regression.
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Therefore, we need an estimator of the true parameter that lies in the range
between the OLS and the FE estimate for the coefficient on the lagged dependent
variable. Anderson and Hsiao (1982) suggested using the instrumental variable (IV)
method to estimate the first-difference model. This technique eliminates the fixed-
effect terms by differencing instead of within transformation. Since the lagged
dependent variable is correlated with the error term, this method uses the second
lagged difference as an IV. Although this method provides consistent estimates,
Arellano and Bond (1991) developed a more efficient estimator, called difference
GMM, in order to estimate a dynamic panel difference model using all suitably
lagged endogenous and other exogenous variables as instruments in the GMM
technique (Roodman 2009a). Blundell and Bond (1998) developed a further strategy
named system GMM to overcome dynamic panel bias. Instead of transforming the
regressors to purge the fixed effects and using the levels as instruments, the system
GMM technique transforms the instruments themselves in order to make them
exogenous to the fixed effects (Roodman 2009a). The estimator in the difference
GMM model can have poor finite sample properties in terms of bias and precision
when applied to persistent series or random-walk types of variables (Roodman
2009b). The system GMM estimator allows substantial efficiency gains over the
difference GMM estimator provided that initial conditions are not correlated with
fixed effects (Blundell and Bond 1998). Thus, we have chosen the system GMM
method to estimate our dynamic supply models.
Several statistical tests were conducted to check the consistency of our preferred
GMM estimator. First, the Arellano–Bond test for autocorrelation is used to test for
serial correlation in levels. The test results, reported in the next section, indicate
that the null hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation in residuals cannot
be rejected for nearly all production, acreage, and yield models, indicating the
consistency of the system GMM estimators. Second, the Hansen test results cannot
reject the null hypothesis of instrument exogeneity. We also conducted a test for
the validity of the Blundell–Bond assumption using the Diff-in-Hansen test of
the two-step system GMM. The test statistics gave p-values greater than 10 %
in all cases, suggesting that past changes are good instruments of current levels
and that the system GMM estimators are more efficient. Furthermore, the standard
error estimates for all specifications are robust in the presence of any pattern of
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within panels. The Windmeijer (2005) two-
step error bias correction is incorporated. Following Roodman (2009a, b), we also
“collapsed” the instrument set in order to limit instrument proliferation.
7.6 Results
7.6.1 Econometric Results
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 present the GMM results of the production/acreage and yield
response functions, respectively. For each crop, we estimated the supply models
using preplanting month spot prices and harvest period futures prices (except for
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Table 7.3 Estimates of yield response
Variable Wheat Corn Soybeans Rice
Lagged dependent variable 0.920*** 0.960*** 0.925*** 0.724***
(0.032) (0.020) (0.034) (0.133)
Lagged dependent variable 0.272
(0.165)
Own-crop price 0.166*** 0.094** 0.146*** 0.043**
(0.055) (0.039) (0.045) (0.018)
Own-price volatility 0.336** 0.366** 0.467** 0.148**
(0.168) (0.170) (0.226) (0.070)
Fertilizer price 0.069** 0.008 0.050** 0.020
(0.026) (0.021) (0.020) (0.017)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1174 1444 1371 1332
F-test of joint significance: p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Test for AR(1): p-value 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.016
Test for AR(2): p-value 0.046 0.425 0.079 0.574
Diff-in-Hansen test: p-value 0.950 0.749 0.933 0.751
Note: All regressions are two-step system GMM and treat the lagged dependent variable as
predetermined. Two-step robust standard errors, which incorporated the Windmeijer (2005)
correction, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels of significance
rice) as proxies for expected prices at planting time.6 We failed to find a significant
supply-price relationship using futures prices (except for soybeans); this could
imply that many agricultural producers do not make use of information on futures
prices in forming their price expectations. Indeed, futures prices are good proxies
for expected prices for producers in countries where domestic prices are strongly
linked to the futures prices—that is, where the maturity basis is constant. Although
the farmers in advanced economies participate widely in futures markets and the
futures prices are linked to the cash prices, this is not the case in many developing
countries. Thus, we reported the results obtained from the specifications with spot
prices.
Production, acreage, and yield responses to own prices are generally positive and
statistically significant, and the results are consistent with economic theory. The
results suggest that higher output prices induce producers to increase acreage and to
invest in improving crop yields, implying that global food supply response to prices
appears to occur through both acreage and yield changes. The production responses
to own prices are larger than the respective acreage and yield responses (with the
exception of the wheat yield response). The acreage and yield own-price elasticities
are mostly similar in their order of magnitude.
6Rice futures markets have relatively short time series data, and local prices are unlikely to be
strongly correlated with futures prices in several countries.
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The results show that soybeans and corn have the largest production responses
to own-crop prices, followed by wheat and rice. Conditional on other covariates, a
10 % rise in the expected own-crop price induces a production increase of about
4 % for soybeans, 2 % for corn, 1 % for wheat, and 0.6 % for rice in the short
run. These production responses typically reflect the acreage and yield adjustments.
An equivalent increase in the respective international crop prices induces farmers
to increase their land allocated to soybean and corn cultivation by about 1.5 %
and 0.7 %, respectively. The yield of soybeans and corn also respond to higher
international own-crop prices in an order of magnitude similar to their respective
acreage responses; the short-run elasticities are 0.15 and 0.09, respectively. Global
wheat acreage and yield also respond to output prices, with short-run elasticities of
0.08 and 0.17, respectively. In line with the production response results, rice has
relatively weaker acreage and yield responses to own prices. Rice cultivation in
some areas requires capital investment (such as for building canals and sluices) to
ensure flooding at the time of planting. These investments are long-term decisions,
implying that short-run price responses are inevitably low.
Additionally, the statistically significant cross-price elasticities have negative
signs, and this is consistent with economic theories. Higher wheat prices are
negatively correlated with soybean production, and corn producers respond to
higher international rice prices by lowering corn production. The cross-price
elasticities show that corn and soybeans compete for land at the global level, with
a stronger corn price effect on soybean acreage than vice versa. In addition, higher
international wheat prices lead to less land for soybean production.
Unlike own-crop price levels, own-price volatility does not have a uniform effect
on the supply of all crops. Price volatility seems to affect wheat and rice production
most. The results reveal that an increase in the volatility of international wheat
and rice prices causes producers to allocate less land to these crops and reduce
yield-improving investments, resulting in a decline in wheat and rice production.
To some extent, the negative wheat acreage response to own-price volatility could
be offset if prices of competing crops such as corn and soybeans also exhibit such
volatility. For corn, the negative supply impact of own-price volatility is due mainly
to declining yields. Corn producers react to rising own-crop prices by using more
inputs to improve productivity, whereas corn price risk induces producers to shift
inputs away from corn production. For soybean acreage, on the other hand, the
estimated coefficient of own-price volatility has a statistically positive sign. This
result is consistent with previous national-level studies that found either insignificant
or positive effects of price volatility on soybean acreage (e.g., de Menezes and
Piketty 2012). The majority of soybean producers in the world are large, commercial
holders who are likely to be well informed about price developments. Thus, they
may be willing and able to absorb price risks.
It is worth mentioning that the coefficients of the price volatility variables—
measured by the standard deviation of log price returns—are not elasticities, and
hence they are not directly comparable with the price elasticity estimates. We
computed the standardized effect sizes of price and volatility on the respective
supply responses to shed light on the relative effect sizes of the mean response when
compared with the volatility responses (4). The effect sizes in Table 7.4 show the
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global supply response for a one standard deviation change in price and volatility
for every crop. In the case of the effect sizes for wheat, the negative impact of
own-price volatility on production and area is roughly half of the positive impact of
own-price increase. Own-price volatility is also an important factor for the yields of
all four crops, with effect sizes ranging between 19 and 34 % of the yield responses
to own-crop prices.
In addition to output prices, input prices are also an important factor in farmers’
production decisions, as shown by fertilizer price elasticities. Higher international
fertilizer prices not only have a negative effect on wheat production but also reduce
the yields of nearly all crops. A doubling of international fertilizer price indices
results in a 1–7 % reduction in crop productivity.
The lagged dependent variables are both statistically and economically relevant
in all crop supply models.7 The estimated coefficients indicate producers’ inertia,
which may reflect the adjustment costs of crop rotation, crop-specific land (and
other quasi-fixed and fixed inputs), technology, and soil-quality requirements.
The coefficients of the lagged dependent variables, however, may also reflect
unobservable dynamic factors, and any interpretations should be made with caution
(Hausman 2012). The estimated coefficients of the lagged dependent variables
are close to one, indicating that agricultural supply is much more responsive to
international output prices in the longer term than in the short term.
7.6.1.1 Robustness Checks
We have conducted several statistical tests to check the consistency of our preferred
GMM estimator; and a number of additional sensitivity checks were performed
to investigate the sensitivity of our results to alternative estimators.8 Results are
generally robust in terms of the significance and sign of the control variables in
most specifications.
The coefficients on the lagged dependent variable of our preferred GMM
estimator are mostly close to unity, potentially suggesting remaining residual serial
correlation. To this end, we conducted the Arellano–Bond test for first- and second-
order autocorrelated disturbances in the first-differenced equation. The p-values
reported for AR(1) and AR(2) indicate that, as expected, there is a high first-
order autocorrelation and no evidence of significant second-order autocorrelation.
However, for any remaining serial correlations and whenever the p-values of AR(2)
are below 0.15—for instance, in the production and yield response models for
soybeans and in the latter model for wheat—we use second- and higher-order
lags of the predetermined variable as instruments. Moreover, the coefficients of
the lagged dependent variable can be statistically distinguished from unity in most
cases. Another useful check for the validity of the dynamic panel estimates is to
7Rice cultivation requires capital investment to ensure flooding at the time of planting, which is
a long-term investment. To account for such dynamics, we include a second lag of the dependent
variable as a control variable.
8Alternative model results are available upon request.
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determine if the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable lies between
the values obtained from OLS and FE estimators. All our preferred system GMM
specifications result in an estimated autoregressive coefficient that lies between the
two bounds.
We also report the two-step difference GMM estimates, which are mostly
consistent with their system GMM counterparts. Nevertheless, the autoregressive
coefficient of the difference GMM (in most cases) lies below the lower credible
bound as given by the FE estimator. In addition, as discussed in the empirical model,
the difference GMM estimator does not take into account the high persistence of the
dependent variable. Although we do not reject the null hypothesis of the validity of
the overidentifying restrictions in all the difference and system GMM estimators,
the Diff-in-Hansen test results validate the additional moment restriction necessary
for the system GMM.
Several things have changed over the period from which our empirical data were
obtained, including the information technology available to form price expectations,
general inflation, and market- and government-based institutions to provide risk
management. Thus, we checked whether our estimated parameters are stable over
the estimation period by estimating our supply response models with 20- and 30-
year rolling windows. Additionally, we include interaction of the price variables
with a dummy variable for the period after 1985–dividing the data period equally—
and the period dummy to test if these additional variables are statistically different
from zero. We also estimated the system GMM model on the subsample of our
data after 1985; however, the estimation results are not reported for brevity. In
general, the results of the recursive rolling estimation and the “Chow” test hint
that the estimated coefficients are mostly stable over time and do not significantly
change between the two periods. Moreover, the results from the estimations using
the subsample data are mostly consistent with the results from our preferred model.
In summary, our empirical results align with previous work that showed that
agricultural supply is inelastic in the short run. Table 7.5 summarizes the supply
elasticities of selected countries as estimated by the Food and Agricultural Policy
Research Institute (FAPRI) and in other literature; these estimates do not, however,
capture the effects of price volatility on supply. The supply elasticity from Roberts
and Schlenker (2009) is aggregated for all four crops in terms of their caloric
content. Apart from the corn supply elasticity, which is larger in the present study,
our other estimated elasticities are of similar order of magnitude to the weighted
average of the national-level estimates.
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Table 7.5 Summary of existing own-price supply elasticities (without considering volatility)
Country Wheat Corn Soybeans Rice
Egypt 0.25 0.09 0.03 0.16
South Africa 0.09 0.28 0.03 0.03
China 0.09 0.13 0.45 0.16
India 0.29 0.21 0.36 0.11
Pakistan 0.23 0.28 0.29 0.29
Argentina 0.41 0.7 0.32 0.24
Brazil 0.43 0.42 0.34 0.07
Turkey 0.20 0.14 0.47
Iran 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.01
EU 0.12 0.08 0.19 0.24
Russia 0.19 0.31
Canada 0.39 0.18 0.32
USA 0.25 0.17 0.30 0.35
Australia 0.33 0.23 0.17
Weighted average (weighted by area share) 0.18 0.14 0.31 0.07
Roberts and Schlenker (2009), Global 0.11
Roberts and Schlenker (2013), Global 0.10 0.27 0.55 0.03
Haile et al. (2014) 0.09 0.18 0.37 0.02
This study 0.11 0.23 0.37 0.06
Source: Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI), FAPRI Elasticity Database,
http://www.fapri.iastate.edu/tools/elasticity.aspx. Because FAPRI only reports rice acreage elastic-
ities for the USA, for the other crops, we used elasticities from Lin and Dismukes (2007). We also
use average acreage elasticities for “other Africa” for unreported elasticities for Egypt and South
Africa. Price elasticities for individual countries refer to acreage responses to domestic producer
prices, while global price elasticities for this study refer to responses to world market prices
7.6.2 Simulation Results
We used the estimated coefficients of our preferred GMM estimator in Tables 7.2
and 7.3 to analyze whether the recent increase in prices and price volatility is an
opportunity or a challenge to world food supply, in terms of acreage and yield
changes. To this end, we calculate the differences in the predicted outcome variables
under the realized prices and under a counterfactual scenario where all output prices
and volatility as well as fertilizer prices after 2006 are set equal to their 1980–
2005 mean values. We consider only the direct short-term impacts and neglect the
influence of the autoregressive term, which would further exacerbate the changes in
the long run. The results of these simulations are shown in Figs. 7.1 and 7.2.
The net impact of increasing own and competing crop prices is about a 2 %
increase in the area used for cultivating both wheat and corn. The effect is higher
(6 %) for rice as we included only own prices in the rice acreage. However, the
effect of higher competing crop prices on soybean acreage offsets that of higher
own-crop prices, resulting in a negligible net effect. In contrast, increasing fertilizer
prices reduces acreage by nearly comparable amounts, except for soybeans, where
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Fig. 7.1 Impacts of the 2006–2010 price dynamics on acreage and yield. Note: The figure shows
the impact of output and fertilizer prices and output price volatility on acreage and yield compared
with a counterfactual scenario where these values were set to their long-term average. The net
effect is calculated as the sum of the three components. The depicted rates refer to the net impacts
during the 5-year period 2006–2010. These changes are the direct short-term response, and they
are the lower bounds for the longer-term effects as the coefficients of the autoregressive term are
positive and closer to unity
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Fig. 7.2 Impacts of the 2006–2010 price dynamics on production. Note: See simulation assump-
tions detailed in Fig. 7.1
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it has a positive effect.9 The coefficient for volatility is statistically insignificant
for corn, but higher volatility affects wheat acreage negatively and soybean acreage
positively. The overall impact of the 2006–2010 output and input price dynamics
on acreage is estimated to be, on average, positive for corn, soybeans, and rice
and slightly negative for wheat. The different price dynamics have greater impacts
on yields, but because of strong opposing effects, the net impact is similar in
magnitude to the impact on acreage allocation decisions. The increase in own-crop
price volatility during the same period dampens yield by about 1–2 % for the crops
under consideration.
Analogously, we calculated the production impact of the recent price dynamics
from the acreage and yield simulations by the identity that production equals acreage
times yield. This way, we rely on the two-stage decision process whereby acreage
and yield decisions are temporally decoupled. The respective results are shown in
Fig. 7.2. According to the results, the overall net impact of the 2006–2010 price
dynamics on production is about a 3 % increase for corn, a 1.5 % increase for
soybeans, negligible for rice, and a 1 % decrease for wheat. Decomposing the overall
effect into output price, fertilizer price, and price volatility effects reveals interesting
results. The net impact of increasing own and competing crop prices ranges from
about a 6 % (for corn and soybeans) to 11 % (for wheat) increase in production.
In contrast, the effect of higher fertilizer price is a reduction of production that
ranges from about 2 % for corn to 8 % for wheat. The effect of own-crop price and
competing crop-price volatility is about a 3 % decrease in production for wheat and
about 1 % for rice; it has a negative but negligible effect on the production of corn
and soybeans.
In summary, the simulation results show that more volatile output prices and
higher input prices have weakened the extent to which rising international agricul-
tural commodity prices might have increased output production since the middle of
the last decade.
7.7 Conclusions
Uncertainty is a quintessential feature of agricultural commodity prices. Besides the
traditional causes of price fluctuations, agricultural commodities are increasingly
connected to energy and financial markets, with potentially destabilizing impacts
on prices (Tadesse et al. 2014). Using cross-country panel data for the period 1961–
2010, this study has investigated the global supply impacts of international price
levels and price volatility. Estimation of the recent supply response to input and
output price levels and to output price volatility is a necessary step in predicting
the effects that developments in output price levels and volatility have on the global
food supply in the future. In addition to responding to price changes by reallocating
9One explanation for this is that soybeans require less nitrogen fertilizer than the other crops, which
makes planting them more attractive when fertilizer prices are high.
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acreage, producers react to expected price changes by making decisions that affect
yields.
The results underscore the relevance of output price volatility for the supply of
the key global agricultural staple crops. Although higher risk in prices is usually
associated with higher returns, economic theory has shown that output price risk is
detrimental to producers (Sandmo 1971). Coefficients for the price-risk variables are
statistically and economically significant in the supply response models for wheat
and rice and in the yield response models for all crops. Besides inducing producers
to shift land away from wheat and rice cultivation, higher output price volatility
weakens the incentive for producers to invest in yield improvement. For corn, own-
crop price volatility has little or no impact on acreage allocation, but it has a negative
impact on yield.
Consequently, reducing agricultural price volatility is likely to increase food
supply globally and, more importantly, in developing countries. Some agricultural
producers, however, do not shy away from making investments in order to obtain
higher returns, which are associated with higher price risks. Such producers are
not necessarily hurt by output price volatility. The findings of this paper suggest
that this is the case for the majority of soybean producers in the world, indicated
by the statistically significant positive coefficient of own-price volatility in the
acreage response model. This result is relevant for policymakers because it suggests
that a one-size-fits-all approach to price volatility management—such as through
stockholding or public price risk insurance systems—may not be appropriate.
This paper has explained why the current high food prices have not brought
about a large increase in global agricultural supply as one might expect. The
estimated short-run supply elasticities are generally small. Agricultural supply does
not increase on a par with output price increases in the short run. In other words,
agricultural producers need more time to make necessary production adjustments
and investments to increase supply. Furthermore, this study has assessed how much
the increased latent output price uncertainty, represented by price volatility, weakens
the global positive supply response.
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8Food Crisis and Export Taxation: Revisitingthe Adverse Effects of Noncooperative Aspect
of Trade Policies
Antoine Bouët and David Laborde Debucquet
8.1 Introduction
Export restrictions are a common practice in the current world trading system.
For instance, some developing countries implemented export taxes and export
restrictions during the recent food crisis (2006–2008). But beyond crisis periods,
export restrictions are, in fact, trade measures that are permanently adopted by some
countries: export taxes implemented by Indonesia on palm oil; by Madagascar on
vanilla, coffee, pepper, and cloves; by Pakistan on raw cotton; by the Philippines on
copra and coconut oil; and by Argentina on crops and meat.
At a first glance, from a mercantilist point of view, it might be difficult to under-
stand why countries implement so many export restrictions. Indeed, policymakers
tend to favor exports and discourage imports. However, a more thorough analysis
revealed several justifications.
In this chapter, we consider these justifications and study how export taxation
may worsen a food crisis. It is important to keep in mind that reducing import duties
may also amplify food crisis and that these policy options form the basis of an
asymmetric game.
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We also focus on institutional aspects and, in particular, why export taxes can
be so easily raised. It appears that countries have a considerably large degree
of freedom when implementing such taxes as the WTO does not prohibit export
taxes and other forms of export restrictions. As stated by Crosby (2008), “general
WTO rules do not discipline Members’ application of export taxes,” but “they can
agree—and several recently acceded countries, including China, have agreed—to
legally binding commitments in this regard.” The Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture only stipulates that, when implementing a new export restriction, a
WTO member must (1) consider the implications of these policies on food security
in importing countries, (2) give notice to the Committee on Agriculture, and (3)
consult with WTO members that have an interest. The agreement does not institute
any penalty for countries ignoring the rules. Restrictive export policies do not
receive much attention from the public or the academic establishment.
Section 8.2 provides the various justifications for export restrictions. Section 8.3
investigates the role of export taxes in worsening a food crisis. Section 8.4 focuses
on the limited institutional role of WTO in the topic of restrictive export policies.
Section 8.5 concludes this chapter.
8.2 Why Do Countries Implement Export Restrictions?
Before discussing the policy justifications for export restrictions, it is noteworthy
that, from a theoretical point of view, export taxes and export quotas are equivalent:
quotas could raise revenue if quota allocations are not issued for free but auctioned
under competitive conditions. However, in the real world, export licenses are given
to domestic producers and do not generate public revenue. Therefore, export taxes
and export quotas are not equivalent in the real world.1
The first justification is the terms-of-trade argument and the desire to increase
export prices. This is perhaps the most important justification from a theoretical
point of view. By restricting its exports, a country that supplies a significant share
of a commodity to the world market may raise the world price of that commodity.
This implies an improvement in that country’s terms of trade. The reasoning behind
this argument is very similar to the optimum tariff argument, which states that, by
implementing a tariff on its imports, a “large” country can significantly decrease
the demand for a commodity that it imports; this therefore leads to a decrease in
the commodity’s world price, which is again an improvement in the terms of trade
(Bickerdike 1906; Johnson 1953).
When considering the final consumption of food products, the second justifi-
cation is food security: export taxes reduce domestic prices. When considering a
food product which is an important commodity in a country’s national consumption
1Let us mention that export quota and export taxes are also not equivalent under retaliation, that
is to say if implemented during a trade war between large countries (see Rodriguez 1974; Tower
1975).
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structure and is also exported, by imposing an export tax, a government creates
a wedge between the world price and the country’s domestic price. This can
lower the final domestic consumption price by reorienting domestic supply toward
the domestic market. Piermartini (2004) cited the Indonesian government as an
example. The Indonesian government frequently imposes export taxes on palm oil
products, in particular on palm cooking oil, as it considers cooking oil an “essential
commodity” for local households. This rationale was often used by governments
during the food crisis of 2006–2008 to justify implementing export taxes and other
forms of export restrictions. Some examples of which are as follows: Bangladesh,
Brazil, Cambodia, China, Egypt, and India implemented restrictive policies on rice
and Argentina, India, and Kazakhstan on wheat. Export restrictions are anticyclical
trade policy instruments: when international prices are high, local consumers are
hurt by high domestic prices; implementing export restrictions decreases local prices
but contributes to the rise of international prices.
The third justification takes into account the existence of intermediate consumers
(firms) of the taxed products in a country. If a raw commodity is exported
and is also used by the local processing industry, imposing export taxes on
this primary commodity indirectly subsidizes the local processing industry by
lowering the domestic price of inputs compared to the commodity’s world price,
which is nondistorted. It has the same mechanism as the previous reason: export
taxation gives local producers more incentive to sell their product domestically.
For example, in Indonesia, an export tax on lumber promoted the development
of the domestic wood-processing industry; the development was judged to be
excessive for environmental reasons as it contributed to the depletion of forests
(World Bank 1998). In 1988, Pakistan imposed an export tax on raw cotton in
order to stimulate the development of the yarn cotton industry. Export taxes on
palm oil are imposed in Indonesia and Malaysia to support the development of
downstream industries (biodiesel and cooking oil; see Amiruddin 2003). According
to this line of reasoning, export taxes may also be applied to a whole value chain
by decreasing the level of taxation along the value chain. This is called differential
export tax (DET) rates: the policy of imposing high export taxes on raw commodities
and low export taxes on processed goods. This policy generates public revenues
and promotes production at the later stages of a value chain. Bouët et al. (2014)
studied the theoretical justification of this trade policy, and then they developed a
partial equilibrium model of the global oilseed value chain and simulated the total
elimination of DETs in Argentina and Indonesia and the independent removal of
export taxes at various stages of production in the two countries. Their estimations
showed that removing export taxes along the entire value chain in Argentina and
Indonesia reduced the local biofuel production; they also point out that the DETs
were implemented to raise public revenues.
The fourth justification is also a “raison d’être” for export taxes. Export taxes
provide a source of revenue to developing countries that have limited capacity to
rely on domestic taxation. This is a second-best argument because the imposition
of lump-sum taxes is a first-best policy (Ramsey 1927; Diamond 1975). It is
noteworthy that only export taxes (and not export quotas) serve this objective.
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As with all trade policy, export taxes may serve the purpose of redistributing
income. This is the fifth justification of this policy instrument combining different
aspects from the three previous arguments. Like import tariffs, export taxes are
measures that imply distribution of income. Here, this is detrimental to domestic
producers of the taxed commodity but benefits domestic consumers and public
revenues.
So we arrive at the first conclusion: export taxes are attractive policy instruments
since they may serve different positive purposes for a government.
This is the reason why export taxes are relatively common in the current global
trading system. Some studies have estimated their importance. Laborde et al. (2013)
used a new detailed global data set on export taxes at the HS6 level and the MIRAGE
global CGE model to assess the impact of export taxes on the world economy.
They found that the average export tax on global merchandise trade was 0.48 %
in 2007, with the bulk of these taxes imposed on energy products. Moreover, the
removal of these taxes would increase global welfare by 0.23 %, a larger figure than
the gains projected by the Doha Round. Both developed and emerging economies,
such as China and India, would gain from removing export taxes. Medium and
small food-importing countries without market power (such as the least-developed
countries) would also benefit from the elimination of export restrictions. The export
taxes implemented by the countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States
on their energy sector appear to play a critical role in the overall economic impact
of the removal of these taxes. However, some countries, such as Argentina, would
experience income losses.
In the next section, we focus on using food security as a justification for export
taxation. We show how implementing this policy instrument is a noncooperative
trade policy when food prices are high. During a food crisis, governments of food-
exporting countries are tempted to alleviate high food prices by restricting exports to
encourage local producers to sell food items domestically and decrease local prices.
But in doing so, these countries decrease the food supply on the world markets,
causing world food prices to increase. This worsens the food crisis and is typically
a “beggar-thy-neighbor” policy.
But in times of food crisis, restricting exports is not the only noncooperative
trade policy. Food-importing countries are, at the same time, tempted to decrease
domestic food prices by decreasing import duties. In doing so, they increase their
national demand on the world market, reinforcing the upward pressure on world
food prices. This is another noncooperative aspect of trade policies in periods of
food crisis.
The combination of export taxes and reduced import duties increases the upward
pressure on world prices when food prices are high. On the contrary, when world
agricultural prices are low, food-exporting countries may be tempted to decrease
export taxes and food-importing countries to increase import duties. This increases
food supply and reduces food demand on world markets and therefore once again
increases the downward pressure on world prices. It may appear that trade policies
make world markets structurally more volatile.
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8.3 ToWhat Extent Does Export Taxation Amplify Food Price
Volatility?
Economic literature helps to explain why large food-exporting countries implement
export taxes and large food-importing countries implement import duties. The first
reason is terms of trade. Bouët and Laborde (2012) designed a general equilibrium
model of international trade between four countries—two large (1 and 2) and two
small (3 and 4)—which trade the two commodities A (agricultural commodity) and
I (industrial good). Countries 1 and 4 have a comparative advantage in A, while
countries 2 and 3 have a comparative advantage in I. Import duties on the industrial
good are assumed to be bound at 0, which implies that countries 1 and 4 will not
use this policy instrument.
Using this simple framework, it is easy to show that if governments’ objective
is to maximize real income (welfare), the Nash equilibrium is a combination of a
positive import duty in country 2 (the large food-importing country) and a positive
export tax in country 1 (the large food-exporting country), while free trade is the
best policy for both small countries. The results point out that large countries may
manipulate world prices by imposing import duties or export taxes, depending on
their export status. This Nash equilibrium implies a reduction in world real income,
but large countries may benefit by having augmented real income. It is important to
note that an import duty in the large food-importing country tends to decrease the
world price of the agricultural commodity, while an export tax in the large food-
exporting country tends to increase it. If at the Nash equilibrium, the world price
of this commodity is increased, the small food-importing country’s real income is
reduced, while the small food-exporting country’s real income is augmented. This
teaches us that (1) export taxes on agricultural commodity improves terms of trade
of large food-exporting countries and (2) when combined with import duties in large
food-importing countries, world trade is drastically reduced and world real income
is hurt with no policy option for small countries.
Bouët and Laborde (2012) also showed that if a government’s objective is to
achieve stable domestic agricultural goods prices during a food crisis, the best
response is to decrease import taxes for a large food-importing country and to
increase export taxes for a large food-exporting country. Both policies increase the
world price of agricultural goods, thereby hurting a small food-importing country
while increasing a small food-exporting country’s real income.
Consequently, a collective action problem emerges from this simple theoretical
framework: in case of a food price spike, governments which are concerned with
establishing domestic food security and stabilizing domestic food prices are tempted
to reduce import duties on food items if they are food importers and to increase
export taxes on food items if they are food exporters. Both policy reactions tend
to reinforce the increase in food world prices. Martin and Anderson (2012) also
pointed out this inefficiency. Gouel (2014) designed a simple stochastic partial
equilibrium model and concluded that countercyclical trade policies are inefficient
172 A. Bouët and D. Laborde Debucquet
at the global level: these trade policies increase world prices when the prices are
relatively high, while they reduce world prices when the prices are relatively low.2
How much these trade policies amplify world price spikes remains to be known.
In the same paper, Bouët and Laborde (2012) used the MIRAGE model of the world
economy to evaluate this point. The study uses the static version of MIRAGE under
perfect competition with 27 regions and 25 sectors.3 They simulated a demand
shock which led to a 10 % increase of the world wheat price. In the first policy
scenario, countries that are net wheat exporters implement export taxes such that
the real domestic price of wheat is constant. This led to additional export taxes in
the range of 16–25 %. This policy reaction also caused the world wheat price to
increase by 16.8 % rather than 10 %. In the second scenario, countries that are
net wheat importers implemented import taxes (import subsidies are forbidden)
such that the real domestic wheat price remained constant (the domestic price is
not constant if the strategic rigidity—i.e., no import subsidies—is binding). Import
duties are decreased by between 13 and 30 % age points, and the world price of
wheat increased by 12.6 %. If both policy reactions are allowed (increasing export
taxes and reducing import duties without implementing import subsidies), additional
export taxes between 19 and 50 % were implemented, and the world price of wheat
increased by 20.6 %: implementing these trade policies caused the world price to
more than double.
Concerning countries’ national real income, net wheat exporters’ economic wel-
fare is positively affected by the initial shock and their policy response (increasing
export taxes), while that of net wheat importers’ welfare is negatively affected. The
economic welfare of Argentina as well as those of Australia, Canada, and Ukraine
significantly increased under all shocks, in particular under the shock that combines
endogenous export taxes and import tariffs. On the other hand, net wheat importers,
such as Egypt and Eastern Africa, are significantly hurt by these shocks in terms of
real income.
This collective action problem necessitates an institutional response: the next
section examines to what extent the WTO may provide a framework adapted to
discipline these inefficient trade policies.
2In case of food glut on world markets, world prices are relatively low: in the model designed by
Gouel (2014), import duties may be increased in the large food-importing country and export taxes
may be decreased in the large food-exporting country since governments have also an objective of
domestic price smoothing.
3The use of a dynamic version of MIRAGE could open the door for new analyses and new
policy conclusions. In the long term, export restrictions diminish sector profitability and, as such,
may decrease investment in these sectors. This means less supply in following periods of time
with a potentially higher risk of increased domestic price which could lead local governments to
implement new export restrictions. This increases the long-term cost of these policies with the
extreme situation where a net-exporting country turns into a net-importing country.
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8.4 Can Export Restrictions Be Disciplined in theWTO
Framework?
There is a clear trade-off between import duties and export taxes with a double
asymmetry. First, in times of food crisis, export taxes are raised while import
duties are reduced. Second, while increasing export taxes is clearly identified as a
noncooperative policy, it is much more difficult to criticize a country when it reduces
its import duties. However, both policy reactions have the same impact on world
prices, and both policies hurt poor food-importing countries. While reducing import
duties cannot be opposed from an institutional point of view, the policy reaction may
be considered as a “beggar-thy-neighbor” policy when analyzed from an economic
perspective.
The literature clearly reflects this dilemma. While Martin and Anderson (2012)
and Bouët and Laborde (2012) underlined that reducing import duties also affects
world price variability, Josling (2014) noted that “such impact : : : [is] : : : likely
minor compared to the positive benefits for domestic consumers. Exporters : : : [are]
also benefiting from the reduction in protection levels and it would therefore not
: : : [make] sense to develop rules that : : : [inhibit] countries from making increased
use of imports when domestic prices are high” (Josling 2014, p. 6). On the contrary,
Gouel (2014) concluded that “export restrictions do not play a more important
role : : : [in recent food price spikes] than tariffs. : : : they both contribute to shift
volatility to partners’ markets” (Gouel 2014, p. 18).4
While the WTO gives its members total freedom to decrease import duties
(even import subsidies are tolerated), the institution forbids the implementation of
quantitative export restrictions (Article X1:1). However, international law makes an
exception for temporary export quotas in times of critical shortages of food items
(Article XI:2). Export taxes are not prohibited, but the WTO requires its members to
consider how their export taxes will affect their trading partners and to notify when
implementing export taxes.
Anania (2014) considered that the provisions concerning export restrictions,
which was included in the agricultural “modalities” issued in December 2008,
reflected a broad agreement on this issue and are not ambitious. He proposed
modifying Article XI.2 by limiting the export prohibitions and restrictions which
are allowed under Article XI to a certain time frame. He wrote: “Existing export
prohibitions and restrictions in foodstuffs and feeds under Article XI.2 (a) of GATT
1994 shall be eliminated by the end of the first year of implementation” and “any
new export prohibitions or restrictions under Article XI.2 (a) of GATT 1994 should
not normally be longer than 12 months, and shall only be longer than 18 months with
the agreement of the affected importing Members.” He also highlighted the need to
4However, Gouel (2014) also concludes that export restrictions may be more damaging in the
real world because of the asymmetry of world price distribution (commodity prices are positively
skewed).
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strengthen the consultation and notification procedures so that they are performed
within 90 days of introducing a new restrictive export measure.
Anania (2014) recommended two options, which he deemed realistic and can
potentially be included in a low-ambition Doha Agreement. First, as proposed
by many other observers, the commitment to shelter noncommercial interventions
from export restrictions made by the G20 at the 2011 Cannes Summit5 needs to
be transformed into a legal commitment at the WTO. Unfortunately, at the 2011
WTO Ministerial Conference in Geneva, the proposal6 to adopt this approach at a
multilateral level was opposed by key countries including Argentina, Brazil, China,
India, and South Africa7, which are all G20 members. And without a consensus, the
proposal was not adopted. Even though it is not legally binding, a statement made
during a Ministerial Conference would have been the first step toward the inclusion
of this basic requirement in the final Doha package—avoiding export restrictions
because they adversely affect food aid. Indeed, food purchases by international
organizations concern mainly key staple products and a few processed products for
emergency reasons.8 They represent a limited amount of total worldwide traded
quantities of these food items. Second, making existing disciplines enforceable
essentially involves clarifying the definition of the conditions under which export
quantitative restrictions are allowed. The exact wording of Article XI is imprecise:
“temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other
products essential to the exporting contracting party” (Article XI:2a of GATT 1994).
In particular, the words “temporarily” and “critical” need to be clearly defined.
However bringing discipline into the area of export restrictions is a complex issue.
Cardwell and Kerr (2014) adopted a pessimistic view on this issue. They opined
that any disciplinary measures to deal with export taxes would neither be effective
nor have any deterrent effects. Trade disputes, including export restrictions, occur
over a different time frame than the other disputes. Any disputes arising from export
restrictions during a period of high food prices are unlikely to be resolved before the
prohibited restriction is lifted. Moreover, the authors also believed that retaliatory
5“According to the Action Plan, we agree to remove food export restrictions or extraordinary
taxes for food purchased for noncommercial humanitarian purposes by the World Food Program
and agree not to impose them in the future.” G20 Cannes Summit, 3–4 November 2011. This
commitment was based on the G20 Action Plan defined on 23 June 2011 and was based on Rec-
ommendation #5 from the international organizations report for the G20 on “Price volatility in food
and agricultural markets: policy responses.” Available at http://www.amis-outlook.org/fileadmin/
templates/AMIS/documents/Interagency_Report_to_the_G20_on_Food_Price_Volatility.pdf.
6The proposal was supported by Australia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, the European Union, Korea,
Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Switzerland, and Turkey.
7See Bridges, Volume 15-number 37. Available at http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/117348.
8For instance, the World Food Program, in 2013, procured mainly rice, maize, wheat,
wheat flour, pulses, vegetable oil, sorghum, maize meal, sugar, and blended food. The lat-
ter includes pasta, high-energy biscuits, emergency rations, and ready-to-use supplementary
foods (breast milk supplement)(see http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/
communications/wfp264134.pdf).
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measures are difficult to design; retaliation for an export restriction in a particular
sector should be carried out in another sector, and the retaliation should amount to
the same value as the lost exports. This is likely difficult to implement when there is
great disparity between the countries concerned, such as in the case of trade between
poor net food-importing countries and countries having imposed export restrictions.
8.5 Concluding Remarks: Looking for a Solution
As discussed in Sect. 8.2, export restrictions play an important role in increasing
price volatility and magnifying the impact of natural weather variability on agricul-
tural markets. It greatly contributes to policy uncertainty and therefore undermines
private investments in domestic agricultural supply, and in trade-related infrastruc-
ture and network. The binding process of import tariffs at the WTO was particularly
aimed at reducing this policy instability, creating a more secure environment for the
private sector and fostering investments. At the same time, it limits the possibility
of a retaliation and prevents noncooperative outcomes and the so-called trade wars
from emerging.9 However, the current system is quite asymmetric at the WTO, as
mentioned in Sect. 8.3, while import restrictions are severely dealt with by a set
of disciplinary measures, export restrictions do not face the same constraints. On
the import side, a clear framework is provided by the binding of tariffs (100 % in
agriculture); tariffication and elimination of quantitative import restrictions (GATT
article XI), exceptional conditions notwithstanding; and stringent rules framing the
use of contingent protection (antidumping duties in GATT article 6, safeguards
GATT article 19, etc.). On the export side, only quantitative export restrictions are
currently disciplined, and the policy space to use them remains large, especially
for food products. Because supplier countries do not face similar disciplines, this
asymmetry undermines the pursuit of global integration of agricultural markets,
and it strengthens the arguments of countries that do not want to reduce their
tariffs and increase their reliance on world markets. Indeed, the current framework
provides an unbalanced distribution of risks between importers and exporters, and
it also lets suppliers increase their market power. It could potentially even have
worse consequences: the overall price instability and the asymmetry in disciplinary
measures could lead to the relaxation of disciplinary actions against contingent
9In fact, applying the game theory to trade policy leads to the conclusion that to facilitate the
emergence of cooperation, there is a choice of either institutionalizing a discipline that forbids
noncooperation (a world institution that forbids countries to implement beggar-thy-neighbor trade
policies) or allowing countries to use retaliatory measures to prevent other countries from being
noncooperative. The threat of retaliation is viewed as a powerful means of encouraging cooperation
(see Axelrod 1981; Bouët 1992). The reality of the trading system today lies somewhere between
these two options since the WTO forbids the use of some policy instruments (import duties) but
authorizes the use of others (export restrictions). Moreover, a global institution is necessary since
trading partners differ in size and capacity to hurt other countries.
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import measures, as with the special safeguard mechanism introduced by the G-33,
instead of strengthening regulations on contingent export restrictions.
In this context, it is important to discuss potential solutions by means of new
WTO regulations or experimenting with new concepts found in some bilateral
agreements. Indeed, the elimination of export restrictions can be seen as a first-
best solution, but domestic political economy will make it unrealistic to attain such
outcome in the short run, especially for countries with weak institutions. This is
because these countries will need time to reform their tax system to replace export
taxes by production taxes.
If not at the multilateral level, a solution may be reached at least on a plurilateral
basis.10 Looking at recent bilateral agreements reveals that some of these features
are already included in both North–North and North–South deals. As an example of
a North–North deal, the Comprehensive Trade and Economic Agreement (CETA)
between the EU and Canada states its position on restrictive trade policies in certain
terms; Article 7 of the agreement eliminates duties and taxes on exports: “Neither
Party may maintain or institute any duties, taxes or other fees and charges imposed
on, or in connection with, the exportation of goods to the other Party, or any internal
taxes or fees and charges on goods exported to the other Party, that are in excess
of those that would be imposed on those goods when destined for internal sale.”
The Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) is
a free trade agreement between the USA, five Central American countries, and the
Dominican Republic. The agreement’s key principle is to bind existing measures,
granting them a “grandfathering” clause, and ban new export taxes (export bans are
still subject to Article XI of the GATT); Article 3.8 of the agreement states: “[ : : : ]no
Party may adopt or maintain any prohibition or restriction on [ : : : ] the exportation
or sale for export of any good destined for the territory of another Party, except in
accordance with Article XI of the GATT 1994.” Article 3.11 indicates clearly that
discriminatory practices are banned: “Export Taxes Except as provided in Annex
3.11, no Party may adopt or maintain any duty, tax, or other charge on the export of
any good to the territory of another Party, unless such duty, tax, or charge is adopted
or maintained on any such good: (a) when exported to the territories of all other
Parties; and (b) when destined for domestic consumption.”
The Economic Partnership Agreement, negotiated between the EU and some
members of the Southern African Development Community (2015), also expresses
its position in firm language while still maintaining some flexibility for the less-
advanced economies. Article 26.1 follows the binding approach: “No new customs
duties or taxes imposed on or in connection with the exportation of goods shall be
introduced, nor shall those already applied be increased, in the trade between the
10If a plurilateral approach on all commodities is not achievable, a commodity-by-commodity
approach following the sectoral initiatives could be considered. The main limit is that for most
of the key staple commodities, one of the major exporters is very defensive regarding export taxes
regulations (e.g., Russia, Argentina, and India on wheat).
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Parties from the date of entry into force of this Agreement, except as otherwise
provided for in this Article.” Article 26:2 recognizes that “In exceptional circum-
stances, [ : : : ] where essential for the prevention or relief of critical general or local
shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to ensure food security Botswana,
Lesotho, Namibia, Mozambique and Swaziland may introduce, after consultation
with the EU, temporary customs duties or taxes imposed on or in connection with
the exportation of goods, on a limited number of additional products.” So, in this
agreement, the largest economies (South Africa, the EU) have strong commitments
to fulfill, while the others benefit from a special and differentiated treatment.
Sections 6–10 of Article 26 provide an interesting framework for how to prevent
products exempted from export taxes from being reexported to third parties on a
bilateral basis.
So, what can be done, especially in the context of restricting contingent,
short-term export restrictions? As previously discussed, humanitarian interventions
should be shielded from these measures in any basic WTO decisions, but attempts to
change international laws have faced strong opposition. In this context, the first basic
step is to enforce a strong monitoring and notifications process,11 aimed at reducing
asymmetry of information. To keep both private and public agents informed, there
are ongoing efforts to create agricultural market information systems aimed at
providing updated policy changes for key agricultural commodities not only at the
WTO but also at the G20, with its AMIS initiative.12 However, the lack of automatic
sanctions when countries fail to notify, which is a larger issue facing the WTO
than export restrictions, is still a major problem. The second step is to develop a
system that focuses on protecting small and vulnerable economies (SVEs). SVEs
are generally more open and have lower income, poorer consumers, and no capacity
to retaliate. Also, their demand, even when aggregated, cannot be considered as a
major driver of global price increase. To ensure healthy global trade, protecting these
countries and limiting negative externalities coming from other larger countries
should be prioritized.
A natural way to address this issue is the “reversed” tariff quota approach. For
normal import levels (e.g., the average bilateral import volume in the last 3 years),
SVEs should be able to import food products without quantitative restrictions and
additional export taxes. This would guarantee normal market access conditions
even when world market turmoil causes major traders to change their policies.
Beyond the “historical” level of imports, exporters would be free to apply short-
term restrictions.
11This issue was emphasized in the WTO agricultural committee meeting on 21 June 2011: “These
require the restricting country to take into account the impact on importing countries’ food security,
to notify the WTO as soon as possible, and as far in advance as possible, to be prepared to discuss
the restriction with importing countries and to supply them with detailed information when asked
for it.”
12http://www.amis-outlook.org/home/en/
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Another solution is to replace rigid legislation by a price mechanism and to
apply a Pigouvian tax on the negative externalities of short-term surges in export
restrictions. When a country, at least a G20 country, implements a new export
restriction on food products, it would have to pay a fee. If more sophisticated pricing
rules can be developed, a first approximation could be the historical amount of taxes
collected from goods imported by an SVE from this exporter. The automaticity
of the payment is ensured by the effective revenue collected by the exporting
countries13 and will address the key problems of (1) a lengthy dispute settlement at
the WTO and (2) the lack of retaliation capacity by the SVE. The income generated
through collecting this fee could be directly channeled toward helping SVEs pay
their surging food import bills and fund their emergency safety nets. Alternatively,
the income could also be used to provide the World Food Program with extra
resources so that the program can cope with an increase in world food prices
and develop targeted interventions. Similarly, a market for authorizing quantitative
restrictions (like the “permits to pollute”) can allow exporters to restrict their export
quantities, while SVEs would have “importing rights” calculated based on historical
import levels and could sell these licenses to exporters, thereby generating income
to cover their import bills. These different measures are designed to provide an
international insurance mechanism against harmful policies by reducing incentives
to implement them (additional costs to exporters) and providing remedies for the
most vulnerable countries.
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Part III
Commodity and Financial Market Linkages
9Directional Volatility Spillovers BetweenAgricultural, Crude Oil, Real Estate, and Other
Financial Markets
Stephanie-Carolin Grosche and Thomas Heckelei
9.1 Introduction
Portfolio diversification is a principal motive for financial commodity trading
(Fortenbery and Hauser 1990). The fundamentals that drive the supply and demand
of commodities largely differ from those of other financial assets, suggesting low
or negative return correlations. And, like real estate, commodities can serve as
an inflation hedge as their prices drive inflation, but holding commodities is not
directly associated with inflation-threatened cash flows (Ankrim and Hensel 1993;
Huang and Zhong 2013; Bodie and Rosansky 1980; Satyanarayan and Varangis
1996; Anson 1999; Gorton and Rouwenhorst 2006; Daskalaki and Skiadopoulos
2011).
The spread of electronic trading and the creation of commodity index-linked
exchange-traded products (ETPs) or mutual funds have made commodity markets
more accessible to financial portfolio managers (Conover et al. 2010; Daskalaki
and Skiadopoulos 2011). Between 2002 and 2010, assets under the management of
commodity ETPs grew from 0.1 billion to 45.7 billion US dollars (BlackRock 2011).
Simultaneously, combined open interest for the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT)
corn, soybean, and wheat futures climbed from 0.7 million to 2.7 million contracts
(CFTC 2013).
Attractive diversification benefits and facilitated inclusion in portfolios stimu-
lated the use of agricultural commodities in both strategic and tactical portfolio man-
agement. While strategic portfolio management may maintain a fixed commodity
share [e.g., 4–7 % according to Greer (2007)], tactical portfolio management con-
tinuously resets portfolio asset weights due to cross-market arbitrage (Büyüks¸ahin
et al. 2010) or as a response to shocks or extreme regimes in selected markets
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(cf. Conover et al. 2010; Jensen et al. 2002). Particularly during financial crises,
portfolio managers may shift weights to comparatively less risky and more liquid
refuge assets, a phenomenon known as “flight-to-quality” or “flight-to-liquidity”
(Beber et al. 2007). Such use of commodities has been suggested, for example,
by Silvennoinen and Thorp (2013) and Chong and Miffre (2010), who proposed
a shift out of equity and bond markets and into commodities during crisis periods.
Finally, the need to meet margin calls in distressed markets may affect weights of all
other portfolio assets, if a broad range of assets needs to be sold to obtain liquidity
(Büyüks¸ahin et al. 2010).
By any of these channels, tactical portfolio allocation may create or intensify
linkages between commodity and financial markets, especially during financial
crises. It may also affect linkages between agricultural and energy markets as both
commodity groups are included in indices such as the Standard and Poor’s (S&P)
GSCI or the Dow Jones UBS (DJ UBS) Commodity index, which are replicated by
index-linked products and funds. In any case, volatility, rather than returns, is the
more interesting linkage due to its closer relation to information flows (Chiang and
Wang 2011; Cheung and Ng 1996). Also, the development of ETP assets suggests
a steadily emerging financial interest and motivates the search for a gradual change
rather than a sudden structural break in market linkages.
In this chapter, we analyze time-varying short-term volatility spillovers between
(1) commodity and financial markets and (2) agricultural and energy markets with
rolling volatility spillover indices as introduced in Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) for
the period from June 1998 to December 2013. The analyses are based on rolling
generalized forecast error variance (FEV) decompositions in a vector autoregressive
(VAR) model and allow us to calculate gradually changing directional volatility
spillovers between any pair of included assets over the entire observation period.
Volatility is measured as the daily range, based on the difference between high and
low prices (Parkinson 1980).
Our analysis contributes to existing research in several aspects. First, we
investigated the volatility linkages between agricultural commodities and financial
assets, which remain scarcely researched. Second, we included a broad market
network rather than conducting a bivariate analysis, thereby specifically taking into
account the potential substitution between commodity and real estate as a result
of the subprime crisis and the aforementioned parallel characteristics between the
two asset classes. This also aids the investigation of agriculture-energy linkages as
commodity markets are part of the global financial market network; any bivariate
relation may thus be affected by the state of third markets. Finally, we do not impose
any structural breakpoints; our analysis also goes beyond comparing the selected
periods (e.g., before and after the recent financial crisis or before and after the
introduction of biofuel mandates), also examining the gradual structural changes.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: The next section focuses
on existing empirical evidence on commodity-financial and agricultural-energy
linkages, which is followed by a brief description of the methodology. Subsequently,
we present and discuss our modeling results and compare them to previous studies.
The final section concludes the analysis.
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9.2 Previous Empirical Results onMarket Linkages
Agriculture-energy market linkages via the use of crops in biofuel production or
the use of energy as an agricultural production input are frequently researched. In
comparison, research on commodity-financial market linkages is scarce and only
recently gaining momentum (Chan et al. 2011).
9.2.1 Agricultural-Energy Market Linkages
We reviewed recent empirical studies which focused on volatility linkages and
which covered at least part of the time period after the subprime crisis.1 The
studies typically split their data sample at around either 2006, due to a hypothesized
structural change in market linkages after the introduction of biofuel mandates, or
2008, reflecting the potential effects of the financial and food price crises. Most
studies used daily data, while Gardebroek and Hernandez (2012) and Du et al.
(2011) used weekly data.
To investigate volatility dependencies, Nazlioglu et al. (2013) and Harri and
Hudson (2009) conducted Granger causality in variance tests (cf. Cheung and Ng
1996). Nazlioglu et al. (2013) found no linkages between the volatility of daily
energy and agricultural spot prices before 2005. The only exception is wheat, which
Granger causes the variance of crude oil in that period. Likewise, Harri and Hudson
(2009) did not detect any linkages between the volatility of daily corn and crude oil
futures prices in the period before 2006. For the period after 2006, Nazlioglu et al.
(2013) found volatility spillovers from crude oil to corn and bidirectional spillovers
between crude oil and soybeans and between crude oil and wheat. Harri and Hudson
(2009) only discovered Granger causality in mean, but not in variance, from crude
oil to corn.
Du et al. (2011) used bivariate weekly stochastic volatility models to analyze
corn, wheat, and crude oil futures returns for the period 1998–2009. They detected
increasing volatility transmission from crude oil to both corn and wheat as well as
volatility transmission between corn and wheat in the later subsample 2006–2009.
Several studies employed multivariate GARCH models. Gardebroek and Hernan-
dez (2012) estimated both BEKK and DCC trivariate GARCH models for weekly
US corn, crude oil, and ethanol spot prices for the period 1997–2011. There are
some short-run volatility spillovers from corn to ethanol but no significant volatility
spillovers in the other direction. Structural break tests and subsequent sample splits
showed that volatility persistence is stronger in all markets after 2008. Trujillo-
Barrera et al. (2011) estimated BECKK GARCH models with daily futures returns
for US crude oil, ethanol, and corn for the period 2006–2011. Similar to Gardebroek
and Hernandez (2012) they found that the volatility linkages between corn and
ethanol increased after 2007, with significant volatility spillovers from corn to
1This remains a vibrant field of research. Any omissions are not deliberate.
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ethanol but only modest spillovers from ethanol to corn. But they did find strong
volatility spillovers from crude oil to both corn and ethanol markets. Ji and Fan
(2012) and Chang and Su (2010) employed bivariate E-GARCH models. Chang
and Su (2010) used daily returns to examine the relationships between crude oil,
corn, and soybean futures during the period 2000–2008. Before 2004, there were no
significant volatility spillovers from crude oil to either corn or soybeans; however,
this changed in the 2004–2008 period. Ji and Fan (2012) used daily returns of crude
oil futures and several Commodity Research Bureau (CRB) indices for the period
2006–2010 and introduced the US Dollar exchange rate as an exogenous shock.
They found that volatility spillovers from crude oil to the CRB crop index decrease
after the subprime crisis.
9.2.2 (Agricultural) Commodity-Financial Market Linkages
We reviewed recent empirical studies that (1) covered at least part of the period of
the subprime crisis and (2) also considered corn, soybeans, wheat, or a relevant
commodity index in their sample. Most studies focused on the relationships
between selected US commodities and equity markets. Other financial asset classes,
especially real estate, are underrepresented. In the past, the emphasis was on return
linkages, but volatility dependencies are moving into focus.
Volatility relations are also mostly examined using multivariate GARCH models.
Gao and Liu (2014) used bivariate regime switching GARCH models for analyzing
the weekly relationships between the S&P 500 index and selected commodity
indices from 1979 to 2010. The volatility linkages between the S&P 500 and both
the grains and energy indices only slightly increase in the few brief periods whereby
the assets shared a high volatility regime. But regime switches in the energy index
appeared more closely related to equity volatility than those in the grains index.
Mensi et al. (2013) estimated bivariate VAR-GARCH models for pairs of indices
for the period 2000–2011; the pairs consisted of the S&P 500 and the following
indices: daily wheat, beverage, gold, crude oil, and Brent oil price. Past volatility
and unexpected volatility shocks to the S&P 500 have significant effects on oil, gold,
and beverage markets, but not on wheat markets. For commodity-foreign exchange
relations, Ji and Fan (2012) found that volatility spillovers from the US Dollar index
to the CRB crop index were weaker after the subprime crisis than before it; Harri
and Hudson (2009) observed Granger causality in mean but not in variance from the
US Dollar exchange rate to corn futures prices in the periods before and after 2006.
Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) used their volatility spillover indices to investigate
volatility linkages between the DJ UBS Commodity index and the following over
the period 1999–2010: the S&P 500, US Treasuries, and the US Dollar index. They
found a significant increase in linkages between the DJ UBS Commodity index and
the other markets after the beginning of the subprime crisis. Volatility spillovers
from the S&P 500 to the commodity index occurred throughout the crisis, while the
commodity index volatility spilled over into US Treasuries and the US Dollar index
during the middle of and the end of the last decade.
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Multivariate GARCH models have also been used to investigate commodity-
financial return linkages. Using a bivariate DCC GARCH model for the period
1991–2008, Büyüks¸ahin et al. (2010) found that negative weekly conditional return
correlations between (1) the Standard and Poor’s Goldman Sachs Commodity
Index (S&P GSCI), (2) its energy sub-index, and (3) the DJ UBS Commodity
index and equities peaked during 2003–2004; the correlations also peaked to a
lesser extent at the beginning of the subprime crisis. Correlations between the
S&P 500 and the S&P GSCI agricultural index returns appeared unaffected by
the crisis. Creti et al. (2013) used bivariate DCC GARCH models to examine the
relationship between the daily S&P 500 returns and (1) 25 sampled commodity spot
returns, and (2) the CRB index for the period 2001–2011. While they found that
dynamic correlations decreased during the subprime crisis for most of the sampled
commodities, return correlations between crude oil and the S&P 500 increase in
times of increasing, and decrease in times of decreasing stock prices. In contrast,
Silvennoinen and Thorp (2013), who used a bivariate DSTCC GARCH2 model
with weekly data between 1990 and 2009, showed that conditional weekly return
correlations of equities and two commodities (corn and soybeans) increased in the
period 2002–2003, while correlations of equities and two other commodities (wheat
and crude oil) peaked in mid-2008. Commodity-bond relations remain relatively
constant. Similarly, results from the DCC GARCH model in Huang and Zhong
(2013) for the days between 1999 and 2010 and for the months between 1979
and 2010 showed that conditional correlations of the S&P GSCI and US bonds
did not considerably increase during the subprime crisis. Yet, conditional rolling
return correlations between the S&P GSCI and equities increased from negative to
strongly positive. In addition, mean-variance spanning tests revealed that the S&P
GSCI, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and US inflation-linked securities
each offered unique portfolio diversification benefits, suggesting relatively weak
market linkages. Finally, Bicchetti and Maystre (2013) examined rolling window
bivariate intraday return correlations of equities and several commodities (corn,
wheat, soybeans, and crude oil) for the period 1996–2011. The authors found an
increase in correlations between all sampled commodities and equity returns after
September 2008, which declined again in 2011 only in the case of crude oil.
Thus, there are some indications of increased volatility or return linkages
between agricultural and energy markets, and between commodity and financial
markets around 2006–2008. But, in the case of the agricultural-energy correlation,
results are rather mixed. In the case of the commodity-financial correlation, the
strongest effects appear to exist between US equities and crude oil. In both cases,
the time-dependent dynamics and the direction of influence remain unclear. The
majority of the studies focused on using multivariate GARCH models and therefore
have to restrict their investigation to a bivariate or at maximum trivariate model.
2Dynamic Smooth Transitional Conditional Correlation Generalized Autoregressive Conditional
Heteroskedasticity model.
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9.3 Description of theMethodology and Data
Volatility spillover indices introduced by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012) allow a
larger sample of asset markets to be included while permitting a time-dependent
analysis of gradually changing volatility relations. Their computation requires
externally calculating a volatility proxy variable, which is then used in the rolling
VAR model estimation.
Given that there is no universally accepted best volatility measure (Engle
and Gallo 2006), a choice has to be made based on informational content,
interpretability, and statistical properties. We expect financial linkages between
markets to mostly affect short-term volatility relations. Therefore, we used the
range volatility proxy that was described in Parkinson (1980), which has also been
shown to have superior statistical properties over the classical volatility proxy. The
classical volatility proxy is calculated as the variance of daily returns, which may
be associated with large, non-Gaussian measurement errors (cf. Parkinson 1980;
Alizadeh et al. 2002; Chiang and Wang 2011). The range is calculated as:
Rangeit D 0:361

ln

highit
lowit
	2
; (9.1)
where high is the highest and low the lowest price observed on a trading day t.
9.3.1 Data
We use a sample of CBOT corn, soybeans and (soft red winter) wheat futures, New
York Metal Exchange (NYMEX) WTI crude oil futures, the S&P 500 US equity
index, the Dow Jones Equity all REIT index, CBOT 10-year US Treasury Note
futures, and the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) Futures US Dollar index. The
REITs index consists of all US publicly traded companies within the Dow Jones
stocks indices that are classified and taxed as equity REITs. The US Dollar Index is
a geometrically averaged index of exchange rates of a basket of currencies against
the US dollar; the basket comprises the euro, Japanese yen, British pound, Canadian
dollar, Swedish krona, and Swiss franc.3 Price and volume data were obtained
from Bloomberg for trading days between 3 June 1998 and 31 December 2013.4
Missing observations were replaced by a linear interpolation.5 All futures prices are
historical first generic price series, and expiring active futures contracts are rolled to
the next deferred contract after the last trading day of the front month.6
3Weights are as follows: Euro: 57.7 %, Yen: 13.6 %, British Pound: 11.9 %, Canadian Dollar:
9.1 %, Swedish Krona: 4.2 %, Swiss Franc: 3.6 %.
4Data for the REIT index is not available prior to that period.
5Interpolation implemented with the MATLAB linear interpolation function.
6This corresponds to Bloomberg’s “relative to expiration” rolling procedure.
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9.3.2 Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decompositions
The FEV decompositions split the FEV of the range of each asset i included in
a VAR model into shares stemming from own shocks and shares stemming from
shocks to the range of another asset j. A VAR model with lag length p (VAR(p)) that
consists of range observations for all assets is written as yt D A0 C A1yt1 C    C
Apytp Ct, where yt is a N  1 vector of range volatilities and N corresponds to the
number of assets in the system. Ai is a fixed coefficient N  N matrix (including
intercept terms), and ut is a N  1 vector of white noise innovations, such that
E .ut/ D 0; E .utut0/ D † and E .ututs/ D 0. The equivalent VAR(1) in matrix
notation is given as Yt D c C AYt1 C Ut, where
Yt D
2
6
6
6
4
yt
yt1
:::
ytpC1
3
7
7
7
5
I c D
2
6
6
6
4
c
0
:::
0
3
7
7
7
5
I A D
2
6
6
6
6
6
4
A1 A2 : : : Ap1 Ap
IN 0 : : : 0 0
0 IN 0 0
:::
: : :
:::
:::
0 0 : : : IN 0
3
7
7
7
7
7
5
I Ut D
2
6
6
6
4
ut
0
:::
0
3
7
7
7
5
:
N  p  1 N  p  1 N  p  N  p N  p  1
The Moving Average (MA) representation of this process is yt D 
CP1hD0 ˆhuth
with ˆh D JAhJ0 and J D ŒIN W 0 W : : : W 0, which is a N  Np selection
matrix (Lütkepohl 2007, pp. 15ff.). The coefficient matrices ˆh contain the impact
multipliers of the system. Their element  ij,h describes the response of the ith asset
range volatility to a shock in the jth asset range volatility, h periods ago.ˆj(h) is the
corresponding impulse response function.
The elements in ut are correlated and estimation of the coefficient matrix ˆh
requires external coefficient restrictions. One possibility is to orthogonalize the
shocks, e.g., via a Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix (†), such
that the orthogonalized impulse response function traces the system’s response to
a specific ceteris paribus shock in the range of asset j over time. But this makes
impulse responses sensitive to the variable ordering in the VAR model (Enders 2010,
p. 309). As we investigate volatility interactions within a system of different asset
markets, such an order is difficult to impose and introduces an unwanted element of
subjectivity into the estimation.
Generalized impulse responses are an alternative restriction method developed
by Koop et al. (1996) and extended by Pesaran and Shin (1998). The generalized
impulse response function is computed as ˆgj .h/ D 
1
2
jj ˆh†ej, where  jj is the
variance of the error term in the equation for the jth range volatility and ej is a N  1
selection vector containing 1 as its jth element and is 0 otherwise (Pesaran and Shin
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1998). These impulse responses represent how the range of asset i responds to a
shock in the range of asset j, taking into account the contemporaneous correlations
contained in † (Pesaran and Pesaran 1997, p. 428). The impulse response function
thus traces the system’s response to a typical composite shock emanating from the
range in asset j (Pesaran and Shin 1998). The responses are independent of variable
ordering and are therefore more suitable for use in an analysis of our asset market
system. Pesaran and Shin (1998) calculated generalized FEVs (gij ) as:

g
ij.h/ D
1jj
Ph1
lD0

e0iˆl†ej
2
Ph1
lD0

e0iˆl†ˆ0lei
 ; i; j D 1; 2; : : : ;N (9.2)
where the subscript l denotes the respective forecast period.7 The correlated shocks
lead to a non-diagonal†, and elements in the rows of the gij matrix will not sum up
to 1.
9.3.3 Volatility Spillover Indices
Time-varying volatility spillover indices require a rolling estimation of the VAR(p)
model. A regression window of size w and T observations for the range volatilities
will give a total of T  wC1 estimates for the gij matrices. For a system of N assets,
the elements off the main diagonal in the gij matrices show the contributions of
shocks to the range of assets j D 1, : : : , N to the h-step ahead FEV for the range of
assets i D 1, : : : , N, with i ¤ j and the diagonal elements denoting the contributions
of own shocks. Analogous to the definitions as given by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012),
a spillover is defined as the share of the contributions of shocks to the range of assets
j D 1, : : : N in relation to the total FEV of the range of assets i with i ¤ j. This
constitutes the basis for the spillover index calculations.
First, the gij matrices were normalized with the respective row sums such that the
entries in each row sum up to 1.8 Consequently, the total FEV across the range for
all assets in the system is equal to N. The definitions and formulas to calculate the
individual spillover indices according to Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) are presented
in Table 9.1.
7The typographical error in Pesaran and Shin (1998, pp. 20 ff.), where  ii was used instead of  jj,
as pointed out in Diebold and Yilmaz (2011, p. 6), has been corrected.
8As suggested in Diebold and Yilmaz (2012), it would also be possible to normalize with the
column sums.
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Table 9.1 Volatility spillover indices
Total spillover index (TOTAL)
Sum of spillovers to the range across all asset classes in relation to
the total FEV in the system
TOTAL.h/ D
PN
i;jD1
i¤j

g
ij .h/
N  100
Directional spillover index from all other assets (FROM)
Spillovers received by the range of asset i from the range of all other
assets j D 1, : : : , N, j ¤ i, in relation to the total FEV in the system
FROMi.h/ DPN
jD1
j¤i

g
ij .h/
N  100
Directional spillover index to all other assets (TO)
Spillovers transmitted by the range of asset i to all other assets
j D 1, : : : , N, j ¤ i, in relation to the total FEV in the system
TOi.h/ DPN
jD1
j¤i

g
ji .h/
N  100
Net spillover index (NET)
Spillovers transmitted by the range of asset i to the range of all other
assets j D 1, : : : , N, j ¤ i less spillovers received from the range of
all other assets j D 1, : : : , N, j ¤ i, in relation to the total FEV in the
system
NETi.h/ D
TOi.h/ FROMi.h/
Net pairwise spillover index (PAIR)
Spillovers transmitted by the range of asset i to the range of one
specific asset j, j ¤ i, less spillovers received from the range of this
asset j, in relation to the total FEV
PAIRij.h/ D

g
ji .h/
g
ij .h/
N

 100
9.4 Empirical Results
We calculated the assets’ range volatilities (for detailed results, see Grosche and
Heckelei 2014) and used them in the rolling VAR estimation, from which we
computed the volatility spillover indices. We also discuss the results and relate the
findings to the current literature.
9.4.1 Rolling VAR Estimation and Spillover Index Calculation
We used logged range volatilities and included a total of 3930 observations for
each of the eight assets for a window length of 252 trading days. This reflects
the volatility movements within one trading year and, at the same time, yields a
sufficient number of observations to estimate the VAR. Lag length selection with
the Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) yielded a VAR(5), and the FEV matrices
were calculated for a forecast horizon of 10 days. The length of a forecast horizon
depends on the underlying assumption regarding the time horizon of asset market
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Fig. 9.1 Total volatility spillover index
linkages. A forecast horizon of 10 days is commonly used in calculating financial
value at risk (Diebold and Yilmaz 2011). We obtained a total of 3679 observations
for each spillover index, and the first observation corresponds to the end of the
first regression window (2 June 1999). More details on the rolling VAR estimation,
including verification of the robustness of the obtained results, are included in
Grosche and Heckelei (2014).
Figure 9.1 shows the total volatility spillover index between 2 June 1999 and
31 December 2013. The areas shaded in gray mark the two major crisis periods
of the last decade. The first period of crisis, between March 2000 and December
2003, was characterized by the burst of the dot.com bubble, the NASDAQ crash,
and the overall downturn in equity markets. The real economy in the USA and the
EU experienced low GDP growth rates. The events of September 11, 2001, and the
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq led to political unrest. Agricultural commodity markets
were influenced by (1) the continual efforts of the EU to reduce buffer stocks, (2)
China’s accession to the WTO in December 2001, and (3) growing US soybean
exports.
The second period of crisis, between July 2007 and December 2012, started
with the early events of the subprime crisis and transformed into a global liquidity
crisis; it later evolved into a sovereign bond and state debt crisis. The US Federal
Reserve Bank lowered interest rates 12 times successively between August 2007
and December 2008, and the real economy in the US and the EU was hit with low
or even negative GDP growth rates. Agricultural commodity markets experienced
further growth in soybean exports to China and were affected by the introduction
of biofuel mandates in the EU and the USA. At the beginning of the period, the
stock-to-use ratios for corn and wheat were at low levels of around 13 % and
18 % respectively, while the stock-to-use ratio for soybeans peaked at 21 % (USDA
ERS 2012). Commodity ETP assets under management strongly increased from 6.3
billion US dollars in 2007 to 45.7 billion US dollars in 2010 (BlackRock 2011).
9 Directional Volatility Spillovers Between Agricultural, Crude Oil,. . . 193
Fig. 9.2 Directional and net spillover indices. Note: The upper graphs in each pair show the
spillovers from and to this asset compared to all other assets in the system. The lower graphs
are the resulting net volatility spillover indices, where a positive (negative) value indicates that the
asset is a net volatility transmitter (receiver)
Volatility spillovers were at much higher levels in the second period of crisis than
the first. While there are two spikes in the first period of crisis (31 % in September
2001 and 35 % in April 2003), the average total spillover between 1 March 2000 and
31 December 2003 amounted to 26 %. In comparison, the average total spillover
between 1 July 2007 and 31 December 2012 was 42 %. The index peaked at 51 %
on 3 May 2012.
Directional spillovers and the resulting net spillover indices are depicted in
Fig. 9.2. During the first crisis, neither of the commodity markets showed a distinct
pattern and the indices moved almost horizontally into the tranquil interim period.
Only crude oil and, to some extent, wheat futures have spiking directional volatility
spillovers. Net spillovers from crude oil peaked at 3.4 % in August 2002, and
net spillovers from wheat at 1.8 % in May 2003. In contrast, during the second
crisis, volatility spillovers to and from the commodity markets were at higher
levels; the net spillover patterns also differ from the previous periods. The changes
in the magnitude of volatility spillovers to and from crude oil were, again, most
pronounced. And, crude oil was mostly a net volatility receiver during most of the
crisis period. Notable spillovers also occurred in wheat and soybean markets. The
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net volatility transmission from soybeans to other assets reached up to 2.9 % in
September 2008. Wheat markets were net volatility receivers and peaked at 1.9 %
in June 2008. Only corn market volatility spillovers appeared relatively unaffected
by the crisis and showed only a slight increase in level.
Among the financial asset markets, the S&P 500 is the largest net volatility
transmitter in the system, with visible increases in the period of crisis (up to 3.4 %
in February 2003) and very pronounced peaks in the second crisis period (up to
5.3 % in November 2008). In contrast, the US Treasuries and the US Dollar index
were both volatility receivers during the two periods of crisis. Again, the effect was
more pronounced in the second crisis, whereby net spillovers to the US Treasuries
reach up to 3.2 % in March 2012 and spillovers to the US Dollar index up to 3.7 % in
October 2009. The REITs market showed the biggest change in volatility interaction
between the two crisis periods. While the REITs market alternated between being a
net volatility transmitter and being a net volatility receiver during the first crisis, it
almost unexceptionally transmits volatility to of up to 3 % during the later crisis.
The pairwise spillover indices allow for the most detailed investigation of struc-
tural changes in volatility interaction between agricultural and energy commodities
as well as between commodity and financial asset markets.9 Figure 9.3 shows the
pairwise indices for the agricultural commodities. Over most of the observation
period, corn was transmitting volatility to the soybean market at a general magnitude
of between 3 and 6 %. There was no marked difference between the first crisis and
the interim tranquil period. But during the second crisis, the volatility spillover rela-
tionship was reversed. Between 2008 and 2010, soybean markets were transmitting
volatility of up to 7.5 % to corn markets in September 2008. In parallel to this
development, the volatility spillover relationship between soybeans and wheat also
changed. Starting in 2008, soybeans became net transmitters of volatility to wheat,
with a peak of 6 % in June 2009. Wheat was mostly a net volatility receiver from
corn at a magnitude of up to 4.7 % in September 2002 and 6.5 % in January 2010.
There were, however, exceptions occurring (1) towards the end of the first crisis, (2)
shortly before the second crisis began, and, most importantly, (3) between 2010 and
2012, when wheat spillovers to corn reach up to 5.3 % in February 2011.
Figure 9.4 shows the indices for the agricultural-crude oil pairs. Corn was
transmitting volatility to crude oil during most of the tranquil period, before the
first crisis (up to 5 % in March 2000), and during the second crisis (up to 5.3 % in
July 2009). This relation was reversed and crude oil transmitted volatility to corn in
the following two periods: (1) between November 2001 and January 2003, during
the first crisis, and (2) after February 2011, during the second crisis; spillovers
reached up to 6.1 % in September 2002 (the first crisis) and 2.6 % in May 2011
(the second crisis). The soybean–crude oil volatility linkages almost perfectly
mirrored this development. Soybeans mostly transmitted volatility to crude oil
and received volatility of up to 5.2 % in July 2002, during the early crisis, and
9Pairwise indices for financial asset markets cannot be discussed in detail in this chapter, but are
available from the authors upon request.
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Fig. 9.3 Pairwise spillover indices: agricultural commodities
up to 4.5 % in May 2011, during the later crisis period. While wheat was also
mostly transmitting volatility to rather than receiving volatility from crude oil, the
magnitude of interaction between the markets’ volatility is generally lower than in
the case of corn and soybeans. But there was one notable spillover spike of up to
12 % in June 2003. And during the tranquil period, we observed some stronger
spillovers from wheat to crude oil of up to 5.4 % in June 2006.
Figure 9.5 shows the pairwise indices for the commodities and the financial asset
markets. During the early crisis, volatility from the S&P 500 predominantly spilled
over into corn and wheat markets, with a high of 6.4 % in February 2003 for corn
and 4.3 % in November 2002 for wheat. Soybean markets, in contrast, were mostly
net transmitters of volatility to the S&P 500 during that period. While crude oil
markets received some spillovers, they also transmitted volatility to the S&P 500
during November 2001 and October 2002, with a strong magnitude of up to 10.6 %
in August 2002. But during and after the second crisis, there was a notable change
in this volatility spillover relationship, both in direction and in magnitude. Crude
oil mostly received volatility from the S&P 500, peaking at 10.8 % in December
2010. A less pronounced but nevertheless visible change occurred in corn and wheat
markets, whereby net spillovers from the S&P 500 increased in magnitude around
the time of the subprime crisis, with peaks of 5.3 % in October 2008 for corn and of
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Fig. 9.4 Pairwise spillover indices: agriculture—crude oil
6.7 % in April 2008 for wheat. Soybean markets showed no change in the magnitude
of spillover relationships, but in contrast to the crisis in the early 2000s, they became
mostly net volatility receivers from the S&P 500.
While the REITs market was a net volatility transmitter to all commodities
during parts of the first crisis, this tendency continued for most commodities (except
soybeans) into the tranquil interim period. During the crisis, spillovers rose to 4.7 %
in January 2003 for corn, 3.8 % in October 2001 for wheat, 4.7 % in January
2003 for soybeans, and 4.5 % in January 2002 for crude oil. For the agricultural
commodities, there was no marked difference in spillover patterns during the later
crisis. But, in parallel to the developments in the volatility relation with the S&P
500, crude oil started to receive markedly higher net spillovers from the REITs
market of up to 9.3 % in February 2009. There was only a short period of reversed
transmission between July 2009 and April 2010.
Net spillover between commodities and US Treasuries occurred bidirectionally
during both the early crisis and the tranquil period. But there were some exceptions.
Around December 2001, there was a period in which volatility of up to 7.2 % spilled
over from soybean markets into Treasuries. In the second crisis, corn and wheat
markets were almost exclusively net receivers of volatility from the US Treasury
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Fig. 9.5 Pairwise spillover indices: commodity—financial assets
(up to 3.2 % in March 2008 for corn and 7 % in July 2008 for wheat), while for
soybeans and crude oil, the patterns were less distinct.
Towards the end of the first crisis, the US Dollar index transmitted volatility to the
corn, soybean, and crude oil markets: up to 7.1 % in February 2003 (corn), 4.3 %
in March 2003 (soybeans), and 4 % in December 2002 (crude oil), while during
almost the entire crisis period wheat was a net volatility transmitter to the index
with a peak of 4.6 % in August 2002. During the second crisis, however, soybeans,
crude oil, and wheat markets transmitted net volatility to the US Dollar index: up
to 7.2 % in August 2008 (soybeans), 4.9 % in September 2009 (wheat), and 9.4 %
in December 2009 (crude oil), while the net volatility transmission of corn markets
was lower and had a less clear direction.
9.4.2 Discussion of Results
The analysis of the above volatility spillover indices does not permit any direct
causal attribution of single spillovers. Nevertheless, it is interesting to examine the
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results in the light of the political and economic developments on the markets and
in relation to existing empirical findings about volatility linkages.
The total volatility spillover index shows a distinct increase in range volatility
interdependence between the markets during the second period of crisis. While the
levels of individual range volatilities were also high at the height of the subprime
crisis, the total spillover index peaked only in May 2012, when the volatility
levels of individual markets decreased again. In comparison, during the first crisis,
there were only two smaller volatility spillover spikes despite high volatility levels
in some markets. Thus, over the course of the subprime crisis, the movements
of individual volatilities became increasingly synchronized with each other, and
they also experienced significant parallel jumps. On the other hand, the period
of increased volatility interdependence stretched beyond the period of individual
volatility jumps, pointing to a generally higher degree of market interaction.
Directional and net volatility spillover indices showed that the S&P 500 was the
strongest volatility transmitter among the assets during the financial crises. Thus,
the drivers behind the S&P 500 range volatility would likely also influence the
range volatility in other markets. The magnitude of spillovers to and from the other
financial asset markets was much lower. Although REITs are also a component
of the S&P 500, the stand-alone REITs spillover indices can better illustrate the
volatility linkages during the subprime crisis, when REITs were strong net volatility
transmitters and remained so until the end of the observation period. US Treasuries,
in contrast, are traditionally refuge assets, towards which liquidity is shifted during
general economic recessions and individual market crises (e.g., equity or real estate).
This effect is visible on the spillover indices, whereby US Treasuries were net
volatility receivers during both crisis periods. Unsurprisingly, net spillovers were
especially high during the sovereign bond crisis at the end of the second crisis
period. The US economy experienced an economic recession during both crisis
periods, which affected demand for the US dollar. But the US dollar is also the
most important currency for international monetary reserves. While the US Dollar
index is a net volatility receiver during both crisis periods, the levels of spillovers
increased in the second period, at a time when both the need to adjust monetary
reserves and to allocate liquidity to comparably safer US Treasuries was high.
9.4.2.1 Agricultural: Energy Linkages
Corn appeared to be the strongest volatility transmitter among the agricultural
commodities, with significant spillovers into both wheat and soybeans. This is
plausible as (1) the USA is the world’s largest producer of corn and a significant
acreage area is allocated to growing corn, and (2) trading volumes of corn futures
were much higher on the CBOT than of soybean and wheat futures. Therefore,
information is most likely disseminated from corn markets to other affected futures
markets rather than in the opposite direction. While seemingly unaffected by the
early crisis, the corn–soybean relationship reversed between 2008 and 2010. During
that time, soybeans also transmitted volatility to wheat. This effect could be related
to China’s surging demand for soybeans, which shocked the soybean market and
also affected corn and wheat through substitution effects.
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The pairwise agriculture-energy spillover indices show that the magnitude of
spillovers between both corn and soybeans and crude oil is higher than for wheat.
The level of spillovers did not considerably change after 2006; therefore, this effect
cannot be clearly attributed to biofuel production. In fact, the spillover indices do
not yield any convincing evidence that an increase in spillovers from the energy to
relevant commodity markets was a result of the biofuel mandates. While there were
some spillovers from crude oil markets to both corn and soybeans markets in the
first crisis, between 2006 and 2010, both markets transmitted volatility to crude oil
rather than receive it. Only soybeans experienced a clear reversal in that relationship
after 2010.
These results are mostly in line with the findings of Gardebroek and Hernandez
(2012), who, based on weekly conditional volatility over the period 1997–2011,
did not discover evidence of energy volatility spilling over to corn price volatility.
And while Ji and Fan (2012) did find significant linkages in the conditional daily
volatility between crude oil and the crop index (which includes corn, wheat,
soybeans, soft commodities, livestock, and cotton), they also found a decrease in
spillovers during the subprime crisis. On the other hand, the results contradict the
findings of, e.g., Nazlioglu et al. (2013), Du et al. (2011), and Chang and Su (2010).
Using their respective models and volatility measures, they showed that volatility
spillovers between crude oil and (1) corn, (2) wheat, and (3) soybeans increased
after 2006. But Nazlioglu et al. (2013) also found bidirectional spillovers between
(1) crude oil and soybeans and (2) crude oil and wheat after 2006, which is again
closer to the results obtained from the spillover indices.
The extraordinary spike (up to 12 %) in the volatility spillovers from wheat into
crude oil in June 2003 would merit a closer (causal) investigation. There could be
some connection to the end of the UN Iraq oil-for-food program in 2003, which was
used by the Iraqi government to secure wheat supplies in exchange for crude oil. It
is interesting that Nazlioglu et al. (2013) also found Granger causality in variance
from wheat to crude oil before 2005, but it could not be found after 2005.
Thus, there is little indication that short-term daily range volatility linkages in
the corn, soybean, and wheat markets were affected by biofuel policies. This is
in contradiction to some findings derived using the GARCH-type models. The
contradictions could stem from the choice of sample splits and restricting sample
size to two or three markets. In this chapter, the volatility spillovers were calculated
for a more comprehensive system of asset markets; some of the apparent bivariate
volatility spillovers may be absorbed by other markets. Also, structural breaks were
not exogenously imposed. Instead, more gradual structural changes were permitted.
9.4.2.2 Commodity: Financial Linkages
The linkages between commodity and financial markets vary strongly depending
on the commodity and financial asset class involved. In the first crisis, there were
few instances of S&P 500 volatility spilling over to commodities, and the spillovers
were low magnitude. However, there were some spillovers from crude oil into the
S&P 500, which could be explained in terms of fundamentals with the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Our findings thus lend strength to the results of Diebold
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and Yilmaz (2012), who speculated that the range volatility spillover between DJ
UBS Commodity index and the S&P 500 during that time were linked to the Iraq
war. During and after the second crisis, however, all commodity markets were
net S&P 500 spillover receivers. This is again similar to and an extension of the
findings in Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) about the DJ UBS Commodity index. Our
results generated from data on individual commodity markets allowed for further
disaggregation of the spillovers and showed that most net spillovers reached the
crude oil market. Yet, corn and wheat also received some transitory spiking net
spillovers. All commodities, and especially crude oil, have strong fundamental
and financial linkages with US equities because they are inputs in production and
components of all important commodity indices, in which crude oil is generally
given higher weights than corn, soybeans, or wheat. An increase in short-term range
volatility linkages was observed during a time when both commodity index-linked
products became more widespread and commodity trading volume increased. This
provided evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the financial linkage factor became
more important in the second crisis period.
Our results lend strength to the existing results about volatility linkages between
the S&P 500 and commodities. Mensi et al. (2013) have shown that volatility
shocks to the S&P 500 can significantly affect the oil market; the results of their
study are also confirmed for range volatility spillovers. Gao and Liu (2014) found
that correlations between energy and grains indices and the S&P 500 increase in
periods of volatility, which is also in line with the results above. But, in their
model, US energy indices and grains indices did not frequently share common
volatility regimes with the S&P 500, and this led the authors to conclude that
commodities remain an attractive portfolio diversifier. Yet, the spillover indices
show stronger volatility relationships, especially between the S&P 500 and crude
oil, which may in fact decrease diversification benefits. In addition, our results
for spillovers complement the evidence of increased dynamic conditional return
correlations between commodities and the S&P 500 during and after 2008 (e.g.,
Huang and Zhong 2013; Bicchetti and Maystre 2013; Büyüks¸ahin et al. 2010). The
observation made by Creti et al. (2013) that oil-S&P 500 return correlations increase
with increasing stock prices could not be confirmed for daily range volatility
spillovers (rather, it increase with decreasing stock prices).
The fundamental connection between REITs and commodity markets is much
weaker than the connection between commodities and the S&P 500. Nevertheless,
volatility spillovers from REITs into crude oil were high in the early 2000s and
surged in the late 2000s crisis. This provides additional evidence in favor of the
financial linkage hypothesis. But agricultural commodities appear to have much
weaker linkages to REITs markets. Volatility spillovers between commodities and
US REITs have barely been analyzed in the literature. Somewhat related to our
results, Huang and Zhong (2013) showed that commodities and REITs (along with
inflation-protected securities) each offer unique diversification benefits that tend to
disappear during a financial crisis.
9 Directional Volatility Spillovers Between Agricultural, Crude Oil,. . . 201
In contrast to the S&P 500 and REITs, the magnitude of range volatility
spillovers between commodities and US Treasuries generally appears unaffected by
either of the crisis periods. This confirms results of Huang and Zhong (2013), who
also found that conditional correlations between the S&P GSCI and US Treasuries
did not significantly increase during the subprime crisis. The net spillovers from
the DJ UBS Commodity index to US Treasuries identified by Diebold and Yilmaz
(2012) were further disaggregated in our model, and they appear to stem mostly
from crude oil and soybeans as both wheat and corn markets are net receivers of
volatility from US Treasuries during that period.
The US Dollar index receives net volatility spillovers from wheat, soybeans, and
crude oil during both crisis periods. But spillovers increased in magnitude during the
late 2000s crisis. This could be related to China importing more soybeans and crude
oil and the associated changes in the demand for the US dollar. Another explanation
is foreign activities on US commodity futures markets. The corn-US Dollar index
relationship is less clear, and during the second crisis period, corn transmits less
volatility to the US Dollar index than the other commodities. Linkages could have
decreased following the drop in US corn exports. Corn was increasingly used for the
domestic biofuel production in the USA. The findings of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012)
about the spillovers between the DJ UBS Commodity index and the US Dollar index
are substantiated for most individual commodities, and crude oil does not appear to
be the main driver of the spillover. Ji and Fan (2012) found that volatility spillovers
from the US Dollar index to the CRB crop index became weaker after the subprime
crisis. When compared with the respective volatility spillover indices, their results
only match the ones for corn but not that for soybeans or wheat.
9.5 Conclusions
This chapter has investigated directional time-varying range volatility spillovers
using a new method developed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012). The chapter
focuses on short-term volatility interaction effects within a system which comprises
agricultural products, crude oil, and selected financial asset markets over the period
between 3 June 1998 and 31 December 2013. We especially emphasized the
comparison between the two periods of financial and economic crises, whereby
the later crisis period is also characterized by an increased use of commodities as
financial investment.
During and after the subprime crisis, individual range volatilities moved increas-
ingly in synchrony, with significant parallel jumps. Also, the total volatility spillover
index shows stronger volatility interdependence. This suggests an overall higher
degree of market interaction. The S&P 500 was the strongest net volatility transmit-
ter in the system and spillovers peaked during the crisis periods. REITs net volatility
transmission starts to rise only with the beginning of the subprime crisis.
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The pairwise agriculture-energy volatility spillover indices do not provide signif-
icant evidence for an increase in spillovers from the energy to relevant commodity
markets as a consequence of biofuel mandates. While this is in line with the findings
of some previous studies, such as Gardebroek and Hernandez (2012), it stands in
contrast to the results of other related studies. This discrepancy could be because (1)
the index uses the full sample rolling approach instead of exogenously introducing
structural breaks and (2) the system was extended to include financial assets that
could have absorbed some of the volatility spillovers. Yet, our results do not permit
the conclusion that biofuel mandates did not have any effects on the volatility (or
return) relation between crude oil and biofuel crops. Due to the focus on short-term
range volatility, we did not capture any longer-term structural changes arising from
events such as reallocating land to be used for biofuel crops as a consequence of a
high or volatile oil price.
The pairwise commodity-financial volatility spillover indices show that the
volatility interaction between commodity and US Treasury markets appeared
relatively unaffected by the crisis periods, but spillovers from commodities to the
US Dollar index increased (except in the case of corn). Yet, the most profound shift
in volatility interaction occurred between the S&P 500, US REITs, and commodity
markets. Crude oil received high net spillovers from both financial asset markets
during and after the second period of crisis. Agricultural commodities are less
affected than crude oil, although there were some spikes in the spillovers into corn
and wheat markets during the second crisis.
The volatility spillover patterns into and from commodities observed in the
second period of crisis were more apparent than in the first crisis. While it is not
possible to directly attribute causes to the discrepancy, the results do provide evi-
dence in favor of the hypothesis that there were increased financial linkages between
the markets. There are two important implications: First, shocks to financial asset
markets, which have no direct fundamental connections to commodity markets, may
increasingly affect short-term commodity market volatility. Second, if commodities
find themselves increasingly being used as portfolio diversifiers and refuge assets,
their diversification benefits may be reduced, especially in times of crisis.
Thus, future research should be directed towards investigating the underlying
structural relationships behind the volatility linkages. And, as also suggested by
Diebold and Yilmaz (2012), a theoretical and empirical comparison of the spillover
indices with multivariate GARCH models could be useful. The focus should be put
on the relationship between short-term conditional volatility and range volatility.
A starting point could be the range volatility-based GARCH models such as the
E-GARCH model used in Brandt and Jones (2006) and the conditional autore-
gressive range model used in Chiang and Wang (2011). In any case, the volatility
spillover indices are a useful addition to the hitherto GARCH-centered analysis of
volatility relationships. The indices should be further used to investigate alternative
asset systems.
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10ARoller Coaster Ride: An EmpiricalInvestigation of theMain Drivers ofWheat
Price
Bernardina Algieri
10.1 Introduction
In recent years, food commodity prices have increased at an unusually rapid
pace, and wheat prices in particular have experienced marked upsurges, only
briefly interrupted by the global financial crisis. These trends can be particularly
detrimental because they could amplify the incidence of poverty (IMF 2011; von
Braun and Tadesse 2012; Dethier and Effenberger 2012; Benson et al. 2013),
hamper economic growth in poor countries (Jacks et al. 2011), and cause worldwide
unrest, such as those documented in several sub-Saharan African regions. Unrest in
these regions occur because people living there spend a larger share of their income
on food (about 50 %) than urban residents in other parts of the world (about 30 %
and 15 % in middle- and high-income countries, respectively) (Portillo and Zanna
2011). Given that Africans depend on a small number of staple crops, increases in
cereal prices can be particularly destructive. Spending more consumer money on
food means fewer purchases of services, such as sanitation, health, and education
(The Economist 2011). In addition, the Middle East and North Africa regions are
the world’s largest importers of cereals, particularly wheat, making them more
vulnerable to higher international cereal prices. This can lead to substantial terms-
of-trade shocks, which affect countries’ internal and external balances, with higher
non-accelerating inflation rates of unemployment and balance of payments deficits.
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In this context, the present study tries to shed light on the main drivers of wheat
prices by identifying the influence of the fundamental factors of supply and demand
and the behavior of investors in the financial markets. In light of the steep hikes in
the price of several commodities, it has become especially important to investigate
the underlying factors that exert an influence on the wheat market.
Specifically, the study divides the drivers of wheat prices into market specific
variables, broad macroeconomic variables, financial factors, and weather conditions.
An empirical analysis was conducted based on monthly data for the period between
January 1980 and January 2012 and the subperiod between January 1995 and
January 2012. The quadrangulation of the drivers will allow us to better understand
commodity price patterns.
The paper makes several contributions to the existing literature. It explicitly
examines the case of the wheat market, merging different strands of the literature.
Empirical analyses of the factors influencing wheat spot prices are quite scant
(Borensztein and Reinhart 1994; Westcott and Hoffman 1999). Some studies about
wheat are more descriptive in nature. For instance, Trostle (2008) and Mitchell
(2008), after carrying out a graphical inspection, suggested that wheat prices
increased due to a large demand for biofuels, high transportation costs, and a severe
decline in global wheat supplies. Other analyses considered demand and supply
factors while leaving out the role of financialization or other broad macroeconomic
factors (Goodwin and Schroeder 1991; Westcott and Hoffman 1999). This study
tries to extend the discussion about the wheat market by singling out specific
factors behind price swings within a cointegration framework. Another novel
contribution is the comparison of two long-run relationships—before and after
the “financialization” of the commodity markets—to identify their similarities and
differences. The last important element of this study is the ability to analyze price
dynamics at a higher resolution through the use of monthly data. Most existing
studies based their analysis on annual or quarterly data (Westcott and Hoffman
1999).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Sect. 10.2 reviews literature about
the key factors influencing commodity price; Sect. 10.3 introduces the variables
of the model; Sect. 10.4 presents the VECM estimation and discusses the results;
Sect. 10.5 concludes this chapter.
10.2 Literature Review
The roller-coaster ride experienced by commodity prices over the recent years has
triggered a vivacious discussion regarding the causes of these fluctuations.
Some observers argued that the run-ups in commodity prices reflect strong
changes in economic fundamentals, with price fluctuations moderated by the
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participation of nonuser speculators1 and passive investors in commodity futures
markets. Others pointed to the role of broader macroeconomic factors as the main
drivers of rising prices. Finally, there are also other observers who argued that
commodity prices have been exuberant and divorced from market fundamentals.
The first view can be dubbed the “fundamentalist” view, the second the “broad”
macro-view, and the third the “financialization” view.
According to the market “fundamentalist” view (Irwin et al. 2009; Irwin and
Sanders 2010; Krugman 2010a, 2011; Yellen 2011; Dwyer et al. 2011, 2012),
the price of any goods or assets should be driven by demand and supply in the
absence of “irrational exuberance.” In this context, any shocks to demand and
supply which lead to rising global demand and disruption of global supply cause
relevant price swings. Negative shocks to agricultural commodity supplies, which
cause commodity prices to surge, are mainly the result of adverse weather conditions
or collapses in the stock-to-use ratios. In other words, extreme weather conditions
are likely to damage existing cropping areas, resulting in greater yield variability
and negatively affecting price changes. Additionally, when stock-to-use ratios are
low, the market is less able to cope with a significant decline in supply or a drastic
increase in demands and thus drives prices significantly upwards (Williams and
Wright 1991; Gilbert and Morgan 2011). Preexisting stocks are thus a fundamental
source of stability in commodity markets. According to a report by the FAO (2009)
about the prerecession spike in food commodity prices, stock levels have been
decreasing by an average of 3.4 % per year since the mid-1990s, and the highest
prices were registered during a period in which the stock-to-use ratios were at
historical lows. Low food stocks and low crop stocks exacerbate the effects of
weather disruptions on prices. For instance, wheat prices increased by 47 % in 2010,
which was largely attributable to droughts in Russia and China and to floods in
Canada and Australia.
With respect to demand, the process of income catch-up (convergence) between
developing and advanced countries has triggered a growth in demand for commodi-
ties and hence drove up commodity prices. More than 90 % of the augmentation in
demand for agricultural commodities in recent years has originated from developing
countries, mainly from India and China (Heap 2005; Coxhead and Jayasuriya 2010;
Fawley and Juvenal 2011; Cevik and Sedik 2011). In Krugman’s words (2010b),
rising commodity prices are a sign that “we are living in a finite world, in which
the rapid growth of emerging economies is placing pressure on limited supplies
of raw materials, pushing up their prices.” However, it should be noted that in real
terms, the price of food commodities has increased by 75 % between 2003 and 2008
(Erten and Ocampo 2013). This pattern is a reversal of the strong downward trends
experienced since the 1980s, but it is still too early to assess if the reversal implies
a long-term change (shift) in the direction of the trend, a pronounced short-run food
1A rational expectations model predicts that the existence of a futures market would reduce the
fluctuation of spot prices for reasonable value of input parameters.
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commodity price spike around the long-run trend, or a commodity price super-cycle
(Rogers 2004; Heap 2005; Jacks 2013).
According to the “broad” macro-view, other macroeconomic determinants—
such as exchange rates, monetary policies, inflation, energy price, global economic
activity, and the “thinness” of markets—could have affected price levels and
their fluctuations via demand or supply channels. For instance, exchange rates
can influence commodity prices through several conduits, such as international
purchasing power and the effects on margins for producers with non-US dollar costs
(Mussa 1986; Gilbert 1989; Borensztein and Reinhart 1994; Roache 2010; Manera
et al. 2013). This means that dollar depreciation increases costs to US producers and
consumers in areas where the US dollar is the currency of trade. A change in the US
dollar exchange rate thus affects prices measured in US dollar terms, but its effect
will be nullified if prices are measured in terms of a weighted basket of currencies.
Monetary policies, including interest rate maneuvers, can affect a number of demand
and supply channels as well (Orden and Fackler 1989; Frankel 2008; Calvo 2008;
Bakucs et al. 2009), leading to greater movements in real commodity prices when
changes in real interest rates become frequent. This occurs particularly when interest
rates are low and when there is an incentive to hoard physical commodities as an
investment vehicle, causing prices to go up. Inflation is a common driver of prices of
different commodities. Oil prices have also been mentioned as an additional factor
in causing food price shocks via demand channels (Mercer-Blackman et al. 2007;
Thompson et al. 2009). This is because a surge in oil prices leads to an increase in
demand for grains as biofuels, and this subsequently causes food commodity prices
to rise.2
Market “thinness,” which is defined as the combined share of imports and exports
relative to the size of global consumption or production, also significantly affects
commodity price movements. In thinner markets, in which domestic prices do not
closely follow international market movements, world market prices have to vary
more to accommodate an external shock to traded quantities (OECD 2008).
Some observers doubt that fundamental shocks could be used as a reason to
fully justify the price run-ups. Instead, they point to the “financialization” of
commodity markets and speculation as the main causes of the drifts and fluctuations
of commodity prices (Masters 2008; Stewart 2008; Hamilton 2009; Gilbert and
Morgan 2011; Tang and Xiong 2012). “Financialization” refers to the large flow
of capital into commodity markets, more specifically into long-only commodity
index funds (Acworth 2005; Domanski and Heath 2007; Miffre 2011; Miffre and
Brooks 2013). Speculation involves buying, holding, and selling of stocks, bonds,
2To reduce oil dependence as the main source of energy, several countries, including the USA, have
adopted new energy policies to promote the use of biofuel. The 2005 US energy bill mandated that
7.5 billion gallons of ethanol be used by 2012. The 2007 energy bill further raised the mandate
to 36 billion by 2022. The mix of increasing ethanol subsidies and high oil prices determined a
rapid growth of the ethanol industry, which consumes about one-third of the US maize production.
The rise of the ethanol industry might have led prices of maize, and other close substitutes such as
soybeans and wheat, to co-move with oil prices (Roberts and Schlenker 2010; EPA 2012).
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commodities, or any valuable financial instruments to profit from fluctuations in
their price. This is in contrast to market participants buying these assets for use,
dividends, interest income, or hedging purposes (Robles et al. 2009). Speculation
thus may take the form of speculative stockholding, speculative purchase and the
sales of commodity futures, or other derivative contracts.
Similarly, a report by the US Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investiga-
tions (USS/PSI 2009, p. 2) argued that commodity traders and futures contracts were
disruptive forces, pushing prices away from fundamentals, and inducing excessive
price movements.
In this context, some believe that a speculative bubble is forming in commodities
as a consequence of the highly accommodative stance of the US monetary policy.
Some of the accommodative policies include the maintenance of the target federal
funds rate at exceptionally low levels (Hamilton 2009) and extremely high flows
of investment funds into commodity futures. Loose monetary policies influence
commodity prices by reducing the cost of holding inventories or by encouraging
“carry trades” and other forms of speculative behavior (Frankel 2013). However,
the “fundamentalist” view points to the fact that stocks of agricultural products
have generally been falling between 2006 and 2008 as evidence that undermines
the hypothesis that speculators contributed to the spike in prices.
The financialization hypothesis suggests that prior to the recession, the surge
in commodity prices was accompanied by a large inflow of funds. According to
Barclays, index fund investment in commodities increased from $90 billion in 2006
to about $200 billion by the end of 2007; in July 2011, the amount of investment
reached a historical peak of $431 billion. In this context, the large-scale speculative
buying of index funds during the boom caused commodity future prices to far
exceed fundamental values, thus creating a “bubble.” However, people who hold
the fundamentalist view again argued against the “speculation theory,” pointing out
that commodities without futures markets have experienced approximately as much
fluctuations as commodities with a derivative market.
10.3 Variables and Data
In order to empirically examine the causes of price fluctuation, wheat spot prices
were considered. The sample consists of monthly wheat spot prices for the period
1980–2012, and a subperiod is defined as 1995–2012. The subsample starts in 1995
due to the unavailability of some financial data before that year. To identify the key
drivers, the different strands of the existing literature were merged, and the driving
forces behind wheat prices were divided into four dimensions: market specific
variables, broad macroeconomic variables, speculative components, and weather
conditions. A detailed description of the data can be found in the Annex.
The focus is on the spot market rather than the futures market for two main
reasons. First, it is important to understand the interconnections between the two
markets and assess how trading activities in the futures markets affect the patterns
of spot prices for their economic and welfare consequences. Second, the existing
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analyses are mainly focused on commodity futures markets and less on the cash
markets.
Wheat spot prices were taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics, via
Datastream. The prices are expressed in US dollars, averaged from daily quotations,
and have been deflated by the US consumer price index to obtain their real values.
The prices were then converted into an index (2000 D 100).
Market Specific Variables include inventory-to-consumption and the “thinness”
of markets.
Inventory-to-Consumption
()
Inventory stock levels have a crucial role in commodity pricing (Williams and
Wright 1991; Pindyck 2001; Krugman 2011). As in manufacturing industries,
inventories are used to reduce costs of adjusting production over time in response to
fluctuations in demand and to shrink marketing costs by facilitating timely deliveries
and preventing stock-outs. Producers can reduce their costs over time by selling out
of inventories during high-demand periods and replenishing inventories during low-
demand periods. Since inventories can be used to ease production and marketing
costs despite fluctuating demand conditions, they lower the degree of short-run
market price fluctuations. Therefore, price levels and their fluctuations are expected
to increase when the level of inventories is lower.
Because inventory holdings can change, production at any period does not need
to be equal to consumption. As a result, the market-clearing price is determined
not only by current production and consumption but also by changes in inventory
holdings.
Aggregate world stocks at the end of a year were expressed as a proportion of
the aggregate world consumption from the previous year. This ratio is also referred
to as the stock-to-use ratio (Fig. 10.1). The inventory data are the predicted end-
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Fig. 10.1 End stock-to-use ratio (in %)
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of-season global wheat inventories as published in the monthly USDA reports.
Therefore, the inventories are the projected quantities of grain reserves carried over
from the ongoing marketing year to the new marketing year. The definition of a
marketing year is based on the aggregate of local marketing years. The largest trader
of wheat in the international market is the USA, where the marketing season starts
at the beginning of June and ends at the end of May. The consumption data are
the projected season’s consumption levels. The data was obtained from the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA).
International Thinness of Markets
(C)/()
The “thinness” of a market refers to the share of the imports and exports of
a specific commodity relative to the size of global consumption or production
(OECD 2008). This ratio describes the extent to which agricultural products are
internationally traded.3 The thinness of the wheat market can be expressed as
follows:
TH 

EXw C IMw
Consw

(10.1)
A low ratio means that the market is “thin,” while a high ratio implies “fatness” of
the market. Hence, a thin market is characterized by low trading volume.
The thinness of a market could exert two opposite effects on prices. Higher
trading volume may lead to higher demand for commodities; this could result in
a price run-up. Conversely, trade could help smooth production and consumption
across space by moving goods from regions with surplus to those with deficit, thus
mitigating the effects of price movements. In this context, more trade implies more
stability and price drops, while a lack of trade implies high movements and price
increases (Jacks et al. 2011). Increased trade integration would thus facilitate the
stabilization of food prices and the reduction of prices for consumers (The World
Bank 2012).
In regards to volatility, thin markets, characterized by low trading volumes, tend
to show high fluctuations (illiquid), while fat markets display high trading volumes
and high liquidity. It is often argued that agricultural markets are “thin”; the ratio of
trade flows to global production/consumption is considered low as a consequence of
protectionist measures or because a commodity is mostly consumed in their country
of production, as in the case of rice (Timmer 2009). This causes price swings that
are larger than those expected in more liquid or deeper markets. In the case of wheat,
3The construction of this measure includes exports and imports to be conceptually parallel to the
degree of openness of an economy. As imports equal exports at a global level, the thinness index
could also be represented by either exports or imports.
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a change in thinness can be considered as a more direct proxy for changes in trade
policy since wheat is consumed independently from where it is produced, and the
market dimension is more linked to the existence of restrictive or expansive trade
policies.
When markets are thinner and prices in domestic markets do not follow those
in international trade because of insulating policies or market imperfections, world
market prices must change to better accommodate an external shock to the traded
quantities, if all else is equal. Trade thus is an important buffer against localized
fluctuations originating from the domestic market and could also be useful for
leveling out local supply shocks around the globe.
Broad macroeconomic variables include global economic activity, interest rates,
real exchange rates, oil price, and inflation.
Global Economic Activity
(C)
The monthly global industrial production index was considered when measuring
the global economic activity. The index was chosen because real world GDP data is
not available on a monthly basis but only at quarterly frequency. Initially, industrial
production data for advanced and emerging economies were considered separately
when analyzing the impact of aggregate demand growth; however, these data are
available only at annual frequency, and in any case, world figures have the advantage
of including emerging countries such as China and India. This is in line with the
study by Frankel and Rose (2009).
Interest Rate and Yield Curve
() & (C)/()
Real interest rates can influence commodity prices in several ways, as explained
by Frankel (2006, 2012, 2013). For instance, the prices of storable commodities
rise as interest rates fall because, by decreasing the cost of carrying inventories,
lower rates stimulate inventory demand for commodities. On the other hand, a rise
in interest rates reduces inventory demand since it increases the cost of carrying
inventories. This, in turn, lessens commodity prices.
Another mechanism by which real interest rates affect commodity prices relates
to financial speculation in commodity markets. Commodities can be thought of
as financial assets; thus when real interest rates are very low, investors are more
prone to take open positions in the financial market for commodities, thereby
pushing commodity prices up. Conversely, an increase in interest rates encourages
speculators to shift from spot commodity contracts to Treasury bills, and this curbs
commodity prices. Following this line of thought, Calvo (2008) put forward that
increases in commodity prices mostly stem from the combination of low central
bank interest rates, the growth of sovereign wealth funds, and the consequent lower
demand for liquid assets.
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In order to account for the effects of monetary policies, the US money market
rate (federal funds) deflated by the consumer price was considered. The interest rate
is thus expressed in real values.
In addition, to gain insights into the expected future path of the short-term interest
rates, the US interest rate spread has been included, constructed as the difference
between the 10-year Treasury bonds and the federal funds. This spread, or difference
between long and short rates, is often called the yield curve. It can be considered
as an indicator of the stance of monetary policy and general financial conditions
because it rises (falls) when short rates are relatively low (high). A negative yield
curve (i.e., short rates are higher than long rates) is historically a particularly strong
indicator of recession. In short, it is a leading indicator which signals changes in the
direction of aggregate economic activity.
The expected relationship between yield spread and commodity prices is uncer-
tain. If risk premiums on Treasury Bond represent a reward to investors for their
exposure to economy-wide macroeconomic risks, then we should expect a strong
positive linkage between variation in commodity spot prices and measures of risk
in Treasury bond markets. This indicates that higher yield spreads, which signal
a declining risk tolerance in the Treasury bond market, mean higher commodity
prices, which indicate an increasing risk tolerance in the commodity markets. This
pattern is consistent with the thesis that asset classes are being treated as substitutes
in diversified portfolios.
If risk aversion is instead expressed in a similar way across the Treasury and
commodity markets during the period, then rising Treasury yields are correlated
with lower commodity prices. This pattern is consistent with the thesis that asset
classes are being treated as complements in diversified portfolios.
Oil Spot Price
(C)
The oil price is a critical factor contributing to the increase in production costs
of agricultural commodities and food (costs of processing, transportation, and
distribution) and consequently to the increase in their market prices. Additionally,
an increase in oil price provides an incentive to produce biofuels, thus exerting a
further upward pressure on food commodity prices. Therefore, wheat prices and oil
prices are expected to be positively related.
Crude oil prices were obtained from Cushing, Oklahoma West Texas Intermedi-
ate (WTI) Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel) via Datastream. To obtain the real
values, the average petroleum spot price was deflated using the US CPI.
Real Effective Exchange Rate
(C)/()
Many agricultural commodities (as with oil) are traded in the US dollar; this
implies that the effective exchange rate of the US dollar affects commodity prices
as perceived by countries other than the USA. Therefore, a change in the dollar
exchange rate can change the demand for and supply of agricultural commodities
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and consequently their prices. A real exchange rate appreciation (depreciation) can
be positively or negatively related to prices.
On the one hand, dollar depreciation tends to reduce the commodity prices in
domestic currencies for countries and regions with floating exchange rates, such as
the euro area, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea. This leads to an increase
in the demand for commodities in these areas. Therefore, dollar depreciation has a
positive impact on the demand for commodities and should contribute to rising com-
modity prices. Conversely, dollar appreciation makes exports less competitive and
decreases the demand for commodities, causing dollar-denominated international
commodity prices to diminish. This has a neutral effect for countries that peg their
currency to the US dollar, like Oman, Saudi Arabia, Eritrea, and Hong Kong.
On the other hand, if uncertainty increases, both the demand for the dollar and
commodities will increase, causing commodity prices to rise.
Inflation
(C)
Since commodities are considered to have the ability to store value, demand
for commodities, for use as financial assets or as stocks, increases with inflation.
Inflation tends to affect commodity prices through the portfolio choices of financial
investors; this occurs because holding commodities can hedge investment portfolios
against inflation risks (Roache 2010). The inflation rate is computed using changes
in the US consumer price index.
To account for Financial Variables, a measure of financialization and speculation
in the wheat market has been included.
Financialization and Speculation
(C)/()
Commodity markets have seen a progressive financialization over time. This
is evident in the evolution of the level of open interest. Open interest describes
the total number of long (purchased contracts outstanding) or short (sold contracts
outstanding) futures contracts for a given commodity in a delivery month or market
that has been entered into but not yet (1) liquidated by an offsetting transaction or
(2) fulfilled by the delivery of the commodity.4 Open interest is hence a widely used
measure of the size of a commodity futures market. Specifically, Fig. 10.2 shows the
open interest disaggregated by the type of traders and the nature of contracts in the
wheat market; that is, it considers the long and short open interests for commercial
traders, noncommercial traders, and non-reportables.
Commercial traders, also known as hedgers, hold positions in the underlying
commodity and attempt to offset their risk exposure using future transactions.
Noncommercial traders, also called speculators, only hold positions in futures
4In analytical terms, the market’s total open interest is the sum of reporting and non-reporting
positions: TOT OI D [NCL C NCS C 2  NCSP] C [CL C CS] C [NRL C NRS], where noncom-
mercial open interest (NC) is distinguished in long (NCL), short (NCS), and spreading (NCSP),
while for commercials (C) and non-reportables (NR) open interest is divided in long and short.
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Fig. 10.2 Role of commercials, noncommercials, and non-reportables in wheat market (Chicago
Board of Trade). Source: Own Elaboration on Datastream
contracts and are not involved in the physical commodity trade. Commercial and
noncommercial traders are defined as reportable traders because they hold positions
in futures and options at or above specific reporting levels set by the US Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Non-reportables refer to small traders who
do not meet the reporting thresholds set by the CFTC. Traders could take either long
(buy) or short (sell) positions in commodity futures markets, depending on whether
commodity prices are expected to appreciate or depreciate.
It is worth noting that although wheat futures can also be traded on the Kansas
City Board of Trade (KCBT), and the Minneapolis Grain Exchange (MGEX),
figures in this chapter come from the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) because
it is the world’s oldest futures and options exchange and the largest commodity
exchange in the world. Founded in 1848, it accounts for about half of the turnover
in futures contracts in the USA and the bulk of the world’s grain futures trading.
As shown in Fig. 10.2, open interest recorded significant gains from 2003
onward, only registering a drop during the financial crisis but surged again soon
afterwards. The fact that the long and short positions of all types of investors in
the wheat market have increased over time suggests a rise in the financialization of
commodity futures markets.
In a well-functioning futures market, hedgers, who want to lower their exposure
to price risks, will have to find a counterparty. In the absence of any speculative
activity, long hedgers have to find short hedgers with an equal and opposite position.
Since long and short hedgers do not always trade simultaneously or in the same
contract amount, there is unmet hedging demand, which speculators can satisfy.
Speculators thus reduce searching costs by taking the opposite positions when
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long and short hedgers do not perfectly match each other’s demand (Büyüks¸ahin
and Harris 2011). This follows Friedman’s (1953) argument: speculators stabilize
prices by buying low and selling high so as to bring prices closer to funda-
mentals. However, it turns out that speculative activities often exceed the level
required to offset any unbalanced hedging, thus destabilizing markets. According
to De Long et al. (1990), rational speculators set price trend and lead short-
term prices away from fundamentals by anticipating the buy/sell orders of trend
followers.
In short, the financialization of commodity markets has brought about an increase
in speculative activities, which could have positive or negative effects on commodity
markets, and consequently on prices.
Since the share of net long positions of noncommercial traders is frequently used
as a variable to capture the activity of financial investors in commodity markets
(IMF 2006; Micu 2005; Domanski and Heath 2007), an excessive-speculation
index has been constructed following Working (1953). This metrics is a good
measure of speculative activities in futures markets since it assesses the relative
importance of speculative positions with respect to hedging positions. And as
Working suggested, the level of speculation is meaningful only when compared
with the level of hedging in the market. The Working index has been used also by
Sanders et al. (2010) and Büyüks¸ahin and Harris (2011) to examine the adequacy
or excessiveness of speculative participation in the commodity futures markets. The
excessive-speculation index is expressed as:
ESPI 
8
<
:
h
1C NC OI Short.C OI ShortCC OI Long/
i
 100 if C OI Short  C OI Long
h
1C NC OI Long.C OI ShortCC OI Long/
i
 100 if C OI Short < C OI Long
(10.2)
where NC OI Short D open futures position of short speculators, NC OI
Long D open futures position of long speculators, C OI Short D open futures
position of short hedgers, and C OI Long D open futures position of long hedgers.
In other words, the nominator denotes the short and long speculative positions. The
denominator is the total amount of futures open interest resulting from hedging
activity.
Figure 10.3 shows the excessive-speculation index in the wheat market and its
descriptive statistics.
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Excessive speculation index
Mean 119.206 Std. Dev. 6.836 Skewness 0.396
Median 118.429 Sum 24079.670 Kurtosis 3.711
Maximum 145.822 Sum Sq. 9393.373 Jarque‐Bera 9.525
Minimum 103.445 Observations 202 Probability 0.008
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Fig. 10.3 Excessive-speculation index. Wheat CBOT
Finally, the model controls for Global weather conditions. To account for
weather conditions, the following two indicators have been considered:
• The sea surface temperature anomalies (SST) for the El Niño region 3.4 (a central
region of the Pacific Ocean). This index measures the deviations between the
sea surface temperatures in the El Niño region 3.4 and its historical average,
and it is calculated by the National Climatic Data Center US Department of
Commerce and the NOAA Satellite and Information Service using the extended
reconstructed sea surface temperature.
• The Southern Oscillation Index anomalies (SOI), which measures the fluctua-
tions in air pressure occurring between the western and eastern tropical Pacific
during El Niño and La Niña episodes (i.e., the state of the Southern Oscillation).
It is a standardized index based on the observed sea-level pressure differences
between Tahiti, French Polynesia, and Darwin (Australia). In general, a negative
phase of the SOI represents below-normal air pressure at Tahiti and above-
normal air pressure at Darwin. SOI data are taken from the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration National Climatic Data Center.
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SOI SST SOI SST
Mean 0.070 0.164 Std. Dev. 1.693 0.632
Median 0.100 0.290 Coef. of variation 24.052 3.864
Maximum 4.800 1.470 Jarque‐Bera 10.292 15.876
Minimum ‐6.000 ‐1.520 Probability 0.006 0.000
Note. Observations: 375
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Fig. 10.4 Weather proxies
Although the events described by these indices arise in the Pacific Ocean, they
have strong effects on the world’s weather and an important influence on the global
production and price of primary non-oil commodities (Brunner 2002). Monitoring
both the SOI and the SST allows for a better understanding of global climatic
fluctuations, enabling us to clearly distinguish between the atmosphere’s and the
ocean’s influence on yield, and thus prices. In addition, evaluating both variables
together significantly improves the accuracy of weather forecast when compared to
using them separately (Russell et al. 2010).
The dynamics of the SST index and the SOI are reported in Fig. 10.4. With
regard to the SST index, positive anomalies (index values above zero) are related to
abnormally warm ocean waters across the eastern tropical Pacific typical of an El
Niño event, and negative anomalies are related to a cool phase typical of a La Niña
episode. Conversely, prolonged periods of positive SOI values (values above zero)
coincide with La Niña events during which water becomes cooler than normal; the
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opposite is true for prolonged periods of negative SOI values. SOI values below
zero mirror El Niño episodes, during which water becomes warmer than normal.
La Niña events are associated with increased instances of drought throughout the
mid-latitudes, where much of the global wheat and other grains (such as corn and
soybeans) are produced, thus decreasing their global yield (Hurtado and Berri 1998)
and driving up prices. For this reason, La Niña episodes have historically been
associated with global food crises. El Niño is associated with an increased likelihood
of droughts in tropical land areas, which mainly affects crops such as sugar and palm
oil.
It is worthwhile to note that the SST index and the SOI tend to have opposite
signs and that the SOI has a higher variability than the SST index as computed by
the coefficient of variation shown below.
10.4 Empirical Evidence
10.4.1 Preliminary Unit Root Test
Prior to testing for cointegration, the time series examined in Sect. 10.3 were
transformed into logarithms, and their properties were carefully investigated. The
transformation of the time series into logarithm is of advantage as the coefficients
can be interpreted as elasticities. Inspecting the data graphically (Fig. 10.5) reveals
that most of the series resemble a random walk, with some “trending” upward and
others downward, and with fluctuations. Therefore, the Augmented Dickey–Fuller
(ADF) (1981) and the Philips Perron (P–P) (1988) tests have been conducted for
each variable to formally test for the presence of unit roots. The critical values for
the rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root are those computed according to
the MacKinnon criterion (1991). The lag length for the ADF test is based on the
Schwarz information criterion (SIC). The lag structure for the P–P is selected using
the Bartlett Kernel with automatic Newey–West bandwidth. The two tests have been
carried out with a constant and a linear trend (Table 10.1).
The ADF and P–P tests show that all the independent and dependent variables
are integrated of order one I(1), i.e., the series become stationary after being
differentiated for the first time. This occurs because the computed values do not
exceed the Mac Kinnon critical values. The only exceptions are for the US Fed
spread and the SST index, which produced different results according to the
two tests.5 However, it is acceptable to consider the series integrated of order
5Although Engle and Granger’s (1987) original definition of cointegration refers to variables that
are integrated of the same order, Enders (2009) argued that: “It is possible to find equilibrium
relationships among groups of variables that are integrated of different orders.” Asteriou and Hall
(2007) also explained that in cases where a mix of I(0) and I(1) variables are present in the
model, cointegrating relationships might exist. Similarly, Lütkepohl and Krätzig (2004) explain:
“Occasionally it is convenient to consider systems with both I(1) and I(0) variables. Thereby the
concept of cointegration is extended by calling any linear combination that is I(0) a cointegration
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Fig. 10.5 Variables developments
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Table 10.1 Unit root tests
ADF level ADF first difference PP Level PP first difference
t-stat Prob. t-stat Prob. t-stat Prob. t-stat Prob.
ln real p 2.992 0.1357 14.911 0.0000 2.758 0.2142 14.856 0.0000
ln real poil 2.431 0.3627 14.537 0.0000 2.173 0.5029 14.026 0.0000
ln real fed fund 1.068 0.9316 11.719 0.0000 0.940 0.9489 11.642 0.0000
ln rex 2.355 0.4028 13.605 0.0000 2.339 0.4111 13.544 0.0000
ln end stock to use 3.066 0.1162 18.986 0.0000 3.124 0.1022 18.986 0.0000
sst 4.111 0.0066 3.853 0.0150 12.365 0.0000
soi 5.796 0.0000 9.232 0.0000
ln us cpi 2.674 0.2480 11.595 0.0000 3.129 0.1010 10.555 0.0000
ln world ind prod 1.775 0.7150 6.058 0.0000 1.850 0.9848 44.358 0.0000
us fed spread 4.484 0.0018 3.363 0.0580 13.339 0.0000
ln thinness 2.636 0.2645 18.783 0.0000 2.900 0.1637 18.782 0.0000
ln speculation 6.668 0.0000 6.766 0.0000
Note: test equation includes trend and intercept. Mac Kinnon crit-values. The sample consists of
monthly observation spanning the period from 1980 to 2012. The sample refers to the period 1995–
2012 only with regard to speculation. Null hypothesis: there is a unit root. Real p D real wheat
price, real poil D real oil price, real fed fund D real federal fund, rex D real effective exchange rate,
sst D sea surface temperature anomalies, soi D Southern oscillation index anomalies, us cpi D US
inflation rate, world ind prod D world industrial production, US fed spread D US bond yield,
thinness D thinness of the market, speculation D excessive speculation
one because the series was confirmed by a supplementary Kwiatkowski, Phillips,
Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS) test (1992). The outcomes of the tests are reported
in Table 10.1. The presence of non-stationarity implies that standard time-series
methods are no longer suitable. And consequently, a cointegration analysis is
required (Enders 2009).
To have a broader indication on the variables of interest, the correlation matrix
has been computed6 (Table 10.2).
relation, although this terminology is not in the spirit of the original definition because it can
happen that a linear combination of I(0) variables is called a cointegration relation.” Therefore,
even in the presence of a set of variables which contains both I(1) and I(0) variables, cointegration
analysis is applicable, and the presence of a long-run linear combination denotes the existence of
cointegrated variables. Hence, it is possible to find long-run equilibrium relationships among a set
of I(0) and I(1) variables if their linear combination reveals a cointegrating relationship.
6On the basis of the variance inflation factor, the variable ln us cpi was excluded from the model
because it is highly correlated with the world industrial production. Further, the inclusion of the
inflation rate would have caused a clear problem of endogeneity.
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10.4.2 Johansen and Juselius Analysis
The Johansen and Juselius methodology (1990), based on maximum-likelihood
estimation, allows for the simultaneous evaluation of equations involving two or
more variables and for determining whether the series are cointegrated; that is to
say, whether there is a long-term relationship among variables. Furthermore, this
technique controls for endogeneity and enables us to assess and test for the presence
of more than one cointegrating vector. Finally, this methodology performs better
than other estimation methods by including additional lags, even when the errors
are non-normal distributed or when the dynamics are unknown, and the model is
over-parameterized (Gonzalo 1994).
Consider a p-dimensional vector autoregressive model, which in error correction
form is given by:
xt D …xtp C
Xp1
iD1 ixti CˆSt C t (10.3)
where  is the difference operator, and xt D (k  1) is the vector of nonstationary
I(1) variables, explicitly:
xt D Œwheat pricetI market specific variablestI broad macro variablestI
weathertI speculationt
(10.4)
and:
… D
Xp
iD1 Ai  I I D a .k  k/ identity matrix (10.5)
i D
Xi
jD1 Aj  I A D a .k  k/ matrix of parameters (10.6)
The variable St contains a constant term and a time trend, and Ÿ is a vector
of Gaussian, zero mean disturbances.  i are (k  k) dimensional matrices of
autoregressive coefficients. The long-run matrix
Q
can be decomposed as the
product of ˛ and ˇ, two (k  r) matrices each of rank r, such that QD˛ˇ’, where
ˇ’ contains the r cointegrating vectors and ˛ represents the adjustment parameters,
which reflect the speed of adjustment of the particular variables with respect to a
disturbance in the equilibrium relationship. Therefore, Eq. (10.3) becomes:
xt D .˛ˇ/ xtp C
Xp1
iD1 ixti CˆSt C t (10.7)
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The maximum-likelihood approach makes it possible to test the hypothesis of r
cointegrating relations among the elements of xt,
H0 W … D ˛ˇ (10.8)
where the null of no cointegration relation (r D 0) implies QD 0. If Q is of rank k,
the vector process is stationary. If rank (
Q
) D 1, there is a cointegrating vector; for
other cases in which 1< rank (
Q
)< k, there are multiple cointegrating vectors.
10.4.3 Empirical Results
A VAR system of variables was constructed to test whether real wheat prices
are cointegrated with specific market variables, broad macroeconomic factors,
speculation, and weather events. To identify the proper model, the five possibilities
considered by Johansen (1995) were tested, specifically: (1) the series have no
deterministic trends, and the cointegrating equations do not have intercepts; (2) the
series have no deterministic trends, and the cointegrating equations have intercepts;
(3) the series have linear trends, but the cointegrating equations only have intercepts;
(4) both series and the cointegrating equations have linear trends; and (5) the
series have quadratic trends, and the cointegrating equations have linear trends.
Following the Pantula test (Pantula 1989), the third and the fifth models are the most
appropriate for two samples. To identify the lag length, the Aikaike information
criterion (AIC) and the SIC were implemented. The chosen lag structure is three
(the smallest value) for the complete sample and five for the subsample, following
the AIC. A number of dummies have been included in the cointegration test to take
into account periods of social and economic instability and structural breaks.7
The results of the Johansen test for cointegration are shown in Table 10.3, which
reports the hypothesized number of cointegration equations in the first column on
the left, the eigenvalue, the trace8 statistics, the max eigenvalue statistics,9 and the
5 % critical values. The asterisks indicate the rejection of the hypothesis.
7Specifically, outliers were detected by looking at the graphs of the residuals. Five dummies relative
to 1998, 2007, 2008, 2010, and 2011 were inserted in the short-sample wheat price equation. The
effects of including dummy variables to capture structural breaks in cointegration models have
been analyzed in Kremers et al. (1992), and Campos et al. (1996).
8The trace statistic of r cointegration relations is a sequence of likelihood ratio tests, computed
as 	trace.r/ D T PkiDrC1 ln

1b	i

, where 	i is the estimated value of the characteristic roots
(also called eigenvalue) obtained from the estimated long-run … matrix, and T is the number of
usable observations.
9The max eigenvalue statistic is calculated as 	t max.r/ D T ln

1b	rC1

.
10 A Roller Coaster Ride: An Empirical Investigation of the Main Drivers. . . 227
Table 10.3 Johansen cointegration tests
Sample (adjusted). Included observations: 365 after adjustments Trend assumption:
Quadratic deterministic trend
Unrestricted cointegration rank test (trace)
Hypothesized no. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Trace statistic 5 % Critical value Prob.**
None* 0.172 233.630 219.402 0.0090
At most 1 0.111 164.650 179.510 0.2206
At most 2 0.097 121.810 143.669 0.4306
At most 3 0.077 84.592 111.780 0.6913
At most 4 0.050 55.509 83.937 0.8503
Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
Unrestricted cointegration rank test (maximum eigenvalue)
Hypothesized no. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Max-Eigen statistic 5 % Critical value Prob.**
None* 0.172 68.980 61.034 0.0071
At most 1 0.111 42.839 54.966 0.4688
At most 2 0.097 37.219 48.877 0.4742
At most 3 0.077 29.083 42.772 0.6531
At most 4 0.049 18.565 36.630 0.9422
Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
Sample (adjusted). Included observations: 173 after adjustments. Trend assumption: Linear
deterministic trend
Unrestricted cointegration rank test (trace)
Hypothesized no. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Trace statistic 5 % Critical value Prob.***
None* 0.362 350.632 285.142 0.0000
At most 1* 0.304 272.774 239.235 0.0006
At most 2* 0.296 210.063 197.371 0.0100
At most 3 0.248 149.364 159.530 0.1561
At most 4 0.167 100.126 125.615 0.5978
Trace test indicates three cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
Unrestricted cointegration rank test (maximum eigenvalue)
Hypothesized no. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Max-Eigen statistic 5 % Critical value Prob.***
None* 0.362 77.858 70.535 0.0091
At most 1 0.304 62.711 64.505 0.0736
At most 2* 0.296 60.699 58.433 0.0294
At most 3 0.248 49.239 52.363 0.1010
At most 4 0.167 31.672 46.231 0.6786
Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
*Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
**MacKinnon et al. (1999) p-values
***MacKinnon et al. (1999) p-values. Estimations include significant dummies
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Elaborating on the trace statistic, the first row of the trace statistic tests the
hypothesis of no cointegration, the second row tests the hypothesis of one coin-
tegrating relation, the third row tests the hypothesis of two cointegrating relations,
and so on. All hypotheses were tested against the alternative hypothesis of full rank
(i.e., all series in the model are stationary). For the longer sample, the 	trace test
and the 	max statistic indicate the presence of one cointegrating equation at the
5 % level. For the shorter sample, the œtrace test indicates the presence of three
cointegrating equations at the 5 % level. The 	max statistic does not confirm this
result. The null hypotheses of no cointegrating vector (r D 0) can be rejected at the
5 % level, but the null of r D 1 cannot be rejected. So, it can be concluded that there
is one cointegrating vector in the system at the 5 % level.
Although the results of trace tests and maximum eigenvalue tests point to
different outcomes, we can conclude for one cointegrating vector since as Johansen
and Juselius note, “one would, however, expect the power of this procedure [the
trace test] to be low, since it does not use the information that the last three
eigenvalues have been found not to differ significantly from zero. Thus, one would
expect the maximum eigenvalue test to produce more clear-cut results” (1990,
p. 19).
To extract the cointegrating vectors, a VEC representation has been adopted.
Convergence was reached after few iterations for the entire sample and the small
sample. The restricted cointegrating vectors and the speed of adjustment coefficients
are reported in Table 10.4.
Table 10.4 Vector error
correction estimations
Cointegrating vector ˇ 1981:1–2012:1 1995:1–2012:1
ln real poil 0:231.4:44/ 0:294.2:84/
ln real fed funds 0:132.2:55/ 0:207.6:03/
ln rex 0:771.3:12/ 0:726.9:77/
ln end-stock-to-use 0:999.3:94/ 0:436.1:99/
sst 0:244.3:50/ 0:248.4:54/
soi 0:166.5:71/ 0:104.4:26/
ln world ind prod 3:290.2:80/ 1:807.2:63/
us fed spread 0:045.1:99/ 0:021.1:09/
ln thinness 1:008.2:56/ 0:340.1:42/
ln speculation 0:715.7:14/
Constant 27:990 25:800
Trend 0:006.3:51/ 0:001.2:01/
Speed of adjustment ˛
dln real price index 0:069.4:87/ 0:085.2:07/
Regressand: ln real wheat price index. t-stat in brackets. ln
stands for logarithm
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10.4.4 Discussion of Results and implications
The cointegration analysis suggests that real wheat prices were cointegrated with
market specific variables, broad economic variables, weather events, and specu-
lation. In particular, the columns of ˇ in Table 10.4 are interpreted as long-run
equilibrium relationships between variables, and the matrix ˛ is used to determine
the speed of adjustment towards this equilibrium. The estimated speeds of adjust-
ment coefficients had the expected signs and were statistically significantly different
from zero. This means that the cointegrating vectors converged towards their long-
run equilibrium in the presence of a shock to the system. Expressly, 6.9 % of the
disequilibrium was eliminated in 1 month for the complete sample, and this figure
was 8.5 % for the subsample; that is, it took 14.5 months (1/0.069) and 11.7 months
(1/0.085), respectively, to restore the equilibrium after a shock.
More specifically, Table 10.4 provides evidence to suggest that higher oil prices
have led to an increase in wheat prices due to greater use of petroleum-based inputs
in the wheat market. In other words, on the supply side, a rise in oil prices exerts an
upward pressure on the input costs (such as fertilizers, irrigation, and transportation
costs), which consequently leads to a decline in profitability and production. This
results in a shift of the supply curve to the left and a rise in wheat prices. The
result provides evidence that energy and agricultural prices are interwoven. A 10 %
increase in international oil prices is statistically associated with an approximately
2.3 % rise in wheat prices for the longer sample and a 2.9 % increase for the shorter
sample, all other things being equal. This result is in line with the studies by Tang
and Xiong (2012) and Chen et al. (2010), who found an increasing correlation
between agricultural commodities and oil price.
In addition, wheat prices appear to be sensitive to fluctuations in the real
exchange rate. The sensitivity to fluctuation is almost the same for the two samples,
both before and after the financialization of the wheat market. Specifically, the
elasticity of about 0.7 suggests that a real dollar depreciation causes wheat prices
to rise as wheat prices are denominated in the US dollar. The coefficients of the real
exchange rate fell in a range between 0 and 1, just as predicted by the economic
theory (Gilbert 1989; Borensztein and Reinhart 1994).
The real federal fund variable is negatively linked to the real wheat price, thus
confirming the presence of the monetary policy effect. A loose monetary stance
(with a lower interest rate of 1 %) implies that the price level will increase by
about 0.1 and 0.2 %. When the real interest rate is high, as in the 1980s, money
will flow out of commodities and therefore prices shrink. This confirms the studies
by Dornbusch (1976), Frankel (2008), Svensson (2008), and Anzuini et al. (2012).
The studies highlighted the high responsiveness of agricultural prices to monetary
policy changes. The spread variable has a positive sign, signaling that the future
expectations of tightened monetary policies do not have a depressing effect on
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wheat prices and that the Treasury bond market and the wheat commodity market
are treated as substitutes asset classes for portfolio diversification. In other words,
when the long-term interest rate is higher than the short-term interest rate, it signals
an increase in the financial and macroeconomic risk linked to Treasury bonds. This
causes investors to shift from the bond market to the commodity market, which
in turn raises commodity prices. A 10 % increase in the spread increased prices
by about 0.5 %; this value decreased to 0.2 % in the short sample and became
insignificant.
The stocks-to-use ratio is used to capture the effects of market supply and
demand factors on price determination (Westcott and Hoffman 1999). The variable
shows a negative relationship with the wheat price. When usage grows faster than
ending stocks, it would imply that demand growth outpaces supply growth, which
puts an upward pressure on prices. Specifically, a reduction in the stocks-to-use ratio
by 1 % caused real prices to surge by 0.9 % for the longer sample and 0.4 % for the
shorter sample. This means that the combined effects of market supply and demand
are factors in determining prices. It also means that a rise in the stocks-to-use ratio
of a commodity translates into an almost proportional drop in the commodity’s price
in the longer sample, while the effect is less pronounced in the shorter sample.
As expected, bad weather conditions negatively affected wheat prices. Specif-
ically, La Niña weather patterns tended to lower wheat yields and lift prices. It
should be noted that the sea surface temperature anomalies had a larger impact than
the fluctuations in air pressure occurring between the western and eastern tropical
Pacific during El Niño and La Niña episodes. However, since the variability of SOI
is larger than SST, the SOI could have more detrimental effects for wheat production
and prices.
A 1 % increase in industrial production produced a significant rise in wheat prices
by about 2–3 %. This implies, in accordance with the studies by Svensson (2008)
and Wolf (2008), that the global demand is an important determinant of commodity
prices.
The thinness of the market, while negative and significant for the longer sample,
turned out to be not significant for the shorter sample. This implies that trade
restriction policies could exert a detrimental effect as they tend to push wheat prices
further up.
Finally, the speculation variable that is included only in the shorter sample
indicates that the financialization of markets has contributed to pushing up prices.
In traded markets, when futures traders seek exposure to commodities without
holding the underlying commodities and speculate on future price movements of
the commodity, they amplify price fluctuations on cash markets. This implies that
speculative behaviors in the wheat futures market affect the associated spot market.
According to our model, a 1 % increase in financial speculation increased cash
prices by about 0.7 %.
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In summary, the estimated coefficients showed that market specific variables,
broad macroeconomic variables, speculative components, and weather conditions
have a significant effect on real wheat prices, and thus the existing theories comple-
ment rather than contradict one another. The key to understanding the findings of
this study is that commodities have multiple uses: they are both consumption goods
and financial assets for investments. The positive effect of world demand on wheat
commodity prices showed that wheat is used as consumption goods. The positive
impact of open interest and yield curve on wheat price demonstrated that wheat is
also used as financial assets.
An increasing demand was a dominant factor in driving up wheat prices, together
with inventories for the longer sample; excessive speculation turned out to be
significant and a relevant factor behind the price swings for the shorter sample.
Pressures on real prices were alleviated by restrictive monetary policies, a real dollar
appreciation, and, to some extent, expansive trade policies.
The properties of the residuals of the estimated model have been carefully ana-
lyzed. A battery of tests revealed that the residuals were stationary, homoskedastic,
and uncorrelated. The estimated model was also “dynamically stable”.10
10.5 Conclusions
The roller-coaster ride which commodity prices have experienced over the last
decade has generated considerable interest among academics, policy makers, and
investors in its effects on the real economy and thus on economic growth, food
security, and investment decisions. In this context, the present study has tried to shed
light on the key factors affecting the price movements of wheat, one of the major
food grains in the world. The analysis was carried out for the period 1980–2012 and
the subperiod 1995–2012, using monthly data.
The results of the study indicated that all the theories about drivers of commodity
price do not necessarily contradict, but rather complement, each other. In fact,
the results showed that a complex amalgamation of factors have caused prices to
rapidly increase in the wheat markets, including speculation in futures markets,
macroeconomic fundamentals, market specific variables, and weather conditions.
Wheat prices have been pushed up by a myriad of factors: loose monetary
policies (as evident in low real interest rates), higher levels of industrial production
(a proxy for strong economic activities), and speculative pressure. An increase in
the stock-to-use ratio and a real appreciation has a curbing or dampening effect on
10The residual analysis, including details about stability, and the short-run dynamics are not
reported for brevity but are available upon request. The impulse response function representation
based on the Cholesky decomposition method indicates that short-run wheat price patterns
in response to a shock are rich, and the impact of the shock is long-lasting. The variance
decomposition based on Monte Carlo repetitions confirmed that there is a long-run relationship
between the variables, and that all the determinants are meaningful in predicting real wheat prices
when considered as a whole.
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wheat prices. The thinness of a market turns out to be insignificant in the short
sample, but it plays a role in the long sample, exerting an upward pressure on prices
when trade diminishes.
Furthermore, the study has shown that an additional factor behind the rise
in wheat prices is the increase in oil prices. Higher oil prices makes wheat
production more expensive by raising the cost of inputs like fertilizers, irrigation,
and transportation, thereby decreasing the profitability and production of wheat and
raising wheat prices.
The variables with the largest effects on price movements over the period 1995–
2012 are the global demand, speculation, and the real effective exchange rates. This
showed that financial and wheat markets are becoming increasingly interwoven.
It also showed that “speculation” which involves trading futures contracts on
commodity markets (to profit from price fluctuations) is an important determinant
of price dynamics. The wider and more unpredictable price changes are caused
by greater possibilities of realizing large gains by speculating on future price
movements of the commodity in question. Although the presence of “speculators”
on derivatives markets is a necessary condition for a well-functioning market and
efficient hedging, price fluctuations can also attract significant speculative activities
and destabilize markets, which are both the cause and the effect of increased prices.
The adopted model satisfied the stability conditions as well as other residuals
properties, and it indicated that cointegrating vectors will converge towards their
long-run equilibrium in the presence of a shock to the system after 14.7 months and
11.7 months for the two sample periods, respectively.
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Annex
Market price for
wheat
This is a market price series for wheat, with values
expressed in US dollars and averaged from daily
quotations. The commodity and market specifications are:
US No. 1 hard red winter, ordinary protein, prompt
shipment, FOB Gulf of Mexico ports. The series was
collected from Datastream
Real effective
exchange rate
The US real effective exchange rate series take into account
not only changes in market exchange rates but also
variations in relative price levels (using consumer prices).
The data was taken from Datastream USOCC011
Oil spot prices This variable has been collected from EIA database and
refers to Cushing, Oklahoma WTI (West Texas
Intermediate) Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel),
Datastream USWTIOIL
Stock-to-use Data was taken from the USDA http://usda.mannlib.cornell.
edu/MannUsda/viewDocumentInfo.do?documentID=1194
El Niño region 3.4
sea surface
temperature
anomalies (SST)
Data was taken from the National Climatic Data Center US
Department of Commerce and NOAA Satellite and
Information Service using the extended reconstructed sea
surface temperature; http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/ersst/ftp://
ftp.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/cmb/ersst/v3b/pdo ftp://ftp.
ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/cmb/ersst/v3b/pdo/el_nino.dat
The southern
oscillation index
(SOI)
Data was taken from National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration National Climatic Data Center;http://www.
ncdc.noaa.gov/teleconnections/enso/indicators/soi.
php http://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/data/indices/soi
Real federal funds The US money market rate (federal funds) deflated by the
consumer price. The Series refers to the weighted average
rate at which banks borrow funds through New York
brokers. Monthly rate is the average of rates of all calendar
days. Data was collected from Datastream
US interest rate
spread
It has been constructed as difference between the 10 year
treasury bonds and the federal fund
Global activity It is measured as industrial production index taken from
IMF, IFS, via Datastream
Thinness It was computed using data provided by the USDA http://
usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/MannUsda/viewDocumentInfo.
do?documentID=1194
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11Relative Prices of Food and the Volatilityof Agricultural Commodities: Evidence
for a Panel of Developing Economies
Carlos Martins-Filho and Maximo Torero
11.1 Introduction
Increases in relative prices of food items may have severe negative impact for
consumer welfare. This can be particularly acute in low income countries where the
share of household expenditure on food items is high. Recently, various time series
on prices and returns for major agricultural commodities (rice, maize, soybeans,
and wheat) have exhibited periods of increased price variability or high absolute
values of returns. Whereas the negative link between high relative food prices and
consumer welfare is empirically well documented in low income economies [see,
e.g., conceptually (Deaton 1989), and for short-term effects (de Hoyos and Medved
2011; Ivanic and Martin 2008; Ivanic et al. 2012; Jacoby 2013; Wodon and Zaman
2010)], the potential link between high returns on major agricultural commodities
and consumer welfare is, to our knowledge, poorly understood. Most of the existing
work has focused on traditional measures of transmission of global price volatility
to price volatility at the country level (see, e.g., Ceballos et al. 2015; Hernandez
et al. 2014; Minot 2014; Zhao and Goodwin 2011). Moreover, the link between
high absolute value of returns (volatility) of agricultural commodities at the global
level and their impact on local prices of foodstuffs and consumer welfare has not
been analyzed in the literature.
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Looking at volatility at the global level is important because although the food
price spikes of 2008 and 2011 did not reach the heights of those during the 1970s,
price volatility (measured in various ways) has arguably been at its highest level in
the past 15 years (see Torero 2012). Wheat and maize prices have been particularly
volatile. For soft wheat, for example, there were an average of 41 days of excessive
price volatility per year between December 2001 and December 2006 (according
to a measure of price volatility recently developed at IFPRI).1 From January 2007
to June 2011, the average number of days of excessive volatility was more than
doubled to 88 per year (see Fig. 11.1).
High and volatile food prices are two different phenomena with distinct implica-
tions for consumers and producers. High food prices may harm poorer consumers
because they need to spend more money on their food purchases and therefore may
have to cut back on the quantity or quality of the food they buy. They may also be
Fig. 11.1 Number of days with excessive volatility in commodity markets. Source: The number
of days of excessive volatility is calculated using the Nonparametric Extreme Quantile (NEXQ)
model for the dynamic evolution of daily returns based on historical data going back to 1954. This
model is then combined with extreme value theory to estimate higher-order quantiles of the return
series, allowing for classification of any particular realized return (that is, effective return in the
futures market) as extremely high or not. A period of time characterized by extreme price variation
(volatility) is a period of time in which we observe a large number of extreme positive returns. An
extreme positive return is defined to be a return that exceeds a certain pre-established threshold.
This threshold is taken to be a high-order (95 %) conditional quantile, (i.e., a value of return that
is exceeded with low probability: 5 %). One or two such returns do not necessarily indicate a
period of excessive volatility. Periods of excessive volatility are identified based on a statistical test
applied to the number of times the extreme value occurs in a window of consecutive 60 days. See
Martins-Filho et al. (2015)
1See Martins-Filho et al. (2013, 2015).
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forced to economize on other needed goods and services. For food producers, higher
food prices could raise their incomes—but only if they are net sellers of food—if
increased global prices feed through to their local markets, and if the price changes
on global markets do not also increase their production costs.
Apart from these effects of high food prices, price volatility also has significant
effects on food producers and consumers. Greater price volatility can lead to
increased losses for producers because it implies price changes that are larger and
occur faster than what producers can adjust to. Uncertainty about prices makes it
more difficult for farmers to make sound decisions about how and what to produce.
For example, which crops should they produce? Should they invest in expensive
fertilizers and pesticides? Should they purchase high-quality seeds? Without a
realistic idea of how much they will earn from their products, farmers may become
more pessimistic in their long-term planning and dampen their investments in areas
that could otherwise improve their productivity. The positive relationship between
price volatility and producers’ expected losses can be modeled in a simple profit
maximization model assuming producers are price takers. Still, it is important to
mention that there is no uniform empirical evidence of the behavioral response of
producers to volatility. By reducing supply, such a response could lead to higher
prices, which in turn would hurt consumers.
It is important to remember that in rural areas the line between food consumers
and producers is blurry. Many households both consume and produce agricultural
commodities or foodstuffs. Therefore, if prices become more volatile and these
households reduce their spending on seeds, fertilizer, and other inputs, this may
affect the amount of food available for their own consumption. Even when the
households are net sellers of food, producing less and having less to sell will reduce
their household income and thus still impact their consumption decisions.
Finally, increased price volatility over time can also generate larger profits
for investors, drawing new players into the market for agricultural commodities.
Increased price volatility may thus lead to increased—and potentially speculative—
trading that in turn can exacerbate price swings further, increasing volatility.
Despite the importance that price volatility may have for consumers, its impact
on consumer welfare is notoriously difficult to measure due to income effects
associated with price changes. In addition, the fact that in many low income
countries economic agents are concomitantly consumers and producers of food
creates added concerns and complications. Besides the inherent difficulties in
adequately measuring consumer welfare, most empirical models for the dynamic
evolution of returns for major agricultural commodities lack flexibility in modeling
the conditional volatility (conditional standard deviation) of returns. Restrictive
modeling of volatility can produce inconsistent return forecasts and inaccurate
assessments and policy recommendations regarding the link between volatility and
consumer welfare.
Since the empirical link between high relative food prices and consumer welfare
is fairly well established, herein we propose an econometric/statistical model that
attempts to model the relationship between conditional return volatility of major
agricultural commodities and relative prices of food items/groups in a collection of
242 C. Martins-Filho and M. Torero
low income countries. Our goal is to better understand the transmission of global
volatility to local relative prices and therefore start to unveil its potential welfare
effects.
11.2 Methodology
11.2.1 Relative Food Prices at Country Level
We are interested in understanding if, and how, changes in relative food prices
(defined for certain groups of foodstuff) are related to volatility of agricultural
commodities in global markets. To construct our variable of interest we use a
Laspeyres price index for country j D 1; : : : ; J in time period t D 0; : : : ;T.
Let N be the number of elements in a collection of goods and services that form
a consumption basket and ptj D

ptj1    ptjN
0
be the corresponding vector of
prices at time period t in country j. We denote a representative consumption basket
for this collection by the vector qtj D

qtj1    qtjN
0
. The share of expenditures
devoted to the nth element of the consumption basket at time t in country j is
given by stjn D ptjnqtjn=. p0tjqtj/, where p0tjqtj D
PN
nD1 ptjnqtjn. Similarly, for a set
IF D fi1; : : : ; iFg that indexes F elements from the representative basket, we define
the share of expenditure on the food group IF by
stj;IF D
p0tj;IF qtj;IF
p0tjqtj
;
where ptj;IF D

ptji1    ptjiF

, qtj;IF D

qtji1    qtjIF
0
and p0tj;IF qtj;IF DP
n2IF ptjnqtjn. We note that 0  stj;IF  1. The Laspeyres price index for country j
from time period t  1 to time period t can be written as
L. ptj; pt1;j; qt1;j/ D
NX
nD1
ptjn
pt1;jn
st1;jn for t D 1; : : : ;T,
and the relative share of the Laspeyres price index associated with food group IF of
the consumption basket is given by
YtjIF D
P
n2IF
ptjn
pt1;jn
st1;jn
L. ptj; pt1;j; qt1;j/
for t D 1; : : : ;T.
Clearly, YtjIF 2 .0; 1/ and represents the share of price index variations from time
period t  1 to t that correspond to the food group defined by the set IF in the
consumption basket. If YtjIF is large, say in the vicinity of 1, the set IF in the
consumption basket accounts for a large share of the price variability of the entire
consumption basket N. In this case, most of the price changes in the consumption
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basket from time period t  1 to time period t can be attributed to price variations
on the elements in IF.
If the consumption share in period t  1 of each element of the food group IF—
st1;jn—is fixed through time at s0;jn for all n in IF, then all changes in YtjIF can be
attributed to changes in relative prices of food items that belong to IF. Otherwise,
the observed variability in YtjIF may result from both changes in relative prices and
changes in expenditure shares. Throughout this paper, we will fix the share of goods
and services through time at s0;jn and take YtjIF as our main variable of interest for
defined sets of food groups IF. In Sect. 11.3.1 we define the sets IF that we consider
in our empirical model.
11.2.2 Conditional Global Volatility and Its Relation to Country
Level Relative Food Prices
As mentioned above, we are interested in the impact that volatility of returns on
agricultural commodities in global markets may have on YtjIF . Hence, a key com-
ponent of our empirical model is a measure of volatility. To obtain such a measure,
we follow Martins-Filho et al. (2013) and envision the evolution of a commodity
(rice, maize, soybeans, and wheat) price P as a discretely indexed stochastic process
fPtgtD0;1;:::. As such, the observation of a time series of commodity prices that
extends from a certain time in the past up to the present time represents a realization
of many possible collections of values that a stochastic process may take. We let the
one-lag log-returns associated with such time series be denoted by rt D log PtPt1 and
assume that
rt D h1=2.rt1; : : : ; rtL/"t; (11.1)
where h.rt1; : : : ; rtL/ D h0 CPLjD1 hj.rtj/, L 2 N represents the maximum lag
on rt to be included as determinants of the conditional variance (squared volatility)
of the process, hj are smooth non-negative functions that are otherwise unrestricted,
"t 	 IID.0; 1/ and E.hj.rtj// D 0 for all j, h0 > 0.2
The model in (11.1) assumes that the dynamic evolution of log-returns
for agricultural commodities can be described as a conditional location-scale
model with conditional mean equal to zero and conditional volatility given by

h0 CPLjD1 hj.rtj/
1=2
, which is a function of L lagged returns. Here, rather than
assuming that volatility takes on a specific parametric structure, as in autoregressive
conditional heteroscedastic (ARCH) or generalized autoregressive conditionally
heteroscedastic (GARCH) models (Engle 1982; Bollerslev 1986), we flexibly
model the impact of lag returns on volatility via the nonparametric functions hj as
2The requirement that E.hj.rtj// D 0 for all j is an identification condition for the conditional
expectation E.r2t jrt1; : : : ; rtL/ D h0 C
PL
jD1 hj.rtj/.
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in Fan and Yao (1998) and Martins-Filho et al. (2013). In this model, a measure
of (conditional) volatility—a function of time—is obtained by estimating h0; hj
nonparametrically from a time series frtg.
A general stochastic model that relates YtjIF to the volatility of agricultural
commodities can be expressed as
E.YtjIF jh1=2.rt1; : : : ; rtL/;Wt/ D g1.m.h1=2.rt1; : : : ; rtL/;Wt// (11.2)
for t D LC1; : : : ;T, where Wt 2 RK is a collection of suitably defined (exogenous)
conditioning variables, g is a strictly monotonic link function g.x/ W .0; 1/ ! R,
m is a smooth function m.x/ W RKC1 ! R. Note that in (11.2) g1 takes values
in Œ0; 1, which guarantees that the regression takes values in .0; 1/, a constraint
that must hold given that YtjIF 2 .0; 1/. It would be desirable to impose as little
structure as possible on the functional m and the link g, however letting m and g
be nonparametric functions creates difficulties both for estimation and for deriving
practical empirical conclusions. As will be described shortly, we prefer a parametric
specification that explicitly accounts for the fact that YtjIF 2 .0; 1/, which has
important implications for stochastic modeling.
11.2.3 Beta Regression
As described above, our variable of interest—YtjIF —takes values in .0; 1/ and an
appropriate parametric statistical model must reflect its range. A flexible univariate
parametric (unconditional) density that accounts for such range is the beta density.
The beta density associated with a random variable Y is given by
.yI p; q/ D . p C q/
.p/.q/
yp1.1  y/q1 for p; q > 0, 0 < y < 1.
If 
 D ppCq and 0 <  D p C q, then 0 < E.Y/ D 
 < 1 and V.Y/ D 
.1
/1C . Here,
we follow Ferrari and Cribari-Neto (2004) and consider a conditional beta density
where 
./ is a function of a collection of conditioning variables X0t 2 RK with K a
natural number, such that for all t
g.
t/ D
KX
kD1
Xtkk D Xt (11.3)
 is a parameter vector taking values in a compact subset of RK and g.
t/ D
log 
t
1
t . This specific form for g can be promptly recognized as the much used
logit-link.
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It is easily verified that for a random sample f.Yt;Xt/gTtD1, the log-likelihood
function associated with the conditional beta model is given by `.; / DPT
tD1 `t.
t; /, where
`t.
t; / D log./  log.
t/ log..1 
t//C .
t  1/logYt
C ..1  
t/  1/log.1  Yt/:
The score vectors associated with the parameters of the distribution are given by
` .; / D X0D.Y  
/;
`.; / D
TX
tD1


t.Y

t  
t /C log.1  Yt/  ..1  
t//
C .// ;
where Y is a vector with tth element given by Yt D log Yt1Yt , 
 has tth element

t D log 
t1
t ,  ./ is the digamma function, D D diagf1=g.1/.
t/gTtD1, and X0 D
X01    X0T

, and g.1/./ denotes the first derivative of g. The values O and O that
satisfy
`. O; O/ D 0 and `. O; O/ D 0 (11.4)
are the maximum likelihood estimators for  and . Ferrari and Cribari-Neto (2004)
obtained the Fisher Information for this model, which is given by
F.; / D

F F
F F

;
where F D X0WX, F D F0 D X0Dc, F D trace.D/ with
W D diag ˚  .1/.
t/C  .1/..1  
t//

.g.1/.
t//
2
T
tD1 ;
D D diag ˚ .1/.
t/
2t C  .1/..1  
t//.1  
t/2   .1/./

T
tD1 , and
c D .c1; : : : ; cT/0; with ct D 

 .1/.
t/
t   .1/..1  
t//.1  
t/

:
Following standard arguments for obtaining the asymptotic distribution of max-
imum likelihood estimators (see Newey and McFadden 1994), we obtain for
sufficiently large T the following approximation
 O
O
!





	 N 0;F1.; / ; (11.5)
which allows for asymptotically valid hypothesis testing on the parameters  and .
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It is desirable to obtain an expression for the first partial derivatives of E.YtjXt/
with respect to the conditioning covariates Xtk. Given (11.3) and the logit-link, we
have
@
@Xtk
E.YtjXt/ D k
exp
PK
kD1 Xtkk

1C exp
PK
kD1 Xtkk
 : (11.6)
11.3 Data, Empirical Model, and Estimation
11.3.1 Data
We have constructed a panel data set for nine Latin American countries: Costa Rica,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Ecuador, Peru, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama,
and one Asian country, India. Our variable of interest—YtjIF —was constructed for
four food groups. They are: (i) Breads and cereals, (ii) meat, (iii) milk and other
dairy products, and (iv) other foods. That is, there are four elements in IF and IF D
fBreads and cereals;Meat;Milk and other dairy products;Other foodsg. These food
groups were defined based on the international agricultural commodity groups rice,
corn and wheat, and on standard grouping for food price indices, which is based
on similarities in expenditure shares and market structure. YtjIF for (i)–(iv) were
constructed using detailed data sets obtained from the national statistical institutes
of each country. They included a price index of approximately 200 food and nonfood
items that constitute a standard consumption basket, and their corresponding relative
importance (weights) in the general consumption price index (CPI).
As components of Xt in the previous section, we included a measure of the overall
economic activity in the country given by a “Monthly index of economic activity.”
This is a Laspeyres index. It measures the evolution of economic activity, approxi-
mating the aggregated value of the industries included in the calculation of the gross
domestic product (GDP). The index is given by It D PniD1 Iitwi0 where It is the
general index in period t; Iit is the index of industry i (manufacturing, agricultural,
etc.) in month t; wi0 is the weight associated with industry i in the calculation of
GDP in the baseline period; n is the number of industries; GDP is the aggregation
of all the aggregated values of the productive activities. Activities included in the
calculation of the IMAE (Indice Mensual de Actividad Economica—Monthly Index
of Economic Activity) include: agricultural and livestock; mining; manufacturing;
construction; water and electricity; trade; transport and communication; services for
enterprises; services for financial intermediation; and hotel business. This variable
was obtained from the Central Banks from each country. This index measures
the total value of all different industries included in the calculation of the GDP.
Additionally we included total imports, returns on oil prices, the monetary value (in
US dollars) of liquid assets (M1) in circulation, and of course, our main conditioning
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variables of interest, the estimated volatility of international commodity prices (see
the Appendix for a detailed list of sources for these variables in each country).
The volatility of returns for agricultural commodities was estimated using a
sequence of returns based on prices for future contracts closest to maturity for:
wheat CBOT (Chicago Board of Trade), wheat KCBT (Kansas City Board of Trade),
corn, soybeans, and rice. From 01/28/1987 until 8/31/2009, daily data was taken
from a historic file bought from the CME Group. From 09/01/2009 to 08/20/2013
daily data was obtained from daily updates, from CME and KCBT. The first
observation for the time series estimation is for 01/03/1995.
11.3.2 Empirical Model and Estimation
Since YtjIF 2 .0; 1/, we consider the following empirical specification for g.
t/ in
Sect. 11.2.3,
g.
t/ D 0 C
4X
lD1
Wtll C
9X
lD5
l h
1=2
l .rl;t1; rl;t2/; (11.7)
where h1=2l .rl;t1; rl;t2/ must be estimated based on a time series of returns frltg on
each of the five agricultural commodities given above, and Wt1;Wt2;Wt3, and Wt4
represent the monthly indicator of economic activity, total imports, M1 and return
on oil prices, respectively. As in Sect. 11.2.3, we specify g.
t/ D log 
t1
t .
Each h1=2l .rl;t1; rl;t2/ is estimated nonparametrically by noting that from (11.1),
we have for each l,
E.r2tljrl;t1; rl;t2/ D h0 C hl1.rl;t1/C hl2.rl;t2/:
Hence, for each l we conduct a nonparametric additive regression estimation using
the procedure discussed in Kim et al. (1999). The data we use on rtl has daily
frequency, and all other data has monthly frequency. Thus, we aggregate our daily
estimated conditional volatility to produce monthly estimates. We have experi-
mented with the following measures of monthly volatility: (a) monthly means; (b)
monthly medians; and (c) monthly inter-quartile ranges. There was little qualitative
change in the results from using either of these measures. The results reported in
Tables 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 11.4, 11.5, 11.6, 11.7, 11.8, 11.9, 11.10, 11.11, 11.12, 11.13,
11.14, 11.15, 11.16, 11.17, 11.18, 11.19 and 11.20 in the Appendix are for monthly
means. These estimates of (monthly) volatility, denoted by Oh1=2l .rl;t1; rl;t2/, are
then used as covariates for the maximum likelihood estimation of (11.7).
The maximum likelihood procedure requires the numerical solution of the
homogeneous system of nonlinear equations given in (11.4). We use the Marquardt
algorithm (see Marquardt 1963) to obtain a solution. The procedure requires initial
values for the parameters  and  , which we choose as suggested by Ferrari and
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Cribari-Neto (2004).3 Convergence of the algorithm is attained very quickly for
all 40 (four food groups in ten countries) beta-regressions we have estimated.
After obtaining O and O for all food groups and for all countries we estimated
Fisher’s information by F. O; O/ using the expressions given in Sect. 11.2.3. F. O; O/
is used to calculate the z-statistics reported in Tables 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 11.4, 11.5,
11.6, 11.7, 11.8, 11.9, 11.10, 11.11, 11.12, 11.13, 11.14, 11.15, 11.16, 11.17,
11.18, 11.19 and 11.20 that appear in the Appendix. Also reported in these tables
are the estimated marginal impact of the various covariates on the conditional
expectation of YtjIF . These are obtained using the estimates O to obtain estimated
partial derivatives as given in (11.6).
11.3.3 Discussion
We first note that proportion of the variation on the general Laspeyres price index
attributed to “Breads and Cereals,” “Meats,” and “Milk and other dairy products”
is fairly small across all countries. These proportions vary from 0:02 to 0:10 for
“Breads and Cereals,” 0:02 to 0:09 for “Meats,” and 0:03 to 0:06 for “Milk and other
dairy products.” As expected, the price variation of the catchall category “Other
foods” is a much larger proportion of the variation on the general Laspeyres price
index. It varies from proportion 0:05 to 0:26.
For illustrative purposes, Figs. 11.2 and 11.3 provide Rosenblatt-kernel estimates
of the density of the proportion of the general Laspeyres price index attributed to the
food group “Bread and cereals” and “Meat” in Honduras and India. Figure 11.4
provides the Rosenblatt-kernel estimate of the density of the proportion of the
general Laspeyres price index attributed to the food group “Milk and other dairy
products” in Peru, and Fig. 11.5 provides the Rosenblatt-kernel estimate of the
density of the proportion of the general Laspeyres price index attributed to the food
group “Other foods” in Nicaragua. The estimated unimodal densities presented here
are typical across the countries, but cases of bimodal densities do exist.
The results for all regressions are given in Tables 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 11.4, 11.5,
11.6, 11.7, 11.8, 11.9, 11.10, 11.11, 11.12, 11.13, 11.14, 11.15, 11.16, 11.17, 11.18,
11.19 and 11.20 in the Appendix. The tables contain parameter estimates, z-statistics
for the null hypothesis that k D 0 against the alternative that k ¤ 0 as well as the
estimated marginal impact of each covariate evaluated at its average sample value.
In addition, we provide pseudo-R2 values for each regression. We can perceive
some general regularities. For all food groups and for all countries, the precision
parameter  and the intercept 0 are significant at the 5 % level, with  > 0 and
0 < 0. Also, the pseudo-R2 for the regressions are generally large, varying from
0:56 to 0:98, indicating a reasonable overall fit for the models we have specified.4
3All codes for estimation were written using MATLAB and are available upon request.
4The exception is the regression for the Meat group in Costa Rica, where the pseudo-R2 is 0:21.
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Fig. 11.2 Rosenblatt density estimate of the density of the proportion of general Laspeyres price
index attributed to “Breads and cereals” in Honduras
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Fig. 11.3 Rosenblatt density estimate of the density of the proportion of general Laspeyres price
index attributed to “Meat” in India
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Fig. 11.4 Rosenblatt density estimate of the density of the proportion of general Laspeyres price
index attributed to “Milk and dairy products” in Peru
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Fig. 11.5 Rosenblatt density estimate of the density of the proportion of general Laspeyres price
index attributed to “Other foods” in Nicaragua
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In addition, for most regressions, plots of standardized residuals against the indices
of the observations show no discernible pattern that may suggest misspecification.
Figures 11.6 and 11.7 provide such plots for Honduras and India. The case of
Honduras is quite typical, but the figure for India reveals that some observations may
have significant leverage on the estimation. We chose to keep these observations in
our calculations, but their removal normally boosts the estimated value of .
For the food group “Breads and cereals” and for all countries, with the exception
of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, the parameters associated with the
volatility of wheat (either KCBT or CBOT) are positive and significant, mostly
at the 5 % level, and in Honduras and Mexico at the 10 % level.5 Whenever the
estimated parameter values associated with either of these volatilities is negative, it
is insignificant at either the 5 or 10 % level. Thus, there seems to be evidence that
increased volatility of prices of wheat in global markets correlates with an increased
proportion of the variation on the general Laspeyres price index that is attributed to
the food group “Breads and cereals.” Put differently, increased volatility on wheat
markets may increase the relative prices of “Breads and cereals” in most countries.
Accordingly, policies or market forces that mitigate volatility in these global markets
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Fig. 11.6 Standardized residuals against the time index of the observations for “Other foods” for
Honduras
5In El Salvador and Nicaragua the parameters associated with global wheat market volatility are
statistically insignificant, and in Guatemala the parameter associated with the volatility of hard
wheat (VolWCBOT) is negative and significant at the 10 % level.
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Fig. 11.7 Standardized residuals against the time index of the observations for “Other foods” for
India
may help curb the share of general price movements that is attributable to “Breads
and Cereals,” therefore lessening the impact of changing prices on the budgets of
households where this food group accounts for a larger share of expenditures.
The parameter associated with the index of economic activity is, whenever
significant, negative for most food groups and countries (19 out of 24 cases). The
exceptions are Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala where the parameter is
positive and significant for the food groups “Breads and cereals,” “Milk and other
dairy products,” and/or the catchall category “Other foods.” Hence, there seems
to be some evidence that increased economic activity dampens the proportion of
the variation on the general Laspeyres price index that is attributed to most food
groups. Thus, growth seems to lighten the impact of changing prices on the budgets
of households where food accounts for a larger share of expenditures.
The parameter associated with the returns on oil prices is insignificant for
virtually all food groups across all countries. The exceptions are “Breads and
cereals” in India and “Meat” in Ecuador. The parameter associated with M1 is
mostly positive and significant, or insignificant in most countries across all food
groups. In addition, the absolute value of the estimated parameters associated with
M1 is quite small, with values that are less than or equal to 104. Similarly, the
estimated parameters associated with imports are also very small in absolute value.
For this covariate, in most countries in Latin America, it has a statistically significant
positive impact on the proportion of the variation on the general Laspeyres price
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index that is attributed to most food groups. In India the impact of this covariate is
significant, but negative.
For the food group “Meats” and for most countries the parameter associated
with the volatility of corn is positive and significant at either the 5 or 10 % level.
The exceptions are Costa Rica, where the parameter is negative and insignificant,
and Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru where the parameters are always positive but not
significant at the 10 % level. Hence, there seems to be some evidence that increased
volatility of prices of corn in global markets correlates with an increased proportion
of the variation on the general Laspeyres price index that is attributed to the food
group “Meats.”
We note that the marginal impact of changes in covariates on E.YtjIF j/ is
relatively small across countries and food groups. This impact is rarely above 1
in absolute value, with exceptions for volatility of wheat in India and Costa Rica
and volatility of rice in Peru for the “Other foods” group, volatility of rice in El
Salvador and volatility of wheat, corn, and soy in Guatemala for the “Breads and
cereals” group, and volatility of rice for the “Meat” group in Mexico. Thus, changes
in volatility produce, at average values, changes on E.YtjIF j/ of smaller magnitude.
11.4 Conclusion
The global food price crises of 2007/2008 and 2010/2011 led to economic diffi-
culties for the poor, contributed to political turmoil in many countries, and in the
long run could undermine confidence in global food markets, thereby hampering
these markets’ performance in balancing fundamental changes in supply, demand,
and production costs. More important, food price crises can result in unreasonable
or unwanted price fluctuations (volatility) that can harm the poor. Price volatility
can have significant effects on food producers and consumers but the potential link
between the volatility of returns for major agricultural commodities at the global
level and welfare at the household level was not well understood. In this paper we
took advantage of the fact that there is already important evidence on the effects of
price levels on welfare and therefore focus on reducing the knowledge gap of the
relationship between price volatility at the global level and relative prices of food
items/groups in low income countries. Specifically, to close this gap we specify
an empirical model that describes the dynamic evolution of the relative share of
various food items in a Laspeyres price index as a function of the global volatility of
returns for major agricultural commodities and a collection of observed covariates
and relate it to the volatility of returns of agricultural commodities emerging from
a fully nonparametric location-scale stochastic process as in Martins-Filho et al.
(2015).
Our results show evidence for most countries of a relationship between relative
prices and price volatility for the food group “Breads and cereals” with the volatility
of wheat (either KCBT or CBOT). Thus, increased global volatility on wheat
markets may increase the relative prices of “Breads and cereals” in most countries.
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Similarly, for the food group “Meats” for most countries the parameter associated
with the volatility of corn is positive and significant being possibly the transmission
mechanism for animal feed based on corn. Hence, and similarly to the case of wheat
and breads and cereals, there also seems to be some evidence that increased volatility
of prices of corn in global markets correlates with an increased proportion of the
variation on the general Laspeyres price index that is attributed to the food group
“Meats.”
Accordingly, policies or market forces that mitigate volatility in these global
markets may help curb the share of general price movements that is attributable
to “Breads and cereals” and “Meat” at the country level lessening the impact of
changing prices on the budgets of households where these food groups account for
a larger share of expenditures. These results are of extreme relevance for the food
price crises of 2007/2008 because volatility was, as initially mentioned, at its highest
level during that period of time relative to the past 50 years. Even more the volatility
was the highest for wheat and corn. For soft wheat there were an average of 41 days
of excessive price volatility per year between December 2001 and December 2006
while from January 2007 to June 2011, the average number of days of excessive
volatility more than doubled to 88 per year.
The question is then what countries can do to cope with excessive volatility.
In this light, many countries try to stabilize prices through trade policies and
management of food reserves. With respect to reserves, international experience
in the management and use of so-called strategic grain reserves is mixed, with
frequent concerns about operational inefficiencies, financial costs, and disincentives
for private traders to perform normal arbitrage functions. Some of the problems
with grain reserves can be overcome by establishing clear and open rules for market
interventions, including the private sector in the tendering for supplies for the
reserves, combining grain and financial reserves to reduce costs. However, instead of
domestic buffer stocks, some authors posit the advantages of holding reserves at the
international level or regional level. Among other reasons, this type of intervention
can reduce storage costs and, if managed by an international intelligence unit, can
reduce governments’ political management of the resources. Albeit compelling,
an international or regional reserve poses other important obstacles. Politically, it
requires multinational coordination and sound governance. Economically, it might
disincentive private grain storage. Operationally, it is important to establish clear
triggers for market intervention. Similarly, there is important evidence showing that
using trade policies to reduce price volatility is not effective and on the contrary
could have important welfare costs as shown by Martin and Anderson (2011) and
Anderson and Nelgen (2012).
On the other hand, there is evidence that improved transport infrastructure helps
reduce price variability. Roads are useful means to spread out regional shocks;
if a certain region is hit by a shock (weather or other), it can import food from
another region. For example, during the food crisis of 2007/2008, it is shown
that regions with better infrastructure in Indonesia were not hit as hard as those
poorly connected. In this line, the World Bank (2010) argues that after controlling
for exchange rates and world prices, remote provinces appear to have higher
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levels of price volatility than well-connected provinces. It confirms the importance
of investment in infrastructure. In particular, it demonstrates that the constraints
created by geography and remoteness to the transmission of price signals can be
alleviated by improving the quality of infrastructure. This result is consistent with
the fact that in our analysis we also find some evidence that increased economic
activity dampens the proportion of the variation on the general Laspeyres price index
that is attributed to most food groups. Thus, growth seems to lighten the impact of
changing prices on the budgets of households where food accounts for a larger share
of expenditures.
In summary, price volatility is likely to remain an important challenge in the
medium and long run and, as was shown, a link exists between the volatility
of returns for major agricultural commodities and relative prices of certain food
groups. It is in this sense that further research is needed to understand alternative
policies at the global, regional, and local level that could help countries to cope with
excessive volatility.
Appendix
Tables
Table 11.1 Model: YtIF —India, n D 196
Breads and cereals Meat
Marginal Marginal
Parameter Estimate z-statistic impact Estimate z-statistic impact
 8322.0225 9:8975 8052.0188 9:8966
0(Intercept) 3.3859 45:8605 0.1181 3.4186 40:4528 0.0918
1(EconAct) 0.0001 0:4041 0 0.0012 2:9929 0
2(Imports) 0 4:1538 0 0 3:8414 0
3(M1) 0 0:8828 0 0 5:1483 0
4(Return on Oil) 0.1347 2:5937 0.0047 0.0363 0:6084 0.001
5(VolCorn) 3.7597 1:6468 0.1311 4.8465 1:8106 0.1302
6(VolSoy) 7.9867 2:9294 0.2785 11.1097 3:5301 0.2985
7(VolRice) 8.0383 3:8538 0.2803 12.6843 5:209 0.3408
8(VolWCBOT) 24.7865 3:972 0.8644 11.699 1:6275 0.3143
9(VolWKCBT) 7.448 1:3926 0.2597 2.8586 0:4622 0.0768
Pseudo-R2 0.61 0:63
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Table 11.2 Model: YtIF —India, n D 196
Milk and other dairy products Other foods
Marginal Marginal
Parameter Estimate z-statistic impact Estimate z-statistic impact
 18,235.638 9:8986 2959.3164 9:8965
0(Intercept) 3.3944 67:3571 0.115 2.8103 27:592 0.1442
1(EconAct) 0.0006 2:5677 0 0.0012 2:374 0.0001
2(Imports) 0 6:9294 0 0 1:9511 0
3(M1) 0 5:2652 0 0 2:9808 0
4(Return on Oil) 0.0456 1:2867 0.0015 0.1576 2:1992 0.0081
5(VolCorn) 0.9446 0:5976 0.032 2.2964 0:7103 0.1178
6(VolSoy) 6.1414 3:3173 0.2081 8.4597 2:2293 0.434
7(VolRice) 0.9646 0:6754 0.0327 12.9179 4:4025 0.6627
8(VolWCBOT) 7.9036 1:8516 0.2678 20.5499 2:3618 1.0542
9(VolWKCBT) 2.1534 0:5863 0.073 5.2261 0:6984 0.2681
Pseudo-R2 0.58 0:58
Table 11.3 Model: YtIF —Costa Rica, n D 161
Breads and cereals Meat
Marginal Marginal
Parameter Estimate z-statistic impact Estimate z-statistic impact
 26,075.522 8:9718 45,212.82 8:9719
0(Intercept) 3.6305 98:3296 0.1566 3.173 106:2465 0.1228
1(EconAct) 0.0004 1:8016 0 0.0001 0:7093 0
2(Imports) 0.0001 2:1393 0 0 2:0016 0
3(M1) 0 4:0094 0 0 0:2263 0
4(Return on Oil) 0.0237 0:8253 0.001 0.0045 0:195 0.0002
5(VolCorn) 3.0216 1:7949 0.1304 0.1286 0:0974 0.005
6(VolSoy) 9.0852 6:4816 0.392 0.2527 0:2246 0.0098
7(VolRice) 2.3734 1:636 0.1024 0.4263 0:3762 0.0165
8(VolWCBOT) 7.5157 2:0229 0.3243 3.4331 1:1423 0.1329
9(VolWKCBT) 8.689 2:2975 0.3749 1.4881 0:4892 0.0576
Pseudo-R2 0.94 0:21
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Table 11.4 Model: YtIF —Costa Rica, n D 161
Milk and other dairy products Other foods
Marginal Marginal
Parameter Estimate z-statistic impact Estimate z-statistic impact
 6196.3183 8:9698 10,060.627 8:9724
0(Intercept) 4.6539 56:4141 0.168 2.1065 64:0618 0.3418
1(EconAct) 0.0034 6:6053 0.0001 0.0009 4:6255 0.0002
2(Imports) 0.0001 1:7584 0 0.0001 3:7474 0
3(M1) 0 0:1881 0 0 4:0935 0
4(Return on Oil) 0.0455 0:7101 0.0016 0.0074 0:2882 0.0012
5(VolCorn) 3.3943 0:884 0.1225 3.4899 2:3559 0.5663
6(VolSoy) 8.2956 2:633 0.2994 0.0698 0:0557 0.0113
7(VolRice) 9.0529 2:7014 0.3268 2.2767 1:7793 0.3694
8(VolWCBOT) 6.7551 0:8206 0.2438 3.2624 0:9848 0.5294
9(VolWKCBT) 15.4374 1:8353 0.5572 6.8953 2:0505 1.1189
Pseudo-R2 0.93 0:94
Table 11.5 Model: YtIF —Ecuador, n D 101
Breads and cereals Meat
Marginal Marginal
Parameter Estimate z-statistic impact Estimate z-statistic impact
 17,823.992 7:105 17,059.821 7:1061
0(Intercept) 4.4994 40:662 0.0942 3.0999 46:642 0.1984
1(EconAct) 0.0003 1:3192 0 0.0003 2:5424 0
2(Imports) 0 0:0158 0 0 0:2144 0
3(M1) 0 0:9764 0 0 3:264 0
4(Return on Oil) 0.0387 0:6157 0.0008 0.0665 1:7533 0.0043
5(VolCorn) 5.7378 1:1672 0.1201 9.0724 3:0926 0.5807
6(VolSoy) 15.704 4:1448 0.3288 3.8565 1:6903 0.2468
7(VolRice) 5.1702 0:8926 0.1083 11.269 3:2368 0.7212
8(VolWCBOT) 5.5333 0:6799 0.1159 3.5782 0:7259 0.229
9(VolWKCBT) 20.9795 2:5906 0.4393 3.5107 0:7179 0.2247
Pseudo-R2 0.83 0:86
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Table 11.6 Model: YtIF —Ecuador, n D 101
Milk and other dairy products Other foods
Marginal Marginal
Parameter Estimate z-statistic impact Estimate z-statistic impact
 91,687.291 7:1062 15,227.761 7:1065
0(Intercept) 3.2196 94:4869 0.1429 1.6972 39:1194 0.3331
1(EconAct) 0 0:6612 0 0.0001 1:4768 0
2(Imports) 0 4:1872 0 0 2:2185 0
3(M1) 0 0:0493 0 0 8:2742 0
4(Return on Oil) 0.0004 0:0218 0 0.0034 0:1382 0.0007
5(VolCorn) 1.4647 0:9732 0.065 4.4661 2:3233 0.8767
6(VolSoy) 0.0609 0:052 0.0027 2.9095 1:9523 0.5711
7(VolRice) 2.8649 1:6069 0.1272 6.1867 2:7241 1.2144
8(VolWCBOT) 0.1769 0:0699 0.0079 1.1011 0:3418 0.2161
9(VolWKCBT) 4.0488 1:6159 0.1797 1.2828 0:4018 0.2518
Pseudo-R2 0.85 0:96
Table 11.7 Model: YtIF —El Salvador, n D 158
Breads and cereals Meat
Marginal Marginal
Parameter Estimate z-statistic impact Estimate z-statistic impact
 5561.2261 8:888 12,950.628 8:8873
0(Intercept) 2.1186 28:6153 0.1978 2.5586 36:4601 0.1052
1(EconAct) 0.0015 3:8894 0.0001 0.0011 2:9273 0
2(Imports) 0 0:6865 0 0.0001 1:9564 0
3(M1) 0.0001 1:6496 0 0 0:5514 0
4(Return on Oil) 0.0263 0:5228 0.0025 0.0079 0:1643 0.0003
5(VolCorn) 3.5452 1:8955 0.331 5.0484 2:819 0.2075
6(VolSoy) 4.9424 2:0159 0.4614 13.2289 5:384 0.5438
7(VolRice) 11.1869 6:2487 1.0444 6.4993 3:7905 0.2672
8(VolWCBOT) 2.2313 0:37 0.2083 11.5973 2:0402 0.4767
9(VolWKCBT) 2.9245 0:6448 0.273 5.62 1:3124 0.231
Pseudo-R2 0.56 0:85
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Table 11.8 Model: YtIF —El Salvador, n D 158
Milk and other dairy products Other foods
Marginal Marginal
Parameter Estimate z-statistic impact Estimate z-statistic impact
 30,430.033 8:8881 5667:8556 8:8887
0(Intercept) 2.549 70:1824 0.1738 1:6938 30:9319 0.322
1(EconAct) 0.0005 2:4619 0 0:0001 0:3237 0
2(Imports) 0.0002 6:41 0 0:0001 1:0381 0
3(M1) 0 1:6455 0 0:0001 4:3691 0
4(Return on Oil) 0.0062 0:2515 0.0004 0:0103 0:2802 0.002
5(VolCorn) 0.9513 1:0251 0.0649 0:2598 0:1873 0.0494
6(VolSoy) 1.1632 0:9433 0.0793 4:208 2:3415 0.8
7(VolRice) 4.3038 4:8952 0.2935 1:2858 0:9834 0.2444
8(VolWCBOT) 7.5635 2:5548 0.5157 4:292 0:9573 0.8159
9(VolWKCBT) 2.8503 1:2763 0.1944 2:7598 0:8161 0.5247
Pseudo-R2 0.88 0:81
Table 11.9 Model: YtIF —Guatemala, n D 87
Breads and cereals Meat
Marginal Marginal
Parameter Estimate z-statistic impact Estimate z-statistic impact
 4298:7881 6:5953 146,788.96 6:5954
0(Intercept) 2:9855 24:5471 0.3232 2.4889 96:4172 0.1709
1(EconAct) 0:0008 0:6875 0.0001 0.0001 0:6322 0
2(Imports) 0:0002 1:7144 0 0 1:1404 0
3(M1) 0:0002 11:7713 0 0 6:0762 0
4(Return on Oil) 0:0757 0:9064 0.0082 0.0175 1:0212 0.0012
5(VolCorn) 11:8679 3:44 1.2849 1.8097 2:6906 0.1242
6(VolSoy) 22:4028 7:5817 2.4255 0.9991 1:605 0.0686
7(VolRice) 8:2857 2:5947 0.8971 1.567 2:5122 0.1076
8(VolWCBOT) 18:6606 1:9522 2.0204 1.1373 0:5625 0.0781
9(VolWKCBT) 5:419 0:5968 0.5867 2.4823 1:3201 0.1704
Pseudo-R2 0:98 0:93
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Table 11.10 Model: YtIF —Guatemala, n D 87
Milk and other dairy products Other foods
Marginal Marginal
Parameter Estimate z-statistic impact Estimate z-statistic impact
 65,680.907 6:5953 25,657.83 6:5955
0(Intercept) 3.3321 64:5307 0.1212 1.4485 36:6358 0.2782
1(EconAct) 0.0002 0:3783 0 0.0009 2:5545 0.0002
2(Imports) 0 0:7157 0 0 1:1066 0
3(M1) 0 1:4175 0 0 2:6884 0
4(Return on Oil) 0.0183 0:5276 0.0007 0.0335 1:2704 0.0064
5(VolCorn) 0.0587 0:043 0.0021 1.775 1:7126 0.3409
6(VolSoy) 1.6323 1:2926 0.0594 4.0444 4:2128 0.7768
7(VolRice) 3.3057 2:6103 0.1202 0.9904 1:0305 0.1902
8(VolWCBOT) 8.1127 2:0038 0.295 3.9504 1:2751 0.7588
9(VolWKCBT) 2.8203 0:7445 0.1025 4.0736 1:4118 0.7825
Pseudo-R2 0.58 0:73
Table 11.11 Model: YtIF —Honduras, n D 96
Breads and cereals Meat
Marginal Marginal
Parameter Estimate z-statistic impact Estimate z-statistic impact
 14,598.789 6:9279 48,382.299 6:9281
0(Intercept) 2.585 26:1313 0.1452 2.3455 43:8583 0.1391
1(EconAct) 0.0053 7:3732 0.0003 0.0017 4:43 0.0001
2(Imports) 0.0005 4:8968 0 0.0001 2:1388 0
3(M1) 0.0001 0:8068 0 0 1:0715 0
4(Return on Oil) 0.0571 1:0855 0.0032 0.0273 0:9683 0.0016
5(VolCorn) 1.0199 0:4448 0.0573 3.9446 3:212 0.234
6(VolSoy) 2.084 0:8758 0.117 8.0223 6:2669 0.4759
7(VolRice) 2.5027 1:2808 0.1406 1.8207 1:7399 0.108
8(VolWCBOT) 7.9671 0:9622 0.4474 3.7906 0:8517 0.2249
9(VolWKCBT) 10.1606 1:6438 0.5706 4.2284 1:2683 0.2508
Pseudo-R2 0.75 0:90
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Table 11.12 Model: YtIF —Honduras, n D 96
Milk and other dairy products Other foods
Marginal Marginal
Parameter Estimate z-statistic impact Estimate z-statistic impact
 34,209.087 6:928 13,181.435 6:9283
0(Intercept) 2.6426 37:6436 0.1261 1.3638 20:9949 0.2263
1(EconAct) 0.0037 7:2297 0.0002 0.0032 6:957 0.0005
2(Imports) 0.0003 4:0397 0 0.0003 4:3367 0.0001
3(M1) 0.0002 3:8116 0 0.0001 2:3503 0
4(Return on Oil) 0.0496 1:334 0.0024 0.0525 1:5292 0.0087
5(VolCorn) 1.5597 0:9562 0.0744 1.3954 0:9295 0.2315
6(VolSoy) 4.8124 2:8469 0.2297 1.6185 1:048 0.2685
7(VolRice) 1.5132 1:0887 0.0722 2.8316 2:2052 0.4698
8(VolWCBOT) 7.0353 1:1958 0.3358 0.4223 0:0777 0.0701
9(VolWKCBT) 4.877 1:1178 0.2328 0.2002 0:0496 0.0332
Pseudo-R2 0.77 0:71
Table 11.13 Model: YtIF —Mexico, n D 159
Breads and cereals Meat
Marginal Marginal
Parameter Estimate z-statistic impact Estimate z-statistic impact
 18,585.355 8:9154 5369.5718 8:915
0(Intercept) 3.5081 32:6184 0.1168 1.9976 13:1078 0.1125
1(EconAct) 0.0002 0:118 0 0.0071 3:3766 0.0004
2(Imports) 0 2:6326 0 0 3:5931 0
3(M1) 0 1:9315 0 0 5:1358 0
4(Return on Oil) 0.0704 1:5813 0.0023 0.0194 0:3014 0.0011
5(VolCorn) 1.8294 1:1281 0.0609 6.605 2:8381 0.3718
6(VolSoy) 2.6105 1:2018 0.0869 1.784 0:5532 0.1004
7(VolRice) 6.2146 3:7211 0.2069 17.8027 7:3128 1.0022
8(VolWCBOT) 9.193 1:8751 0.3061 0.2148 0:0305 0.0121
9(VolWKCBT) 1.1962 0:2925 0.0398 2.0003 0:3489 0.1126
Pseudo-R2 0.63 0:88
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Table 11.14 Model: YtIF —Mexico, n D 159
Milk and other dairy products Other foods
Marginal Marginal
Parameter Estimate z-statistic impact Estimate z-statistic impact
 8191.7135 8:9149 8349.1367 8:9159
0(Intercept) 2.5171 17:6153 0.1044 2.2455 20:5959 0.1644
1(EconAct) 0.0065 3:3301 0.0003 0.0024 1:6152 0.0002
2(Imports) 0 4:4809 0 0 3:3767 0
3(M1) 0 6:0912 0 0 6:1153 0
4(Return on Oil) 0.0212 0:3538 0.0009 -0.0103 0:2262 0.0008
5(VolCorn) 3.7388 1:7097 0.1551 2.3254 1:3982 0.1702
6(VolSoy) 7.3896 2:4292 0.3066 8.1107 3:5465 0.5936
7(VolRice) 14.9432 6:5592 0.62 7.112 4:1495 0.5205
8(VolWCBOT) 10.5947 1:6134 0.4396 6.3139 1:2587 0.4621
9(VolWKCBT) 0.6629 0:1234 0.0275 0.627 0:152 0.0459
Pseudo-R2 0.86 0:81
Table 11.15 Model: YtIF —Nicaragua, n D 88
Breads and cereals Meat
Marginal Marginal
Parameter Estimate z-statistic impact Estimate z-statistic impact
 23,124.049 6:6331 28,388.756 6:6331
0(Intercept) 2.9785 61:2473 0.2098 2.557 55:4856 0.18
1(EconAct) 0.0002 0:8483 0 0.0001 0:3479 0
2(Imports) 0.0004 4:291 0 0.0001 1:7132 0
3(M1) 0.0005 5:2454 0 0 0:3868 0
4(Return on Oil) 0.0511 1:2112 0.0036 0.03 0:7928 0.0021
5(VolCorn) 1.4927 0:8725 0.1052 2.3858 1:5672 0.1679
6(VolSoy) 7.6796 5:1633 0.541 3.8797 2:8563 0.2731
7(VolRice) 2.4418 1:6053 0.172 3.5647 2:6457 0.2509
8(VolWCBOT) 1.3202 0:2667 0.093 2.5505 0:5616 0.1795
9(VolWKCBT) 4.8302 1:0473 0.3403 4.9979 1:2009 0.3518
Pseudo-R2 0.94 0:88
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Table 11.16 Model: YtIF —Nicaragua, n D 88
Milk and other dairy products Other foods
Marginal Marginal
Parameter Estimate z-statistic impact Estimate z-statistic impact
 8894:0985 6:6327 12,171.234 6:6334
0(Intercept) 2:8914 32:9862 0.168 1.6241 36:4102 0.3154
1(EconAct) 0:0002 0:6858 0 0.0002 0:9527 0
2(Imports) 0:0005 2:9821 0 0.0003 3:8202 0.0001
3(M1) 0:0007 4:0906 0 0.0003 4:1596 0.0001
4(Return on Oil) 0:1163 1:5761 0.0068 0.0444 1:1844 0.0086
5(VolCorn) 10:1085 3:3629 0.5872 2.7707 1:8333 0.538
6(VolSoy) 4:7079 1:7503 0.2735 0.3458 0:2589 0.0672
7(VolRice) 3:62 1:3816 0.2103 0.1308 0:0975 0.0254
8(VolWCBOT) 17:1722 1:9661 0.9976 4.24 0:9516 0.8234
9(VolWKCBT) 3:447 0:4277 0.2002 1.7843 0:4344 0.3465
Pseudo-R2 0:88 0:81
Table 11.17 Model: YtIF —Panama, n D 79
Breads and cereals Meat
Marginal Marginal
Parameter Estimate z-statistic impact Estimate z-statistic impact
 42,836.899 6:2847 27,901.146 6:2848
0(Intercept) 3.3296 48:3513 0.1477 2.5388 39:1479 0.2065
1(EconAct) 0.0012 2:3271 0.0001 0.0008 1:6198 0.0001
2(Imports) 0.0001 3:0469 0 0 0:6296 0
3(M1) 0.0001 6:2054 0 0 1:0226 0
4(Return on Oil) 0.0334 1:1603 0.0015 0.0145 0:5335 0.0012
5(VolCorn) 4.9734 2:2377 0.2207 3.0768 1:4729 0.2502
6(VolSoy) 3.9587 2:7148 0.1757 0.2289 0:1686 0.0186
7(VolRice) 0.2367 0:1261 0.0105 1.5116 0:8705 0.1229
8(VolWCBOT) 13.9842 3:0451 0.6205 4.0673 0:9367 0.3308
9(VolWKCBT) 1.0518 0:2336 0.0467 1.3298 0:3149 0.1081
Pseudo-R2 0.95 0:70
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Table 11.18 Model: YtIF —Panama, n D 79
Milk and other dairy products Other foods
Marginal Marginal
Parameter Estimate z-statistic impact Estimate z-statistic impact
 30,599.764 6:2845 19,812.572 6:285
0(Intercept) 3.9488 41:1289 0.1244 2.0358 34:6196 0.3042
1(EconAct) 0.001 1:4929 0 0.0006 1:5135 0.0001
2(Imports) 0 0:2854 0 0.0001 3:8037 0
3(M1) 0.0001 3:3279 0 0 4:291 0
4(Return on Oil) 0.0364 0:9104 0.0011 0.037 1:5032 0.0055
5(VolCorn) 12.6476 4:0779 0.3984 1.4221 0:7495 0.2125
6(VolSoy) 8.5396 4:2007 0.269 4.6104 3:7345 0.6888
7(VolRice) 1.7534 0:6661 0.0552 0.7373 0:4654 0.1102
8(VolWCBOT) 0.5952 0:0932 0.0187 2.2778 0:5795 0.3403
9(VolWKCBT) 16.9397 2:705 0.5336 3.5562 0:9275 0.5313
Pseudo-R2 0.94 0:92
Table 11.19 Model: YtIF —Peru, n D 152
Breads and cereals Meat
Marginal Marginal
Parameter Estimate z-statistic impact Estimate z-statistic impact
 10,649.305 8:7177 5867.4867 8:7175
0(Intercept) 2.2777 51:2681 0.2132 1.7373 28:2889 0.1568
1(EconAct) 0.0007 2:2116 0.0001 0.0031 6:8838 0.0003
2(Imports) 0.0001 6:9847 0 0.0003 10:029 0
3(M1) 0 1:39 0 0 6:4168 0
4(Return on Oil) 0.0446 1:2385 0.0042 0.0391 0:7958 0.0035
5(VolCorn) 2.4112 1:8183 0.2257 2.2836 1:2644 0.2061
6(VolSoy) 8.627 4:9168 0.8076 7.3505 2:9558 0.6634
7(VolRice) 5.3316 3:9281 0.4991 12.0382 6:4187 1.0865
8(VolWCBOT) 6.1178 1:5146 0.5727 5.9913 1:0871 0.5407
9(VolWKCBT) 7.8244 2:268 0.7325 10.5296 2:2921 0.9503
Pseudo-R2 0.81 0:87
11 Relative Prices of Food and the Volatility of Agricultural. . . 265
Table 11.20 Model: YtIF —Peru, n D 152
Milk and other dairy products Other foods
Marginal Marginal
Parameter Estimate z-statistic impact Estimate z-statistic impact
 25,927.176 8:7173 4281.78 8:7186
0(Intercept) 2.9624 69:5966 0.1187 0.7408 15:7126 0.1931
1(EconAct) 0.002 6:502 0.0001 0.0017 4:9396 0.0004
2(Imports) 0.0001 6:299 0 0.0001 3:3777 0
3(M1) 0 3:1206 0 0 0:4413 0
4(Return on Oil) 0.0555 1:622 0.0022 0.0059 0:157 0.0015
5(VolCorn) 2.0215 1:6189 0.081 3.1737 2:3028 0.827
6(VolSoy) 1.4678 0:8619 0.0588 3.3824 1:8061 0.8814
7(VolRice) 5.5173 4:266 0.2211 7.4991 5:2855 1.9542
8(VolWCBOT) 1.7307 0:4505 0.0694 1.0336 0:2425 0.2693
9(VolWKCBT) 8.6824 2:6816 0.348 0.681 0:1887 0.1775
Pseudo-R2 0.77 0:70
Data Sources
For oil prices the source is always U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA),
and for the volatility of international commodities the source is the estimation
procedure described in the text.
• Costa Rica—Share of Laspeyres index: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y
Censos de Costa Rica (INEC); Monthly Index of economic activity: Banco
Central de Costa Rica; Imports: Banco Central de Costa Rica.
• El Salvador—Share of Laspeyres index: Direccion General de Estadística y
Censos (DIGESTYC); Monthly Index of economic activity: Banco Central de
Reserva de El Salvador; Imports: Banco Central de Reserva de El Salvador.
• Guatemala—Share of Laspeyres index: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica
Guatemala (INE); Monthly Index of economic activity: Banco de Guatemala;
Imports: Banco de Guatemala.
• Honduras—Share of Laspeyres index: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Hon-
duras (INE); Monthly Index of economic activity: Banco Central de Honduras;
Imports: Banco Central de Honduras.
• Ecuador—Share of Laspeyres index: Instituto Nacional de Estadística de
Ecuador (INEC); Monthly Index of economic activity: Banco Central del
Ecuador; Imports: Banco Central del Ecuador.
• Peru—Share of Laspeyres index: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica e Informatica
(INEI); Monthly Index of economic activity: Banco Central de Reserva del Peru;
Imports: Banco Central de Reserva del Peru.
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• Mexico—Share of Laspeyres index: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia
(INEGI); Monthly Index of economic activity: Banco de Mexico; Imports: Banco
de Mexico.
• Nicaragua—Share of Laspeyres index: Instituto Nacional de Informacion de
Desarrollo (INIDE); Monthly Index of economic activity: Banco Central de
Nicaragua; Imports: Banco Central de Nicaragua.
• Panama—Share of Laspeyres index: Contraloria General de la Republica;
Monthly Index of economic activity: Contraloria General de la Republica;
Imports: Contraloria General de la Republica.
• Dominican Republic—Share of Laspeyres index: Oficina Nacional de Estadistica
(ONE); Monthly Index of economic activity: missing; Imports: Banco Central de
la Republica Dominicana.
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12How Strong Do Global Commodity PricesInfluence Domestic Food Prices in Developing
Countries? A Global Price Transmission
and Vulnerability Mapping Analysis
Matthias Kalkuhl
12.1 Introduction
Major global food commodities experienced unexpected price spikes in 2007/2008
and again in 2010. This raised serious concerns about the impact of global price
shocks and volatility on food security in developing countries. There have been
several attempts to investigate the impacts of price shocks on income and poverty
as well as nutrition indicators. Some of these papers quantified the number of
people who were pushed below the poverty line due to increased food prices
(and decreased real incomes) at 105–150 million (de Hoyos and Medvedev 2011;
Ivanic and Martin 2008); Tiwari and Zaman (2010) estimated that 63 million
people became food insecure, as measured by the number of people who consume
less than 1810 calories/day. However, as these studies used either domestic food
prices, whereby the linkage to global prices is not directly clear (de Hoyos and
Medvedev 2011), or the ad hoc assumption that price transmissions from global
markets are uniform (Ivanic and Martin 2008; Tiwari and Zaman 2010), they
cannot provide a satisfactory answer about the impacts of global price shocks. The
heterogeneous degree of price transmission from international to domestic markets
has to be considered explicitly for ex-post impact analysis as well as early warning
and information systems, which are aimed at identifying upcoming food security
risks.
There are some controversies about the role of international commodity prices
in the local food security of developing countries. A common explanation for
the low integration of developing countries, in particular African countries, in
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global markets is that many of them import only small amounts of the commodity
they consume and that trade does not take place continuously. Additionally,
transaction costs due to transportation costs and trade barriers, like tariffs and
quotas, are considered to reduce price transmission. Existing research has there-
fore come to different conclusions regarding the degree of price transmission,
depending on the considered domestic market, crop and international reference
price.
So far, a comprehensive analysis of the extent of price transmission for the 1.2
billion people worldwide living below the poverty line is missing: We neither have
an estimation of how many poor people are affected by global market-induced food
price changes nor do we know the heterogeneous extent of price transmission. While
the recent FAO report on the State of Food Insecurity in the World (FAO 2013)
attempted to provide an aggregate picture of the extent of price transmission, it
used regionally aggregated food price indices which showed only weak linkages to
global prices and price volatility.1 The use of regionally aggregated price indices,
however, masks the heterogeneity of countries and commodities: combining prices
from markets with high market integration and low (or missing) market integration
will give an average low transmission that distracts from the serious impacts of
international price shocks on some markets.
This paper aims to fill this gap by providing a globally comprehensive but
nationally differentiated analysis of price transmission which maps transmission
elasticities to the size of the vulnerable population. The result will be a Lorenz-type
curve showing how many poor people are affected by international price shocks
and how strong these effects are. The paper also provides a pragmatic way to deal
with the heterogeneity of local food staples by creating a domestic grain price
index which is highly relevant to the poor and vulnerable population. Our grain
price index is preferable to the food price indices from national statistical agencies
used in FAO (2013), Cachia (2014), and Ianchovichina et al. (2012) because the
latter often contain processed and luxury food items that are of little relevance to
the poor. As for these products, material costs play a minor role; therefore, using
official food price indices would likely result in an underestimation of the degree of
price transmission to the costs of the food basket of poor people. On the contrary,
using individual crop prices instead of price indices – as in most existing studies –
inflates the reported results of the empirical analysis, neglects possible substitution
effects between grains, and complicates the interpretation of the severity of price
transmission.
The market integration of developing countries is a highly relevant topic for
policymakers and international organizations. Market integration presents both
opportunities and risks. The larger a market is, the better its capability to diversify
1Cachia (2014) provides a more detailed overview on methods and data on regional price
transmission.
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(uncorrelated) shocks; this generally has a stabilizing effect on prices, benefitting
producers as well as consumers. In contrast, integration into global markets makes
domestic markets vulnerable to “external” shocks that are beyond the control of
the national government, in particular, international price volatility (Kornher and
Kalkuhl 2013). Market liberalization may further be incompatible with domestic
price stabilization schemes, such as buffer stocks.
In this paper, we do not attempt to assess the costs and benefits of market
integration. Leaving the normative debate aside, we address the descriptive question
of the extent of market integration, which forms the basis of not only further nor-
mative analyses but also an appropriate impact assessment of global price shocks.
Mapping price transmission with vulnerable population is one important step toward
a better understanding of the impacts of recent global food price spikes since
2007. Additionally, our mapping analysis helps to identify the crucial international
reference prices that should be monitored carefully in early warning and food
security information systems. Finally, the calculated transmission elasticities can
be used for forecasting the partial effect of international commodity price dynamics
on local food prices and thus food security.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 12.2 provides an overview on existing
literature on price transmission and market integration. Section 12.3 establishes
the theoretical framework by drawing on basic trade and storage models from the
literature. This section in particular helps to explain price transmission when trade
is (temporarily) absent.2 Section 12.4 describes the empirical model to estimate
price transmission. Section 12.5 presents the price data used and the calculation
of a domestic grain price index as an alternative reference price for the costs of
the food basket of the poor. Section 12.6 discusses the results of the transmission
analysis, including some robustness checks for different specifications. Section 12.7
summarizes the findings and concludes the chapter with policy and research
implications.
12.2 ExistingWork on Price Transmission
In the wake of the large swings in international commodity prices, there have
been various researches on market integration and price transmission. Using staple
prices on several sub-Saharan African markets, Minot (2010) calculated that the
price increase in the region was on average 71 % of the corresponding world
market increase in 2007/2008. Because static correlations between prices might
be spurious and no compelling evidence for market integration exists (Ravallion
2Götz et al. (2013) provided an analysis on the price transmission of Ukraine and Russia during
different trade regimes. The authors find that price transmission was also present during times of
tight export quotas and high export taxes but stronger during liberal trade regimes.
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1986), Minot (2010) extended the correlation analysis by applying a vector error
correction model (VECM). This model, however, suggests that only one-fifth of the
considered domestic price series have a long-run relationship to international prices.
The estimated price elasticities range from 16 to 97 %. In general, rice prices seem
to be more integrated than maize prices.
Robles (2011) estimated price transmission with an autoregressive distributed lag
(ADL) model for some Latin American and three Asian countries using retail prices
(Latin America) and wholesale prices (Asia) between 2000 and 2008. Transmission
to processed food items is reported to be lower than to raw commodities. The
average transmission from international wheat to domestic bread and pasta prices
is 20 % and 24 %, respectively. In contrast, transmission of rice and wheat prices
in Asia to the raw commodity prices varies a lot among the considered cities, but
values higher than 50 % are reported for several cities.
Using a similar econometric approach but considering food price indices instead
of commodity prices, Ianchovichina et al. (2012) analyzed price transmission to
Middle East and North Africa countries. They report transmission for several
countries in the range of 20–40 %. Greb et al. (2012) attempted to investigate
price transmission and made some observations about the extent and determinants
of market integration by assessing existing literature and by an own analy-
sis based on FAO GIEWS price data. In their meta-analysis, they found that
rice markets are more integrated than maize markets. They reported substantial
price transmission to domestic markets (long-run price transmission coefficient of
75 %).
Most recently, Baquedano and Liefert (2014) calculated short- and long-run
transmission coefficients for several commodities in developing countries within
a single-equation error correction model (SEECM). They found that most consumer
markets in developing countries are co-integrated with world markets although
their speed of equilibrium adjustment is rather low. Cachia (2014) provided an
overview of different concepts and models of price transmission and estimated
market integrations and price transmission between the FAO (global) food price
index and regionally aggregated food price indices (based on consumer price indices
from national statistical agencies). His findings suggest limited market integration
and rather slow transmission, which might be related to the use of aggregated food
price indices as discussed above.
12.3 Theoretical Framework
Domestic prices are linked to world market prices primarily through trade. If a
commodity is imported, its domestic price pDt equals its international price p
G
t plus
the transaction costs  I;Et for import I and export E. Depending on the trade balance
(a positive Tt denotes exports, a negative Tt imports), we can therefore distinguish
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the three cases (Samuelson 1952)3:
pDt D pGt C  It if Tt < 0 (12.1a)
pDt D pGt  Et if Tt > 0 (12.1b)
pDt D D

QDt ;Y
D
t

if Tt D 0; (12.1c)
where D

QDt ;Y
D
t

is the inverse of the domestic demand function, which depends on
consumption QDt and income Y
D
t . Equations (12.1a)–(12.1c) imply that the domestic
price is independent from the global price if and only if it is neither profitable to
export nor to import the commodity, that is if
pGt  Et < D

QDt ;Y
D
t

< pGt C  It (12.2)
Spatial arbitrage through trade links domestic and global prices immediately. There
exists, however, also another form of arbitrage through storage which links current
prices to expected (future) prices. Assuming rational expectations, current prices are
a function of expected futures prices (Wright and Williams 1991):
pt D ˇEt Œ ptC1 if It > 0; (12.3a)
pt > ˇEt Œ ptC1 if It D 0; (12.3b)
where pt is the price of the commodity at time t; ˇ D .1  ı/ = .1C r/ contains the
interest rate r and rate of deterioration ı; Et Œ refers to the expectation at time t; and
It denotes the inventory of grains. When there are no inventories (It D 0), current
and future prices are not directly linked through intertemporal arbitrage.
Consider now the case of a country which has a zero or negative trade balance
(that may change over time) but which is never in an exporting state. Combining
Eqs. (12.1a) and (12.3a) for the domestic and global markets and assuming positive
storage on both, for exactly s consecutive periods without trade, we obtain:
pDt D  spGt C

ˇD
s
E ŒtCs if ID;GtCj > 0; TtCj D 0 for 0 < j < s; (12.4)
where  ´ ˇD
ˇG
D .1ıD/.1CrG/
.1ıG/.1CrD/ . Equation (12.4) indicates that domestic prices
depend on global prices even when there is no trade in a sequence of s periods. If
3In the subsequent theoretical analysis, we will assume that all transaction costs are unit costs
and independent of the price level pGt . Considering ad-valorem transaction costs &
I
t (e.g., due to
transport insurance, value-added tax, or ad-valorem tariffs), Eq. (12.1a) would change to pDt D
pGt

1C & It
 C  It . As the ad-valorem component has no impact on the transmission elasticity (it
cancels out after taking the derivatives), we have omitted it to shorten the formal analysis.
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Price at tDomestic
Market
International 
Market
Price at t+s
Price at t Price at t+s
Storage
Storage
[Expected]
Trade at t
Trade
at t+s
Fig. 12.1 Linkage between domestic and international prices through storage, trade, and expec-
tations. Source: Own elaboration, based on Eqs. (12.1)–(12.4)
trade is expected in future periods (which brings domestic and global prices back
to equilibrium), current domestic prices are adjusted according to intertemporal
arbitrage. The relation between domestic and international markets for the direct
trade regime and the indirect transmission regime (expected trade, with storage) is
depicted in Fig. 12.1.
In the case of trade, prices at t are directly linked. In the case of no trade at t but
expected trade at t C s, prices at t are indirectly linked through storage and expected
trade arbitrage.
Inserting Eq. (12.4) into the transmission elasticity  ´ @pD
@pG
pG
pD
, we get4:
 D p
G
t
pGt C ŒˇGsE ŒtCs
Building partial derivatives of , we obtain 0

pGt

> 0, 0

ˇG

<0, 0 .E ŒtCs/ <0;
and 0.s/ > 0. Thus, transmission increases in the global price level, and it
decreases in the storage discount factor ˇG and in expected transaction costs E ŒtCs.
Transmission increases, however, in the distance s to the next trade period: the
longer the period of no trade, the stronger domestic prices respond to global prices
(if storage domestic and global stocks are strictly positive during that period).
Table 12.1 gives an overview of the different possible trade and storage regimes
and how they determine domestic prices and price transmission. In the case of trade,
4For s D 0, the transmission elasticity collapses to the standard form (direct transmission in case
of trade)  D pGt =

pGt C t

. As argued above, any ad-valorem transaction costs cancel out in the
price transmission.
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or in case of expected (future) trade, and positive domestic and global stocks, there
is always a positive price transmission from global to domestic markets. However, if
global stocks are zero5 (i.e., if global prices are not in an intertemporal equilibrium),
current global prices do not affect current domestic prices. Nevertheless, current
domestic prices are in equilibrium with the expected global prices (which might, in
turn, be a function of current global prices). Only in the remaining cases whereby all
stocks are zero or whereby there will never be trade, domestic prices are completely
decoupled from global prices. In these cases, domestic prices are solely determined
by the conditions of domestic supply and demand, and price transmission is zero.
The theoretical analysis revealed two further interesting insights: For each trade
regime, the transmission elasticity  is not affected by ad-valorem transaction costs
(which include ad-valorem taxes and tariffs), and it is furthermore independent of
the traded amount. In other words, the transmission elasticity will be the same
for a country with small and large imports as long as the (unit) transaction costs
are the same. Finally, the formal analysis emphasizes the role of storage in price
transmission. Traditionally, storage is seen as a buffer against supply shocks,
and this buffer reduces price fluctuations. As (private) storage, however, links
current and future prices via expectations, it links domestic prices to global prices
even if no trade occurs. Hence, storage could make a country more vulnerable
against international price shocks because domestic prices are additionally linked
to international prices through expectations.
While trade and storage link domestic prices to international prices of the
same commodity, substitution effects might also link non-traded commodities to
international prices if they are substitutes for traded commodities. The magnitude
of substitution effects is expressed in the cross-price elasticity of demand, relating
the percentage change in a commodity price to the percentage change in the price
of a substitute. Hence, we would also expect price transmission to non-traded local
products if they are substitutes for traded commodities. This is in particular the case
for staples or different edible oils.
12.4 Empirical Model
As we are interested in the transmission of global shocks to domestic prices,
any empirical analysis should consider intra-annual prices. However, many of the
variables that determine price transmission (like grain stocks and trade) are only
observable on an annual basis and suffer additionally from substantial measurement
5Zero stocks refer here to the theoretical model. In real-world settings, stocks become rarely zero
because a certain amount of grains will be always stored for operational purposes. This “operational
stock,” however, is not part of the intertemporal arbitrage dynamics as it is used to ensure deliveries
and does not respond to (expected) prices.
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errors and data quality problems.6 While there are models that allow data of different
frequencies to be combined [e.g., GARCH-MIDAS for analyzing volatility, see
Engle et al. (2013)], estimating them requires typically a large sample size. Because
most of our price series start after the year 2000, we used a pure time-series approach
to quantify country- and crop-specific “average” transmission elasticities instead of
estimating the underlying fundamental model parameters, like the transaction costs,
trade flows, and storage levels.
Time-series models are often confronted with the problem of nonstationary data
series, which generates biased estimates and high R2 due to spurious regression of
explanatory variables with trends which leads to the overestimation of t-values in
the case of autocorrelation. The typical approach to deal with a nonstationary time
series is to differentiate the data until it becomes stationary. If the time series is also
co-integrated (i.e., there exists a linear combination of the series that is integrated
of order one), it is possible to estimate the long-run relationship between trended
variables within an error correction model (ECM) (Engle and Granger 1987). If the
time series is integrated to the order of one but not co-integrated, one can analyze
the first-differenced, stationary time series within an autoregressive distributive lag
model (ADL). If the time series is stationary, the ECM can be made equivalent to
an ADL (De Boef and Keele 2008).
An ECM would be the favorable model to test for market integration (i.e., co-
integration of domestic and international price series). However, the transmission
of short-term shocks in international prices to domestic prices, which is the focus
of this paper, does not require co-integrated time series. Relying on co-integrated
time series only could exclude countries with significant transmission of shocks.7
Using an ADL for this set of countries would be one option. As the estimated short-
run transmission elasticities of the ADL are not directly comparable to the ECM,
which controls for error correction, we prefer to use the same econometric model
for all countries and series. Hence, we used an ADL with stationary first-differenced
logarithmic prices, which is suitable for all countries and price series.8 Our basic
model estimates the relative change of the domestic food price index as follows:
pdit D
Xl
jD1˛
dw
i p
d
itj C
Xk
jD1ˇ
dw
ij p
w
tj C
Xk
jD1
dw
ij eitj
C
Xk
jD1
dw
ij p
oil
tj C ıdwim C cdwi C "dwi;t ;
(12.5)
6Stocks data is, for example, lacking for many countries. Published stock data (e.g. on the USDA-
PSD database) is for many developing countries based on rough estimates and balance sheet
calculations rather than original survey data.
7Additionally, testing for a unit root process, a necessary condition for the ECM, is problematic
due to the low performance of unit root tests. Hence, the use of the ADL avoids the risk of using a
misspecified ECM.
8The stationarity of all domestic and international price series was tested using the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller test. While only a few of the original series are stationary, all first-differenced series
are stationary with a test statistic below the 1 % critical value. Results are available upon request.
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wherext D xt  xt1 is the difference operator, pdi;t denotes the domestic reference
price d (or price index) in country i (all prices in logs) at time t, pwtj is a world
market reference price (or price index), ei;tj the exchange rate (in US dollars) of
country i, poilt is the oil price, ıi;m a monthly country-specific dummy to account
for seasonality, and cdwi is a (country and commodity specific) constant. We chose
the lag structure l D 3 and k D 3 in our base model, but we also explored different
lag structures (including optimal lags using information criteria) as a robustness
check. Although oil prices are neglected in most other studies, we considered them
important as they influence domestic production and transportation costs as well as
import costs (Minot 2010).
Controlling for seasonality (Helmberger and Chavas 1996) and oil prices may
allow us to consider important determinants of food and grain prices in particular
countries; it might, however, also weaken the reliability of the model due to
decreased degrees of freedom for countries in which seasonality or oil prices are
irrelevant. Therefore, to automatically select the appropriate model specification for
each country and commodity, we applied the Akaike information criterion to (1)
the full model, (2) a model which ignores oil prices, (3) a model which ignores
seasonality, and (4) a model which ignores both oil prices and seasonality.
We ran the regression in Eq. (12.5) separately for each country i, each inter-
national reference price pwt and each considered domestic food price p
d
t . With the
estimated coefficients, we calculated the short-run transmission ˇdwi D
Pk
jD1ˇdwij
and the pass-through  (i.e., the equilibrium effect of a marginal world price change
on the domestic food price index) of international price w to domestic price d in
country i as:
dwi D
Pk
jD1 ˇdwij
1 PljD1˛dwij
;
where ˇdwi D
Pk
jD1ˇdwij and ˛dwi D
Pl
jD1˛dwij ; both terms are set to zero if they are
not significant at the 5 % level (F-test with Newey-West estimated standard errors).9
While ˇdwi gives the direct (short-term) price transmission within 1–3 months, the
autoregressive term ˛dwi further amplifies price changes in the subsequent periods.
The total effect is therefore given by the pass-through dwi . As we estimated ˇ
dw
i
and dwi separately for each country and international commodity price (index), we
obtained a matrix of transmission elasticities and pass-throughs for every domestic
food price index d.
9Significance levels of 10 % and 1 % were also employed to check robustness (see below). The
Newey-West estimator corrects for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. We use a lag length of
6 months. The standard OLS procedure gives similar results (see below).
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12.5 Data
This study differs from other related studies because it used an extensive dataset
of international commodity prices and price indices, ranging from spot prices at
important export destinations to prices of relevant futures contracts.
Table 12.3 in the Appendix lists the prices that were used as international
reference prices and price indices. The main sources of information are the FAO
and the FAO GIEWS for the international food prices and price indices, the World
Bank (2013b) for important international spot prices, and Bloomberg for futures
prices. We also calculated indices over futures prices in order to better capture price
dynamics on commodity exchanges. For all futures prices, a time series consisting
of the respective active contract was used. All price series are monthly data (for
daily price series, like futures prices, monthly averages were calculated).
The food price indices (FPI), a part of the national consumer price indices (CPI),
served as reference database for the domestic prices. These data are available from
the LABORSTA database for 200 countries in the world in a monthly or quarterly
frequency (ILO 2013). We drop those countries which only report quarterly food
price indices and consider the years 2000–2012.10 While the LABORSTA database
has the advantage of covering many countries, the calculation of the food price
indices is not transparent for many countries. In particular, CPIs may suffer from
urban bias as price collection in urban area is less expensive than in remote rural
areas. Additionally, the weights in a CPI might reflect the consumption and spending
patterns of the urban lower-middle class rather than the very poor households that
spent up to 70 % of their expenditures on staple food (James 2008). For example,
dramatic changes in staple prices, which affect the real income of poor households,
might only lead to small changes in the domestic food price index, which consists
of processed foods as well as luxury food and beverages.
Because FPI data might be inadequate to monitor the food costs for poor people,
we developed an alternative staple grain price index which consists of the retail
prices of wheat, maize, rice, sorghum, and millet. We used several sources to
compile this retail price database and calculate the national average price in US$
across different markets for each of the commodity prices. We used prices in US$ to
avoid the problem of strong inflationary shocks, which are difficult to control for, but
provided robustness checks for prices in nominal and CPI-deflated local currencies.
We combined the different commodity prices into a price index according to their
share of the domestic per capita food supply [taken from FAOSTAT (2013)]:
pGPIit D
X
j
˛ijpitj;
10These countries are (20 in total) AIA, ASM, AUS, BLZ, BTN, COK, CYM, FRO, GUM, JEY,
KIR, MHL, MNP, NFK, NIU, PNG, SHN, SPM, TUV, and VUT.
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Table 12.2 Domestic food price indices
d Variable Description Source
FPI Food price index (FPI) National food price index
(nominal); 2000–2012
ILO (2013)
GPI Domestic grain price
index (GPI)
Index of the national average
retail prices (nominal US$) of
five staple grains for
2000–2012: wheat, maize, rice,
sorghum, and millet; weighted
according to domestic per capita
food supply for 2000–2009
Own calculation; domestic per
capita food supply from FAO;
retail prices from FEWS NET,
FAO GIEWS, WFP Price
Monitor, and national sources
Exchange rates were obtained from the IMF database. For the oil price, we consider the “average
oil price” of WTI, Brent and Dubai prices quoted at World Bank Commodities Price Database.
Source: Own elaboration
where ˛ij D Cij=Cj is the j-th crop’s share of the total consumption of the considered
grains in country i in kg over the period 2000–2009 and pitj is the corresponding crop
price at month t in US$ per kg. We used national average prices if available in one
of the databases (shown in Table 12.2); otherwise, we calculated an (unweighted)
national average price using all the markets price data available (again, using the
sources shown in Table 12.2). Our self-constructed grain price index accounts on
average for 45 % of the average national calorie consumption in many countries. As
the diet of poor people consists of a higher share of staples, our grain price index
is likely to cover more than the national average number for poor people which
increases its relevancy.
One drawback of the grain price index is the limited data availability. Contrary
to the food price index from national statistical offices, retail grain prices were
available for 65 countries only. Yet, as will be discussed later, the considered
countries are home to more than 90 % of the global poor, who live with an income
below $1.25 per day. Thus, the coverage with respect to poor people is much larger
than the “geographical” coverage. Another drawback of the grain price index is
that it is likely irrelevant to the countries where staples other than those grains
considered in this study are consumed as part of their diet (e.g., roots and tubers
in Uganda). Because of the advantages and disadvantages of both food price indices
and grain price indices, we considered both in our analysis. Table 12.2 summarizes
the characteristics and data sources for the domestic price indices.
12.6 Results
This section presents and discusses the calculated transmission elasticities. For
policymakers as well as for establishing early warning information systems, it might
be relevant to know whether a country’s food prices are linked to at least one
international commodity price. Subsequently, a country’s policymakers can access
the database on transmission elasticities to find out which particular commodity
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prices are transmitted from the international market to the domestic market of
that particular country. We therefore calculated a country-specific transmission
vulnerability indicator Vdi as the maximum transmission over the pass-throughs of
different commodities from the set :
Vdi D max
w2
˚
dwi


(12.5)
If this indicator is zero, domestic food markets are with a high degree of certainty
not vulnerable to global price shocks.11 If the indicator is high, there is high
transmission for at least one international commodity price (or price index), which
implies that the country is generally vulnerable to global market price changes. As
we will see, the vulnerability indicator provides an important benchmark for single
international prices or price indices, like the FAO food price index. We further
calculated the vulnerability indicator for subsets  of commodities, for example,
we calculated Vdi as maximum pass-through overall international rice prices.
12.6.1 Transmission from the FAO Food Price Index
We first considered the transmission from the FAO food price index – an interna-
tional reference price index – which is often used as an indicator for global food
market dynamics. We ran regressions for the transmission to domestic food prices
as well as to domestic grain prices. The magnitude of the aggregate transmission
elasticity ˇ (if significant at the 5 % level) is depicted in Fig. 12.2 for both
the domestic food price index (Fig. 12.2a) and the domestic grain price index
(Fig. 12.2b). The maps indicate that there was no significant transmission for
several developing countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Where there
was statistically significant transmission, it tended to be particularly high. These
findings are consistent with the other studies mentioned above but provide a more
comprehensive country coverage.
The map showing global transmission to domestic food price indices, for which
data is available for almost all countries in the world, reveals another interesting
finding: Several developed countries (North America, Europe) show a statistically
significant but low price transmission, while transmission to developing countries is
either insignificant (i.e., zero) or relatively high. An explanation for this finding is
that the food basket in developed countries consists of many processed food items;
commodity costs constitute only a very small share of the final price of process
food items. Thus, a price increase in a raw commodity translates only into a very
small price increase in the final product. This explains why price transmission to the
US domestic market is very low – although several of the international reference
prices used are quoted from US markets. The transmission from world to domestic
11However, they might still be co-integrated with world markets (through rather slow adjustment
process) as we do not test for co-integration.
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a
b
Fig. 12.2 (a) Transmission from the FAO food price index to the domestic food price index (FPI).
(b) Transmission from the FAO food price index to the domestic grain price index (GPI)
markets showed high variance among developing countries because some of them
are not integrated into the world market due to high transaction costs. If a country is
integrated, price transmission to its domestic market is relatively high because raw
commodity costs are a major part of the price of many food items.
The FAO food price index is a much more aggregated price index. It uses weights
according to the export share on the global market of the considered commodities.
While this gives an appropriate average price index for globally traded commodities,
trade patterns may differ greatly among countries. For example, a country might
predominantly import rice, but rice prices have a very low weight in the FAO
food price index. By adding further international price indices and concentrating
on the vulnerability indicator (maximum transmission) for all the grain prices in
our database, we got a map which reveals a different result. Many Asian, African,
and Latin American countries experience significant and high price transmission
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Fig. 12.3 Transmission to the domestic grain price index – vulnerability indicator over inter-
national grain prices. Note: Maximum transmission to the domestic grain price index using all
international grain prices in Table 12.3
(Fig. 12.3). For example, some of the West African countries showed high price
transmission to their domestic grain price index, which is primarily driven by
international rice prices as these countries import a large amount of rice. Note
that a low transmission elasticity of even as low as 20 % may have remarkable
implications: doubling of commodity prices (e.g., as was experienced for wheat
in 2007/2008) increases the costs of the entire food or staple commodity basket
by 20 %. This is an important difference when compared with other studies:
transmission elasticities for a single commodity do not reveal how important the
commodity is for the population. Using a price index, in contrast, weights the price
transmission in relation to the importance of the commodity to the diet of a country’s
population, and it also takes into account any potential substitution effects.
The use of the vulnerability indicator emphasizes that considering the FAO food
price index exclusively might lead to serious biases in the assessment of price
transmission downward. Thus, it is important to consider a larger set of reference
prices and price indices rather than only relying on the FAO food price index.
However, the FAO food price index remains a pragmatic alternative when only a
single international price (index) can be used.
12.6.2 Vulnerability Mapping: HowMany Poor People Are Affected
by Global Price Changes?
To assess the impacts of global price changes, it is important to know how many
poor people live in countries with high price transmission. Price changes have often
heterogeneous impacts on the welfare of households, depending on their production
structure and market access (von Braun et al. 2013). High agricultural commodity
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prices can increase the income of poor rural households who produce cash crops
(Tefera et al. 2013). Nevertheless, such beneficial impacts are often realized in the
medium or long term when households adjust their production by growing high-
value crops. However, existing empirical analyses have concluded that sudden price
spikes negatively affect not only poor consumers and the landless but also farmers
who buy many food items as they cannot quickly adjust their production in the short
run (Aksoy and Isik-Dikmelik 2008; Anríquez et al. 2013).
To assess how strongly poor people are exposed to global price changes, we took
the following steps: The transmission elasticities ˇ of the countries (e.g., regarding
the Chicago corn price or the vulnerability indicator containing the maximum
transmission by grain prices) were sorted in descending order. Next we calculated
the number of people living below the extreme poverty line of $1.25 per day12 using
poverty share and population data from the World Development Indicators (World
Bank 2013a).13
Figure 12.4 shows the transmission from different international grain prices to the
domestic grain price index. We calculated the maximum transmission (vulnerability
indicator) according to Eq. (12.1b) for each of the three commodities: wheat, corn,
and rice. Hence, the wheat line shows the maximum transmission for each country
from all the available wheat price series shown in Table 12.3. We calculated the total
vulnerability indicator as the maximum over the commodity indicators (blue line).
Regarding the extent of transmission, Fig. 12.4 clearly shows that rice prices
are most strongly transmitted; this has also been highlighted by other studies (e.g.,
Robles 2011; Baquedano and Liefert 2014). While wheat prices experience lower
transmission elasticities than rice prices for many countries, the tail is much longer
due to its impact on India, where one-third of the globally poor live. The all-
grain vulnerability indicator revealed that more than 1.06 billion poor people live
in countries with significant price transmission of 10 % or higher – which constitute
96 % of the poor in the countries studied in this chapter and 89 % of the poor
globally. More than 360 million poor people (one-third of the poor) live in countries
with transmission elasticities of 30 % or higher; about 44 million poor people live
in countries with transmission elasticities of 50 % or higher.
We decomposed the transmission further into the individual price series (see
Appendix, Figs. 12.8, 12.9, 12.10, 12.11 and 12.12) to identify the most relevant
international reference price for each of the commodities. Prices of futures contracts
at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) are the most relevant for wheat, in
particular regarding the number of people affected. Transmission elasticities from
CBOT prices are, however, topped by transmission rates from Canadian wheat and
Argentinian spot prices for some countries (e.g., Nigeria, Ethiopia, or Kenya). For
maize, US spot and futures prices were transmitted at rates ranging from 15 to
12Using the “moderate poverty line” of $2 per day gives qualitatively similar results. Quantitatively,
however, roughly double as many people are affected.
13Poverty rates are not available for every year. We use therefore the most recent number and
multiplied it with the 2012 number of total population.
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Fig. 12.4 Number and extent of poor people potentially affected by international price changes
(change of grain price index). Note: The figure shows the transmission elasticities over all countries
in descending order mapped to the number of people below the extreme poverty line in the
particular country. Source: Own illustration
50 % for 150 million poor people. Yellow and white maize prices at the South
African Futures Exchange (SAFEX) are strongly transmitted to Malawi at rates
higher than 70 %. There is no clear reference price emerging for rice. IGC rice
prices and Pakistani and Thai prices transmit at different rates to different countries,
with Nigeria experiencing high transmission, in particular from Thai prices and the
IGC price index.
Comparing the transmission indicated by the all-grain vulnerability indicator
with several other price indices emphasizes that using individual price index alone
would cause the size of the affected population to be underestimated. For example,
the FAO food price index, a popular international reference price, suggests that
700 million poor could be affected by global price shocks (due to its significant
transmission to India and China); the FAO cereals price suggests that 350 million
people could be affected – far below the numbers obtained from the all-grain
vulnerability indicator. The FAO food price index shows a higher transmission
elasticity than most indices that are based only on grain prices because the FAO
food price index has a lower variability.14
14The FAO food price index also contains meat and oils, which are processed food items that
typically fluctuate less than commodity prices. Comparing the FAO food price and cereals price
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Fig. 12.5 Number and extent of poor people potentially affected by changes of international price
indices. Source: Own illustration
Figure 12.5 further illustrates that about 850 million poor people might be
affected by price changes in US cereals futures contracts (140 million with
transmission rates of 30 % or higher), which is particularly relevant for the debate
on speculation and financialization (Tadesse et al. 2014; von Braun et al. 2013). The
transmission elasticities from commodity prices and price indices for countries with
at least one million people living below the poverty line are listed in Table 12.4 in
the Appendix.
The calculations shown in Figs. 12.4 and 12.5 require an important qualification:
They represent the likely upper bound of the number of people affected. More
precisely, they show the number of poor people living in countries affected by a
specific price transmission. Not all poor people in a country with positive price
transmission experience international price changes. In developing countries, in
particular Africa, poor people in remote rural areas lack access to markets due
to bad infrastructure (Barrett 2008; Nelson 2008). As discussed previously, food
price indices from national statistical agencies could exhibit biases because of
their focus on urban centers, making them less relevant for the rural population
index between 1990 and 2011, the former shows an average change rate of ˙0.8 % per month,
while the latter changes ˙1.3 % per month. We would therefore expect a roughly 60 % higher
transmission from FAO food prices for an identical commodity composition compared to cereals
prices.
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Fig. 12.6 Comparison of transmission and pass-through. Source: Own illustration
in remote areas. A transmission analysis based on food price indices from national
statistical agencies would overstate the number of affected poor as one would expect
lower price transmission from international prices to remote rural markets. The
use of the grain price index which also considers grain prices from rural markets
is an important alternative because it is constructed independent of the FPI using
alternative price data. Nevertheless, the markets considered in this study are far from
comprehensive, and prices for many rural areas are missing. The number of poor
people in affected countries therefore only indicates the potential number of people
affected (which would be the same if domestic markets were perfectly integrated).
12.6.3 Pass-Through and Equilibrium Effects
While the sum of the coefficients of international prices ˇ gives the relative
magnitude of price transmission 1–3 months after a spike, the pass-through 
considers long-run equilibrium adjustments due to the autoregressive term (see
Sect. 12.4 above). Figure 12.6 depicts the vulnerability indicator (maximum overall
international grain prices) for both transmission and pass-through to the domestic
food price index as well as to the domestic grain price index. Consistent with
Figs. 12.2 and 12.3, we found that transmission elasticities are considerably higher
for the domestic grain price index than for the domestic food price index. The
long-run equilibrium effect of international price spikes is substantially higher: For
high vulnerable countries, the long-run effect is approximately twice as high as the
short-run effect. The discrepancy between short-run transmission and long-run pass-
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though is higher when domestic grain prices instead of domestic food prices are
considered. This is due to the more important role of the auto-regressive dynamics.
12.6.4 Robustness Checks
The outcome of our econometric analysis depends on not only the chosen model
specification but also the considered significance levels. We therefore discuss the
implications of different model specifications for our findings. We confine our
discussion only to the vulnerability indicator for grain prices, in particular, with
regard to its mapping to affected poor people (as shown in Fig. 12.4).
12.6.4.1 Significance Levels
If the null hypothesis of zero transmission cannot be rejected at the 5 % level, we set
the transmission to zero; otherwise, we use the point estimate for the calculation of
the transmission. Changing the significance level to 10 % increases the likelihood
of erroneously detecting transmission to a country’s domestic market when there
is none; it reduces, however, the possibility of wrongly concluding that there is no
price transmission in the case that the F-test does not reject the null hypothesis
of zero transmission. We therefore employed two different significance levels (at
10 % and 1 %) to check the sensitivity of our results. As shown in the Appendix,
a significance level of 10 % has only marginal impacts on the extent of price
transmission and the number of poor people affected (Fig. 12.7). For a stricter
significance level of 1 %, the transmission is lower relative to the poor population:
Many countries on the right tail (with low transmission rates) do not pass the stricter
significance test. Nevertheless, transmission elasticities for the 550 million poor
people in countries with significant transmission hardly changed when compared
with the lower significance levels.
12.6.4.2 CPI-Deflated Food Prices
It is often argued that nominal price changes are less relevant because monetary
inflation might change the overall price level and therefore the purchasing power
of money. To study welfare impacts of price changes, one would ideally deflate
nominal prices with (nominal) income for consumers. This information is, however,
hardly available.15 Using the consumer price index (CPI) is a pragmatic alternative,
although CPIs do not measure the income or wage of people but rather the costs of
goods a consumer who is representative of the population buys. For some countries
(e.g., Bangladesh), food items have a share over 50 % of the CPI (ILO 2013). Thus,
even without any monetary inflation and without any increases in wages or prices
of other consumption goods, an increase in food prices by 10 % would increase the
CPI by more than 5 %. Deflating the food price change with the CPI would then
15For households with substantial income from selling their agricultural produce, prices of inputs
need also to be considered (Dorward 2011).
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result in a “real” price change of 5 %, although wages and other consumer prices
would remain constant. Deflating the food price index with the CPI would in such
cases understate the impact on welfare due to price changes.
Due to the lack of monthly wage or income data, we resorted to deflating food
prices by the CPI despite knowing its shortcomings. As our grain price index used
prices in the US dollar, which shows very low monthly inflation rates, we performed
this robustness check only for the domestic food price analysis. As expected, the
transmission to CPI-deflated food price indices was lower than to nominal food
prices (Fig. 12.7). The transmission-population curves obtained are similar to our
standard model, although slightly lower to the right tail (in particular, for India
which experiences high inflation). Using nominal prices in the local currency also
gave results similar to our standard model. The robustness of our findings regarding
the choice of the currency and deflator is probably due to the use of first differences
of log prices, which cancel out inflation, and the use of heteroskedasticity-corrected
standard errors by the Newey-West method.
12.6.4.3 OLS Versus Newey-West
To check the robustness of the Newey-West approach with time lags of 6 months,
we also included regressions based on the standard OLS, whereby homoskedasticity
is assumed for calculating standard errors and thus significance levels. The OLS
method allows for a much faster calculation of the standard errors; this becomes
important when applying the method to many country and commodity time series.
As indicated in Fig. 12.7, OLS gives similar results, although transmission rates
were slightly lower as high transmission elasticities for some commodities did not
pass the t-test at the 5 % level anymore.
12.7 Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to better understand the transmission of shocks from
international prices to domestic food prices. Our analytical model emphasized that
international price changes can be transmitted through intertemporal arbitrage of
storage even if no trade takes place. Our empirical analysis suggests that focusing
only on the FAO Food or Cereal Price Indices might cause the vulnerability of the
poor to international price changes to be understated. Likewise, food price indices
from national statistics might be biased, being more representative of (on average
wealthier) urban consumers, who buy and consume relatively more processed sta-
ples and luxuries. To avoid these shortcomings, we used a comprehensive database
on international reference prices and constructed a domestic grain price index based
on retail prices in developing countries and the considered commodities’ share of the
total consumption. Our price database allows for almost universal country coverage,
in particular, with respect to countries where poor people live. For the first time
therefore, we were able to estimate how many poor people live in countries where
international price changes are transmitted to domestic prices.
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Our empirical analysis illustrated that the vast majority of the poor (over 90 %)
live in countries where food prices are linked more or less strongly to international
prices in the short term that is within 1–3 months. For 360 million poor people,
international prices transmit to their country at rates of 30 % or higher. The empirical
analysis considered seasonality and oil prices (endogenous model selection). The
findings were robust at different significance levels and for different price deflators.
Because of our chosen lag structure of 3 months, we expect that international
price shocks will translate to domestic price shocks rather quickly. Existing research
on the impact of price changes on the welfare of poor consumers has paid more
attention to the differentiated and heterogeneous effects of price changes, depending
on the production and consumption structure. While higher prices can benefit net
sellers of the affected crops, they make poor consumers, net buyer farmers and rural
landless worse off in the short term. Several quantitative estimates concluded that
the negative effects overweigh the positive effects, for example, with respect to the
number of people falling below the poverty line – at least in the short term when
production is not able to respond flexibly to higher prices (Ivanic and Martin 2008;
Tiwari and Zaman 2010; de Hoyos and Medvedev 2011; Anríquez et al. 2013).
There are also concerns that price increases affect poor consumers more than the
effect of a symmetric price decrease on producers of food: While poor consumers
can run into serious problems because they cannot afford sufficient food, producers
may still have enough (self-grown) food to eat, even though their income may be
significantly reduced (Kalkuhl et al. 2013).
Although our analysis focused on the transmission of price levels rather than
price risk or volatility, one can expect that high international volatility (measured in
the fluctuations of monthly prices) would also increase domestic food price volatility
(see also Chap. 13). While the impacts of price changes on welfare are as yet unclear,
higher volatility may have negative effects on welfare because of an increase in the
production risks for farmers and, thus, undermining long-term food supply (Haile
and Kalkuhl 2013; Haile et al. 2013).
The transmission analysis and the estimated elasticities could be used in early
warning systems to detect vulnerable countries in times of high international price
swings. It could further be extended to explain the different degrees of price
transmission by using other explanatory variables like transportation costs, trade,
GDP, or grains stocks.
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Appendix
International Reference Prices and Price Indices
Table 12.3 Considered international reference prices and price indices
w Variable Description Source
1 FAO food price index Consists of 55 commodity quotations considered
as representing the international prices of food
commodities; weighted by export share
FAO
2 FAO cereals price index Consists of wheat, maize, and rice prices;
weighted by export share
FAO
3 FAO oil/fat price index Consists of 12 different oils (including animal
and fish oils); weighted by export share
FAO
4 FAO sugars price index Index form of the International Sugar Agreement
prices with 2002–2004 as base
FAO
5 FAO meat price index Consists of poultry, bovine meat, pig meat, and
ovine meat products; weighted by export share
FAO
6 FAO dairy price index Consists of butter, skimmed milk powder,
whole-milk powder, cheese, and casein prices;
weighted by export share
FAO
7 WB grain price index Includes barley, maize, rice, and wheat World Bank
8 WB fats and oils price
index
Includes coconut oil, groundnut oil, palm oil,
soybeans, soybean oil, and soybean meal
World Bank
9 Wheat (HRW) US No. 1, hard red winter, ordinary protein, export
price delivered at the US Gulf port for prompt or
30 days’ shipment
World Bank
10 Wheat (SRW) US No. 2, soft red winter, export price delivered at
the US Gulf port for prompt or 30 days’ shipment
World Bank
11 Wheat CAN Wheat (Canada), no. 1, western red spring
(CWRS), in store, St. Lawrence, export price
World Bank
12 Wheat AUS Australian soft white, Australia, f.o.b. USDA/IGC
Australia Eastern States Standard White Wheat
FOB Spot (for 10/2007–09/2008 where
USDA/IGC series has missing entries)
Bloomberg
13 Barley Barley (Canada), feed, western no. 1, Winnipeg
Commodity Exchange, spot, wholesale farmers’
price
World Bank
14 Sorghum US Sorghum (US), no. 2 milo yellow, f.o.b. Gulf
ports
World Bank
15 Corn US Maize (US), no. 2, yellow, f.o.b. US Gulf ports World Bank
16 Soybeans Soybeans (US), c.i.f. Rotterdam World Bank
17 Soybean oil Soybean oil (Any origin), crude, f.o.b. ex-mill
Netherlands
World Bank
18 Soybean meal Soybean meal (any origin), Argentine 45/46 %
extraction, c.i.f. Rotterdam beginning 1990;
previously US 44 %
World Bank
(continued)
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Table 12.3 (continued)
w Variable Description Source
19 Rice Thai A1 Rice (Thailand), 100 % broken, A.1 Super from
2006 onward, government standard, f.o.b.
Bangkok; prior to 2006, A1 Special, a slightly
lower grade than A1 Super
World Bank
20 Rice Thai 5 % Rice (Thailand), 5 % broken, white rice (WR),
milled, indicative price based on weekly surveys
of export transactions, government standard,
f.o.b. Bangkok
World Bank
21 Rice Thai 25 % Rice (Thailand), 25 % broken, WR, milled
indicative survey price, government standard,
f.o.b. Bangkok
World Bank
22 Rice Vietnam Vietnamese rice, 5 % broken World Bank
23 Palm oil Palm oil (Malaysia), 5 % bulk, c.i.f. N. W. Europe World Bank
24 Groundnut oil Groundnut oil (any origin), c.i.f. Rotterdam World Bank
25 Coconut oil Coconut oil (Philippines/Indonesia), bulk, c.i.f.
Rotterdam
World Bank
26 Fishmeal Fishmeal (any origin), 64–65 %, c&f Bremen,
estimates based on wholesale price, beginning
2004; previously c&f Hamburg
World Bank
27 Beef Meat, beef (Australia/New Zealand), chucks and
cow forequarters, frozen boneless, 85 % chemical
lean, c.i.f. US port (East Coast), ex-dock,
beginning 11/2002; previously cow forequarters
World Bank
28 Chicken Meat, chicken (US), broiler/fryer, whole birds,
2½–3 pounds, USDA grade “A,” ice-packed,
Georgia Dock preliminary weighted average,
wholesale
World Bank
29 Sheep Meat, sheep (New Zealand), frozen whole
carcasses prime medium (PM) wholesale,
Smithfield, London, beginning 01/2006;
previously Prime Light (PL)
World Bank
30 Wheat/CBT #2 Soft red winter at contract price, #1 Soft red
winter at a 3 cent premium, Chicago Board of
Trade
Bloomberg
31 Corn/CBT #2 yellow at contract price, #1 yellow at a 1.5
cent/bushel premium, #3 yellow at a 1.5
cent/bushel discount, Chicago Board of Trade
Bloomberg
32 Soybeans/CBT #2 Yellow at contract price, #1 yellow at a 6
cent/bushel premium, #3 yellow at a 6 cent/bushel
discount, Chicago Board of Trade
Bloomberg
33 Soybean oil/CBT Crude soybean oil meeting exchange-approved
grades and standards, Chicago Board of Trade
Bloomberg
34 Soybean meal/CBT 48 % protein soybean meal, Chicago Board of
Trade
Bloomberg
(continued)
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Table 12.3 (continued)
w Variable Description Source
35 Rough rice/CBT US no. 2 or better long grain rough rice with a
total milling yield of not less than 65 % including
head rice of not less than 48 %, Chicago Board of
Trade
Bloomberg
36 Feeder cattle/CME 650–849 pound steers, medium-large #1 and
medium-large #1–2, Chicago Mercantile
Exchange
Bloomberg
37 Live cattle/CME 55 % choice, 45 % select, yield grade 3 live
steers, Chicago Mercantile Exchange
Bloomberg
38 Lean hogs/CME Hog (barrow and gilt) carcasses, Chicago
Mercantile Exchange
Bloomberg
39 Wheat/KCBT Hard red winter wheat, no. 2, at contract price;
no. 1 at a 1½-cent premium; Kansas City Board
of Trade
Bloomberg
40 Wheat/MGEX Hard red spring wheat, no. 2 or better Northern
spring wheat with a protein content of 13.5 % or
higher; Minneapolis Grain Exchange
Bloomberg
41 White maize/SAFEX South African Futures Exchange; starting in
08/1996
Bloomberg
42 Yellow maize/SAFEX South African Futures Exchange; starting in
08/1996
Bloomberg
43 Wheat/SAFEX South African Futures Exchange; starting in
11/1997
Bloomberg
44 Soybean/SAFEX South African Futures Exchange; starting in
04/2002
Bloomberg
45 Sunflower seeds/SAFEX South African Futures Exchange; starting in
02/1999
Bloomberg
46 Palm oil/MDEX Malaysia Derivatives Exchange; starting in
03/1995
Bloomberg
47 GSCI agriculture Price index over active futures with the 2012 S&P
GSCI weights on wheat (CBT), wheat (KCBT),
corn, soybeans, lean hogs, live cattle and feeder
cattle (all CBT)
Own
calculation
48 Trade weighted country
index
Price index over US corn, US HRW and Thai 5 %
spot prices according to the trade shares (imports
plus exports of commodity divided by imports
plus exports of all three commodities) of each
country
Own
calculation
49 Rice/Vietnam Vietnam, rice (25 % broken), export FAO GIEWS
50 Rice/Vietnam Vietnam, rice (5 % broken), export FAO GIEWS
51 Rice/Pakistan Pakistan, rice (25 % broken), export FAO GIEWS
52 Rice/Pakistan Pakistan, rice (Basmati ordinary), export FAO GIEWS
53 Rice/USA USA, rice (US long grain 2.4 %), export FAO GIEWS
(continued)
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Table 12.3 (continued)
w Variable Description Source
54 Rice/USA USA, rice (US California medium grain), export FAO GIEWS
55 Rice/Thailand Thailand: Bangkok, rice (25 % broken), export FAO GIEWS
56 Rice/Thailand Thailand: Bangkok, rice (5 % broken), export FAO GIEWS
57 Rice/Thailand Thailand: Bangkok, rice (fragrant 100 %), export FAO GIEWS
58 Rice/Thailand Thailand: Bangkok, rice (glutinous 10 %), export FAO GIEWS
59 Rice/Thailand Thailand: Bangkok, rice (parboiled 100 %),
export
FAO GIEWS
60 Rice/Thailand Thailand: Bangkok, rice (Thai 100 % B), export FAO GIEWS
61 Rice/Thailand Thailand: Bangkok, rice (Thai A1 Super), export FAO GIEWS
62 Wheat/Argentina Argentina, wheat (Argentina, up river, trigo pan),
export
FAO GIEWS
63 Maize/Argentina Argentina, maize (Argentina, up river), export FAO GIEWS
Source: Own elaboration
Robustness Checks for Transmission to Grain Price Index
Fig. 12.7 Global price transmission to the domestic grain price index under different significance
levels and model specifications. Source: Own elaboration
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Price Transmission from Individual Grain Prices
Fig. 12.8 Transmission from several international wheat prices to the domestic grain price index
and affected people
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Fig. 12.9 Transmission from several international maize prices to the domestic grain price index
and affected people
Fig. 12.10 Transmission from several international rice prices to the domestic grain price index
and affected people
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Fig. 12.11 Transmission from Thai rice prices (export) to the domestic grain price index and
affected people
Fig. 12.12 Transmission from several international oilseed prices to the domestic grain price
index and affected people
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13Transmission of Food Price Volatilityfrom International to Domestic Markets:
Evidence from Africa, Latin America,
and South Asia
Francisco Ceballos, Manuel A. Hernandez, Nicholas Minot,
and Miguel Robles
13.1 Introduction
The global food crisis of 2007–2008 was characterized by a sharp spike in grain
and other commodity prices. These price increases have been attributed to supply
shortages, increased biofuel production, reduced stock-to-use ratios, export bans by
major grain exporters, and panic buying by some major importers (Gilbert 2010).
Commodity prices rose rapidly again in 2010, 2011, and 2012. Since 2007, global
grain markets have seen an overall increase in price volatility, which is defined as
the standard deviation of monthly price returns. For example, comparing the 27-
year period before the crisis (1980–2006) with the 4-year period during and after
the crisis (2007–2010), the unconditional volatility of international prices rose by
52 % for maize, 87 % for rice, and 102 % for wheat (Minot 2014).
To the extent that this price volatility is transmitted to markets in developing
countries, it may have serious implications for farmers and low-income consumers.
First, low-income consumers spend a large share of their income on food in general
and on staple foods in particular, thereby making them more vulnerable to food
price volatility. For instance, in some countries, such as Tanzania, Sri Lanka, and
Vietnam, low-income households allocate more than 60 % of their budgets to
food (Seale et al. 2003). Second, food price volatility affects poor, small-scale
farmers who rely on food sales for a significant part of their income and possess
limited capacity for timing their sales. Third, price volatility is likely to inhibit
agricultural investment and reduce agricultural productivity growth—especially in
the absence of efficient risk-sharing mechanisms—with long-run implications for
poor consumers and farmers.
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A key question, however, is whether food price volatility in world grain markets
is indeed transmitted to local markets in developing countries. If so, efforts to
reduce excessive price volatility should perhaps be focused on concerted regional
and international actions through the World Trade Organization or other multilateral
bodies. Alternatively, if food price volatility in developing countries is mostly
attributed to domestic factors, then the most effective policy remedies would likely
be solutions at the local level which are targeted at the most vulnerable groups.
One approach to answering this question is to examine the transmission of prices
(in levels) from world markets to local markets.1 Although it seems reasonable to
assume that markets with high transmission of prices could also be characterized by
high transmission of volatility, this may not necessarily be the case. For example,
prices from highly volatile world markets may only be transmitted to local markets
with a 1- to 6-month lag, thus insulating local markets from international turmoil and
resulting in less volatile local prices. Alternatively, even if there were no direct price
transmission, it would still be possible for local market volatility to be determined
by the degree of uncertainty among local traders, which could be influenced by a
sudden increase in the volatility on world markets.
The objective of this paper is to directly estimate the transmission of grain price
volatility from world markets to local markets in developing countries. In particular,
we focus on the effect of the changes in the world price of maize, rice, wheat, and
sorghum on 41 domestic prices of grain products in 27 countries in Latin America,
Africa, and Asia. The price data are monthly, and mostly cover the period from
January 2000 to December 2013, though there is some variation in the starting and
ending points. The analysis is based on a multivariate generalized autoregressive
conditional heteroskedasticity (MGARCH) model using the BEKK specification
proposed by Engle and Kroner (1995).2
The main contribution of this paper is that it is one of the first studies to estimate
the transmission of food price volatility from international markets to local markets
across several developing countries and regions. As will be discussed later, other
studies have examined the transmission of (mean) price levels from global markets
to developing countries. However, studies on the transmission of price volatility
have mainly focused on examining volatility dynamics across different commodities
and international markets. In addition, by focusing on market interactions in terms of
the conditional second moment and allowing for volatility spillovers, better insight
into the dynamic price relationship of international and domestic markets can be
gained.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 13.2 provides a
review of recent research on transmission of prices and volatility. Section 13.3
details the methodology used in the study. Section 13.4 describes the data. Sec-
1Section 13.2 discusses the relatively large body of research examining price transmission.
2The BEKK acronym comes from the synthetized work on multivariate GARCH models by Baba
et al. (1990).
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tion 13.5 presents and discusses the estimation results, and Sect. 13.6 summarizes
the findings and draws some conclusions for future research.
13.2 Previous Research on Transmission of Prices and Volatility
There is a large body of research on the transmission of prices between markets
within developing countries (see Baulch 1997; Abdulai 2000; Rashid 2004; Lutz
et al. 2006; Negassa and Myers 2007; Van Campenhout 2007; Myers 2008; Moser
et al. 2009). Most of these studies used cointegration analysis in the form of error
correction models, although some of the more recent studies applied threshold
cointegration models and asymmetric response to positive and negative price shocks
(e.g., Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel 2004). Fewer studies have examined the
transmission of prices from world markets to local markets. Mundlak and Larson
(1992) estimated the transmission of world food prices to domestic prices in 58
countries using annual price data. They found very high rates of price transmission,
but the analysis was carried out in levels rather than first differences, so the results
probably reflected spurious correlation due to nonstationarity. Quiroz and Soto
(1995) repeated the analysis of Mundlak and Larson (1992) using cointegration
analysis and an error correction model. They found no relationship between
domestic and international prices for 30 of the 78 countries examined. Conforti
(2004) examined price transmission in 16 countries, including 3 in sub-Saharan
Africa, using an error correction model. In general, the degree of price transmission
in sub-Saharan African countries was lower than in Asian and Latin American
countries. Minot (2010) analyzed the transmission of prices from world grain
markets to 60 markets in sub-Saharan Africa and found a statistically significant
long-term relationship in only 13 of the 62 prices examined. He also found that
African rice prices are more closely linked to world markets than maize prices,
presumably because most African countries are close to self-sufficiency in maize
product but import a large share of their rice requirements.
Another set of studies has focused on the co-movement of world commodity
prices. In their seminal paper, Pindyck and Rotemberg (1990) found “excessive
co-movement” of seven commodity prices, which they attributed to herd behavior
among traders in financial markets. The hypothesis of excess co-movement, how-
ever, was challenged by Deb et al. (1996) and Ai et al. (2006). These studies argued
that the results obtained by Pindyck and Rotemberg suffered from misspecification
and that fundamental supply and demand factors were sufficient to explain the co-
movement.3 In the case of international agricultural prices, Gilbert (2010) indicated
that shocks to individual commodity prices are often supply related, whereas joint
price movement can be explained by macroeconomic and monetary conditions.
3See Saadi (2010) for an extensive review of commodity price co-movement in international
markets.
306 F. Ceballos et al.
Fewer studies have examined the co-movement of conditional price volatility. As
noted by Gallagher and Twomey (1998), dynamic models of conditional volatility,
like MGARCH models, which are widely used in empirical finance, can provide
a better understanding of the dynamic price relationship between markets by
evaluating volatility spillovers. Volatility transmission between commodity markets
may occur through substitution effects or as a result of common underlying factors,
such as uncertainty in financial markets.
Some of the recent studies that examined market interactions between agricul-
tural commodities using MGARCH models include Le Pen and Sévi (2010), Zhao
and Goodwin (2011), Hernandez et al. (2014), Beckmann and Czudaj (2014), and
Gardebroek et al. (2014). Le Pen and Sévi (2010) used different multivariate models,
including a factor model and a Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model,
to examine the interrelationship between eight agricultural and nonagricultural
commodities and find moderate co-movement in prices and volatility. Zhao and
Goodwin (2011) found important volatility spillovers between corn and soybean
future prices based on a BEKK model. Using both a BEKK and a DCC model,
Hernandez et al. (2014) showed significant volatility spillovers within corn, wheat,
and soybean futures exchanges in the United States, Europe, and Asia as well
as an increase in their interdependence in recent years. Beckmann and Czudaj
(2014) also showed evidence supporting short-run volatility transmission between
futures prices of corn, wheat, and cotton, based on bivariate GARCH-in-mean
VAR models. Lastly, Gardebroek et al. (2014) used different MGARCH models
and found little evidence of price transmission in levels between corn, wheat,
and soybean spot markets. However, they found significant transmission in price
volatility, particularly at weekly and monthly frequencies.
13.3 Methodology
We followed an MGARCH approach to evaluate the dynamics of volatility in
monthly price returns from major agricultural international commodities to key
domestic products in Africa, South Asia, and Latin America.4 In particular, we
estimated a bivariate T-BEKK model, proposed by Engle and Kroner (1995), which
allowed us to model volatility transmission from international to domestic markets
since the model is flexible enough to take into account both volatility spillovers and
persistence across markets.5
The T-BEKK approach involves modeling both a conditional mean equation
and a conditional variance equation for each price return series considered in the
analysis. In our case, we defined price returns as rmt D ln .pmt=pmt1/, where pmt is
4See Bauwens et al. (2006) and Silvennoinen and Teräsvirta (2009) for an extensive overview of
different MGARCH models.
5The T acronym refers to the student’s t density used in the model estimation in order to better
control the leptokurtic distribution of the price returns series.
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the price of a certain product (commodity) in market m at month t, and m D 1 refers
to the domestic market while m D 2 to the international market. The logarithmic
transformation is a standard measure for net returns in a market and is generally
applied in empirical finance to obtain a convenient support for the distribution of
the error term in the estimated model.
For those cases in which the pair of price returns are not found to be cointegrated,
the conditional mean equation is simply modeled as a vector autoregressive (VAR)
process such that
rt D a0 C
kX
sD1
asrts C "t; "t
ˇ
ˇ
ˇIt1 	 .0;Ht/ (13.1a)
where rt is a 2  1 vector of price returns for the corresponding product (commodity)
in the domestic and international market at month t, i.e., rt D

r1t
r2t

; a0 is a 2  1
vector of constants; as, s D 1,..,k, are 2  2 matrices of parameters capturing own
and cross lead-lag relationships between markets at the mean level; and "t is a
2  1 vector of innovations with zero mean, conditional on past information It1,
and conditional variance-covariance matrix Ht.6 In order to determine the number
of lags (k), we relied on the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC). The
number of lags in the conditional mean equation varied between zero and two lags,
with only one case requiring three lags.
For those cases where the pair of price returns are found to be cointegrated, the
conditional mean equation is modeled as a vector-error correction (VEC) model
such that
rt D a0 C
kX
jD1
ajrtj  	ECTt1 C "t; "t
ˇ
ˇ
ˇIt1 	 .0;Ht/ (13.1b)
where ECTt1 is the lagged error correction term resulting from the cointegration
relationship, i.e., ECTt1 D lnp1;t1  ˇ0  ˇ1lnp2; t1, and 	 is a 2  1 vector of
parameters that measure the adjustment of each (log) price series to deviations from
the long-run equilibrium.
6Other control variables were excluded from the conditional mean (and variance) equations to
capture dynamic price relationships across markets in their purest form. As with any autoregressive
process, the state of the process (mean or variance) in the previous period is assumed to account
for all relevant information prior to the realization of the mean or variance in the current period.
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The conditional variance-covariance matrix Ht at time t (with one-time lag) is, in
turn, given by
Ht D C0C C A0"t1"t1A C G0Ht1G; (13.2)
where C is a 2  2 upper triangular matrix of constants cij, A is a 2  2 matrix whose
elements aij capture the direct effect of an innovation in market i on the current price
return volatility in market j, and G is a 2  2 matrix whose elements gij measure the
direct influence of past volatility in market i on the current volatility in market j
(persistence). If we expand Eq. (13.2), the resulting conditional variance equation
for the domestic market is defined as
h11;t D c211 C a211"21;t1 C 2a11a21"1;t1"2;t1 C a221"22;t1 C g211h11;t1
C2g11g21h12;t1 C g221h22;t1
(13.3)
This variance-covariance specification allows us to characterize the magnitude and
persistence of volatility transmission from international to domestic markets. More-
over, similar to Gardebroek and Hernandez (2013) and Hernandez et al. (2014),
we derived impulse response functions for the estimated conditional volatilities to
assess how a shock or innovation is transmitted from the international market to the
domestic market and obtain the elasticity of domestic price volatility with respect to
international price volatility.
13.4 Data
We compiled a large dataset of monthly prices of maize, rice, sorghum, wheat, and
wheat products for 41 markets in 27 countries. We obtained domestic price data
from two sources. Our main source was the Famine Early Warning Systems Network
(FEWS NET), which tracks the nominal prices of several staple food commodities
across several key domestic markets on a monthly basis. This service is provided
as part of their Price Bulletin product and is only available for countries in which
the network has a presence—mostly African and Central American economies. Our
second source was the Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) of
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), which relies on price information
from a number of local primary sources across FAO’s 190 member countries. We
relied on this source to obtain domestic prices in Asian, South American, and some
additional Central American countries.
Out of all the price series available from these sources, we considered the domes-
tic prices of the most important food staples in each country, which are defined
as those constituting the highest share of the local diet. Moreover, prices from the
main local market—generally the capital city—were chosen to be representative
of each product. We also included prices observed in more than one market for a
few countries (in India, for example, prices from both the Mumbai and the New
Delhi markets were considered). As prices are denominated in local currency, each
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price series was converted into the US dollar using monthly exchange rates from the
IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. Normalizing all prices to the
US dollar allowed us to take into account the potential impact of the exchange rate
on the international-domestic price transmission analysis. We excluded price series
with less than 100 observations (i.e., months) or with a high number of missing
or repeated values. Missing values in the remaining series were approximated
through linear interpolation between the two closest available data points. Appendix
Table 13.3 shows the details for each of the price series used, including its source
(FEWS NET or GIEWS), the corresponding local market, whether it is a retail or a
wholesale price, and its unit of measurement.
International monthly price series are compiled by the FAO International Com-
modity Prices database (FAOSTAT). These prices are expressed in terms of US
dollars per tonne. The maize price is for No. 2 yellow maize, U.S. Gulf; the rice
price is for A1 super, white broken rice, Bangkok, f.o.b.; the sorghum price is for
No. 2 yellow sorghum, U.S. Gulf; and the wheat price is for No. 2 hard red winter
wheat (ordinary protein), U.S. Gulf, f.o.b. Appendix Table 13.4 shows the details of
each of the international price series used.
Figure 13.1 shows the evolution of international monthly prices for maize, rice,
sorghum, and wheat over the 2000–2014 period. In general, prices had been rising
in a relatively stable way until the spikes experienced during the food crisis of
2007–2008; price spikes were subsequently observed between 2010 and 2012.
Interestingly, the figure shows a large degree of co-movement between the prices
for the four commodities during the past years. The price movement of sorghum
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Fig. 13.1 International commodity prices—2000–2014. Note: this figure shows the evolution of
the monthly international prices of maize, rice, sorghum, and wheat during the 2000–2014 period.
Prices are expressed in US$ per tonne
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Fig. 13.2 Volatility of international grain prices (2-year moving window)—2000–2014. Note: this
figure shows the evolution of the volatility of monthly international prices of maize, rice, sorghum,
and wheat during the 2000–2014 period. The monthly volatility was calculated as the standard
deviation of the monthly price returns observed during that month and the previous 23 months
and maize showed striking similarities; this is also true of wheat price movement—
though to a lesser extent.
International prices of different food commodities also seem to co-move in
terms of volatility. Figure 13.2 shows the evolution of price volatility (the standard
deviation of monthly price returns) for these four commodities over a 2-year moving
window from 2000 to 2014.7 The price volatility of these commodities seems
to have followed a similar pattern during most of the period of analysis, with a
considerable increase during and following the 2007–2008 food crisis, followed by
a decrease—even though price volatility after the decrease was still higher than
prior to the crisis. This is more clearly observed in Fig. 13.3, which compares price
volatility before (2000–2006) and after the crisis (2008–2014). Except for sorghum,
which showed only a moderate increase, sample standard deviations for the rest of
the commodities increased by more than 30 % after the crisis, indicating a much
higher variation (fluctuation) of international agricultural prices in recent years.
As discussed above, the main purpose of this study is to analyze volatility
transmission from international to domestic markets. As a first step, it is useful
to analyze the dynamics of the volatility of domestic prices vis-à-vis that of the
international reference prices. Figure 13.4a–d plots the evolution of price volatility
(the standard deviation of international and domestic price returns) by commodity
over a 2-year moving window, similar to Fig. 13.2. The results were mixed. In the
7For instance, the number for January 2000 reflects the standard deviation of the monthly realized
price returns from February 1998 until January 2000.
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Fig. 13.3 Volatility of international grain prices before and after the 2007–2008 crisis. Note: this
figure shows the volatility of monthly international prices of maize, rice, sorghum, and wheat
before and after the 2007–2008 food crisis. The “before” period spans 2000–2006 while the “after”
period spans 2009–2014. The volatility for each period is calculated as the standard deviation of
the observed monthly price returns for each commodity
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Fig. 13.4 Volatility (2-year moving window) of domestic and international prices for (a) maize,
(b) rice, (c) sorghum, and (d) wheat. Note: Figures (a)–(d) show the evolution of the volatility of
monthly domestic and international prices of maize, rice, sorghum, and wheat during the 2000–
2014 period. The volatility for every month is calculated as the standard deviation of the monthly
price returns observed during that month and the previous 23 months. The line in bold represents
the volatility of each international price series
case of rice and wheat, there seems to be a substantial co-movement in the volatility
of domestic and international prices, particularly in the case of rice. The volatility
of international sorghum prices also showed some evidence of co-movement with
the volatility of domestic sorghum-related prices. The volatility pattern of prices in
domestic maize markets, in contrast, did not generally resemble the volatility pattern
exhibited by international maize prices. The volatility dynamics between domestic
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Table 13.1 Summary statistics and selected normality, autocorrelation, and stationarity tests
Maize Rice Sorghum Wheat Total
Panel A: domestic price series
Number of domestic price series 16 15 3 7 41
Mean price returns (%) 0.42 0.33 0.47 0.46 0.40
% of series with kurtosis> 3 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
% of series rejecting Jarque-Bera test’s H0 93.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 97.6
% of series rejecting Ljung-Box test’s H0
on squared returns (5 lags) 31.3 66.7 0.0 71.4 48.8
% of series rejecting Ljung-Box test’s H0
on squared returns (10 lags) 31.3 73.3 33.3 71.4 53.7
% of series rejecting AC Q test’s H0 on
squared returns (first lag) 37.5 73.3 33.3 71.4 56.1
% of series rejecting AC Q test’s H0 on
squared returns (second lag) 43.8 80.0 33.3 85.7 63.4
% of series rejecting ADF test’s H0 on
logarithm of price in levels (5 lags) 56.3 13.3 0.0 57.1 36.6
% of series rejecting ADF test’s H0 on
price returns (5 lags) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Panel B: international price series
Mean price returns (%) 0.52 0.39 0.54 0.62
Standard deviation of price returns (%) 6.44 6.18 6.74 6.65
Jarque-Bera statistic 28.68* 273.10* 39.46* 39.37*
Kurtosis 4.84 9.15 5.27 5.11
Ljung-Box statistic on squared returns (5 lags) 1.58 53.74* 4.42 7.25
Ljung-Box statistic on squared returns (10 lags) 11.86 80.14* 8.71 11.86
AC Q statistic on squared returns (first lag) 0.09 0.35* 0.08 0.17*
AC Q statistic on squared returns (second lag) 0.03 0.34 0.01 0.09*
ADF statistic—logarithm of price in levels (5 lags) 1.40 1.58 1.47 1.78
ADF statistic—price returns (5 lags) 5.88* 5.74* 5.74* 4.68*
Note: This table presents summary statistics and selected normality, autocorrelation, and station-
arity tests for domestic (panel A) and international (panel B) price return series for maize, rice,
sorghum, and wheat. An asterisk indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 % level of
confidence
and international price returns requires further examination, as will be discussed in
the next section.
Table 13.1 provides some descriptive statistics for the domestic and international
price returns used in the analysis. First, the Jarque-Bera test indicated that the returns
for almost every domestic price and all four international prices did not follow a
normal distribution. The kurtosis in all of the analyzed markets was greater than 3,
further pointing to a leptokurtic distribution of returns. These results revealed the
need to use a Student’s t density for the estimation of the BEKK models below.
Second, both the Ljung-Box (LB) statistics for up to five and ten lags and the
Portmanteau (Q) statistics for the first- and second-order autocorrelation coefficients
generally rejected the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation for the squared returns.
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This autocorrelation suggests the existence of nonlinear dependencies in several of
the price returns, which motivates the use of MGARCH models to better capture
own- and cross-market interdependencies between domestic and international
markets.
Third, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test suggested that several of the
domestic and international prices (in natural logarithms) were non-stationary. As
explained in the methodology section, for all these cases, a cointegration test
was first conducted to determine if a potential long-run relationship between the
corresponding domestic and international price needs to be taken into account
by applying a vector-error correction model. Finally, the ADF test confirms the
stationarity of all the domestic and international price returns series.
13.5 Results
In this section, we describe our estimates of volatility transmission from interna-
tional commodity markets to domestic food markets across countries and commodi-
ties. Due to space limitations, we did not provide detailed estimation results of
the BEKK model for each of the 41 country-commodity combinations; instead, we
assessed the reliability of our estimations by comparing model predictions to sample
statistics. In particular, we compared the volatility of each domestic price sample
(standard deviation of domestic price returns) with the corresponding predicted
volatility from our estimated model. Since the BEKK model explicitly formulates a
law of motion for the conditional variance of price returns, the estimated variance
are not individual values but rather a series of monthly estimated conditional
variances. In addition, we can estimate the implied steady-state (or unconditional)
volatility and compare it with the sample volatility. In practice, we estimate the
following for each domestic price return:
The sample volatility:

hsample11
0:5 D
qPn
tD1 .rtr/2
n
The steady-state volatility

hSS11
0:5
which satisfies the following expression:
HSS D C0C C G0HSSG
The average of the predicted conditional volatilities: ch11 D
Pn
tD1
bh0:511:t
n
Figure 13.5a–c compare the sample values and model estimates of the domestic
price volatility. First, note that the sample volatilities of maize prices are, on average,
higher than those of rice and wheat. The sample maize price volatilities ranged from
4.3 % (in Mexico) to 20.8 % (in Malawi), with an average of 10.4 % for our full
set of countries. Sorghum also showed volatility levels which are similar to or even
higher than maize, although we only obtained data for three countries. In the case of
rice and wheat, the sample volatilities are on average 4.7 % and 4.8 %, respectively.
Interestingly, African countries have the highest sample volatilities (an average of
11.3 %), while Asia and Latin America countries have averages which are less than
half of the African average.
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Fig. 13.5 Volatility of monthly prices (in %) sample, average, and steady state for (a) maize, (b)
rice, and (c) sorghum/wheat. Note: Figures (a)–(c) compare the sample, average, and steady-state
volatilities of monthly price returns. Sample volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the
domestic price returns. Average and steady-state volatilities were derived from the results of the
conditional variance estimation. The average volatility is the average of the squared roots of the
estimated domestic variance terms. The steady-state volatility is the squared root of the domestic
variance term after the estimated system reaches a hypothetical steady state. See Sect. 13.5 of the
main text for details.
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Our estimated steady-state and predicted volatilities yielded similar conclusions
when comparing commodities and regions. On average, volatilities estimated by our
model for maize prices are larger than those for rice and wheat, with the last two
being quite similar. Across regions, estimated food price volatility was around twice
as high in Africa than Asia and Latin America. Comparing steady-state volatility
with sample volatility, the former is consistently lower than the latter. In particular,
steady-state volatility estimates are on average 60 % of the sample estimates, and
these differences range from 10 % for maize in Zambia to 93 % for maize in Malawi.
Steady-state estimates are expected to be consistently lower than sample estimates
because steady-state estimates reflect the standard deviations to be reached over
time in the absence of shocks to price volatility. This finding is also consistent with
results reported by Gardebroek et al. (2014).
When comparing the average predicted volatility from the estimated models with
the sample volatility, we also observed that our estimated models exhibited a rela-
tively good predictive performance. The ratio of the average predicted volatility to
the sample volatility is on average 0.99 for the full set of countries and commodities.
This ratio ranged from 0.81 for wheat in Peru (the largest underestimation) to 1.28
for maize in Mozambique (the largest overestimation). Across commodities, the
model predictions on average slightly overestimated the sample value in the case of
maize (average ratio of 1.05) and underestimate it for rice and wheat (average ratios
of 0.92 and 0.96). These average predicted volatilities further reaffirm that maize
prices are much more volatile than rice and wheat prices.
To estimate the degree of volatility transmission from international markets to
domestic markets, we carried out the following two steps for each estimated model
(one per country-commodity):
We estimated the size of a shock in the international market ."2/ such that the
steady-state variance of the international price return increases by 1 % after one
period:
H1;22 ."2/  H0;22
H0;22
D 0:01
We introduced the shock "2 into Eq. (13.2), estimated the percentage change in the
variance of the domestic price return (with respect to its steady-state value), and
compute our volatility transmission VT indicator according to:
VT D H1;11  H0;11
H0;11

 0:01
In other words, our volatility transmission indicator compares the reaction (after
one period and assuming the system is at a steady state) of the domestic price return
variance and the reaction of the international price return variance to a shock in
the international market. If our volatility transmission indicator is equal to 1, it
means that the domestic price return variance increases by the same proportion as
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Fig. 13.6 Price return volatility transmission estimates for (a) maize, (b) rice, and (c)
sorghum/wheat. Note: Figures (a)–(c) show estimates for the elasticity of price volatility transmis-
sion from international markets to domestic markets for each available country and commodity.
Panel (a) focuses on volatility transmission of the international maize price, panel (b) on volatility
transmission of the international price of rice, and panel (c) on volatility transmission of the
international prices of sorghum (first three country-commodities) and wheat. The elasticity of
price volatility is defined as the percentage change in the variance of the domestic price return
(with respect to its steady-state value) relative to that of the international price return variance (see
Sect. 13.5 of the main text for details). The figure is truncated to preserve scale; outlier values are
indicated in bold. *, **, and *** denote statistically significant estimates at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 %
level, respectively
the international price return variance in one period, after introducing a shock to the
international market.
We present our volatility transmission estimates for each country and commodity
in Fig. 13.6a–c, together with a measure of their statistical significance. Aggregated
medians and frequencies across commodities and regions are shown in Table 13.2.8
8We measured statistical significance by implementing the Wald test for the joint significance
of ˛21 and g21 in the conditional variance equation, where ˛21 is the short-term effect of an
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Table 13.2 Price return volatility transmission, by commodity and region
Volatility transmission (elasticity)
Median
Lower
than 0.1
Between
0.1 and 1
Higher
than 1 Total
Not significant
(at 5 % level)
Total 0.172 6 6 8 20 21
By commodity
Maize 0.372 0 1 3 4 12
Rice 0.082 3 4 1 8 7
Sorghum 0.035 1 0 0 1 2
Wheat 1.919 2 1 4 7 0
By region
Africa 0.450 2 0 4 6 9
Asia 0.103 1 3 1 5 4
Central America
and Caribbean 0.288 0 0 0 0 6
South America 0.172 3 3 3 9 2
Note: This table shows the estimates of the elasticity of price volatility transmission from
international markets to domestic markets by commodity and region. The first column presents the
median elasticity of all estimates, while columns 2–4 show the number of statistically significant
cases (at the 5 % level) for which the estimated elasticity falls between certain values. The
last column shows the number of cases for which the estimated volatility transmission was not
statistically significant at the 5 % level. The elasticity of price volatility is defined as the percentage
change in the variance of the domestic price return (with respect to its steady-state value), relative
to that of the international price return variance (see Sect. 13.5 of the main text for details)
Overall, we found volatility transmission that was statistically significant at the 5 %
level in about half of the cases, with most of the estimates within reasonable values.9
In the case of maize, the median volatility transmission from international to
domestic markets was 0.37, but just 4 of the 16 countries exhibited a relationship
that is significant at the 5 % level: Ethiopia, Benin, Nigeria, and Colombia.
Our estimates indicated that the volatility transmission of rice prices was lower
than that of maize and wheat. The median volatility transmission was less than 0.1,
and in seven out of eight statistically significant cases, our volatility transmission
estimates are below 0.5. On the other hand, more than half of the estimates of
volatility transmission for rice are statistically significant, compared to just one-
fourth for maize. Across regions, evidence of transmission was observed mostly in
Asia and Latin America, with the highest levels in Thailand and Brazil.
international price shock on domestic volatility (innovation effect) and g21 is the short-term effect
of changes in international price volatility on domestic volatility (persistence effect).
9Our estimates showed extreme values larger than 10 only in 6 of the 41 cases.
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In the case of wheat, the median volatility transmission (1.92) is larger than for
any other commodity, and all of our estimates are statistically significant. However,
there does not seem to be a clear pattern across countries. Volatility transmission was
very low (below 0.2) in three of the seven cases: Mumbai wheat, New Delhi wheat,
and Brazilian bread. In contrast, volatility transmission was quite high (above 4) in
three other cases: wheat in Peru, Brazil, and Ethiopia. Finally, volatility transmission
for sorghum was estimated for just three economies, all in Africa, and only one of
these (Burkina Faso) was statistically significant.
In terms of regional patterns, while we found no evidence of price volatility
transmission in any Central American and Caribbean countries, there was a
significant relationship between the volatility of international prices and domestic
prices in a large proportion of South American economies. In the case of Africa and
Asia, the evidence was mixed, with statistically significant volatility transmission in
around one-third of the African cases and one-half of the Asian cases.
13.6 Discussion
We expect price transmission and volatility transmission to be greatest when (1)
the international trade in the commodity is large relative to domestic production or
consumption, (2) trade restrictions (particularly quantitative restrictions) are low, (3)
the government does not intervene to stabilize the domestic price of the commodity,
and (4) the transport costs between the country and international markets are low.
Some of these factors, particularly the ratio of trade to domestic production, are
helpful in explaining the volatility transmission results obtained in this study, but
some of the findings were unexpected.
In the case of maize, it is unsurprising that Colombia was the only Latin
American country for which our estimate of volatility transmission was statistically
significant: Colombian maize imports are equivalent to 64 % of its domestic
production, as shown in Appendix Table 13.5. In the other five Latin American
countries, the proportion ranges from 15 % to 38 %. And the African countries
are not expected to have statistically significant volatility transmission because
they are almost self-sufficient in maize production (net trade is 0–9 % of domestic
production). The only unexpected finding was the statistically significant volatility
transmission in Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Benin.
Turning to rice markets, it is unsurprising that volatility transmission was
statistically significant in Thailand, which exports 70 % of its domestic rice
production, and Senegal, whose imports are equivalent to 82 % of its domestic
output (see Appendix Table 13.5). The lack of volatility transmission to domestic
markets in Mali, India, Nepal, and Ecuador is expected given that these countries
import an equivalent of no more than 16 % of their domestic production. However,
there was evidence of volatility transmission to the domestic markets of Peru, Brazil,
and Colombia despite these countries relying minimally on rice imports.
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In the case of sorghum, the three countries examined have negligible trade in this
commodity, so the volatility transmission in Burundi was unexpected, but the lack
of transmission in the other two countries was expected.
As mentioned above, all of the seven wheat prices tested showed statistically
significant transmission of volatility. This was expected in the cases of Peru, Bolivia,
and Brazil, whose wheat imports are equivalent to 88 %, 72 %, and 56 % of
domestic production, respectively. And it is perhaps also understandable in the case
of Ethiopia, whose imports are equivalent to 32 % of domestic output. However, it
is less clear why international volatility is transmitted to Indian wheat markets given
that wheat trade is equivalent to just 2 % of its domestic production.
Overall, it appears that price volatility is (is not) transmitted from international to
domestic markets when the ratio of traded volume to domestic production is above
(below) 40 %. In our analysis, 29 of the 41 prices (71 %) follow this pattern.
13.7 Conclusions
Food price volatility in developing countries is economically and politically impor-
tant. In these economies a large share of household budgets is spent on food, so
food price levels and volatility have a direct and large impact on welfare. Food
price volatility also affects poor, small-scale farmers who rely on crop sales for
a significant part of their income. Food price volatility is also likely to inhibit
agricultural investment and reduce the growth in agricultural productivity, with
long-run implications for poor consumers and farmers. Hence, it is important to
better understand the sources of food price volatility and whether the volatility is
mostly transmitted from international agricultural commodity markets or largely
determined by domestic factors. This in turn will help design better global, regional,
and domestic policies to cope with excessive food price volatility and to protect the
most vulnerable groups.
The objective of this paper is to estimate the transmission of grain price volatility
from world markets to local markets in developing countries, as these estimates have
been generally absent in the literature. In particular, we focused on the effect of the
world price of maize, rice, wheat, and sorghum on 41 prices of grain products in
27 countries across Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Monthly price data were used,
and the data mostly covered the period from January 2000 to December 2013. The
analysis was based on a MGARCH approach using a BEKK model.
We assessed the reliability of our estimations by comparing model predictions
to sample statistics. In particular, we compared sample food price volatility to
average predicted conditional volatility and estimated steady-state volatility. Our
model predictions did a good job in replicating sample data patterns. For our full set
of commodity/countries, the ratio of the average predicted volatility to the sample
volatility was 0.99, and as in the data, the average predicted volatility is higher for
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maize prices than for rice and wheat prices. Across regions, the estimates showed
that the average food price volatility in African countries was around double those in
South Asia and Latin America. Furthermore, as expected, our estimated steady-state
price volatilities were consistently lower than the sample price volatilities.
We proposed a volatility transmission estimator (or elasticity) that shows the
reaction of domestic price return variance relative to the reaction of international
price return variance to a one-time shock in the international market (after one
period and assuming the system is at steady-state).
We found that most of our estimates were within reasonable values. About half
(20 of 41) of the volatility transmission estimates were statistically significant,
but the proportion varies by commodity: all seven wheat prices show volatility
transmission, but just half of the rice prices and one-fourth of the maize prices
did so. Volatility transmission of a commodity’s price appears to be linked to the
importance of trade in that commodity to the country in question. When the ratio
of trade to domestic production is over (under) 40 %, price volatility is (is not)
transmitted from world markets to local markets. This rule could explain 29 of the
41 prices examined (71 %). All 12 exceptions to this rule are cases in which trade is
minimal but volatility is transmitted from world markets. This could occur through
transmission of volatility between closely related commodity markets or perhaps as
a result of transmission of “anxiety” from international markets to domestic markets.
Further research is needed to examine these alternative explanations.
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Table 13.4 International price series’ sources and information
International
commodity Description Country Market Units Source
Maize No. 2 yellow United States U.S. Gulf US$/tonne FAOSTAT (primary
source: USDA)
Rice A1 super,
white broken
Thailand Bangkok US$/tonne FAOSTAT (primary
source: Jackson Son
& Co. (London)
Ltd.)
Sorghum No. 2 yellow United States U.S. Gulf US$/tonne FAOSTAT (primary
source: USDA)
Wheat No. 2 hard
red winter
United States U.S. Gulf US$/tonne FAOSTAT (primary
source: International
Grains Council)
Table 13.5 Ratio of imports minus exports over domestic production, average 2007–2013
Maize (%) Rice (%) Sorghum (%) Wheat (%)
Benin 0 85 0 95
Chad 8 2 4 91
Ethiopia 1 49 3 32
Kenya 9 86 10 70
Malawi 0 3 8 108
Mali 1 16 0 103
Mozambique 9 77 1 95
Nigeria 0 37 0 98
Senegal 30 82 1 100
Tanzania 0 9 0 100
Uganda 2 29 7 94
Zambia 7 46 35 10
India 13 5 1 2
Nepal 3 5 109 1
Philippines 4 12 97 104
Thailand 6 70 3 105
Bolivia 1 3 1 72
Brazil 18 3 1 56
Colombia 64 6 52 98
Ecuador 33 5 44 100
El Salvador 38 72 1 100
Guatemala 32 71 0 97
Honduras 37 83 1 97
Mexico 25 76 32 44
Nicaragua 15 35 1 100
Peru 50 5 99 88
Mean abs. value 16 36 22 72
Note: Data obtained from FAOSTAT online (accessed on May, 2015)
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14.1 Backdrop
In a country which has a population of 1.25 billion and which still has the largest
number of poor and malnourished people in the world, ensuring food security for
the masses is one of the prime concerns of the government policy.
It may be worth noting that an average Indian household still spends about
45 % of its total expenditure on food (NSSO 2013). The decade of the 2000s saw
the overall GDP grow by an average annual growth rate of more than 7 %. With
population growing by less than 1.5 % per annum, per capita incomes consequently
rose by more than 5.5 % per annum, thus exerting pressure on food demand, and
the pressure is only going to amplify in the foreseeable times. If India can raise its
domestic food production at a pace faster than its domestic demand, it can at least
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have food available to feed its population from domestic sources. Otherwise, India
would have to increasingly rely on food imports.
India is already importing more than half of its edible oil consumption and
about 15–20 % of pulse consumption from global markets. Any abrupt increase in
the global prices of these commodities will therefore directly affect their domestic
prices and consumption and thereby elements of food security. Domestic prices of
important food commodities are also affected when the commodities are exported.
India, for example, has been the largest exporter of rice from financial year (FY)
2011–2012 to 2014–2015, and its domestic prices are affected by what is happening
in the global rice market.
Against this backdrop, this paper looks at the issue of food security in India in
the wake of recent global food price volatility, especially the price spikes of 2007–
2008 and the price surge in early 2011, when global food price index exceeded the
previous peak from 2008. How did India react to global food price spikes of 2007–
2008? Could it protect its poor? What were the likely implications of India’s policy
choices on global prices? What lessons can we learn from that experience in terms
of providing reasonable stability in food prices, locally and globally, so that food
security can be ensured for the masses? These are some of the questions that will be
addressed in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 14.2, we study the global rice and
wheat markets and how India is placed in it. Section 14.3 elaborates on the policy
landscape of rice and wheat, the two primary staples in India. The section is
subdivided into two parts where both the trade and the domestic policies are given.
After elaborating on India’s policy response to the global food crisis of 2007–2008,
we use the interconnectedness of the global and the domestic food prices to illustrate
India’s competitiveness in the global markets. The subsection about domestic grain
policies highlights the domestic grain dynamics and the major policy changes in
the domain. The last section encapsulates the things that could be learned from the
analysis in this paper and gives suggestions for the future with regard to the Indian
grain trade market.
14.2 Global Rice andWheat Markets and India
Only 9 % of the total rice production was globally traded between 2013 and 2014
(see Figs. 14.1 and 14.2). This indicates a rather thin global rice market compared
to wheat and corn, where 23 % and 13 % of the production was traded respectively.
The rice supply in global markets is also highly concentrated: in 2013–2014, 80.4 %
of the global rice supply came from five countries, namely, Thailand, Vietnam, the
United States, Pakistan, and India.
Globally, the production of all three staples is going up. The markets are
expanding and so are the demands. Between 2011–2012 and 2013–2014, global
exports of rice, wheat, and corn increased by 9 %, 5.4 %, and 24.9 %, respectively.
This increase may also be due to the markets liberalizing after the 2007–2008 global
food crisis, in which the major food exporters like India and Thailand restricted
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Fig. 14.2 Trends in world exports (MMT). Source: USDA
their food supplies and thus triggering an unprecedented global food price spike in
history.
As a net food exporter, India was bound to benefit from such global trend. We
next examine the performance of the Indian agriculture exports.
India exported more than US $42.6 billion worth of agricultural exports in 2013–
2014, while it imported agricultural commodities worth US $15.9 billion; India’s
agriculture trade account had therefore a net surplus (Fig. 14.3). According to the
WTO, India’s share in the total global export of agricultural products increased from
0.8 % in 1990 to 2.6 % in 2012. India emerged as the world’s largest exporter of
rice.
India has a gross cropped area between 190 and 200 million ha, depending upon
the amount of rainfall during the monsoons. In 2013–2014, India produced about
106 million metric tonnes (MMTs) of rice from roughly 43 million ha (m ha) of rice
planting area and 96 MMT of wheat from 29 m ha of wheat planting area. India’s
share of rice and wheat production globally is roughly 22 % and 13 %, respectively
(FAO, stat).
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Rice and wheat are staple crops of the country and help in meeting a significant
proportion of the daily caloric needs of the people. Close to 22 % of the population
still live below the poverty line, as estimated by the Planning Commission based on
Tendulkar poverty line (Planning Commission 2014). By international definition of
US $1.9/day/capita, almost 21.3 % of the people in India lived below poverty line in
2011 (World Bank 2014). The largest mass of poor and malnourished people in the
world live here (World Bank 2013). Roughly about one-sixth of the world’s people
and one-third of the world’s poor are Indians. One in every three malnourished
children in the world is from India (HUNGaMA 2011). Thus, anything affecting
food prices, and rice and wheat in particular, is important for Indians, especially for
those hovering around the poverty line. It is no wonder that the government monitors
food prices very closely.
The Indian government supports both the cereal producers as well as its
consumers. By providing price support mechanisms for paddy and wheat using
minimum support price (MSP) and by reducing their effective costs of production
(input subsidies mainly for fertilizers, electricity, and irrigation), the government
supports and incentivizes cereal (rice and wheat) production. The government
also supports the consumers by ensuring that prices of wheat and rice remain
low and stable through its public distribution system (PDS). It provides identified
beneficiaries with subsidized (and sometimes free) food under its various food-
based welfare schemes. The government also utilizes the Open Market Sale Scheme
Domestic (OMSS-D) to smoothen any inter-/intra-year fluctuations by actively
regulating the market grain supply and thereby ensuring price stability.
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India is a net exporter of agricultural commodities, whereas it is a net importer
in the overall trade (CACP, Kharif Report 2013–2014). Both in terms of quality and
cost, Indian rice has a comparative advantage in the global market. Nevertheless,
India’s agricultural trade policies are somewhat conservative and subject to frequent
bans/restrictions. Nevertheless, in the last 3 years since FY 2012–2013, India
exported a total of approximately 62 MMTs of cereals, and around 53 % (i.e., 33
MMTs) of this consisted of rice exports. The country earned close to US $30 billion
from these cereal exports (Fig. 14.4).
What could explain such a massive increase in cereal exports? Open trade policy
regime (more recently for common rice), overflowing government granaries owing
to production gains, and global price (cost) competitiveness could explain the
phenomenon. We will look at the factors individually.
14.3 Rice andWheat Policy: Trade and Domestic
Historically, India has been a country of droughts and famines. It is an agrarian
economy with large dependence on rains for irrigating its crops. 54 % of its gross
cropped area and 40 % of the rice planting area are still rainfed. With close to 1.25
billion people to feed, including the highest number of the global poor, opening the
trade of its staple crops, like rice, is still a decision to be made with extreme caution.
A significant proportion of the Indian population is still rice eating. Because of
growing concerns regarding the high level of malnutrition and food security issues
in the country, the government has always been cautious in liberalizing the rice and
wheat trade. Therefore, the government has always first met the consumption needs
and maintained enough buffer stocking before letting the “residual” determine the
nature of trade policy.
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India has come a long way since the mid-1960s, when it was living from “ship
to mouth” through PL 480 imports from the USA to today when it has become the
largest rice exporter globally and a net agricultural exporter. Still India’s rice and
wheat trade policy is highly cautious and sometimes even unpredictable as we will
see in the section below.
14.3.1 Grain Policy: Trade
India exports mainly two types of rice: basmati and common rice (raw or par boiled).
While the former is a finer quality rice meant for niche markets in the Gulf, Europe,
and the USA, the latter is comparable to the type of rice supplied by Thailand,
Vietnam, and others. India’s trade policies for both types of rice are different from
each other. While there has been no restriction on the export of basmati rice, trade
restrictions, such as minimum export price (MEP), export quotas, and even complete
bans, have been imposed on the common rice export. Until 1991, the common
rice export was completely restricted; with quotas and MEP in place. Overvalued
exchange rate and export restrictions taxed the Indian farm sector before 1991.
The devaluation of the Indian rupee in 1991 contributed immensely to making the
expensive basmati rice more price competitive in the global market, and thus its
export surged.
Common rice exports were banned until October 1994 despite being highly price
competitive globally. The government finally decided to open common rice exports
in FY 1995–1996. As a result, the net exports of the common rice surged from 0.9
MMTs in 1994–1995 to 4.9 MMTs in 1995–1996 (Fig. 14.5), making India the
second largest exporter of rice in the world. Encouraged by the phenomenal growth
in rice exports, India opened its wheat exports in May 1995. However, increasing
exports squeezed domestic market supplies thus building pressures on the domestic
prices. Within a year, the rising prices of staple crops like rice and wheat drove the
policymakers to reverse the trade decision and completely ban the rice and wheat
exports in 1996–1997 (Hoda and Gulati 2008).
Increased production incentivized by rising minimum support prices (MSPs),
falling global grain prices owing to many factors like the 1997 East Asian crisis,
falling PDS grain offtakes due to the “targeted” focus of the system in 1997, and
export bans were among the many factors that resulted in the overaccumulation
of grain stocks in the coming years in the country. This forced the government to
remove the bans on rice and wheat exports in 2000.
But it was not before 2005–2006 when Indian wheat regained its competitiveness
because global prices had improved from their trough in around 2001–2002 (Hoda
and Gulati 2008). Wheat exports were expected to rise; however, contrary to
expectations, the government had to import wheat in 2006 to refill its plummeting
wheat stocks in the Food Corporation of India (FCI) granaries. The FY 2006–2007
was an interesting year for the food sector of the country. Owing to farmers (mainly
wheat) getting a better price for their produce from the private market, the FCI was
unable to meet its annual procurement targets, and thus its granaries fell below the
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Fig. 14.5 India’s exports of rice from 1990–1991 to 2014–2015. Source: Ministry of Commerce,
GoI
desired stock norm level. Consequently, the government imported wheat amounting
to 5.6 MMTs in that year. This is when India decided first to ban wheat exports in
February 2007 (Sharma 2011).
14.3.2 The 2007–2008 Global Price Hikes and India’s Response
From the point of view of Indian policymakers, India’s withdrawal from the inter-
national rice and wheat markets in 2007 was a well-calibrated response. However,
it appeared like a knee-jerk reaction to outsiders. Some of the alarming concerns
driving the Indian policymakers’ response to the global food crisis included food
insecurity at the household level, impacting millions of vulnerable people, continued
volatility in agricultural production caused by weather changes, fear of political
unrest in times of high and sticky food inflation, and the need to feed a large PDS.
In this section, we discuss India’s policy response to the crisis, mainly for the rice
and wheat markets.
Export Restrictions on Rice To stop the global price hikes from being transmitted
to the domestic market and to strengthen the government’s grain stocks, the country
started imposing export restrictions on common rice. In October 2007, they imposed
an MEP on common rice of US $425/ton; but by December 2007, this MEP was
increased to $500/ton. Nevertheless, the exports of rice continued unabated. In
March 2008, the government finally imposed a complete ban on common rice
exports. The exports of rice dropped from 6.5 MMT in 2007–2008 to only 2.5
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MMT in 2008–2009 (and these were mainly basmati rice exports). This decision to
ban exports of common rice in the wake of surging global prices came under severe
criticism from several rice-importing countries. In response, India opened a window
to export common rice at “concessional” prices compared to prevailing global prices
of rice to some neighboring countries, like Bangladesh and Bhutan, and also to some
low-income African countries. However, not much rice was actually exported. The
government eventually lifted the export ban on common rice in September 2011.
Since then, India has exported record quantities of rice, especially in 2014–2015,
when 12 MMT of rice was exported (Fig. 14.5).
The share of common rice in the total rice export earnings increased from 4 %
in 2010–2011 to 42.6 % in 2 years. During the period in which the export ban on
common rice was in place, India’s basmati rice exports constituted 2.5 % (2008–
2009) and 2.4 % (2009–2010) of the total rice production in India. Today, after
the ban has been removed, the country is exporting close to 10 % of its annual
production (Fig. 14.6).
The 1990–1991 Indian rice export basket comprised mainly basmati rice. With
the opening of the common rice trade, the share of basmati rice exports in the total
rice export decreased over time to less than 35 % in 2012–2013.
India has emerged as the world’s largest rice exporter since 2011, closely
competing with Thailand. Despite the export competiveness, the country imposes,
contrary to expectations, high import duty on rice: 70 % on semi-milled or wholly
milled rice and 80 % on paddy, brown rice, and broken rice. Such a high import
duty is ineffective when the country is quite export competitive in rice and has been
exporting more than 10 MMT of rice annually since 2012–2013.
Export Restrictions on Wheat India is the world’s second largest wheat producer
after China, producing about 12 % of the global wheat. It has, however, not been
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among the largest wheat exporters (accounting for about 3 % of total world exports)
because the country consumes more than 90 % of its production, and it even had
to import wheat in some of years (India was the fourth largest importer of wheat
in 2006–2007). India imposed a complete ban on wheat exports in February 2007
(Fig. 14.7) in reaction to rising prices and supply fears, both domestically and
globally.
Since India has a very small share in the global wheat market, its restrictions
on wheat exports did not have any significant effect on international prices. But the
imposition of the ban pulled domestic prices of wheat down from US $283/ton in
February to US $225/ton by April (Fig. 14.8).
The export ban also helped the domestic market to remain stable and insulated
from the steep hike in international prices in the first half of 2008; in April 2008,
when the wheat price in the global market touched US $380/MT, the domestic wheat
price in India was less than US $280/MT (Fig. 14.8).
14.3.3 Impact of Global Prices on Domestic Prices
In 2006–2007, as mentioned before, India imported about 6 MMTs of wheat after a
long time. When the global prices of rice and wheat increased drastically in 2007–
2008, banning the rice and wheat exports seemed to be a logical response in the
country’s efforts to insulate its poor from global prices spikes getting transmitted to
the domestic markets. As a result, India was actually able to contain its domestic
cereal inflation to about 6 % in 2007–2008, which helped restrict the overall
food inflation at the time and thus protect India’s poor from the price volatility.
Similarly, India managed to avoid the more severe price spikes of 2010–2011, when
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in February 2011 the global food price index even exceeded the peak reached in
2008. However, what happened in the long run is an interesting departure from
expectations.
A closer examination of the food price indices of the country and of the world
(Wholesale Price Index (WPI) food and FAO food, respectively) reveals that the
protection was only effective in the short run as the two price indices appear to have
converged over the longer run, thus rejecting the transmission insulation theory.
Since the period between 2004 and 2013, the correlation between FAO food and
Indian WPI food has been 0.78, indicating strong comovement between the indices.
Figure 14.9 shows that India’s restrictive stance on trade policy has in fact helped the
country to escape the food price spikes of the food crisis of 2007–2008 and 2010–
2011. However, in the longer run, the domestic price line appears to be converging
with its global counterpart.
Clearly, India managed to avoid price spikes in its domestic market. Interestingly,
the country also managed to avoid the troughs in global markets. In other words, it
did not allow falling global prices to immediately get transmitted to its domestic
prices. For the years 2000–2005 and more recently since 2013, when the global
food prices fell, Indian food prices remained somewhat higher. It is possible that
the domestic prices will converge over a longer period. The upshot is that Indian
trade policy has tried to smoothen out the effects of global price spikes and troughs
to prevent volatility transmission to the domestic prices, but in the medium to long
term, Indian food prices have broadly followed the global food prices.
The FAO Food Price Index is a measure of the monthly change in international
prices of a basket of food commodities. It consists of the average of five commodity
group price indices, weighted with the average export shares of each of the groups
for 2002–2004. The commodity groups are sugar, dairy, meat, edible oils, and
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cereals. Upon bringing the base of all these groups from 2002–2004 to 2004–2005,
we analyzed the numbers together with subindices of India’s WPI (Figs. 14.10 and
14.11).
Similarly, the domestic prices appear to be catching up with the international
long-run trends. The role of restrictive trade policy is evident here.
Several researchers have proven the non-transmission or limited transmission
of global volatility to domestic prices (see, e.g., Pinstrup-Andersen 2015; Kalkuhl
2014). Baltzer (2015) wrote:
Non-fiscal interventions, such as non-tariff trade barriers, parastatal grain traders (China,
India, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Malawi, Zambia and Egypt) and price controls (notably Senegal),
disrupt the price transmission mechanisms in ways harder to generalize.
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India’s Economic Survey 2014–2015 attributed the divergence between the
global and domestic prices to restrictive domestic food and trade policy. However,
the curves shown above highlight the limitations of these opinions—even though
these opinions may be true in the short run, but over a longer run, the opinions appear
to fall flat with the commoving global and domestic food prices, as evidenced by the
converging global and domestic food price curves. More sophisticated, statistical,
and econometric tools are needed for a more robust analysis of the phenomenon.
14.3.4 Indian Rice andWheat Competitiveness
From 2001–2002 to 2007–2008 (Q1), India’s domestic wholesale rice prices were
generally higher than international prices, but from 2007–2008 (Q2) to 2012–2013
(Q3), they have been continuously lower than the international prices (Fig. 14.12). It
may be observed that MSP of paddy converted to rice has been continuously lower
than domestic wholesale prices of rice during the same period.
Indian wheat prices, on the other hand, have closely followed the international
wheat prices of the US hard red winter (HRW) and the soft red winter (SRW)
( fob). The 2007 export ban on wheat protected India’s domestic wheat prices from
the enormous international food price volatility (Fig. 14.13). While the export ban
protected consumers from these fluctuations, it also harmed farmer’s interests by
limiting their exposure to lower domestic prices. Indian wheat prices generally
hovered between the fob and cif wheat prices. With global wheat prices rising in
2007–2009, Indian wheat became highly price competitive. It has regained its price
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competitiveness in 2011, when it opened its wheat exports in September. More than
12 MMTs of wheat were exported in 2012–2013 and 2013–2014.
India’s MSP has been fairly lower than most of the other rice and wheat-
producing economies (Fig. 14.14). Studies (Gulati et al. 2010) using the nominal
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protection coefficient (NPC) have shown that Indian rice is export competitive, with
its domestic prices lower than the global rice prices in most years.
In the next section, we unearth the trends in the domestic production and
understand the policy environment governing the rice and wheat farmers and the
consumer.
14.3.5 Grain Policy: Domestic
The government intervention in domestic markets of wheat and rice, ranges from
providing farmers with price support under MSP, procuring grains from mandis
(grain wholesale markets) or through millers under compulsory levies on rice, to
stocking and distributing the procured grains through the PDS. The reason that
government intervention has been heavy in wheat and rice markets is rooted in
the country’s history of famine and shortage of basic staples. Despite the costs of
market intervention, the government is unwilling to withdraw the intervention for
fear of risking potential high price volatility, which affects the food security of the
vulnerable sections of society. Lately, the new government set up a high-powered
committee to look into the functioning of the FCI in this context. The committee
made some wide-ranging recommendations, which included abolishing levy on rice,
outsourcing grain-stocking operations to private sector, introducing cash transfers in
the PDS, and reducing the buffer stocks held by the government. The government
has introduced pilot schemes for cash transfers, but many other recommendations
are still under consideration.
During the 2007–2008 global price crisis, the Government of India took two
major steps: (1) it raised the MSP substantially and (2) it started the NFSM in 2007
to produce additional 20 MMT of grains in the subsequent 5 years.
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The MSPs were raised aggressively in the years 2007–2008 and 2008–2009.
MSP increases were also necessitated by the country’s need to become self-
sufficient in cereals’ production, which suffered a setback in 2006–2007, when it had
to import wheat because FCI grain stocks fell below the norm. The MSP increases
formed a pivotal step in the direction of attaining maximum self-sufficiency
domestically.
14.3.6 National Food Security Mission 2007–2008
As a response to this forced wheat import in 2006–2007, India launched the NFSM
in 2007–2008. The objective of this mission was to increase the country’s food
grain production by at least 20 MMT in the 5 years after that—rice production by
10 MMT, wheat by 8 MMT, and pulses by 2 MMT. A two-pronged strategy was
adopted to boost grain production: (1) introducing better technology (seeds) to the
districts/states which were identified as priority, and (2) MSP for wheat and rice
were raised by almost 40 % over the next 2 years, thereby encouraging farmers
to grow more of food grains. Farmers responded positively to the combination of
technology and incentives, and grain production increased by 42 MMT between
2006–2007 and 2011–2012, even though the target was just 20 MMT. This increase
in production coincided with a period of export bans on rice and wheat. The
unexpected production boom resulted in massive accumulation of grain stocks. The
stocks with FCI, for example, reached unprecedented levels of 80.5 MMT on 1 July
2012 (Fig. 14.15).
Increasing MSPs guaranteed the further strengthening of the grain production.
Eventually the policymakers opened the exports of wheat and common rice in
2011. Since then India has become the largest rice exporter in the world, regularly
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exporting more than 10 MMT of rice each year until 2014–2015, when rice exports
reached 12 MMT.
Rising grain stocks also encouraged the government to introduce a bill in the
parliament in 2011 and then enact the National Food Security Act (NFSA) in 2013.
14.3.7 National Food Security Act, 2013
By ensuring ample food stocks with a robust and expanding production base, the
country appeared to have attained food security at the national level. However,
as highlighted before, the situation at the microlevel was bleak, with widespread
malnutrition and stunting among the population. Backed by the growing food grains
stocks, the government enacted the NFSA in 2013.
The PDS is the tool through which the government of India improves food
security at the microlevel. The FCI is the nodal agency which procures, stores,
and distributes grains (mainly rice and wheat) to states, which in turn distribute
it to the identified beneficiaries under the various food-based welfare schemes run
by the central government of the country. Appendix (Fig. 14.16) summarizes the
evolution of the PDS. The depth, scope, and coverage of the PDS expanded under
the NFSA 2013. The Act aims to solve the problem of food and nutritional security
of the Indian population. It combines and expands some existing food-based welfare
schemes and a conditional cash transfer scheme. The Act is likely to be the biggest
program of its kind so far and aims at reaching more than 800 million people (67 %
of India’s population), with an annual, legally enforceable distribution commitment
of 61.4 MMT of grains sold at highly subsidized prices (with almost 90 % subsidy).
A legal commitment of such quantum of grains is likely to put greater pressure
on the government’s procurement machinery which would need the farmer to
continue (and possibly increase) his production of the two crops. Price incentives are
important drivers of farmer behavior (Gulati et al. 2013), and future MSP increases
thus form an inevitable tool under NFSA. If the Act, in its present form, is to
deliver on its set objective of alleviating poverty and malnutrition, commensurate
price incentives have to be put in place. Supplying the committed 61.4 MMTs of
grains necessitated the government to revisit its quarterly buffer-stocking norms.
The government has already approved a newly revised, quarterly buffer stock norm
(with higher norms for three quarters).
The Act is currently unfolding in the country and faces several challenges
ranging from large leakages in the PDS and distortions in production basket to
ballooning food subsidy bill (Saini and Gulati 2015). There are apprehensions
about the capacity and the ability of the act to deliver on its set objectives. The
problem is caused by the inefficiency of the existing PDS machinery, which forms
the base of implementing the Act. The machinery is marred with inefficiencies and
redundancies. (Saini and Kozicka 2014) There are talks of substituting the systems
with a dynamic platform of direct cash/benefit transfer (DBT), whereby instead of
physical grains an equivalent amount of cash will be transferred into the account
of the beneficiary. Four Indian union territories (UTs)—Chandigarh, Puducherry,
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Daman and Diu, and Dadra and Nagar Haveli—have agreed to introduce the
DBT scheme in September 2015. Out of 36 Indian states/UTs, 13 have started
implementing the provisions under the Act.
Falling yields in the traditional rice-growing states and the lowering water tables
is one of the big challenges faced by the country today. Feeding the growing grain
needs of the country necessitates the urgency to create alternative supply stations in
the country. Therefore, the resource-rich Eastern states of Bihar, UP, Jharkhand, and
Assam need to evolve into becoming the future supplier of rice in particular. The
Second Green Revolution is likely to begin in Eastern India this time.
14.3.8 Second Green Revolution
Eastern India, with 2–3 times more rainfall compared to the Northwest states,
has underused its high-quality groundwater aquifers. Vast social capital resource
gives Eastern India a relative advantage in terms of sustainable rice production.
The Eastern states account for 56 % of the total rice planting area in India but
produce only 48 % of the total rice production. The productivity levels in the Eastern
states, except Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal, are among the lowest in India. Out
of the 26.6 million ha rice planting area in Eastern India (UP, Bihar, Jharkhand,
West Bengal, Assam, Orissa, and Chhattisgarh), approximately 14.3 million ha is
rainfed and thus prone to different abiotic stresses like flooding, drought, and soil
salinity/sodicity. These abiotic stresses are the single most important yield-limiting
factor for rice production in Eastern India. The rice productivity of Eastern India,
except UP and West Bengal, is not only low (1.7–2.5 tns/ha) but also fragile.
The central government has been allocating money under Rashtriya Krishi Vikas
Yojana from 2010 to 2011 for extending the Green Revolution to the eastern
regions of the country comprising of Bihar, Jharkhand, Eastern UP, Chhattisgarh,
Orissa, and West Bengal. The objective is to increase the productivity of crops,
mainly rice, wheat, maize, pulses, by intensive cultivation through the promotion
of recommended agriculture technologies, package of practices and high-yielding
stress-tolerant hybrid rice varieties.
14.4 Lessons Learned and theWay Forward
Overall, the experience of 2007–2008 did play a significant role in India’s agri-
culture sector. Country’s intrinsic aversion to volatile food prices coupled with a
disinclination to importing food to feed its population led the policymakers to act
the way they did during the food crisis of 2007–2008.
However, the country learned three key lessons from the food crisis. First, price
incentives are important for Indian farmers, whose encouraging response to raising
the MSP under the NFSM brought the country to new heights in the global trade.
Second, India is not insulated from global events, and putting export bans offers
only a temporary respite to the domestic food prices, which in the longer run
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converged with their global counterpart. Third, agriculture could be a large source
of foreign exchange (net exports) for the country. As evident in the trade flows and
demonstrated using a Balassa Index,1 India has a higher relative trade advantage
in agriculture than manufacturing. Yet the country has not been able to tap the full
potential of the sector because of its restrictive agricultural trade policies.
Therefore, to harness the full potential of the agricultural sector, there is a
need to ensure that agricultural trade policies are consistent, stable, predictable,
and conceived for the long term. Concerted efforts, however, should be made for
aligning domestic and international prices while guarding against sharp price spikes
and troughs through constant monitoring and applying calibrated tariffs rather than
outright bans.
Food security has been and will continue to be one of the primary concerns of
the country’s agriculture and food sector. The NFSA 2013 is seen as a vital step in
alleviating the issue of widespread poverty and malnutrition. Apprehensions about
the inability of the Act to deliver on the set objectives are widespread. There are even
talks about substituting the entire system of subsidized physical grain distribution
(price policy) with direct cash transfers (income policy), but a complete substitution
is still unlikely in the short run. Given the slow pace of policy changes, it may take
3–5 years to transition from physical transfers to cash transfers once the government
decides to implement the changes. Therefore, the country would remain dependent
on and sensitive to any factors affecting food crops like rice and wheat, particularly
with regard to their production and price levels.
However, the country’s policymakers should dilute the intrinsic bias of the
policy and the policy incentives toward food grains (mainly rice and wheat),
which have resulted in inefficient resource allocation and usage. The country
needs to reorient its agriculture sector and policies by calibrating them with two
things: the changing consumption patterns of the Indian population and the relative
comparative advantage that the country’s agricultural sector has globally. While the
former would bridge the increasing gap between the “plough” and the “plate,” the
latter would help the country reap benefits from trade in terms of efficiency.
Apart from crops, the country’s policymakers have an inherent bias toward
certain regions. The Second Green Revolution, which is envisaged to be a game
changer for the Eastern states, is a step in the right direction, with the focus shifting
away from the traditional northern and southern agricultural states. This evolution
should be accompanied by a reorientation of the roles of the many stakeholders,
with the public sector playing a much smaller role in the food market in the future.
1Balassa Index for revealed comparative advantage: It is an index used in international economics
for calculating the relative advantage or disadvantage of a certain country in a certain class of
goods or services as evidenced by trade flows. It is based on the Ricardian comparative advantage
concept. For year 2013–2014, value of the index for agriculture is 1.37 and that of manufacturing
is 0.8, thus indicating India’s relative advantage in agri trade than manufacturing.
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India is an important economy in the global food space and is naturally
interdependent with the world. By having a stable long-run trade policy, creating
institutions and infrastructures to facilitate trade, and focusing on promoting
resource allocation in line with its inherent competitive advantage, the country will
not only tap the full potential of its agricultural sector but will also benefit the world
immensely.
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Appendix
Appendix
PDS (1942 to 
1992)
• No Rationing of People
• Urban Bias till 1951 and  later extended to rural areas facing chronic shortages
• Rationing of quantities
• Grain under PL480 distributed till 1960s used for distribution from Ration shops.
• FCI and APC set up in 1965 and 1960s’ Green Revolution meant domestically procured grains distributed from FPSs
RPDS (1992-
1997)
• Introduced area-approach
• Targeted ALL in the identified poor areas
• Areas targeted included: hilly, remote and inaccessible areas where substantial section of poor lived
• Scale of issue: Upto 20 kg per family per month
TPDS (1997 
onwards)
• Targeted poor in ALL areas
• BPL and APL cards were issued
• Entitlements: 10 kg/month/family for both APL and BPL. Issue price was 50% of economic cost for BPL and at 100% of 
economic cost for APL. BPL entitlements increased to 20 kg in 2000, to 25 kg in 2001
• AAY introduced in 2000 with 25 kg/month/family entitlement. CIP was Rs. 2/kg for wheat and Rs.3/kg for rice. 
• The scale of issue to APL, BPL and AAY categories has been revised to 35 kg/family/month with effect from 01/04/2002
NFSA (2013 
onwards)
• Targets 67% of total population: 75% rural and 50% urban
• Beneficiaries’ identified on the base of poverty estimates and SECC Survey
• Entitlement: 5 kg/person/month. AAY the entitlement is per household, 35 kg/month/HH
• CIP: Rs.3/kg rice, Rs.2/kg  wheat and Re.1 /kg coarse grains
Fig. 14.16 Brief about the evolving system of PDS in India. Source: Saini and Kozicka (2014)
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15The Costs and Benefits of RegionalCooperation on Grain Reserves: The Case
of ECOWAS
Lukas Kornher and Matthias Kalkuhl
15.1 Introduction
Despite widespread skepticism towards public intervention in food markets, many
governments in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere in the world responded to the
2007/2008 global food crisis by implementing or enhancing public stockholding.
These interventions are criticized due to their distortive effects on private trading
and their high operating costs (Newbery and Stiglitz 1981; Miranda and Helmberger
1988; Tschirley and Jayne 2010). On the other hand, the crisis also showed
that international trade is incapable of dampening supply and price shocks when
exporters insulate their domestic markets from the international price development
(Martin and Anderson 2012; Porteous 2012).
Child mortality and general food insecurity in West Africa are among the
highest in the world (FAO et al. 2013; von Grebmer et al. 2013). The region is a
major rice importer and is dependent on these imports to meet food consumption
targets. International food aid has been an important factor in offsetting fluctuations
in national production but has been decreasing rapidly since the middle of the
last decade (FAOSTAT 2014). For these reasons, the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) community decided to make plans for a regional
emergency reserve.1
1For a detailed description of the current proposal, see ECOWAS Commission et al. (2012).
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Regional food reserves are viable and comparably cheap means, as an alternative
to national reserves (FAO et al. 2011; Wright and Cafiero 2011). This is not a new
idea. International risk sharing and multinational insurance schemes were heavily
discussed in the 1970s (Johnson 1976; Reutlinger et al. 1976; Konandreas et al.
1978). As with the concept of any insurance, pooling national supplies stabilizes
regional food availability due to the imperfect correlation of national production
shocks (Koester 1986). However, potential benefits of cooperation can only be
realized when countries agree on common rules under which the reserve operates.
In other words, how much each country contributes and under which circumstances
releases from the reserve are authorized. This requires that all countries benefit from
cooperation vis-à-vis without cooperation.
Academic literature on regional storage cooperation is scant. Existing studies
underline the potential of risk sharing without explicitly conceptualizing the link
to storage. This study aims at closing the gap by providing a methodology to
evaluate potential benefits of regional storage cooperation. The main objective
is to examine whether storage cooperation could enhance food security in West
Africa. Specifically, various possible storage policies are tested, and an efficient load
distribution among participating countries is discussed. Generally, the methodology
is applicable to any group of countries and not limited to West Africa.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. First, Sect. 15.2 discusses
food security and storage as well as trade as means to increase food availability
and introduces the concept of regional cooperation. Then, Sect. 15.3 and Sect. 15.4
outline the framework for assessing the benefits of cooperation and then define
optimal levels of storage in the presence of stochastic supply with the goal of
stabilizing national consumption. The results of this study, including sensitivity
analysis, are presented in Sect. 15.5. Section 15.6 concludes this chapter and
discusses policy implications.
15.2 Food Reserves, Trade, and Benefits of Regional
Cooperation
Annual production is subject to great fluctuation and consequently may be insuffi-
cient to meet stable consumption needs in non-exporting economies. Food imports
and stocks can offset these fluctuations. The empirical literature emphasizes the
interchangeability of trade and storage to offset unstable production (Williams and
Wright 1991; Makki et al. 1996, 2001). There are good reasons to believe that
free market stock levels in many developing countries are not sufficiently high or
optimal (Newbery and Stiglitz 1981; Gilbert 2011). Similarly, the potential gains
from regional trade are not exhausted in many developing countries (Badiane et
al. 2014). Gilbert (2011) suggests considering a country’s specific characteristics
to determine the right policy. So, exporters can easily regulate domestic food
availability by flexible export quantities. Trade is also advantageous if supply shocks
between countries are independent or negatively correlated (Koester 1984; Badiane
et al. 2014). In contrast, importers and countries that switch between net importer
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and net exporter can successfully insure themselves against high international
prices by keeping security stocks. Furthermore, high transportation costs (e.g.,
for landlocked countries) and/or long periods of shipment make public reserves
favorable to trade. Trade can also transmit market instability from partner countries
into national markets (Makki et al. 2001). Moreover, relying on imports to manage
food availability can be problematic when partner countries are noncooperative and
restrict exports at times (Gouel and Jean 2015). This was a frequently observed
practice during the price surges in 2007/2008 (Martin and Anderson 2012; Porteous
2012). For these reasons, food reserves have a structural advantage over trade
integration, at least from a government’s perspective.2
Food reserves can be divided into two broad categories: emergency or strategic
reserves and buffer stocks. The purpose of the former is to overcome food supply
shortfalls caused by weather-related shocks (such as droughts or floods), pests,
and political instability (Lynton-Evans 1997). During a crisis, additional food is
brought into the system via targeted food subsidies (e.g., food stamps, food for
work, school feeding programs, etc.). In contrast, buffer stocks are used to generally
stabilize commodity prices at both ends of the distribution. In doing so, public
institutions buy and sell commodities in order to increase market supply or demand.
The objective of the buffer stock is to keep prices within a price band, between a
predetermined floor and ceiling price (Newbery and Stiglitz 1981). Purchases and
sales can be realized not only in the open market but also through contract farming
and subsidized sales to public and private entities. The main danger lies in having to
operate buffer stocks permanently, which implies permanent market intervention.
Notably, intervention levels of existing national reserves and buffer stocks vary
significantly across countries.3
The gains from cooperation rest on the concept of risk pooling. Risk pooling,
or diversification, originates from the insurance and finance literature and is the
central business concept of every insurance company. Pooling uncertain outcomes
of multiple individuals reduces the volatility of their joint outcome. Expected losses
remain the same, but insurance companies can reduce their accrued liabilities if (and
only if) losses of policyholders are not perfectly correlated. On the same account, a
group of countries can reduce the stocking norm of their food reserves by sharing the
risk of supply shocks. Statistically, the covariance and correlation of individual risks
is the key determinant for gains from cooperation. If shocks are idiosyncratic, then
risk sharing is feasible. On the contrary, if shocks are highly correlated, the benefits
of cooperation will be small (Townsend 1995). From this, it is possible to conclude
2On the one hand, deepening trade relationships require trading partners to be equally willing to
cooperate; on the other hand, trade integration usually takes time to establish business relations
and trust between actors.
3Agricultural markets in India, Zambia, and Indonesia are dominated by state-owned enterprises
that buy, stock, and sell a very large share of marketed grains. In contrast, several countries maintain
public stockholding that is unlikely to affect market prices due to its small size. In an ideal world,
buffer stocks should be large enough to influence prices but small enough not to crowd out private
investment and distort markets.
356 L. Kornher and M. Kalkuhl
that supply instability in one region (a group of countries) is lower if national
supply quantities are independent or negatively correlated. The potential of regional
risk sharing with respect to supply shocks of major food crops in Africa is well
acknowledged in existing studies (Koester 1986; Badiane et al. 2014). Since supply
variability is the main reason to establish food reserves, lower supply variability
implies that a reserve requires lower stock levels.
Wright and Cafiero (2011) also discuss the role of regional reserves in increasing
a country’s commitment to refrain from imposing export regulations in times
of a food crisis. These commitments seem unfeasible under the common WTO
discipline. At the same time, governments dispose of ways to impede exportation
through the over-bureaucratization of legal processes. Hence, it is conceivable to
combine storage and trade cooperation. In doing so, participating countries provide
a share of their national supply for exporting (if harvests are sufficiently high) and
in return receive the entitlement to release stocks during a crisis.
A multinational reserve involving a buffer stock scheme, with market purchase
and release, seems very challenging to realize. If the regional reserve operates
separately at national levels, trade between countries would undermine the prin-
ciples of operation and could lead to complete inefficacy. On the contrary, if the
region is considered as a single market, intervention prices are extremely difficult
to determine since price levels naturally differ among member countries, especially
without a common currency. Therefore, strategic humanitarian reserves should be
preferred.
15.3 Assessment of the Costs and Benefits of Cooperation
In order to assess the costs and benefits of regional cooperation, we compare
consumption variability and reserve levels under regional cooperation vis-à-vis
without cooperation. In other words, optimal stocking norms are defined for each
individual country and for specific groups of countries. If a country’s welfare is
given by:
U D H ŒVAR .C .˛//  G .˛/ ; (15.1)
where H is a function decreasing with consumption variability Var.C/ and G, the
costs of interventions that increase with the stock-to-use ratio ˛I ˛ 2 .0; 1/ reduces
consumption variability and thus increases H in the following manner: H0 .˛/ > 0
and H00 .˛/ < 0.
Then welfare increases with consumption stability and decreases with higher
reserve stock levels. A government chooses the optimal policy by opting for a
stock-to-use ratio (˛) that maximizes social welfare. Accordingly, there is a trade-
off when increasing the stock level of the reserve. Higher stock levels guarantee
greater consumption stability but are associated with higher operational costs.
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The optimal ˛ maximizes social welfare without cooperation. On the contrary,
in the case of regional storage cooperation, the level of consumption variability,
and thus the optimal stock-to-use ratio, is no longer determined by an individual
country through welfare optimization but by a common decision among all member
countries. Heterogeneity among regional partners could explain why they may
disagree about common regional policies. For instance, countries with high supply
instability may be satisfied with a relatively moderate level of consumption stability,
whereas countries with stable national supply need regional consumption stability
to be sufficiently high to benefit from an intervention. In regional integration, states
voluntarily hand their decision-making power over to supernational entities and
create a political power that overrules national policies (Heinonen 2006). Taking a
game-theoretic approach, the median voter will decide on the level of consumption
stability in such a setting (Alesina et al. 2005). As a consequence, countries with
similar economic structures lose less in comparison with countries with divergent
economic structures.
Thus, the benefits of regional risk sharing are evaluated against the costs of
a potentially suboptimal choice of stock-to-use ratio. Following the framework
mentioned above, the net benefits (Xi) of cooperation for each country i are given
by the difference in social welfare before and after joining the regional agreement:
Ni D Hi
h
VAR

bCi
i
 Hi

VAR

Ci
C Gi

˛i
  Gi .b˛i/ (15.2)
where VAR

Ci

is the consumption variability resulting from the optimal ˛i for an
individual country without cooperation or the optimal level of target consumption
chosen by the country. Analogously, VAR

bCi

is the consumption variability under
cooperation determined by b˛, which is jointly selected by the member countries.
However, without specifying the functions Hi and Gi, welfare impacts are not
unambiguously appraisable. Definite predictions are possible when benefits increase
and costs decrease and vice versa. Yet in the remaining cases, a specific functional
form of Hi and Gi is required for a clear assessment.
The framework introduced requires the definition of optimal stocking rules or
stock-to-use ratios that are applied by each country. This implies stocks need
to be sufficiently high to permit stock releases that achieve the desired level of
consumption (stability). At the same, the policy governing the release of stocks
from the reserve must be strictly defined. Within regional storage cooperation, the
member countries must contribute to the endowment of the regional reserve. These
contributions could be proportionally equal. In this case, all countries would have
identical stock-to-use ratios. Alternatively, Koester (1986) proposes that a country
should contribute according to its individual stock needs. In doing so, countries
with greater supply instability would be asked to contribute more than countries
with greater supply stability. In this way, all countries would benefit from the
cooperation in the same manner. Again, the releases from the reserve must make
sure that the desired consumption (stability) is given for each member country. This
means that whenever a country’s supply falls short of its target level (specified in the
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rules of the reserve), the country would receive stocks from the regional reserve to
guarantee national consumption. As opposed to this, if a country’s domestic supply
is sufficient in satisfying domestic demand in a particular year, then the country does
not receive anything from the regional reserve.
15.4 Optimal Stocks and Stocking Rule
In this analysis, two possible types of reserve are considered: an emergency reserve,
which releases stocks whenever supply falls short of a predetermined level, and a
buffer stock regime, which stabilizes supply in both directions.
15.4.1 Emergency Reserve
In line with the existing literature, the optimal reserve level should be able to absorb
historical production and supply shocks by a predetermined probability or margin
(Johnson 1976; Konandreas et al. 1978; Koester 1986). Let the market identity be
given by:
Ct D Qt C IMt  EXt D Xt (15.3)
where total consumption (Ct) equals production (Qt) plus imports (IMt) minus
exports (EXt). Imports and exports are assumed to be from international markets
only. National production and imports constitute total national supply (Xt).
In case production falls short of the desired level, minimum consumption of a
country can be satisfied through additional imports. However, food availability has
generally (not only in the case of West Africa) seen drastic variations from year
to year despite food imports. Furthermore, international food prices fluctuate and
therefore make the food import bill unpredictable (Sarris et al. 2011). In such a
situation, the emergency reserve would step in to lift consumption to the desired
minimum level. Following Konandreas et al. (1978), the desired minimum level is
referred to as target consumption level c (e.g., 95 % of long-term trend). Then,
consumption in a given year is given by:
Ct D max

Xt; c
E ŒCt

(15.4)
where Xt, is the actual supply in at t, and cE ŒCt is the target consumption based on
expected supply that is calculated from historical values. By definition c 2 Œ0; 1.
In words, when national supply is higher than the target level, consumption just
equals total supply. But whenever supply is lower than the target level, the reserve
releases the necessary amount to close the gap to satisfy at least c  100% of the
expected consumption. Consumption is expected to always equal supply. In order
to satisfy Eq. (15.4), stocks need to compensate for supply shortfalls of more than
.1  c/  100%. Subsequently, the ratio of consumption to be stored .˛/ is defined
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as the ratio between stocks and expected consumption:
St D maxt

0; cE ŒXt  .Xt/

for t D t1; : : : ; tn (15.5)
˛t D
St
E ŒCt
(15.6)
where max
t
ŒcE ŒXt  .Xt/ is the largest historical supply shortfall over the period
t1–tn. If supply never falls below cE ŒXt, no stocks shall be carried. St are optimal
stocks, and ˛t is the optimal stock-to-use ratio at present time.
In regional cooperation, the reserve must carry sufficiently large stocks to satisfy
the sum of supply shortfalls in all member countries, so that regional consumption
is given by
CRt D
X
i
Cit (15.7)
where CRt is the regional consumption, which is the sum of the consumption in each
member country given by Eq. 15.4.
Accordingly, the individual national reserves carry total regional stocks which
are the sum of national stocks:
SRt D
X
i
Sit D
X
i
max
t

0; ciE ŒXit  .Xit/

for t D t1; : : : ; tn (15.8)
where SR is the amount of regional stocks and all other parameters are described as
above.
If national supply shortfalls are not perfectly correlated, then the common
regional reserve must carry only enough stocks to balance the sum of the shortfalls
that occur in a particular year.
bSRt D maxt
"
0;
X
i
bc E ŒXit  .Xit/
#
for t D t1; : : : ; tn (15.9)
where max
t

0;
P
ibc E ŒXit  .Xit/

is the largest historical regional supply shortfall
over the period t1–tn.andbc is the consumption target in a regional cooperation which
does not vary between member countries i. If supply never falls belowbc E ŒXt, no
stocks shall be carried.
The regional reserve shall be endowed with stocks by contributions from its
member countries. In this instance, national stocking norms change to:
bSit D sibSRt D b˛tE ŒXit (15.10)
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with b˛t D S
R
t
E ŒCRt
(15.11)
eSit D SitPn
iD1 Sit
SRt (15.12)
where si is a country’s share of the total regional consumption; bSit and eSit are a
country’s contributions to the regional reserve under equal and relative contribu-
tions. Under equal contributions, all countries have the same stock-to-use ratio b˛
in t. Under relative contributions, b˛i varies among countries by the extent to which
national stocks vary across countries without regional cooperation.
However, regional storage cooperation and intra-regional trade cooperation can
work hand in hand. For instance, it is conceivable to assume that supply surpluses
are exported to the region. Hence, supply shortfalls in neighboring countries can
be first alleviated through trade before releasing stocks from the regional reserve.
Storage cooperation could also increase the commitment to such arrangements
(Wright and Cafiero 2011).
A reasonable assumption may be that a country’s excess surpluses ESit D Xit 
E ŒXit are approved for export. Thus, intra-regional trade and regional stocks are
given by:
TRt D
X
i
max Œ0; Xit  E ŒXit (15.13)
SRt D maxt
"
0;
"
X
i
bcE ŒXit  .Xit/
#
 TRt
#
for t D t1; : : : ; tn (15.14)
where TRt is the total quantity traded within the region in a particular year, which
is computed as the sum of excess surpluses across all member countries. Regional
trade reduces the amount of regional stocks, which are necessary to alleviate supply
shocks. Therefore, historical shortfalls, which have to be balanced, diminish with
growing amount of intra-regional trade. Contributions of member countries and
stock-to-use ratios can be computed in a way analogous to the case without intra-
regional trade.
15.4.2 Stabilization Reserve
As opposed to the emergency reserve described in the previous section, the concept
of the stabilization reserve is derived from the classical storage literature (Gustafson
1958). Stocks are regarded as part of national supply and demand. Each year, a
constant portion ( ) of the total available supply is kept as stock in a reserve; this
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is a linear approximation of the stocking rule pioneered by Gustafson. In this way,
stock levels change over time. After years with good harvests, stock levels will be
become higher (and will correspondingly become lower after bad harvests). In this
case, the market identity from Eq. (15.3) above changes to:
Ct D Xt St (15.15)
St D StC1  St (15.16)
StC1 D  .St C Xt/ (15.17)
where all parameters are defined the same as above. St is opening stocks available
for consumption in t, and StC1 are the stocks carried to the next period. St is the
change in ending stocks from t  1 to t.  is the constant portion of total available
supply that is carried over to the next period.
Inserting Eq. (15.15) in Eq. (15.14), consumption can be written as4:
Ct D .1  / .Xt/C .1 / St (15.18)
Since supply naturally fluctuates, we want to know the expected level of stocks. This
can be easily derived since E ŒSt D E ŒStC1. Thus,
St D
E ŒXt
.1  / (15.19)
˛ D 
1   (15.20)
where St is the optimal stock level and ˛ the corresponding optimal stock-to-use
ratio.
The objective of the stabilization reserve is to stabilize consumption. Hence, it
is of interest is to investigate how consumption variability depends on the stocking
parameter . ). Taking the variance of Eq. (15.18) yields:
VAR.C/ D 1  
1C  VAR.X/ (15.21)
CV.C/ D
s
1  
1C  CV.X/; (15.22)
4For the complete analytical derivation, see Kornher (2015).
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where VAR .C/ and VAR .X/ are variance of consumption and supply, respectively,
and CV .C/ and CV .X/ are the respective coefficients of variation.
Consequently, consumption variability is a function of supply variability and the
stocking parameter ( ). The larger the supply variability, the larger the consumption
variability. On the other hand, increasing  stabilizes consumption. It is important
to note that the stabilization reserve in the case of regional storage cooperation
works only if markets are fully integrated and if demand and supply adjust perfectly
between countries. In this case, regional supply and consumption variability are
equal to national supply and consumption variability for each individual member
country.
15.5 Results
15.5.1 Supply Patterns inWest Africa
Table 15.1 provides economic and agricultural statistics on West African countries
involved in this analysis. Heterogeneity between countries exists with respect to
income level and food security status. While Ghana and Cape Verde have relatively
low prevalence of hunger and malnutrition, 12 % of the total ECOWAS population
is still undernourished, with alarmingly high figures in the Sahel zone. With the
exception of Mali and to some extent Burkina Faso, all countries depend on imports
to guarantee sufficient supply of grain. In general, it is observed that coastal
countries have larger import-to-production ratios, with Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire,
Liberia, Senegal, and Mauritania having ratios above one. Overall, Nigeria’s
prominent role in the region is to be noted. Due to the country’s population, more
than 40 % of regional production originates from Nigeria, and thus the country
would likely assume a leading role in any regional cooperation agreement.
The subsequent analysis is based on fluctuations in national food production
and supply. Supply is calculated as production plus imports. In this way, extreme
fluctuations in the production of many import-dependent countries are extenuated.
Therefore, the analysis of supply shocks is considered to be more instructive. All
imports are considered to be from international markets. In the analysis which
considers intra-regional trade, these international imports are considered to be part
of the national supply.
Since production increases with agricultural productivity and population growth,
unadjusted measures of variability as variance and coefficient of variation become
inappropriate measures of variability (Cuddy and Della Valle 1978). One possibility
is to correct coefficient of variation and variance by the fitness of a trend function
(Koester 1984). Alternatively, variability can be measured after detrending the time
series. Thus, variability in supply is given as the variation around a trend. A linear
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Table 15.1 Key statistics: ECOWAS
Total Import/
Population (in GDP per % of under- production (in production
100,000) capita PPP nourished 1000 mt) (in %)
Benin 10,323 1791 8.1 1667 21
Burkina Faso 16,934 1634 25.9 4949 9
Cape Verde 498 6412 – 7 2.86
Cote d’Ivoire 20,316 3012 21.4 1276 116
Gambia, The 1849 1666 14.4 214 58
Ghana 25,904 3974 3.4 2645 44
Guinea 11,745 1255 17.3 2292 21
Guinea-Bissau 1704 1242 8.7 175 74
Liberia 4294 878 31.4 150 227
Mali 15,301 1641 7.9 5032 3
Niger 17,831 913 12.6 4308 13
Nigeria 173,615 5863 8.5 22,042 32
Senegal 14,133 2269 20.5 1182 150
Sierra Leone 6092 1927 28.8 897 28
Togo 6816 1390 16.5 1142 23
Total ECOWAS 327,355 4123 12 47,978 30
Cameroon 22,253 2711 15.7 3047 37
Chad 12,825 2081 33.4 1647 18
Mauritania 3889 3042 9.3 222 207
Source: AFDB (2014), von Grebmer et al. (2013), USDA (2014). Note: Mauritania withdrew
from ECOWAS in 2000; CFA countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire,
Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal; all other countries use their own free floating
currency
trend clearly does not fit the supply data of several countries in the region. Therefore,
the data is detrended by using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP-filter).5
An example is given in Fig. 15.1, which shows the national supply in Ghana.
Actual supply quantities are depicted by the black line, and the dashed gray line
indicates the HP-filter trend values for a smoothing parameter of 6.25. The deviation
of actual supply from trend supply becomes stationary, and variability can be
computed by:
CV D
r
1
.
n
X

  Xt=St
2
=
; (15.23)
5The HP-filter is widely used to detrend macroeconomic time series data that exhibits cyclical
fluctuations. The estimated trend value is given by the minimization of quadratic deviations in due
consideration of a smooth trend. As recommended for annual data, the smoothing parameter is
chosen to be 6.25 (Gabler Wirtschatfslexikon 2014).
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Fig. 15.1 Grain supply in Ghana 1980–2014. Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA
(2014)
where Xt is the total supply in t and Xt the trend value of supply determined by the
HP-filter. By definition, 
 equals 1.
Table 15.2 shows each country’s contribution to the total regional grain supply
in 2014 as well as the coefficient of variation in production and supply over the
period from 1980 to 2014. In brief, there are two general observations. First,
supply variability is substantially lower than production variability, in particular for
countries with high import-production ratio. Second, no country exhibits production
and supply variability that is lower than the figure for the region as a whole.
Therefore, the basic requirements for the West African region to benefit from
cooperation are fulfilled.
In more detail, production variability is highest for Cape Verde, Mauritania,
Senegal, the Gambia, and Chad. All these countries largely depend on import.
However, for all of these countries, supply variability is significantly lower. This
implies that imports were successfully utilized to stabilize domestic consumption,
but the import levels are still higher than in countries with greater self-sufficiency.
In general, coastal countries show higher production and supply stability; this can
be explained by more favorable climatic conditions in the humid and semi-humid
tropical zone compared to the Sahel zone (HarvestChoice 2014). Interestingly, these
findings with regard to instability are quite similar to those of Koester (1984), who
looks at the period from 1960 to 1980. According to his analysis of the UEMOA
countries, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, and Mali had more stable production than
Senegal, Mauritania, and Niger. The observed pattern seems to persist over time.
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Table 15.2 Production and supply instability in West Africa
Share in regional Share in regional
production CV production supply CV supply
Benin 2:9 7:6 2:7 7:6
Burkina Faso 8:9 10:3 7:5 9:1
Cameroon 5:7 7:2 6:0 6:0
Cape Verde 0:0 43:8 0:0 30:3
Chad 3:4 15:7 3:0 13:3
Cote d’Ivoire 2:4 5:5 4:0 5:7
Gambia, The 0:4 16:1 0:5 14:4
Ghana 5:0 14:0 5:6 10:2
Guinea 4:2 5:5 3:9 5:6
Guinea-Bissau 0:4 9:8 0:4 10:3
Liberia 5:0 16:1 0:7 14:8
Mali 10:4 9:7 8:1 9:4
Mauritania 0:4 27:6 1:0 9:6
Niger 8:7 13:5 7:4 12:0
Nigeria 40:6 5:8 41:2 5:4
Senegal 2:4 18:0 4:3 8:3
Sierra Leone 1:5 13:8 1:6 11:1
Togo 2:1 10:2 2:0 8:1
Region 100:0 4:5 100:0 3:4
Source: Author’s computation based on USDA (2014)
15.5.2 Emergency Reserve
This subsection discusses the optimal stocking norms for an emergency reserve as
defined earlier. The target consumption level is the critical parameter to be chosen.
A target consumption level of j % can be represented by j % of annual production
(dashed line in Fig. 15.1).6 The lighter solid line in Fig. 15.1 illustrates this for a
target consumption level of 95 %. Then, the deviation of actual supply from target
consumption is computed, and the maximum historical shortfall is identified. In the
instance of Ghana, the largest shortfall happened in 1983. The size of the shortfall
depends on the target consumption chosen. Target consumption levels of individual
countries are hypothetical and cannot be observed. A possible way to determine
target consumption levels is to assume that each country uses the reserve to mitigate
x- % of the largest supply or production shock. From the standard deviation of these
shocks of each country, the target consumption level with respect to any quantile
can be computed. Normalized standard deviations are equal to the coefficient of
variation shown in Table 15.2. Figure 15.2 shows the target consumption levels
6Recall that production/supply D consumption.
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Fig. 15.2 Possible target consumption levels by country. Source: Author’s illustration
across countries for the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % quantiles when assuming a normal
distribution of supply shocks.7
Figure 15.2 contains important information. Intuitively, the larger the tail of
the distribution (the greater the quintile), the lower target consumption will be.
First, as elaborated above, higher target consumption levels also require larger
stocking norms. Second, target consumption levels would vary significantly among
the countries: Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, and Guinea would have the highest target
consumption levels, and Cape Verde would have the lowest. Third, the lower the
national supply variability, the higher the target consumption levels in a particular
quintile. This is also intuitive because when national supply is more stable, higher
target consumption is required to alleviate a relatively moderate supply shock. In
71 %, 5 %, and 10 % quantiles reflect the frequency of interventions of the national reserve. Thus,
absorbing the 10 % largest supply shocks demands the highest frequency of supply shocks.
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the following, the median values will serve as possible target consumption levels
for the region.
15.5.2.1 Emergency ReserveWithout Intra-regional Trade
The stocking norm is defined as the largest historical shortfall between actual and
target consumption over the past 35 years. Table 15.3 summarizes the respective
stocking norms for all countries and various levels of target consumption. Apart
from the median target consumption levels, the target consumption levels of 99 %,
97 %, 95 %, and 90 % are also considered.
Large countries have the highest optimal stocking norms. The corresponding
stock-to-use ratios show the relative level of the stocking norms. All countries that
are characterized by high supply variability also have the largest optimal stocking
norms within an emergency reserve. The total regional stocks according to the
maximum historical shortfall rule are between 231,137 tons and 6.2 million tons.
The values for the target consumption levels of 95 % and above are well in the
range of the actual stock levels according to USDA and FAO CBS. However, one
would choose optimal emergency reserve stocks that are smaller than actual stocks
since total stocks also include speculative and working stocks of private market
participants. In this respect, lower levels of target consumption seem to be more
reasonable.
On the other hand, several countries with low supply variability hardly stock
anything at target consumption levels below 95 %, as shown in Table 15.3.
For instance, Nigeria and Guinea would not store anything at target consumption
levels of 88 % and below and thus would not benefit from regional storage with
all stocking norms selected using the median values (shown in Fig. 15.2). At
the target consumption level of 84 %, Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal would likely
also cease to participate in a regional reserve, followed by Benin, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Togo for 78 % target consumption. Hence,
target consumption levels need to be sufficiently high in order that all West African
countries benefit from cooperation. For this reason, only simulation results for target
consumption levels of 90 % and above are subsequently presented in the main text.
The detailed simulation results for the target consumption level of 95 % are tabulated
in the main text in Table 15.4; the detailed results for 90 %, 97 %, and 99 % are
presented in the Appendix (Tables 15.6, 15.7, and 15.8).
Under storage cooperation, optimal stocking norms can be significantly lower
if shortfalls between actual and target consumption levels are independent or not
perfectly positively correlated. The potential for the ECOWAS region to benefit
from these independencies of production and supply shocks is underlined by the
analysis conducted by Badiane et al. (2014).
Table 15.4 shows the results of having a regional reserve. For both production
and supply, the remaining columns contain the optimal stocking norm under the
following three scenarios: (1) no storage cooperation under autarky, (2) equal con-
tributions from the countries to the regional reserve, and (3) relative contributions to
the regional reserve required under autarky. The first column reveals the probability
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Table 15.4 Optimal stock levels in 2014 for target consumption of 95 %
Production Supply
Pi Si
 bSi eSi Pi Si
 bSi eSi
Benin 26 % 98,832 68,249 58,004 29 % 103,195 66,181 66,804
Burkina Faso 26 % 461,771 209,158 271,009 29 % 407,983 182,765 264,111
Cameroon 11 % 163,986 134,570 96,242 14 % 148,788 146,499 96,319
Cape Verde 43 % 7572 298 4444 40 % 14,144 885 9156
Chad 37 % 301,534 79,510 176,968 31 % 278,533 73,389 180,311
Cote d’Ivoire 14 % 84,520 55,554 49,604 20 % 99,615 97,416 64,487
Gambia, The 34 % 70,230 9566 41,217 43 % 34,589 12,069 22,391
Ghana 17 % 287,853 118,080 168,939 26 % 366,847 136,789 237,481
Guinea 17 % 57,988 99,377 34,033 14 % 51,597 96,782 33,402
Guinea-Bissau 29 % 21,528 7566 12,635 31 % 20,755 10,768 13,436
Liberia 31 % 20,306 7941 11,918 31 % 44,203 18,083 28,615
Mali 37 % 216,774 243,921 127,223 31 % 223,631 199,491 144,770
Mauritania 46 % 49,666 9552 29,149 29 % 91,279 25,604 59,090
Niger 29 % 607,626 204,524 356,610 31 % 503,972 182,173 326,251
Nigeria 17 % 928,445 951,527 544,897 14 % 977,939 1,010,583 633,077
Senegal 40 % 429,613 56,908 252,136 26 % 208,432 106,131 134,930
Sierra Leone 31 % 105,992 35,788 62,206 31 % 119,471 38,301 77,341
Togo 23 % 75,671 49,553 44,411 20 % 94,014 48,925 60,861
Total 97 % 3,989,905 2,342,642 2,342,642 97 % 3,788,989 2,452,834 2,452,834
Source: Author’s computation based on USDA (2014). Note: Stock levels in mt; Pi is the
probability of intervention when production and supply are below the target consumption (99 %).
Si
,bSi,eSi are stocks without cooperation and with equal and relative contributions
of a shortfall in production and supply.8,9 The last row contains the total stock level
of the whole region if the countries operate individual reserves and if they cooperate.
Without regional storage cooperation, the total regional stocks amount to 3,989,905
metric tons for production only and 3,788,989 metric tons for supply. In contrast,
with cooperation, regional stocks only need to be 2,342,642 and 2,452,834 metric
tons. Comparing the two scenarios reveals a 41 % and 35 % reduction in the total
storage level for production and supply, respectively. Since relative contributions
among the countries imply that all countries benefit equally from the cooperation,
the percentage reduction in storage levels applies to all countries alike. The positive
effect of a regional storage cooperation holds regardless of the rule of contributions
(equal or relative), but two countries, namely, Guinea and Nigeria, are disadvantaged
in the case of proportionally equal contributions. Figure 15.3 shows the difference
between the effects of both types of contributions on each country. It becomes
evident that countries with relatively low levels of supply variability would prefer
8Equal contributions imply, proportionally equal to a country’s share in regional consumption.
9The probability of shortfall is computed from historical shortfalls.
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Fig. 15.3 Contributions to a regional reserve with 95 % target consumption by country (based
on supply). Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA (2014). Note: Equal contributions to the
reserve imply an identical stock-to-use ratio across countries, while relative contributions demand
higher stock-to-use ratios in countries with higher variability in supply
relative contributions to the regional reserve. Nigeria, the single largest contributor,
could save more than 300,000 metric tons of food when making relative as opposed
to equal contribution. Similarly, Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, and Cameroon would
be able to reduce their contributions under the relative contribution scheme. In fact,
the average stock-to-use ratio in the region (5 % for 95 % target consumption)
represents a threshold. Without regional cooperation, all countries that have a stock-
to-use ratio above the regional average are better off by adopting equal instead of
relative contributions, while all countries with a stock-to-use ratio below regional
average would prefer relative contributions.
For clarity, the tabulated results for the other target consumption levels are
only presented in the appendix. However, their effect on total regional stocks is
illustrated in Fig. 15.4. The benefits of cooperation are lower at higher levels of
target consumption. At 99 % and 97 % target consumption, regional stocks were,
respectively, around 25 % and 30 % lower with cooperation than without cooper-
ation, whereas the benefits of cooperation are greater at the target consumption of
90 %. Accordingly, regional stocks could be 62 % lower with regional cooperation
in contrast with without cooperation.
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Fig. 15.4 Regional stocks with and without storage cooperation (without intra-regional trade).
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA (2014)
It is noteworthy that a regional reserve without integration of markets or transfers
between countries is required to act significantly more often than a national reserve
as the probability of shortfalls increases. Hence, the total quantity needed to
compensate for production and supply shortfalls is equal with or without storage
cooperation. The benefits of cooperation are apparent only when lower stock levels
are kept at any one time. However, these benefits are substantial as countries are also
required to renew their reserve stocks on a regular basis, even if the reserve stocks
are not used to offset supply shocks.
Lastly, what are the welfare implications that can be derived from the simulation
results above? First and foremost, with reasonably high levels of target consumption,
optimal stocking norms can be defined so that all countries would benefit from
the decision. However, preferences are not homogeneous, and low levels of target
consumption put countries with low supply variability at a disadvantage. Since the
preferences of countries cannot be observed, only under two circumstances can net
benefits be identified when preferences are heterogeneous. First, target consumption
chosen by the region is lower than that of a country without cooperation, while
stocking norms are lower with cooperation; in this case, a country benefits from
cooperation. Second, the net benefits of cooperation are unambiguously negative if
target consumption with cooperation is higher than with regional cooperation and
if stocking norms are higher than without cooperation. Indeed, the latter can be
excluded by choosing target consumption levels above 90 %. Intuitively, countries
with large supply variability would likely prefer equal contribution to the regional
reserve. Therefore, it is important to offer incentives for all countries to participate
in the reserve in order to realize the full benefits of cooperation.
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15.5.3 Emergency Reserve with Intra-Regional Trade
When intra-regional trade is allowed, the analysis is analogous to the scenario
without trade. Therefore, the largest historical shortfalls and the associated stocking
norms in autarky remain unchanged. The only difference is that supply shortfalls in
neighboring countries are first alleviated through trade before releasing stocks from
the reserve. Participating countries are committed to export only when actual supply
exceeds estimated supply as computed by the HP-filter.
Figure 15.5 shows a comparison of the required stocks with and without intra-
regional trade. Trade appears to hardly reduce the level of required stocks. The most
notable gains are seen when stocks are based on a consumption shortfall of 10 %.
The results of the simulation can be explained by the choice of the criterion
used to determine reserve levels according to historical consumption shortfalls. The
historically largest shortfall occurred in 2007, and only very few countries were
able to export in that year. The exports from these very few countries are not
high enough to offset the supply shortfalls of other countries. Small differences
in the reserve level notwithstanding, regional trade would reduce the frequency of
stock-outs significantly. The probability of a shortfall occurring is at most 43 %,
compared to between 89 % and 100 % across all levels of target consumption for the
emergency reserve without intra-regional trade. When 5 % shortfall in consumption
is allowed, with intra-regional trade, the probability of a shortfall is only between
20 % and 26 % for supply and production, respectively.
These benefits are founded on intra-regional exports. Figure 15.6 shows the
average annual exports, based on production and supply figures, over the period
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Fig. 15.5 Regional stocks for an emergency reserve with intra-regional trade. Source: Author’s
illustration based on USDA (2014)
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Fig. 15.6 Average annual exports by country 1980–2014. Source: Author’s illustration based on
USDA (2014)
from 1980 to 2014. The total annual exports amounted to 1.13 million tons based
on production and 1.16 million tons based on supply data. As calculated using
the expected supply for 2014, the total annual exports range between 0.7 % and
0.9 % of total supply in 2014 for Guinea and Cameroon and between 4.59 % and
7.9 % for Cape Verde. By the definition used to determine exports, countries with
higher production and supply fluctuations automatically export more than countries
with lower fluctuations. This is because these countries exhibit greater positive and
negative deviations from the trend. Generally, exports are at a realistic level. Net
welfare benefits can be computed in a way similar to the case without intra-regional
trade.
15.5.4 Stabilization Reserve
The optimal stocking rule under national stockholding can be estimated using actual
stock data. Since the USDA only has poor quality of data on stocks for small
countries, the FAO CBS stock data is preferred and utilized in this analysis. The
stocking parameter is obtained by estimating the following equation with OLS:
St D  .St1 C Qt1 C IMt1  EXt1/C "t (15.24)
where all variables are as described in the previous sections and "t is the normally
distributed error term.
It should be noted that the constant is omitted in this estimation. First, storage is
a nonnegative value, and negative stocks values are also impossible. Second, stocks
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Fig. 15.7 Stocking parameter and supply variability across study countries. Source: Author’s
illustration based on USDA (2014) and FAO CBS (2014)
need to increase with supply starting from zero if supply is zero.10 The results are
presented in Fig. 15.7, which depicts the stocking parameter  conditional on the
level of supply variability estimated by the coefficient of variation around a trend as
described in the previous sections.
The solid line represents the overall positive correlation between supply vari-
ability and the stocking rule. A slope parameter of 0.30 implies that the stocking
parameter increases by 3 percentage points on average when supply variability
is 10 percentage points higher.11 However, there are notable exceptions to this
relationship.12 Niger, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria store only 6 % of its total available
supply, although their supply variability is relatively high. In contrast, the Gambia
and Chad experience supply variability similar to Niger, but they store 24 % and
19 %, respectively. All other countries in the region store roughly between 8 and
10The estimation is associated with several problems (non-stationarity, number of observations),
and results have to be interpreted with caution. However, the objective is not to establish causality
or to compute confidence intervals but rather to obtain a country’s preferences without storage
cooperation.
11When Cape Verde, an outlier, is excluded, the slope parameter only changes marginally.
12It should be noted that an increase of 0.1 is quite substantial because  ranges between 0 and 1.
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Fig. 15.8 Consumption and supply variability of study countries. Source: Author’s illustration
based on USDA (2014) and FAO CBS (2014)
17 %. Taking the sum of individual stocks as the optimal choice for the region, 9 %
of the region’s annual supply should be stored due to the low value of Nigeria.
Using the policy parameter and the information on each country’s supply
variability, it is possible to compute the consumption variability as chosen by each
country (see Eq. 15.22). Figure 15.8 shows the relative position of each country with
regard to their consumption and supply. The solid line represents the parity between
consumption and supply variability; countries without storage would lie on this line.
With additional storage, countries move further to the right, away from the solid line.
Hence, the larger a country’s stocking parameter ” is, the farther away from the
parity line countries are. Moreover, for countries with lower supply variability, it is
less efficient to decrease consumption variability by one unit by increasing storage.
For example, Cameroon needs to store 18 % of its total available supply to reduce
consumption variability by 1 %. In contrast, Ghana is able to reduce consumption
instability by 0.8 % by storing only 9 % of its available supply.
The costs of stabilization are already described by the stocking parameter  . The
full dimension of the costs become more visible when looking at the amount of
stocks required to reach a desired level of consumption stability. Table 15.5 presents
the optimal stock levels and stock-to-use ratio for  calculated using country-level
stock data and compares them to actual levels. The resulting stock-to-use ratio is
˛ D 
1 , which has a positive exponential relationship with  . When  > 0.5,
stocks already amount to expected consumption levels with a stock-to-use ratio
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Table 15.5 Actual and optimal stock levels under a linear stocking rule
 CVc S S2013 ˛
S2013
C
Benin 0.105 6.8 220,802 162,000 11.8 12.8
Burkina Faso 0.083 8.4 466,615 495,000 9.0 8.5
Cameroon 0.178 5.0 899,228 866,000 21.7 16.0
Cape Verde 0.169 25.5 5089 7000 20.3 20.3
Chad 0.193 10.9 496,928 564,000 23.9 22.3
Cote d’Ivoire 0.095 5.2 290,463 467,000 10.5 9.3
Gambia, The 0.239 11.2 107,609 48,000 31.5 30.4
Ghana 0.089 9.4 379,520 325,000 9.8 9.2
Guinea 0.138 4.9 438,248 511,000 16.0 14.3
Guinea-Bissau 0.164 8.7 59,828 69,500 19.6 17.3
Liberia 0.144 12.8 86,482 56,000 16.9 14.7
Mali 0.117 8.4 746,375 855,000 13.2 10.1
Mauritania 0.159 8.2 137,177 95,500 18.9 20.7
Niger 0.057 11.4 314,910 522,000 6.1 5.4
Nigeria 0.063 5.1 1,915,352 850,000 6.7 7.0
Senegal 0.140 7.2 491,235 492,000 16.3 16.2
Sierra Leone 0.063 10.4 72,532 87,000 6.7 5.3
Togo 0.132 7.1 211,342 171,000 15.2 14.9
Region – 3.1 7,063,305 6,643,000 – 10.3
Source: Author’s computation based on USDA (2014) and FAO CBS (2014). Note: Country level
 is obtained by the regression (15.24); CV consumption is computed as CVc D
q
1
1C
CV.X/
(see Eq. 15.22); the optimal regional  is unknown
greater than one. Notably, the linear stocking rule predicts actual stocks and stock-
to-use ratios quite precisely.
The last row in Table 15.5 provides stock figures for the region as a whole. Given
the current stock level of around 7 million tons, the regional stocking rule would
imply that 9 % of the total supply needs to be stocked up. This is associated with
a consumption variability of 3.4 %, as compared to 3.1 % without storage. It is
also possible to describe the initial optimization problem of governments directly
as a trade-off between costs and benefits, more specifically, the trade-off between
consumption stability and operational costs. Figure 15.9 shows the trade-off for the
region as a whole. The dotted black line indicates the status quo – roughly 7 million
tons of stocks associated with a coefficient of variation of consumption of 3.1 %.
The dashed black line represents a stock level of 11.1 million tons resulting from
a stocking parameter of 0.135, which is the median parameter across all member
countries.
The required amount of stocks increases overproportionally with a reduction in
consumption instability. In order to reach consumption stability of up to only 2.7 %,
the region would require roughly 20 million tons of stocks. When no stocks are
required however, consumption variability through market integration or transfers
between countries is only 3.4 %; this figure is 2 % less for Nigeria, which has
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Fig. 15.9 Regional consumption variability at different stock levels. Source: Author’s illustration
based on USDA (2014) and FAO CBS (2014)
the lowest supply variability. This implies that most of the gains originate from
trade integration and not from storage cooperation. In other words, consumption
stability is largely enhanced by regional trade integration, but increasing stocks
have only very little impact on the level of consumption variability. The benefits
of regional trade cooperation are significant. Individual countries would need an
unrealistically large amount of stocks in their stabilization reserve to achieve a
consumption variability of 3.4 %. The costs and benefits of cooperation can be
evaluated for a particular level of consumption variability which the region desires.
We assume the observed stocking parameter is chosen as the optimal stocking rule
by each country. Since trade integration is associated with huge benefits in the form
of a reduction of consumption instability, a country in autarky may be worse off only
if the regional stocking parameter exceeds the one chosen by the country. Hence, net
benefits are strictly positive for all countries up to a stock-to-use ratio of 6.1 % for
Niger, 6.7 % for Nigeria and Sierra Leone, 9.0 % for Burkina Faso, and 9.8 % for
Ghana; in the same manner, the values for other countries are determined according
to ˛i , as shown in Table 15.5.
Lastly, it is possible to test how a linear stocking rule would have performed over
the course of the last 35 years. Figure 15.10 illustrates the performance in relation
to the associated target consumption levels. Despite regional trade integration, the
simulated regional consumption undershot target consumption levels of 99 %, 97 %,
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Fig. 15.10 Regional consumption under trade integration without storage. Source: Author’s
illustration based on USDA (2014) and FAO CBS (2014)
and 95 % multiple times.13 Thus, regional trade integration reduces consumption
variability significantly, but it is unable to combat severe supply shortfalls. Con-
versely, a linear stocking rule which guarantees that all countries achieve net benefits
by cooperating (˛D 6.1 %) would have a guaranteed target consumption of 97 %
over the whole period. Clearly, a linear stocking rule is effective in buffering positive
and negative supply shock. However, the effects are rather small compared with the
benefits of trade integration within the whole region. This may change if the number
of participating countries reduces.
15.6 Conclusion
In this study, a methodology for assessing the costs and benefits of regional
storage cooperation is outlined and applied to the West African region. Building
on the influential works of Johnson (1976) and Koester (1986), the methodology
establishes a link between supply and consumption variability, and it accounts for
the potential benefits of cooperation through the imperfect correlation of production
and supply shocks among neighboring countries. In doing so, the work complements
previous studies by conceptualizing the link to storage.
13To be exact, the number of shortfalls are (accordingly to target consumption) 99 %, 11 times;
97 %, 7 times; 95 %, 3 times; and 90 %, never.
15 The Costs and Benefits of Regional Cooperation on Grain Reserves:. . . 379
The principles of risk pooling allow for reducing carry-over stocks by 35–
41 % within West Africa without welfare transfers or trade between countries
so as to guarantee at least 95 % of the expected trend consumption. For other
minimum consumption levels, the benefits are between 25 % and 60 %. National
contributions to the reserve can be organized in such a manner that all countries
benefit significantly from the cooperation. However, in this way, releases from the
reserve would occur frequently, and stocks would need to be refilled on a regular
basis. If limited intra-regional trade takes place between areas with surplus and
deficiency, the optimal regional stocks under cooperation hardly change. However,
the need for stock release intervention reduces significantly. Therefore, trade is
very effective in smoothing consumption when supply fluctuations are moderate.
In contrast, reserves are required to dampen large supply shortfalls. These benefits
are large enough to justify additional costs that may arise from storage cooperation.
Lastly, complete market integration in West Africa would greatly benefit countries
with high supply variability. Without undertaking any storage, regional supply
variability is at 3.4 %, which is higher than that of each country included in
the analysis. Storage cooperation beyond full market integration would reduce
consumption variability only marginally. Furthermore, trade integration without
storage, unlike an emergency reserve, is incapable of dampening severe supply
shortfalls.
It is also important to consider offering incentives to countries to encourage
them to participate in a regional reserve. When the level of target consumption
is relatively low in an emergency reserve, countries with low supply variability
do not benefit. Yet these countries are of particular importance to realize the full
benefits of regional cooperation. The advantages of cooperation diminish rapidly
when countries with limited supply variability or countercyclical shock patterns
refuse to participate in the alliance. However, it should be noted that a regional
emergency reserve guaranteeing relative high levels of target consumption needs to
carry large amounts of stocks, which are associated with high operational costs.
These findings are of great relevance to the ongoing debate on public food
storage, trade integration, and regional reserves. Trade liberalization is widely
considered as an effective instrument to balance supply variability and production
shortfalls. In contrast, public storage is associated with substantial market distor-
tions and comes at high fiscal costs. Nevertheless, a number of developing countries
responded to the global food crisis in 2007/2008 by implementing and enhancing
public storage to increase food security. This is also driven by the unpredictability of
food availability at international markets as exporters attempt to insulate domestic
markets. Regional storage cooperation was brought up for discussion as viable and
comparably cheap means of addressing a food crisis and as an alternative to national
reserves. Moreover, storage cooperation could enhance commitment of exporters to
regional trade agreements (Wright and Cafiero 2011).
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West Africa has taken a pioneering role by showing the intention to implement a
region-wide emergency reserve. Political and economic integration in West Africa
is among the most advanced in Africa. However, at present, intra-regional trade is
limited partly because of bad infrastructure and bureaucratic hindrances at national
boundaries. The results from this study should be understood as an encouragement
to regional storage cooperation in the region. Three messages can be taken away
from this study. First, production and supply patterns in the region are able to
facilitate cooperation which may yield massive benefits. Second, trade integration is
more effective than storage in smoothing supply, but storage is required to dampen
extreme supply shortfalls. Last, there is great potential for storage cooperation with
regard to an emergency reserve and less with regard to a stabilization reserve.
Nevertheless, clear rules about individual country’s contributions and releases, and,
if needed, regional trade management, are essential to organize regional storage with
mutual benefits. Administrative complexity is likely to be a smaller problem with
a limited number of partner countries. Therefore, future research should attempt to
evaluate the costs and benefits for subsets of countries in an attempt to identify the
countries which could possibly form a coalition. Moreover, the potential benefit of
intra-regional trade integration should be analyzed more rigorously.
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Appendix
Table 15.6 Optimal stock levels in 2014 for target consumption of 99 %
Production Supply
Pi Si
 bSi eSi Pi Si
 bSi eSi
Benin 40 % 141,604 120,137 100,356 37 % 152,677 127,265 116,424
Burkina Faso 40 % 631,234 368,174 447,361 40 % 593,667 351,453 452,700
Cameroon 49 % 214,049 236,879 151,698 26 % 203,148 281,713 154,911
Cape Verde 49 % 8101 524 5741 52 % 15,455 1701 11,785
Chad 49 % 368,209 139,960 260,953 46 % 357,082 141,125 272,293
Cote d’Ivoire 37 % 127,531 97,789 90,382 43 % 181,273 187,327 138,229
Gambia, The 43 % 79,208 16,839 56,135 55 % 48,382 23,208 36,894
Ghana 43 % 357,196 207,853 253,148 43 % 477,451 263,042 364,079
Guinea 43 % 90,030 174,930 63,805 46 % 124,296 186,109 94,782
Guinea-Bissau 43 % 26,771 13,318 18,973 46 % 26,092 20,706 19,896
Liberia 40 % 27,477 13,978 19,473 49 % 53,601 34,774 40,873
Mali 58 % 419,760 429,367 297,487 55 % 417,047 383,615 318,019
(continued)
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Table 15.6 (continued)
Production Supply
Pi Si bSi eSi Pi Si bSi eSi
Mauritania 49 % 56,683 16,814 40,172 46 % 111,038 49,237 84,672
Niger 37 % 779,525 360,017 552,456 37 % 681,052 350,313 519,335
Nigeria 43 % 1,786,527 1,674,944 1,266,127 43 % 2,167,705 1,943,323 1,652,981
Senegal 49 % 477,554 100,173 338,447 52 % 308,029 204,087 234,887
Sierra Leone 37 % 128,728 62,996 91,231 46 % 149,723 73,652 114,171
Togo 43 % 95,910 87,226 67,972 40 % 117,762 94,081 89,800
Region 100 % 5,816,099 4,122,000 4,122,000 100 % 6,185,480 4,716,730 4,716,730
Source: Author’s computation based on USDA (2014). Note: Stock levels in mt; Pi is the probability
of intervention when production and supply are below the target consumption (99 %). Si,bSi,eSi are
stocks without cooperation and with equal and relative contributions
Table 15.7 Optimal stock levels in 2014 for target consumption of 97 %
Production Supply
Pi Si
 bSi eSi Pi Si
 bSi eSi
Benin 34 % 120,218 93,057 79,668 37 % 127,936 96,089 91,907
Burkina Faso 34 % 546,502 285,182 362,163 37 % 500,825 265,358 359,785
Cameroon 29 % 189,018 183,483 125,260 17 % 170,363 212,702 122,386
Cape Verde 49 % 7836 406 5193 40 % 14,800 1285 10,632
Chad 43 % 334,871 108,411 221,916 40 % 317,808 106,554 228,308
Cote d’Ivoire 23 % 106,025 75,746 70,262 31 % 139,631 141,438 100,309
Gambia, The 37 % 74,719 13,043 49,515 54 % 41,486 17,523 29,803
Ghana 37 % 317,677 161,000 210,522 34 % 422,149 198,605 303,265
Guinea 34 % 74,009 135,498 49,045 31 % 87,947 140,519 63,179
Guinea-Bissau 34 % 24,150 10,316 16,004 40 % 23,423 15,634 16,827
Liberia 40 % 23,892 10,827 15,833 37 % 48,902 26,255 35,130
Mali 46 % 309,623 332,581 205,185 49 % 303,936 289,642 218,342
Mauritania 49 % 53,175 13,024 35,238 37 % 101,159 37,175 72,671
Niger 34 % 693,576 278,864 459,627 34 % 585,455 264,498 420,581
Nigeria 34 % 1,285,869 1,297,387 852,134 34 % 1,572,822 1,467,271 1,129,890
Senegal 43 % 453,584 77,593 300,586 43 % 258,230 154,092 185,508
Sierra Leone 34 % 117,360 48,796 77,773 40 % 134,597 55,609 96,692
Togo 31 % 85,791 67,564 56,853 29 % 105,888 71,035 76,069
Region 100 % 4,817,894 3,193,000 3,193,000 97 % 4,957,355 3,561,283 3,561,283
Source: Author’s computation based on USDA (2014). Note: Stock levels in mt; Pi is the probability
of intervention when production and supply are below the target consumption (99 %). Si,bSi,eSi
are stocks without cooperation and with equal and relative contributions
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Table 15.8 Optimal stock levels in 2014 for target consumption of 90 %
Production Supply
Pi Si
 bSi eSi Pi Si
 bSi eSi
Benin 11 % 49,479 31,300 20,578 11 % 42,379 17,315 15,755
Burkina Faso 23 % 271,876 95,923 113,071 20 % 203,667 47,818 75,717
Cameroon 9 % 101,408 61,716 42,175 9 % 94,852 38,329 35,263
Cape Verde 34 % 6910 137 2874 34 % 12,505 231 4649
Chad 23 % 218,190 36,465 90,743 23 % 180,347 19,201 67,048
Cote d’Ivoire 6 % 30,755 25,478 12,791 3 % 35,635 25,487 13,248
Gambia, The 29 % 59,007 4387 24,540 31 % 22,209 3158 8257
Ghana 14 % 257,176 54,153 106,957 11 % 228,592 35,789 84,984
Guinea 6 % 17,936 45,576 7460 6 % 10,864 25,322 4039
Guinea-Bissau 17 % 14,974 3470 6227 14 % 14,084 2817 5236
Liberia 26 % 15,564 3642 6473 23 % 32,455 4731 12,066
Mali 11 % 110,280 111,866 45,864 14 % 78,210 52,194 29,076
Mauritania 37 % 40,894 4381 17,007 17 % 66,580 6699 24,753
Niger 20 % 392,751 93,798 163,341 20 % 345,241 47,663 128,351
Nigeria 3 % 497,369 436,384 206,851 9 % 128,646 264,404 47,827
Senegal 29 % 369,686 26,099 153,749 9 % 83,935 27,768 31,205
Sierra Leone 23 % 77,571 16,413 32,261 20 % 81,657 10,021 30,358
Togo 14 % 50,373 22,726 20,950 11 % 64,329 12,800 23,916
Region 89 % 2,582,200 1,074,000 1,074,000 89 % 1,726,187 641,747 641,747
Source: Author’s computation based on USDA (2014). Note: Stock levels in mt; Pi is the probability
of intervention when production and supply are below the target consumption (99 %). Si,bSi,eSi
are stocks without cooperation and with equal and relative contributions
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16Regional Trade and Volatility in Staple FoodMarkets in Africa
Ousmane Badiane and Sunday Odjo
16.1 Introduction
Recent studies have indicated that Africa as a whole and a number of individual
countries have exhibited relatively strong trade performance in the global market
(Bouët et al. 2014) as well as in continental and major regional markets (Badiane
et al. 2014). The increased competitiveness has generally translated into higher
shares of regional markets in total exports by the different groupings. Faster growth
in demand in continental and regional markets compared to the global market has
also boosted the export performance of African countries. For instance, during the
second half of the last decade, Africa’s share of the global export market has risen
sharply, in relative terms, for all goods and agricultural products in value terms,
from 0.05 to 0.21 % and from 0.15 to 0.34 %, respectively. This is in line with the
stronger competitive position of African exporters mentioned earlier.
By promoting competition and specialization in production, regional trade–
similar to global trade–can contribute to food security through its impact on
long-term output and productivity growth. At the same time, it can positively affect
employment and incomes. Where these effects are positive, trade increases the
availability of food and improves the accessibility of food to affected segments of
the population. Trade also helps reduce the unit cost of supplying food to local
markets, thereby lowering food prices or reducing the pace of food price increase,
which in turn improves the affordability of food. Finally, trade can also help stabilize
supplies in domestic food markets and reduce the associated risks to vulnerable
groups.
All of the above-mentioned benefits can be obtained, perhaps to a larger extent,
through trading with the rest of the world. For instance, one could question why a
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given country should pursue an expansion of regional trade as opposed to global
trade in general for stabilizing domestic food supplies, given that world production
can be expected to be more stable than regional production. Several factors, such as
transport costs, foreign exchange availability, responsiveness of the import sector,
and dietary preferences, may provide valid economic justification for a country’s
efforts to boost regional trade as part of a wider supply stabilization strategy that
would also include increased trade with extra-regional markets. Regional and global
trade should therefore be seen as complementary rather than as substitutes.
The increase in intra-African and intra-regional trade, and the rising role of
continental and regional markets as major destinations of agricultural exports by
African countries suggest that cross-border trade flows will exert greater influence
on the level and stability of domestic food supplies. The more countries find ways
to accelerate the pace of intra-trade growth, the larger that influence is expected to
be in the future. The current chapter examines the future outlook for intra-regional
trade expansion and the implications for volatility of regional food markets. The
chapter starts with an analysis of the potential of regional trade to contribute to
stabilizing food markets, followed by an assessment of the scope for cross-border
trade expansion. A regional trade simulation model is then developed and used
to simulate alternative scenarios to boost trade and reduce volatility in regional
markets.
16.2 Regional Potential for the Stabilization of Domestic Food
Markets Through Trade
Variability of domestic production is a major contributor to local food price
instability in low income countries. The causes of production variability are such
that an entire region is less likely to be affected than individual countries. Moreover,
fluctuations in national production tend to partially offset each other, so that such
fluctuations are less than perfectly correlated. Food production can be expected
to be more stable at regional level than at country level. In this case, expanding
cross-border trade and allowing greater integration of domestic food markets would
reduce supply volatility and price instability in these markets. Integrating regional
markets through increased trade raises the capacity of domestic markets to absorb
local price risks by: (1) enlarging the area of production and consumption and thus
increasing the volume of demand and supply that can be adjusted to respond to
and dampen the effects of shocks; (2) providing incentives to invest in marketing
services and expand capacities and activities in the marketing sector, which raises
the capacity of the private sector to respond to future shocks; and (3) lowering the
size of needed carryover stocks, thereby reducing the cost of supplying markets
during periods of shortage and hence decreasing the likely amplitude of price
variation.
A simple comparison of the cereal production variability in individual countries
against the regional average is carried out to illustrate the potential for local market
stabilization through greater market integration (Badiane 1988). For that purpose, a
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trend-corrected coefficient of variation is used as a measure of production variability
at both country and regional levels. We then use a normalization procedure whereby
the value of the coefficient for each country is divided by the value of the coefficient
for the corresponding region. Calculations are carried out for each of the three
regional economic groupings (as mentioned above), and the results are presented
in Table 16.6 in the annex and plotted in Fig. 16.1a–c below. The bars in the
figures represent the normalized coefficients of variation, which indicate how much
more (when normalized coefficient are greater than 1) or less (when normalized
coefficient are less than 1) volatile a country’s production is when compared with
production at the level of their respective region.
Of the three regions, SADC has the highest level of aggregate volatility with a
coefficient of variation of 18.58 or more than two and three times that of ECOWAS
and COMESA, respectively. For the vast majority of countries, national production
volatility is considerably larger than regional level volatility. The only exceptions
are the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in SADC and to a lesser extent
Côte d’Ivoire in ECOWAS. None of the COMESA countries has a more stable
production than the regional aggregate. The COMESA countries can be divided into
two subgroups: (1) a relatively low volatility subgroup with normalized coefficients
of less than twice the regional average, including Burundi, Comoros, DRC, Egypt,
and Uganda and (2) a high volatility regional subgroup with volatility levels that
are at least five times higher than the regional level, comprising Malawi, Mauritius,1
Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Kenya and Madagascar both
have moderate levels of volatility and fall between the two groups. Most countries
in SADC and ECOWAS are in the moderate regional category, with only Botswana
and Mauritius (in SADC), and Gambia, Liberia, Mali, and Senegal (in ECOWAS)
showing volatility levels more than three times higher than the respective regional
levels. The countries in the moderate- and high-volatility subgroups would benefit
the most from increased regional trade in terms of greater stability of domestic
supplies.
The likelihood that a given country would benefit from the trade stabilization
potential, as suggested by the difference between its volatility level and the regional
average, will be greater if its production fluctuates more and is weakly correlated
with that of the other countries in the region. Figure 16.2 presents the distribution
of correlation coefficients between individual country’s production levels for each
regional group. For each country, the lower segment of the bar shows the percentage
of correlation coefficients that are 0.65 or less or the share of countries with
production fluctuations that are defined as relatively weakly correlated with the
country’s own production movements. The top segment represents the share of
countries with highly correlated production fluctuations, with coefficients that are
higher than 0.75. The middle segment is the share of moderately correlated country
productions, with coefficients that are between 0.65 and 0.75.
1Mauritius has a coefficient that is more than 18 times the regional average and is not shown in the
figure for clarity.
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Fig. 16.1 (a) COMESA cereal production instability, 1980–2010. (b) ECOWAS cereal produc-
tion instability. (c) SADC cereal production instability. Source: Authors’ calculation. All graphs
based on FAOSTAT 2014 data from 1980 to 2010
Using the above criteria, countries in the most volatile region, SADC, have the
highest concentration of weakly correlated country production levels. As shown
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Fig. 16.2 (a) Distribution of correlation coefficients, COMESA. (b) Distribution of correlation
coefficients, ECOWAS. (c) Distribution of correlation coefficients, SADC. Source: Authors’
calculation. All graphs based on FAOSTAT 2014 data from 1980 to 2010
in Fig. 16.2c, only three countries have less than an 80 % share of correlation
coefficients below 0.65. The combination of high volatility and weak correlation
suggests that countries in this region would benefit the most from increased regional
trade in terms of domestic market stabilization. They are followed by COMESA
countries, where 60 % of the correlation coefficients for any given country are
below 0.65. In contrast, country-level production levels in the ECOWAS region
tend to fluctuate more together than the other two regions, as shown by the high
share of coefficients above 0.75. The division of the region into two nearly uniform
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subregions, Sahelian and coastal, may be an explanation. In general, however, the
patterns and distribution of production fluctuations among countries in all the three
regions are such that increased trade could be expected to have a stabilizing effect
on domestic agricultural and food markets. But that is only one condition; the other
is that there is actual potential to increase cross-border trade, a question that will be
examined in the next section.
16.3 The Scope for Specialization and Regional Trade
Expansion in Agriculture
Despite the recent upward trends, the level of intra-African and intra-regional trade
is still very low compared with other regions. Intra-African markets accounted only
for an average 34 % of the total agricultural exports from African countries between
2007 and 2011 (Badiane et al. 2014). Among the three RECs, SADC had the highest
share of intra-regional trade (42 %), and ECOWAS the lowest (6 %). COMESA’s
share of intra-regional trade was 20 %. Although SADC is doing much better than
the other two RECs, its member countries still account for far less than half of the
value of agricultural trade within the region (Badiane et al. 2014).
There may be a host of factors behind the low levels of intra-regional trade. These
factors may not only make trading with extra-regional partners more attractive,
but they may also raise the cost of supplying regional markets from intra-regional
sources. The exploitation of the regional stabilization potential, as pointed out
above, would require measures to lower the barriers to and the bias against
transborder trade such as to stimulate the expansion of regional supply capacities
and of trade flows across borders. This supposes that there is sufficient scope for
specialization in production and trade within the subregions. Often, it is assumed
that neighboring developing countries would exhibit similar production and trading
patterns because of the similarities in their resource bases, leaving little room
for future specialization. There are, however, several factors that may lead to
different specialization patterns among such countries. These factors include (1)
differences in historical technological investments and thus the level and structure
of accumulated production capacities and skills; (2) the economic distance to, and
opportunity to trade with, distant markets; and (3) differences in dietary patterns
as well as consumer preferences that affect the structure of local production. The
different patterns of specialization in Senegal compared with the rest of Sahelian
West Africa and in Kenya compared with other Eastern African countries well
illustrate the influence of these factors.
Consequently, we use a series of indicators to assess the actual degree of spe-
cialization in agricultural production and trade, and whether there is real scope for
transborder trade expansion as a strategy to exploit the less-than-perfect correlation
between national productions to reduce the vulnerability of domestic food markets
to shocks. The first two indicators are the production and export similarity indices,
which measure and rank the relative importance of the production and trading of
individual agricultural products in every country. The level of importance or position
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of each product is then compared for all relevant pairs of countries within each
subregion.2 The indices have a maximum value of 100; an index value of 100
implies that the production or trade patterns between the considered pair of countries
are completely similar. The closer the index value is to zero, the greater the degree of
specialization between the two countries. Index values of around 50 and below are
interpreted as indicating patterns of specialization that are compatible with higher
degrees of trade expansion. The estimated indicator values for the three regional
groupings, covering 150 products in total, are presented in Fig. 16.3a, b. Each bar
represents the number of country pairs that falls within the corresponding range
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Fig. 16.3 (a) Similarity of production patterns, 2007–2011. Source: Authors’ calculations based
on data from FAOSTAT 2014. (b) Similarity of trading patterns, 2007–2011. Source: Authors’
calculations based on data from FAOSTAT 2014
2See Koester (1986).
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of index values. The vast majority of country pairs fall within the 0–50 range. A
value of less than 60 is conventionally interpreted as compatible with higher trade
exchange between the considered pair of countries. The estimated index values
therefore suggest that there exists sufficient dissimilarity in the current production
and trading patterns between countries and hence a scope for transborder trade
expansion in all three subregions.
The third indicator, the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) index, is com-
puted to further assess the degree of trade specialization among countries within
the three regions. The RCA index compares the share of a given product in a given
country’s export basket with that of the same product in total world exports. A value
greater than 1 indicates that the considered country is performing better than the
world average; the higher the value is, the stronger the country’s performance in
exporting the considered product. Of the nearly 600 RCA indicators estimated for
various products exported by different COMESA countries, 70 % have an index
value higher than 1. ECOWAS and SADC each have a total of about 450 indicators.
The share of indicators higher than 1 is about the same as in the case of COMESA:
68 % for SADC and 73 % for ECOWAS. For each regional grouping, the 20 products
with the highest normalized RCA index value are presented in Table 16.1. The
normalized RCA is positive for RCA indicators that are greater than 1 and negative
otherwise.3 For very high RCA indicators, the normalized value tends toward 1.
All the products listed in the table have normalized RCA values above 0.98.
The rankings reflect the degree of cross-country specialization within each REC. In
ECOWAS, for instance, a total of 12 products, spread across 8 out of 15 member
countries, account for the highest 20 indicators for the region. There are 13 products
in that category in the case of COMESA, and these products come from 9 out of
19 countries. SADC has the highest number of products in that category, a total of
14, but they come from only 5 out of 15 countries. The table also illustrates the
difference in degree of specialization between the three major regions. Only two of
the top ranking products (carded and combed cotton, and cashew nuts in shell) are
common to the ECOWAS and SADC regions. Even between COMESA and SADC,
only six of the top ranking products are common to the two regions, while there
are no common top ranking products between COMESA and ECOWAS. A fuller
appreciation of the degree of specialization across all countries in the three regions
is best obtained by looking at the RCA values for the entire set of products and
countries. For instance, if countries have similar patterns of specialization, the same
products would tend to rank equally high and the values of the RCA indicator for the
same product would not vary significantly across countries. Similarly, if countries
have similar patterns of specialization, exports would be concentrated around a
few products, with substantial variation of the indicator value across products. An
analysis of the variance of the RCA index is, therefore, carried out to test for
either of the above-mentioned possibilities. The results of the analysis, presented in
Table 16.2, show that for the entire sample of African countries, nearly two-thirds
3The formula for the normalized RCA is (RCA  1)/(RCA C 1).
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Table 16.2 Estimation of RCA variability across countries and products
Source of variance
Sequential
sum of square Mean squared F P-value
Share of variation
explained
Model 1489.66 6.03 46.63 0.00 72:86 %
Country 936.94 23.42 181.09 0.00 45:82 %
Commodity 552.44 2.68 20.73 0.00 27:02 %
Year 0.28 0.28 2.19 0.14 0:01 %
Residual 555.03 0.129 27:14 %
Total 2044.69 0.45
Number of obs. 4539 R2 0.73 R2 adj 0.71
Note: The mean square (partial sum of squares/degrees of freedom) is used to compute the
F-statistic and determine the significant amounts of variation. This ANOVA is without interaction
terms due to the missing values from the unbalanced nature of the data. The time factor is included
(63 %) of the total variation of the RCA index among countries and commodities is
accounted for by country-to-country variation. The balance of variation is explained
by variation across products. The RCA index, like the previous two indicators, thus
confirms the existence of dissimilar patterns of trade specialization in agricultural
products.
So far, the analysis has established the existence of dissimilar patterns of
specialization in production and trade of agricultural products among countries
within and across the three major regions. Two final indicators, the Trade Overlap
Indicator (TOI) and the Trade Expansion Indicator (TEI), are calculated to examine
the potential to expand trade within the three blocks of countries based on current
trade patterns.
The indicators measure how much of the same product a given country or region
exports and imports at the same time. The TOI measures the overall degree of
overlapping trade flows for a country or region as a whole, while the TEI measures
the overlapping trade flows at the individual product level for a country or region.
The results are presented in Fig. 16.4 and Table 16.3. The results indicate that there
is a considerable degree of overlapping trade flows: 25 % for Africa as a whole and
as much as 40 % for the SADC region. Normalized TOI values, obtained by dividing
country TOI values by the TOI value, for the respective regions can be found in
Badiane et al. (2014). In the vast majority of cases, they are significantly less than 1.
The overlapping regional trade must therefore be taking place between different
importing and exporting countries. In other words, some countries are exporting
(importing) the same products that are being imported (exported) by other member
countries in their respective grouping, but in both cases to and from countries outside
the region. By redirecting such flows, countries should be able to expand transborder
trade within their groupings.
The TEI indicates which products have the highest potential for increased
transborder trade based on the degree of overlapping trade flows. Table 16.3 lists
the 20 products with the highest TEI value for each of the three regions. The lowest
TEI value for any of the products across the three regions is 0.41. RCA values
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Fig. 16.4 Trade overlap indicators, average 2007–2011. Source: Authors’ calculations based on
FAOSTAT 2014
for the same products presented in Badiane et al. (2014) are all greater than 1,
except for only three products: fresh fruits in ECOWAS, bananas in COMESA, and
chocolate products in SADC. The fact that products with high TEI also have high
RCA indicator values point to a real scope for transborder trade expansion in all
three subregions.
The findings above indicate a real potential to expand intra-trade in all three
regions beyond the levels shown in Table 16.1, even with current production and
trade patterns. The remainder of the chapter therefore analyzes the outlook for intra-
trade expansion and the expected impact of volatility of regional food markets over
the next 15 years. This is done by simulating alternative policy scenarios to boost
intra-regional trade and by comparing the resulting effect on the level and volatility
of trade flows up to 2025 with outcomes simulated under a baseline scenario that
assumes continuation of historical trends.
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16.4 The Outlook for Regional Cross-Border Trade andMarket
Volatility Under Alternative Scenarios
The preceding analysis presents evidence that African countries could use increased
regional trade to enhance the resilience of domestic markets to supply shocks. The
high cost of moving goods across domestic and transborder markets and outwardly
biased trading infrastructure are major determinants of the level and direction of
trade among African countries. A strategy to exploit the regional stabilization
potential therefore has to include measures to lower the general cost of trading and
remove additional barriers to cross-border trade. This section simulates the impact
of such changes on regional trade flows, using IFPRI’s regional Economy-wide
Multimarket Model (EMM) described below.4
16.4.1 The Regional Trade Simulation Model
In this study, the original EMM was modified to differentiate between intra- and
extra-regional trade sources and destinations and between informal and formal trade
costs in intra-regional trade transactions. In its original version, the EMM solves for
optimal levels of supply QXr c, demand QDr c and net trade (either import QMr c or
export QEr c) of different commodities c for individual member countries r of the
modeled region.
Supply and demand balance at the national level determines domestic output
prices PXr c as stated by Eq. (16.1), while Eq. (16.2) connects domestic market
prices PDr c to domestic output prices, taking into account an exogenous domestic
marketing margin margDr c. The net trade of a commodity in a country is determined
through mixed complementarity relationships between producer prices and potential
export quantities and between consumer prices and potential import quantities.
Accordingly, Eq. (16.3) ensures that a country will not export a commodity
(QEr;c D 0) as long as the producer price of that commodity is higher than its export
parity price, where pwer c is the country’s FOB price and margWr c is an exogenous
trade margin accounting for the cost of moving the commodity to and from the
border. If the domestic market balance constraint in Eq. (16.1) requires that the
country exports some excess supply of a commodity (QEr;c > 0), then the producer
price will be equal to the export parity price of that commodity. Additionally, Eq.
(16.4) governs any country’s possibility to import a commodity, where pwmr c is its
CIF price. There will be no import (QMr;c D 0) as long as the import parity price
of a commodity is higher than its domestic consumer price. The domestic market
balance constraint requires that, if a country has to import a commodity to meet a
given excess demand (QMr;c > 0), then the domestic consumer price will be equal
to the import parity price of that commodity.
4See Diao et al. (2007) and Nin-Pratt et al. (2011).
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QXr c C QMr c  QEr c D QDr c (16.1)
PXr c  .1C margDr c/ D PDr c (16.2)
PXr c  pwer c  .1  margWr c/ ? QEr;c  0 (16.3)
pwmr c  .1C margWr c/  PDr c ? QMr;c  0 (16.4)
In the version of the EMM used in this study, the net export of any commodity
is modeled as an aggregate of two output varieties differentiated by their market
outlets (regional and extra-regional) while assuming an imperfect transformability
between the two export varieties. Similarly, the net import of any commodity is
modeled as a composite of two varieties differentiated by their origins (regional and
extra-regional) while assuming an imperfect substitutability between the two import
varieties.
In order to implement export differentiation by destination, the mixed com-
plementarity relationship in Eq. (16.3) is replaced with two new equations which
specify the price conditions for export to be possible to both destinations. Equation
(16.5) indicates that for export to extra-regional market outlets to take place
(QEZr c > 0), suppliers should be willing to accept a price PEZr c that is not
greater than the export parity price when exporting to that destination. Similarly,
Eq. (16.6) ensures that exporting to within-region market outlets is possible
(QERr c > 0) only if suppliers are willing to receive a price PERr c that is not
more than the regional market clearing price PRc adjusted downward to account
for exogenous regional trade margins margRr c incurred in moving the commodity
from the farm gate to regional market (see Eq. (16.17) below for the determination
of PRc).
PEZr c  pwer c  .1  margWr c/ ? QEZr c  0 (16.5)
PERr c  PRc  .1  margRr c/ ? QERr c  0 (16.6)
Subject to these price conditions, Eqs. (16.7)–(16.10) determine the aggregate
export quantity and its optimal allocation to alternative destinations. Equation (16.7)
indicates that the aggregate export of a commodity by individual countries QEr c
is obtained through a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function of the
quantity QEZr c exported to extra-regional market outlets and the quantity QERr c
exported to intra-regional market outlets, where er c, ı
e
r c; and ˛
e
r c are the CET func-
tion exponent, share parameter, and shift parameter, respectively. Equation (16.8)
is the first-order condition of an aggregate export revenue maximization problem,
given the prices that suppliers can receive for the different export destinations
and subject to the CET export aggregation function. The equation indicates that
an increase in the ratio of intra-regional to extra-regional prices will increase the
ratio of intra-regional to extra-regional export quantities (i.e., exports shift toward
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destinations which offer higher returns). Equation (16.9) helps identify the optimal
quantities supplied to each destination; it states that aggregate export revenue at
producer price of export PEr c is the sum of export sales revenues from both intra-
regional and extra-regional market outlets at supplier prices, while Eq. (16.10) sets
the producer price of export to be the same as the domestic output price PXr c,
which is determined by the supply and demand balance equation (Eq. 16.1) as earlier
explained.
QEr c D ˛er c 

ıer c  QER
e
r c
r c C

1  ıer c
  QEZer cr c
 1
er c (16.7)
QERr c
QEZr c
D

PERr c
PEZr c
 1  ı
e
r c
ıer c
 1
er c1
(16.8)
PEr c  QEr c D PERr c  QERr c C PEZr c  QEZr c (16.9)
PEr c D PXr c (16.10)
Import differentiation by origin is implemented by following the same procedure
for export differentiation by destination, as described above. Equation (16.4) is
replaced by Eqs. (16.11) and (16.12). Accordingly, import from extra-regional
origins will happen (QMZr;c > 0) only if domestic consumers are willing to pay
a price PMZr c that is not smaller than the import parity price for the extra-regional
variety. Furthermore, import from intra-regional origins is possible (QMRr;c > 0)
only if domestic consumers are willing to pay at a price PMRr c that is not
smaller than the regional market clearing price PRc adjusted upward to account
for exogenous regional trade margins margRr c incurred in moving the commodity
from the regional market to consumers.
pwmr c  .1C margWr c/  PMZr c ? QMZr;c  0 (16.11)
PRr  .1C margRr c/  PMRr c ? QMRr c  0 (16.12)
Under these price conditions, Eq. (16.13) represents aggregate import quantity
QMr c as a composite of intra- and extra-regional import variety quantities QMRr c
and QMZr c, respectively, using a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function;
in the equation, the terms mr c, ı
m
r c, and ˛
m
r c stand for the CES function exponent,
share parameter, and shift parameter, respectively. The optimal mix of the two
varieties is defined by Eq. (16.14), which is the first-order condition of an aggregate
import cost minimization problem, subject to the CES aggregation (Eq. 16.13) and
given import prices from both origins. An increase in the ratio of extra-regional to
intra-regional import prices will increase the ratio of intra-regional to extra-regional
import quantities (i.e., imports shift away from more expensive sources). Equation
(16.15) identifies the specific quantities imported from each origin. It defines the
total import cost at consumer price of import PMr c as the sum of intra-regional and
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extra-regional import costs, while Eq. (16.16) sets the consumer price of import to
be the same as the domestic market price PDr c, which is determined by Eqs. (16.1)
and (16.2), as earlier explained
QMr c D ˛mr c 

ımr c  QMR
m
r c
r c C

1  ımr c
  QMZmr cr c
 1
mr c (16.13)
QMRr c
QMZr c
D

PMZr c
PMRr c
 ı
m
r c
1  ımr c
 1
1Cmr c
(16.14)
PMr c  QMr c D PMRr c  QMRr c C PMZr c  QMZr c (16.15)
PMr c D PDr c (16.16)
After determining export quantities and prices by destination, and import quantities
and prices by origin, the regional market clearing price PRc can now be solved.
Equation (16.17) imposes the regional market balance constraint by equating the
sum of intra-regional export supplies to the sum of intra-regional import demands,
with qdstkc standing for discrepancies existing in observed aggregate intra-regional
export and import quantity data in the model’s base year. Thus, PRc is the price that
ensures regional market balance.
X
r
QERr c D
X
r
QMRr c C qdstkc (16.17)
The model is calibrated separately for each of the three RECs. Calibration is
performed such that for every member country within each REC, the same
production, consumption, and net trade data are replicated as observed for different
agricultural subsectors and two nonagricultural subsectors in 2007–2008. Baseline
trend scenarios are then constructed such that until 2025, changes in crop yields,
cultivated areas, outputs, and GDP reflect the same observed changes. Table 16.6 in
the annex compares the calibrated agricultural and economy-wide GDP growth rates
under the baseline scenario with the observed rates in the recent years. Although
the model is calibrated to the state of national economies 7 years earlier, it closely
reproduces the countries’ current growth performances.
Four different scenarios are simulated using the EMM. The first is the baseline
scenario described above, which assumes a continuation of current trends up to
2025. It is used later as a reference to evaluate the impact of the changes under
the remaining three scenarios. The latter scenarios introduce the following three
different sets of changes to examine their impacts on regional trade levels: a
reduction of 10 % in the overall cost of trading in every country; removal of all cross-
border trade barriers–that is, a reduction of their tariff equivalent to zero; and a 10 %
yield increase across the board. These changes are modeled to take place between
2008 (the base year) and 2025. The change in cross-border exports is used as an
indicator of the impact on intra-regional trade. In the original data, there are large
discrepancies between recorded regional exports and import levels, the value of the
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latter often being multiples of the former. The more conservative export figures are
therefore the preferred indicator of intra-regional trade.
16.4.2 Intra-trade Simulation Results
The results for the different regions are presented in Figs. 16.5 and 16.6. Figure 16.5
presents the results of the baseline scenarios for the three regions from 2008 to 2025.
Assuming the current trends to continue, intra-regional trade in both ECOWAS and
SADC is expected to expand rapidly but with marked differences between crops.
The aggregate volume of intra-regional trade in staples would approach 3 million
tons in the case of ECOWAS and about half of that amount in the case of SADC if
the growth rates in yields, cultivated areas, and nonagricultural income sustained at
their current level until 2025. Cereals would see the smallest gains, while trade in
roots and tubers as well as other food crops would experience much faster growth
in the case of ECOWAS. This is in line with the current structure of and trends in
commodity demand and trade. While the increase in demand for roots and tubers
is being met almost exclusively using local sources, the fast growing demand for
cereals is heavily tilted toward rice, which is supplied from outside the region. The
two leading cereals that are traded regionally, maize and millet, therefore benefit less
from the expansion of regional demand and have historically seen slower growth in
trade than roots and tubers. In the case of SADC, the rise of Angola as a main
exporter of roots and tubers starting in 2013 is a main factor in explaining the strong
boost in regional trade of that commodity. Zimbabwe had been the sole exporter of
roots and tubers before 2013 and exported only very modest quantities. Hence, the
high rates of growth of overall regional exports can be attributed to the developments
in Angola.
The story is a bit different in the case of COMESA. As was already made appar-
ent by the market share analysis earlier, the COMESA regional market has been
the least dynamic of the three regional markets and the only one associated with a
negative market effect. COMESA is the only region where the member countries
have experienced a decline in competitiveness as a whole. The underwhelming
performance is reflected in the baseline scenario. If current trends were to continue,
the levels of intra-regional trade would continue to stagnate, except in the case of
cereals. And even for this group of products, the decline in trade volumes would be
reversed, but the reversal would not be enough to bring the trade volumes back to
their initial levels. The projected evolution of the trade in cereals reflects different
country dynamics and a shift in the sources of regional exports. The fall in regional
trade levels at the beginning of the period is a result of a continual decline in exports
from the two main traditional suppliers Egypt and Malawi. At the same time, the
faster growth in several other countries, particularly Tanzania and Ethiopia, results
in rising exports from these countries, starting from 2011 for Tanzania and from
2019 for Ethiopia. The result is a U-shaped pattern in COMESA cereals exports: the
declining exports in some countries are eventually offset by the increasing imports
in other countries. The graphs in Fig. 16.6 show the cumulated changes in intra-
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Fig. 16.5 Regional exports outlook, baseline. Source: Authors’ calculation
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regional export levels by 2025 compared with the baseline results; the changes are
the result of a reduction in total trading cost, removal of transborder trade barriers,
and a yield increase. The bars represent the percentage changes, and the numbers
above the bars indicate the corresponding absolute changes in 1000 metric tons.
The results show that intra-regional trade invariably increases by a considerable
margin for cereals and roots and tubers (the main food crops) in response to changes
in trading costs and yields. Intra-community trade levels in ECOWAS climb by
between 10 and 35 % for most products over the entire period. By 2025, when
compared to baseline trends, the volume of cereal trade increases by a cumulative
total of between 200,000 and 300,000 mt for individual products and the volume of
overall staple trade by between 1.5 and 4.0 million tons. Cereals seem to respond
better than other products in general. It also appears that removing transborder trade
barriers would have the strongest impact of trade flows across the board.
The COMESA region shows similar increases in overall trade in staples. Cereals
trade tends to be proportionally less responsive but because of its initial higher
levels, the cumulative additional volume of regional trade is much higher, ranging
from 0.7 million to more than 3.0 million tons above the baseline. Also, in contrast to
ECOWAS, intra-regional trade in COMESA seems to be more responsive to changes
in overall trading costs and yields than to changes in cross-border barriers. This
may be explained by the fact that equivalent tariffs constitute a smaller fraction
of producer prices, and hence changes in barriers result in smaller changes in
incentives. Trade in the SADC region also seems to respond more to changes in
transborder trade barriers and yields, as in the case of ECOWAS. A 10 % increase
in yields would raise trade in staples by a cumulative volume of slightly more than
3.0 million tons by 2025 compared to the baseline scenario.
16.4.3 Regional Market Volatility Under Alternative Policy
Scenarios
Under each scenario, the model-simulated quantities of intra-regional exports
QERr c are used to estimate an index of future export volatility at country and
regional level as follows: First, a trend-corrected coefficient of variation TCV is
calculated for each country, using the following formula as in Cuddy and Della
Valle (1978):
TCV D CV 
r
1  R2

(16.18)
where CV is the coefficient of variation and R2 is the adjusted coefficient of
determination of the linear trend regression obtained using the time series of
aggregate quantities of intraregional exports of all staple food crops from 2008 to
2025.
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Second, an index of regional volatility TCVREC is derived for each REC as a
weighted average of trend-corrected coefficients of variation of its member countries
with the formula
TCV2REC D
Xn
i
s2i  TCV2i C 2
Xn
i
Xn
j
si  sj  vij  TCVi  TCVj (16.19)
where TCVi and TCVj are the trend-corrected coefficients of variation in aggregate
exports of staple food crops in countries i and j, n is the number of member
countries in the REC, si and sj are the shares of countries i and j in the region’s
overall intra-regional exports of staple food crops, and vij is the coefficient of
correlation between aggregate exports of countries i and j. Finally, the coefficients of
variation at country level are normalized by dividing them by the respective regional
coefficients.
The historical and simulated levels of cross-border trade volatility of food staples
in the various regions are reported in Table 16.4. The volatility levels simulated
under historical trends are calculated based on the TradeMaps database.5 Table 16.5
shows the comparison of the simulated volatility levels under the various alternative
scenarios with historical volatility levels, with the difference expressed in absolute
point changes. The figures in the two tables show that volatility levels are lower
under nearly all scenarios than under historical trends. The only exception is in
the case of ECOWAS, where regional cross-border trade volatility decreases with
a reduction of overall trading costs, but it rises when cross-border trade barriers
Table 16.4 Regional cross-border trade volatility under various scenarios
Historical
trend
(1996–2012)
Baseline
trend
(2008–2025)
10 %
reduction in
trade costs
(2008–2025)
Removal of
cross-border
trade barriers
(2008–2025)
10 % increase
in crop yields
(2008–2025)
ECOWAS 0.345 0.33 0.323 0.354 0.378
COMESA 0.682 0.55 0.505 0.551 0.449
SADC 0.73 0.126 0.131 0.173 0.151
Source: Authors calculations from TradeMaps database and EMM model simulation results
5In the SADC case, baseline and historical trends of the trade volatility deviate a lot. The main
explanation is that, unlike traditional CGE models where countries are exporters or importers
from the beginning and remain as such for the length of the simulation period, our model allows
countries to enter or exit the regional export market based on relative prices. Therefore, we have
used historical production as opposed to trade data to calibrate the model, given that not all
countries have historical trade data. The baseline volatility of trade flows is therefore not a result of
calibration but rather derives from the calibrated baseline production and its induced trade flows.
The SADC region, unlike other regions, has undergone a major structural change in terms of the
composition and source of production and thus trade of agricultural products, with Angola, a new
player, emerging as the most important trading partner and roots and tubers as the single most
important traded agricultural commodity. The projected overwhelming dominance of the more
stable Angola in regional production and trade under continuation of current trends is the main
explanation of the drop in baseline export volatility.
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Table 16.5 Change in regional trade volatility under alternative scenarios (2008–2025)
Removal of
10 % reduction in cross-border trade 10 % increase in
Baseline trend trade costs barriers crop yields
Absolute point change compared to historical trend
ECOWAS 0.015 0.022 0.009 0.033
COMESA 0.132 0.178 0.132 0.234
SADC 0.604 0.600 0.557 0.579
Source: Authors calculations from TradeMaps database and EMM model simulation results
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Fig. 16.7 Changes in country export shares and volatility compared to baseline trends
are removed or when yields are increased. The magnitude of changes are, however,
rather small across all three scenarios. The figures also show that when the current
trend of rising volumes of intra-regional trade continues, volatility levels in all three
regions are expected to decline compared to historical trends. A better comparison is
therefore to contrast changes that take place under the two trade policy scenarios and
the productivity (meaning increasing yields) scenario with the expected volatility
levels under the baseline scenario. Furthermore, the direction and magnitude of
changes in the level of intra-regional trade volatility are determined by the combined
effect of changes in the level of volatility as well as changes in the share of cross-
border exports in individual countries. Figure 16.7 above shows changes in volatility
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levels (x-axis) and shares of exports (y-axis) by individual countries under each
of the scenarios when compared with the baseline. The different dots indicate the
position of different countries under the three scenarios. The tilted distribution of
country positions to the left of the x-axis indicates that most countries’ exports
would experience a lower level of volatility.
The combined changes in export share and volatility for individual countries
under each of the scenarios are reported in Table 16.7 and presented in Figs. 16.8,
16.9, 16.10 in the Annex. Only countries that have historically exported are
considered. Changes in a country’s production patterns resulting from the simulated
policy actions lead to changes in both the volatility and the level of exports,and
hence the shares in regional trade of each country. The magnitude and direction of
these changes determine the contribution of individual countries to changes in the
volatility level in regional food markets.
16.5 Conclusions
The current chapter has examined the potential to use increased intra-regional
trade among Africa’s main regional economic communities as a means to raise the
resilience of domestic food markets to shocks across their member countries. The
distribution and correlation of production volatility as well as the current patterns
of specialization in the production and trade of agricultural products among African
countries suggest that it is indeed possible to raise cross-border trade to reduce the
level of instability of local food markets. The results of the baseline scenario indicate
that continuation of recent trends would sustain the expansion of intra-regional trade
flows in all three regions, particularly in the ECOWAS region. The findings also
reveal that it is possible to significantly boost the pace of regional trade expansion,
which in turn would contribute to creating more resilient domestic food markets
through modest reduction in the overall cost of trading, a similarly modest increase
in crop yields, or the removal of barriers to transborder trade. More importantly,
the simulation results also suggest that such policy actions to promote transborder
trade would reduce volatility in regional markets and help lower the vulnerability of
domestic food markets to shocks.
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Appendix
Table 16.6 GDP and agricultural growth rates under baseline and recent trends
agrGDP GDP agrGDP GDP
Baseline Trends Baseline Trends Baseline Trends Baseline Trends
Benin 5.23 4.85 4.84 5.13 Burundi 2:50 2:51 6:12 6.70
Burkina Faso 5.36 5.48 5.67 5.50 Comoros 2:75 2:75 3:26 2.60
Cape Verde 2.37 2.03 6.89 7.50 D. R. Congo 1:25 1:25 2:43 2.20
Chad 1.83 1.33 5.61 8.00 Djibouti 2:31 3:24 9:04 3.00
Cote d’Ivoire 2.74 2.21 3.95 3.69 Egypt 3:33 3:39 6:25 5.20
Gambia 4.53 3.96 7.00 7.19 Eritrea 5:26 5:36 5:60 2.90
Ghana 3.56 3.48 6.44 7.06 Ethiopia 6:51 6:52 9:08 8.20
Guinea 5.17 5.00 4.25 4.33 Kenya 2:42 2:17 2:03 3.40
Guinea Bissau 4.02 3.97 3.86 4.30 Libya 1:39 1:43 3:05 2.20
Liberia 2.55 2.00 4.02 5.09 Madagascar 1:99 1:98 3:18 3.90
Mali 3.70 3.26 5.24 6.26 Malawi 1:57 1:57 1:90 2.70
Mauritania 2.54 2.46 4.49 3.22 Mauritius 3:31 3:31 4:58 5.00
Niger 3.25 3.19 2.61 2.84 Rwanda 5:28 5:30 9:39 7.60
Nigeria 5.04 5.00 5.62 4.79 Seychelles 1:48 1:47 1:89 2.30
Senegal 2.75 2.30 3.52 3.44 Sudan 2:50 2:45 6:40 7.20
Sierra Leone 4.94 4.83 6.08 5.67 Swaziland 1:03 1:11 2:85 2.60
Togo 2.31 1.63 4.54 6.66 Tanzania 4:64 4:65 7:60 6.00
Uganda 3:01 3:01 6:51 8.10
Zambia 1:06 0:95 3:49 6.30
Zimbabwe 0:51 0:68 0:85 1.00
Source: Authors’ calculations
Table 16.7 Change in volatility and share of staple exports under alternative scenarios, 2008–
2025
Change in volatility compared to
baseline (points)
Change in share compared to
baseline (% points)
10 %
reduction
in trade
cost
Removal
of cross-
border
trade
barriers
10 %
increase
in crop
yields
10 %
reduction
in trade
cost
Removal
of cross-
border
trade
barriers
10 %
increase
in crop
yields
Benin 0:073 0:043 0:085 2:756 0:338 2:448
Burkina Faso 0:213 0:077 0:027 0:398 0:545 0:530
Ivory Coast 0:126 0:026 0:066 0:351 0:428 0:843
Gambia 0:039 0:206 0:294 0:047 0:026 0:052
Ghana 0:023 0:079 0:088 0:609 0:227 0:704
Guinea 0:002 0:160 0:116 0:144 0:095 0:151
Guinea-Bissau 0:086 0:055 0:082 0:009 0:005 0:016
(continued)
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Table 16.7 (continued)
Change in volatility compared to
baseline (points)
Change in share compared to
baseline (% points)
10 %
reduction
in trade
cost
Removal
of cross-
border
trade
barriers
10 %
increase
in crop
yields
10 %
reduction
in trade
cost
Removal
of cross-
border
trade
barriers
10 %
increase
in crop
yields
Liberia 0:001 0:136 0:094 0:002 0:003 0:002
Mali 0:031 0:057 0:017 3:137 0:069 4:475
Niger 0:091 0:129 0:241 1:111 1:115 3:247
Senegal 0:019 0:137 0:126 0:020 0:014 0:016
Sierra Leone 0:666 0:073 0:242 0:075 0:016 0:045
Togo 0:083 0:150 0:046 0:038 0:026 0:042
Egypt 0:129 0:020 0:102 2:315 0:701 0:360
Eritrea 0:075 0:043 0:547 0:091 0:014 0:203
Ethiopia 0:052 0:005 0:125 2:557 0:368 4:261
Kenya 0:006 0:081 0:041 0:009 0:004 0:016
Libya 0:001 0:001 0:004 4:669 0:918 7:018
Sudan 0:007 0:037 0:020 1:456 0:453 2:175
Angola 0:043 0:024 0:030 0:165 0:210 2:306
Botswana 0:002 0:052 0:025 0:003 0:001 0:008
Congo, Dem. Rep 0:182 1:232 0:730 0:004 0:000 0:006
Madagascar 0:162 1:423 1:695 0:007 0:001 0:005
Malawi 0:107 0:757 0:557 0:781 0:114 1:876
Mozambique 0:130 1:288 6:099 0:165 0:007 0:194
South Africa 0:017 0:166 0:159 1:382 0:258 0:927
Swaziland 0:002 0:071 0:016 0:007 0:001 0:022
Tanzania 0:093 0:342 0:739 0:237 0:052 1:189
Zambia 0:170 1:464 1:168 0:002 0:001 0:000
Zimbabwe 0:039 0:290 0:543 0:030 0:003 0:008
Source: Based on simulation results using Economy-wide Multimarket Models of ECOWAS,
COMESA, and SADC regions
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Fig. 16.8 Changes in country export share and volatility under 10 % reduction in trade costs
compared to baseline. Source: Based on Table 16.7
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Fig. 16.9 Changes in country export share and volatility under a removal of cross-border trade
barriers compared to baseline. Source: Based on Table 16.7 above
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Fig. 16.10 Changes in country export share and volatility under 10 % increase in crop yields
compared to baseline. Source: Based on Table 16.7. Note: For the sake of clarity, values for
Madagascar and Mozambique, which are too large compared to the rest, are not plotted in the
figure
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17ASEAN Food Reserve and Trade: Reviewand Prospect
Irfan Mujahid and Lukas Kornher
17.1 Introduction
High uncertainty and volatility of food prices in the recent years have renewed the
interests of many countries in considering food reserves as an important instrument
in managing food price instability. These reserves come back into the focus of policy
agenda as a result of the huge doubts on the reliability of international trade to
guarantee food supply. The 2008 crisis, in particular, highlighted that low levels of
food stocks make countries vulnerable to excessive price volatility even only with
low levels of supply or demand shocks (Wright 2009).
Countries in Southeast Asia have been using storage-based price stabilization
for decades (Rashid et al. 2007). Grain price stabilization in the Philippines
started in 1960s, carried out by Rice and Corn Administration (RCA) and Rice
and Corn Board (RICOB). In Indonesia, price stabilization is managed by Badan
Urusan Logistik (BULOG), a national food reserve agency created in 1967. At
the regional level, the cooperation on food reserves has been ongoing since the
late 1970s, when the original members of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) established the Agreement on Food Security Reserve (AFSR).
The ASEAN Emergency Rice Reserve (AERR) was created in 1979 with the initial
earmarks of 50,000 tons of rice to serve as the subset of national stocks in addressing
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food emergencies in the region. However, due to small size of the stocks and its
complex release mechanism, the AERR had never really been activated during the
entire operational period of more than a quarter of a century (Dano 2006).
The recent food price crisis affecting almost all countries in the world led to a
new phase of the regional reserve cooperation in Southeast Asia. The ten member
countries of ASEAN, in partnership with China, Japan, and Korea, agreed on the
ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR), which entered into force
in July 2012. The APTERR is a permanent reserve scheme which replaces the pilot
project East Asia Emergency Rice Reserve (EAERR), which itself was presented
as a metamorphosis of the AERR. The initial earmark of APTERR is 787,000 tons
of rice, roughly twice the size of von Braun and Torero’s (2008) proposal for a
modest emergency grain reserve of 300,000–500,000 metric tons for the whole
world. However, the APTERR has hardly been tested in practice. Since entering
into force, only 200 tons of rice have been released at the end of 2012 for poverty
alleviation and the malnutrition eradication program in Indonesia, and another 800
tons of rice in early 2014 for typhoon Haiyan victims in the Philippines. Several
other small releases have been made during its pilot phase from 2004 to 2010.1
This study aims to review the storage-based price-stabilization policy in South-
east Asia, both at the national and regional level, and to discuss the prospect of the
policy in the current era of price instability. The remainder of the article is organized
as follows: Sect. 17.2 provides information on ASEAN market structure, which
will discuss the food trade and development of trade cooperation in the region.
Sections 17.3 and 17.4 describe food reserves at the national and regional level in
ASEAN, including a discussion on their cost and benefit. The discussion about food
reserves at the national level will use several countries in ASEAN as examples,
while at the regional level, the discussion will mainly focus on the ASEANC3.2
Section 17.5 analyzes the WTO rules on public stockholding, and the last section
provides the concluding remarks.
17.2 ASEAN FoodMarket Structure
The recent waves of global food price crisis have affected almost all countries in
the world. ASEAN countries are among those that are hit by the price crisis. Since
2007, the food price index increases have been higher than the consumer price index
increases in the region (Fig. 17.1).
ASEAN countries accounted for 29 % of the total global rice output in 2013,
while maize production in this region accounted only for 4 % of the total global
output. Countries in this region are not traditional producers of wheat and other
1www.apterr.org, accessed on 17 September 2014.
2Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members are: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam; Plus Three Countries (C3)
are China, Japan, Rep. Korea.
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Fig. 17.2 World’s rice production in 2013. Source: FAOSTAT
cereals. The countries rely heavily on import for their supply of these commodities.
Most Southeast Asians eat rice as their main staple food. Rice constitutes more than
half of the population’s total calorie intake from cereal. In Thailand and Vietnam,
rice accounts even for more than two-third of their total calorie intake from cereal.3
ASEAN provides a mix of cases. It is home to some of the world’s biggest
producers, consumers, exporters, and importers of rice at the same time. Thailand
and Vietnam are among the biggest rice exporters, whereas Indonesia, Malaysia,
and the Philippines are among the biggest rice importers in the world. However,
Indonesia and the Philippines, with their goals to achieve self-sufficiency, view trade
as the last source of supply, making them occasional rice importers depending on
their production level. Other countries such as Singapore and Brunei are considered
as traditional purchasers of rice (Fig. 17.2).
3Own calculation based on FAOSTAT data. The shares are among cereals, in 2012.
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Table 17.1 ASEAN rice
trade balance 2011 (million
USD)
Country Import Export Net import
Brunei 39.6 2.0 37.6
Myanmar 1.6 98.5 96.9
Indonesia 1513.2 0.8 1512.3
Cambodia 4.9 107.9 103.1
Lao PDR 9.8 NA NA
Malaysia 606.1 0.4 605.7
Philippines 383.2 1.7 381.5
Singapore 284.3 52.6 231.6
Thailand 8.9 6507.5 6498.6
Vietnam 1.3 3656.8 3655.5
Source: FAOSTAT
The international rice market has been historically thin and unstable (Dawe and
Timmer 2012). The geographic concentration of rice production and the thinness
of international rice trade with high transactions costs are among the factors
contributing to its instability. Only about 5 % of the total global rice production
enters the international market, which is mostly concentrated in Asia. Southeast
Asia as a region is a net rice exporter (Fig. 17.3), but the bulk of the countries are
rice importers (Table 17.1).
ASEAN countries’ imports are mainly sourced from within the region. The
countries in this region absorb roughly one-third of the total regional exports and
send the excess rice supply to the rest of the world (Fig. 17.4).
The average rice tariff rates of ASEAN countries are relatively high compared
with other commodities. In 2012, the tariff for rice was 15.94 % on average among
ASEAN countries, which was much higher than the total average tariff rates for all
commodities (Table 17.2).
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Table 17.2 Average tariff
rates of ASEAN countries’ in
2012 (%)
Sector Tariff rates
All commodities 5.42
Food commodities 7.01
Rice 15.94
Source: TRAINS database accessed via WITS
Note: Average tariff rates not weighted, classi-
fication based on standard product in SITC
Southeast Asian countries liberalize their markets through regional and multi-
lateral trade agreements. The cooperation through ASEAN started in 1967, and
all ASEAN members are currently also members of the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO). Through the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), which
supersedes the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme implemented
in 1992, international trade within the region is almost without tariffs except for
certain sensitive commodities. In addition to bilateral cooperation between ASEAN
members and many other countries, the members also build cooperation with
neighboring countries while maintaining ASEAN centrality (Fig. 17.5). There are
AK-FTA (with Rep. Korea), AC-FTA (with China), AANZFTA (with Australia
and New Zealand), and AI-FTA (with India). Although the agreement of ASEAN
and Japan has not yet entered into force, many ASEAN members have already
established bilateral agreement with Japan. Furthermore, Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP), which will combine ASEAN and their six partners,
is currently under negotiation.4 ASEAN itself is entering a new phase of stronger
cooperation through the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015.
4RCEP participating countries are ASEAN countries (Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, Vietnam) plus their six partners (Australia, China,
India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea), launched in November 2012.
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Fig. 17.5 ASEAN free trade agreement. Source: WTO
Table 17.3 Tariff of selected agricultural product of different trade agreement regimes 2012 (%)
Commodity MFN applied ATIGA AKFTA ACFTA AANZFTA AIFTA
Animals & product 4.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.8 2.2
Dairy products 5.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 2.2
Fruit, vegetables, & plants 5.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.2 3.8
Coffee & tea 6.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 4.3
Cereals 11.8 7.1 7.3 7.3 7.7 10.1
Oil seeds, fats, & oils 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.3
Sugar 12.8 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1 10.4
Cotton 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6
Other agriculture products 4.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.4
Source: WTO. Note: MFN most favoured nations, ATIGA ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement,
AK FTA ASEAN Korea FTA, AC FTA ASEAN China FTA, AANZFTA ASEAN Australia New
Zealand FTA, AI FTA ASEAN India FTA
However, despite having significantly reduced their tariffs on many commodities
through trade agreements among ASEAN members (and plus countries), consider-
ably high cereals tariffs are still in place (Table 17.3). Cereal products, especially
rice, are considered highly sensitive commodities in ASEAN, and thus ASEAN
countries still make exceptions by not reducing the tariff on these commodities.
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17.3 National Food Reserves in Southeast Asia
The fact that the international rice market has been historically thin and unstable
forced countries in this region to prevent the transmission of world price fluctuations
to domestic markets (Dawe and Timmer 2012; Rashid et al. 2007). Storage-based
public intervention policies have been part of their development agenda for many
years to control food availability in the market.
Food price stabilization in the Philippines is managed by the National Food
Authority (NFA), which acts as a regulator as well as a corporation engaged in
grain trading. The history of the NFA started in the 1960s, when the RICOB and
the RCA were still active. In 1972, the National Grains Authority (NGA) replaced
these two agencies to promote the integrated growth and development of the grain
industry in the country. In 1981, the NGA was transformed to the NFA, and the new
organization has two primary mandates: ensuring food security and stabilizing the
supply and price of rice. This highlighted the importance of rice in the society. The
NFA aimed to fulfill its mandates through procurement, distribution, importation,
and buffer stock activities. For the buffer stock activities, the NFA is required to
maintain rice stocks which are equivalent to 15 days of consumption for the entire
country in its warehouses (Aquino et al. 2013).
In Indonesia, price stabilization was managed by BULOG, a national food
reserve agency created in 1967 with the special objective to protect Indone-
sian domestic markets from sharp price fluctuations on world markets. BULOG
buys excess rice production that is not absorbed by the market during harvest
seasons from farmers, keeps the rice in its warehouses throughout the country,
and distributes the rice at low prices during planting seasons, drought, or other
conditions that may cause sharp increases in market rice prices. BULOG maintains
a ceiling price policy to ensure the affordability of rice for low-income consumers,
especially those living in urban areas. Like the NFA in the Philippines, BULOG also
monopolizes rice imports in Indonesia.
As rice importers, Indonesia and the Philippines mainly control rice imports.
Other countries, such as Vietnam, which is an exporter country, also use public
reserve policies to control rice exports. VINAFOOD in Vietnam is responsible for
managing rice availability and rice prices in the market.
17.3.1 Benefits and Costs of National Reserves
Although it is difficult to separate the contributions of policies, we have provided
some reviews and discussions on the costs and benefits of national food reserve
using qualitative approaches. Rashid et al. (2007) argued that storage-based price-
stabilization policies benefit countries through price stability and better agricul-
tural performance. Southeast Asian countries were among those that successfully
420 I. Mujahid and L. Kornher
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
Ja
n-
69
D
ec
-7
0
N
ov
-7
2
O
ct
-7
4
Se
p-
76
Au
g-
78
Ju
l-8
0
Ju
n-
82
M
ay
-8
4
Ap
r-
86
M
ar
-8
8
Fe
b-
90
Ja
n-
92
D
ec
-9
3
N
ov
-9
5
O
ct
-9
7
Se
p-
99
Au
g-
01
Ju
l-0
3
Ju
n-
05
M
ay
-0
7
Ap
r-
09
M
ar
-1
1
Domestic
World
New Order Reform
Fig. 17.6 Rice prices in Indonesia during “New Order” and “Reform.” Source: Dawe (2008) and
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managed their domestic food prices for years. Under the “New Order,”5 Indonesia
was one of the success stories of food price stabilization, especially for rice. From
1969 to 1997, domestic rice prices were substantially less volatile than in the
“reform”6 period after 1998, when BULOG has less power to intervene in the
market7 (see Fig. 17.6). In Vietnam, agricultural policies introduced in the early
phase of the unification of North and South Vietnam have transformed the country
with disappointing agricultural production to one of the biggest rice exporters in the
world.
Price stability benefits consumers and producers at the same time (Timmer
1989). Poor consumers in Southeast Asia, like many others in developing countries,
spend more than half of their income on food (von Braun and Tadesse 2012).
Excessive price volatility and spikes can cause food and nutrition insecurity for
those consumers who cannot maintain consumption stability. Reducing food and
nutrition intake, even only temporarily, can have short- and long-term effects (Block
et al. 2004). Price-stabilization policy serves as a preventive program instead of a
response program for emergency cases. This kind of policy can help consumers
better manage their expectations on food prices and thus better manage their food
and nutritional intake. Price stability also helps producers maintain consumption
stability because most farmers in Southeast Asia are also categorized as poor citizen
living in rural areas.
Furthermore, price stability allows farmers to better manage price expectations
on food crops, which can enhance efficiency in the farming sector through better
management of planting systems. Moreover, price stability contributes to social and
5“New Order” refers to the government lead by President Soeharto, in power from 1967 to 1998.
6“Reform” refers to democratization era in Indonesia after the lost power of Soeharto regime in
1998.
7Empirical test using standard deviations of log of prices in difference (SSD) shows 0.05 for the
periods before 1998 and 0.1 for the periods after 1998.
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political stability. Arezki and Brückner (2014) showed that price movements can
induce political instability, which is manifested in political riots and civil conflicts.
Sociopolitical instability can in turn make it difficult for governments to promote
growth and development.
Food price stability is in fact associated with the rapid economic growth during
the early development phase in Southeast Asia (Dawe and Timmer 2012; Cummings
et al. 2006). However, the downside of stabilization policies are that the fiscal costs
of public reserves are often high, while the benefits may not be as high as expected.
In the Philippines, for instance, the government spending on the NFA surpassed
its spending on agrarian reform, research and development, and extension services
during the period of 2003–2008 (Aquino et al. 2013). In Indonesia, a financial audit
report by Arthur Anderson covering the period from April 1993 to March 1998
suggested that total inefficiency of BULOG was about US$400 million per year
(Arifin 2008). Likewise, the economic costs of distorting market and crowding out
private storage and trade can also be very high.
Over decades, there have been several shifts in the price-stabilization policies in
Southeast Asia. In the 1980s and 1990s, public reserves fell out of favor particularly
because of the changing interest of many countries, which wanted to improve
market efficiency. Fiscal difficulties caused by the Asian crisis in the late 1990s
triggered countries in the region to intervene less in the market. Indonesia loosened
its monopolistic structure and created competition within the domestic market.
BULOG lost its domestic power to monopolize the sugar and rice trade because
Indonesia was required to comply with the International Monetary Foundation
(IMF) Letter of Intent by liberalizing its market.
17.4 Regional Food Reserve Cooperation
Following the global food price crisis in 2008, ASEAN countries agreed on the
ASEAN Integrated Food Security (AIFS) framework, which aimed to address four
major components of the food security challenges: food security arrangements and
emergency short-term relief, sustainable food trade development, integrated food
security information system, and agricultural innovation. The AIFS framework
provides the foundation for the establishment of the APTERR, an ASEAN regional
reserve cooperation together with its three partners.8 The APTERR was finally
agreed upon in October 2011 and entered into force in July 2012.
The history of the APTERR dates back to 1979, when the original members of
ASEAN9 agreed on the ASEAN Emergency Rice Reserve (AERR). The objective
was to build up physical rice reserves that would serve the needs of member
countries when the demand in any member country cannot be fulfilled from own
8China, Japan, and Rep. Korea.
9Five original members are: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand; current
ASEAN members also include Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.
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production or through purchases in international market. The main reason for
the cooperation was that the ASEAN countries identified food instability as a
common threat and as the consequence of the high vulnerability of the region’s
food production. The AERR was created with the initial earmarks of 50,000 tons of
rice as a subset of national stocks. Releases from the AERR were to be arranged
through bilateral negotiation between a country in a state of emergency and a
country offering its earmarked reserve. The system, however, was never used,
and the amount of rice in the reserve was too undersized to cope with an actual
emergency.
The efforts of building up stocks in the region continued. In 2001, ASEAN
countries, in partnership with China, Japan, and Korea, initiated a consultation and
cooperation process in establishing an emergency rice reserve at the regional level.
A pilot project of the East Asia Emergency Rice Reserve (EAERR) was created at
the end of 2003 with the political support of the ASEAN Plus Three countries. The
purpose of the EAERR is twofold: maintaining food security in case of emergency
and contributing toward price stability in the region (APTERR 2014). The food price
crisis in 2008 led the ASEAN Plus Three governments to strengthen the financial
and stockpiling abilities of the EAERR and move beyond the project beyond its pilot
phase. The APTERR was finally agreed upon as a permanent scheme in October
2011 and entered into force in July 2012.
The initial earmarked stock of the APTERR is 787,000 tons of rice, which were
voluntarily contributed by the member countries (Table 17.4). The stocks remain
owned and controlled by the respective governments for meeting the needs of any
other member countries in case of emergency. The governments are also responsible
for the management cost of their earmarked stocks to ensure the stocks remain in
Table 17.4 Earmarked
stock of APTERR
Country Earmarked stocks (tons)
ASEAN countries
Brunei Darussalam 3000
Cambodia 3000
Indonesia 12,000
Lao PDR 3000
Malaysia 6000
Myanmar 14,000
Philippines 12,000
Singapore 5000
Thailand 15,000
Vietnam 14,000
Plus Three countries
China 300,000
Japan 250,000
Korea 150,000
Total 787,000
Source: APTERR
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good quality. Another type of APTERR stock is a stockpiled emergency rice reserve,
which could be in form of cash or rice, but is owned collectively by APTERR
member countries and managed by the APTERR secretariat under the supervision
of the APTERR council.10
The APTERR is designed to mainly address emergency situations anywhere in
the region. Emergency is defined as “the state or condition having suffered extreme
and unexpected natural or man-induced calamity, which is unable to cope with such
state or condition through its national reserve and is unable to procure the need
through normal trade.”11 In principle, given the definition of emergency, extreme
price volatility is not a reason for releasing rice from the APTERR.
The APTERR presents itself as a subset of national reserves. Rice release from
the APTERR is only possible when a national reserve is unable to cope with extreme
shocks. The release of APTERR stock is based on the request of the member
country which encounters an emergency rice shortage. The requesting country is
also responsible for the transportation and operational costs incurred during the
stock release.
The APTERR heavily relies on the commitment and political will of every
member country, without any sanction mechanism in place. Nevertheless, APTERR
member countries appoint a Management Team to ensure rice releases take place in
case of emergency.
17.4.1 The Benefits and Costs of Regional Reserves
There have been extensive debates on storage-based price-stabilization policies
(Galtier 2013). On the one hand, countries with public reserve policies can benefit
from price stability and better agriculture performances, which are associated with
economic success. On the other hand, the policies are often criticized for their high
fiscal and economic costs.
National public food reserves in Southeast Asia are largely managed as buffer
stocks to address price instability. The size of national public food reserves is usually
large, and their stocks are frequently rotated to maintain the quality of the stocks.
Consequently, the fiscal costs of storing food/grains are high, and the potential of
creating market distortion is high as a result of the high degree of intervention.
On the other hand, an emergency public reserve usually holds a low amount of
stocks and is only intended for addressing humanitarian needs rather than for price
stabilization.
In the competitive storage model, the central idea behind storing food today for
tomorrow’s consumption is based on the assumption that an equilibrium price can
be reached when today’s price (pt) equals the expected price tomorrow (ptC1) plus
the costs of storage. Stocks are held in anticipation of profit, which implies that the
10The APTERR council is composed of one representative from each APTERR member country.
11ASEAN Integrated Food Security Framework.
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marginal gain of holding stocks should exceed the marginal cost. However, under
this condition, the optimal stock level is not necessarily optimal from the social
welfare perspective.
Using this assumption, public involvement in stockholding is needed to address
the economy-wide consequences of demand or supply shocks. Difficulties arise
when determining the optimal stock level (Gardner 1979) as it depends on the
criterion of desirability. For instance, public rice stocks maintained by the NFA in
the Philippines are equivalent to 15-day consumption needs of the entire country
(Aquino et al. 2013). This stock level is determined based on the assumption that
the national stock level (public and private) should be equivalent to the 90-day
consumption needs, which covers the lean season, when usually no harvests from
domestic production prevail.
Notwithstanding the difficulties in determining the optimal stock level, we
provided an illustration on how regional cooperation can significantly reduce
the required stocks.12 Following Kornher and Kalkuhl (2014), we estimated the
required stocks as the difference between the largest historic supply shortfall and
the percentage of threshold:
S D max
h
1  x
100

E .Qt/  Qt
i
(17.1)
where x is the level of allowed supply shortfall. For instance, if we want to maintain
97 % consumption stability, then the allowed supply shortfall is 3 %. E(Qt) is
the expected supply level at time t. Since supply for consumption increases with
population growth, we measured shortfall around a trend.
Supply shortfalls of countries individually were compared with the total supply
shortfalls of the entire region using the coefficient of variation of supply, which can
be written as:
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where CV2
Xn
1
Qi

is the coefficient of variation of the regional supply, and Qi
is the supply of each country. si and ri; iC1 are a country’s share and coefficient
of correlation, respectively. This condition assumes that there is free flow of food
between the countries within the region. Production shortfall can be compensated by
imports, which means that the supply shortfall in one country can be compensated
by supply surpluses in other countries.
12Further discussion on optimal stock level can be found in Kornher and Kalkuhl (2014).
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Table 17.5 Stocks required for allowed supply shortfall of 3 % (tons)
w/o cooperation With cooperation Actual APTERR stock
Required
stock
Stock-to-use
ratio
Required
stock
Stock-to-use
ratio
Earmarked
stock
Stock-to-use
ratio
ASEAN
Brunei 1227 23.22 688 13.02 3000 56.76
Cambodia 47,768 12.95 26,799 7.27 3000 0.81
Indonesia 57,413 1.05 32,210 0.59 12,000 0.22
Lao PDR 18,912 10.73 10,610 6.02 3000 1.7
Malaysia 17,947 5.59 10,069 3.14 6000 1.87
Myanmar 34,552 2.37 19,385 1.33 14,000 0.96
Philippines 78,355 5.41 43,960 3.04 12,000 0.83
Singapore 10,420 23.28 5846 13.06 5000 11.17
Thailand 130,132 8.60 73,008 4.82 15,000 0.99
Vietnam 136,657 5.42 76,669 3.04 14,000 0.55
Plus Three
China 678,268 3.2 380,533 1.8 300,000 1.42
Japan 132,280 8.7 74,214 4.88 250,000 16.45
Korea 59,788 6.93 33,543 3.90 150,000 17.40
Total 1,403,717 3.81 787,535 2.14 787,000 2.14
Source: Own elaboration based on USDA PSD. Note: required stocks w/o cooperation and with
cooperation are calculated for 2 months consumption
Considering that not all of ASEAN countries are rice producers, supply data
(production C imports) was used instead of production data only. Rice supply in
Singapore, for instance, relies heavily on imports. Using the actual rice supply
data of ASEANC3 countries from the USDA PSD for the period of 1980–2014,
we estimated the required stocks for the 2-month consumption stability at 97 %
(allowed supply shortfall of 3 %). Countries’ stocks were determined from the
regional stocks using their consumption shares. The results of the estimations are
presented in Table 17.5.13
The simulations showed that regional cooperation can significantly reduce the
required rice stock by roughly 44 %, from 1,403,717 to 787,535 tons. This
implies that the fiscal costs associated with holding stocks can be reduced through
cooperation and risks sharing. The simulations also showed that all countries can
reduce the required contributions of stocks through regional risk sharing.
In the APTERR system, stocks remain owned and controlled by the respective
governments for the purpose of meeting the needs of any other APTERR member
countries when they experience an emergency. However, transportation costs arise
when transferring rice from a donor country to a country in need. This transportation
costs should also be taken into consideration when calculating the cost reduction
13Correlation matrix of supply shortfall, maximum shortfall, average annual supply, and consump-
tion shares that were used for the estimations are available in Appendix.
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Table 17.6 Storage and transportation cost (million USD)
Storage cost Transportation cost Total cost
Low High Low High Low High
w/o cooperation 35 49 – – 35 49
With cooperation 20 28 0.7 1.1 20.7 29.1
Cost savings 14.3 19.9
Source: own elaboration. Note: Storage cost is estimated in the range of US$25 (low) to US$35
(high) per ton. Transportation cost within ASEANC3 countries is estimated in the range of US$10
(low) to 15 (high) per ton
resulting from cooperation. Since transportation costs arise only when a country
within the region experiences a shortfall, we calculated the transportation costs
from the expected trade volume14 in times of shortfall, which was estimated to be
equal to the required stocks for 2 months consumption. The results are available in
Table 17.6.15
The total cost saving through food reserve cooperation was estimated to be
about US$14.3–19.9 million when storing enough food to satisfy consumption for
2 months. The saving is roughly 40 % of the estimated cost without cooperation.
The current APTERR stock is roughly equal to the total stocks needed by the
region to maintain consumption stability at 97 % for 2 months. However, the
voluntary contribution of each member country of the APTERR is not the same
as the required stock for each country with cooperation through risks sharing. For
instance, Japan and Korea contribute more than what they need, but Cambodia and
Lao PDR contribute less than their required stocks. Richer countries of the APTERR
are more likely to provide food assistance to their poorer neighboring countries. This
can be seen also from the voluntary contributions of APTERR member countries:
each of the “Plus Three” countries contributes more than the total contribution from
all ASEAN countries. There is a strong indication that the large contribution from
the “Plus Three” countries has brought APTERR into practice. Its predecessor, the
AERR, which consisted only of ASEAN members with small size of stock, had
never released its stock during its entire operational period.
We also conducted a simulation to determine the required stock for ensuring
consumption stability of 97 % in different cooperation regimes in order to analyze
whether countries benefit from larger cooperation (Table 17.7). Through our
simulation of three scenarios—ASEAN, ASEANC3, and ASEANC3 plus India—
we found that the benefits of cooperation decreased when more countries joined
the cooperation. This is possible because the correlation of shortfall risks increases
with the increasing number of member countries. However, although the benefits
of cooperation were decreasing, the required stock was still significantly reduced.
14The expected trade volume in times of shortfall is based on the mean value of the historical
regional shortfalls.
15Numbers of supply shortfall for each country are available in Appendix.
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Table 17.7 Stocks required for allowed supply shortfall of 3 % in different (tons)
Regional cooperation
(simulation)
Required stocks without
cooperation
Required stocks with
cooperation Reduced by (%)
ASEAN 533,382 178,885 66
ASEANC3 1,403,717 787,535 44
ASEANC3CIndia 2,362,418 1,637,777 31
Source: Own elaboration based on USDA PSD
For instance, if India also joined the ASEANC3 cooperation, the required stock
would be reduced by 31 %. Moreover, larger cooperation means larger coordination
between countries, which can potentially prevent collective action failures.
17.5 WTO Rules on Public Reserve
The central issue in a WTO-compatible framework for developing countries,
including those in Southeast Asia, is whether these countries are able to stockpile
their staple food (i.e., rice) to ensure stable incomes for their farmers while ensuring
that their low-income citizens are able to access the basic food at an affordable
price. This issue, however, affects or has the potential to affect other countries.
The potential spillovers of public reserves are high in different member countries
due to different conditions of countries in ensuring food security for the citizens.
The increasing demand for food for stockholding purposes increases prices and
potentially reduces supply for immediate consumption in other countries. When
food stocks are finally released for consumption, international trade can be distorted,
affecting market competition.
The present WTO rules allow member countries to maintain or introduce
domestic support measures without any limitations or reduction commitments. To
qualify for this, domestic support to food reserves must meet “the fundamental
requirement that they have no, or at most minimal, trade distorting effect or effects
on production.”16 Countries, however, may argue the definition of minimal trade
distorting effects.
A public reserve is not only economically complex but also politically encum-
bered. The Bali Package, which has been mentioned as the first-ever agreement
reached in the history of the WTO, still makes an exception for public stockholding.
In the 9th ministerial meeting held in Bali, Indonesia, at the end of 2013, the
WTO member countries adopted an interim solution and agreed to negotiate a
permanent solution that would specifically address public reserve by the 11th
16WTO Agreement on Agriculture.
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ministerial conference in 2017. Furthermore, in the Post-Bali work, countries also
agreed to continue with the interim solution if the permanent solution cannot be
agreed upon by 2017. This means that no agreement has been reached for a public
reserve. Nevertheless, the interim solution, which should prevent countries from
challenging other countries through dispute settlement mechanism until a permanent
solution is found, can be a starting point for a new institutional arrangement to
prevent collective action failures of uncoordinated national public reserves, which
can further destabilize prices at the international level.
17.6 Conclusion and Policy Implication
Public food reserve policies have been used by many countries for decades.
Although in the 1980s and 1990s, public reserves fell out of favor with many
countries particularly against the backdrop of changing interest, with the countries
turning their attention to improving market efficiency, the policy has always been
part of the development agenda of many countries. Storage-based stabilization
policy through public food reserve is receiving much more attention today in the
era of increasing food price volatility. Food security concerns in the recent years
have led many countries to reconsider using public food reserve as the main policy
to deal with such uncertainty and price instability.
ASEAN countries have provided an interesting case with their long experience
in implementing storage-price-based stabilization policies. Despite the difficulties
in measuring the impact of different policies, price stabilization has been an
integral part of the development agenda of ASEAN countries for decades and has
contributed to price stability, which is associated with the economic successes in
this region. ASEAN also has shown that cooperation at the regional level is possible.
The APTERR presents itself as a regional effort to face the common challenges of
ensuring food security.
One of the main concerns regarding public reserve is that the fiscal cost of storing
food is relatively high. The cost, however, can be reduced with cooperation. The
simulations have shown that regional cooperation significantly reduces the required
stocks, which in turn reduces the costs of holding them. Even when transportation
cost arising because of decentralized storage in the different countries is taken
into account, the total cost for food reserve with cooperation is still lower than
without cooperation. This definitely will be beneficial for all participating countries.
Admittedly, determining the optimal stock level is difficult. It always depends on the
criterion of desirability. The current earmarked stock of the APTERR is designed
mainly to address emergency situation rather than for price stability. However, it
may have a calming effect on the market and thereby prevent the rapid increase in
food prices.
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ASEAN and their partner countries can also consider expanding their coopera-
tion to include other neighboring countries. The simulation which considered India
as the “fourth” country showed that such cooperation would still significantly reduce
the required stocks that will be beneficial for all member countries involved. India
was emphasized in the simulation because of its important role in the region. The
fact that the country is home to around 200 million undernourished people17 has
brought serious concerns to the policymakers in the country. With the world’s largest
food programs covering public procurement, storage, and distribution of wheat and
rice, India has successfully stabilized its food prices for many years. However, the
policies give rise to very high fiscal cost. In 2013, the cost is estimated to be around
1.2 % of the country’s GDP (Kozicka et al. 2015).
While India is not part of ASEAN Plus Three countries food reserve cooperation,
ASEAN and India have already signed an FTA, which has been in force since
January 2010. The countries involved could also consider including food reserve
as part of their cooperation which will likely be beneficial to all the participating
countries. In addition to reducing the overall fiscal costs, larger cooperation and
coordination also mean that collective action failures are diminished.
Learning from ASEAN case, public food reserve is an ancient idea that is still
relevant today. The way forward is to build institutional arrangements that facilitate
coordination and cooperation among countries through various channels, including
the multilateral trading system of the WTO. Each of the ASEAN trade agreements
with six countries18 which could be deepened under the RCEP framework, which
combines all ASEAN “plus” agreements together, and this could be a starting point
for a stronger and larger cooperation in various areas, including public reserves.
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Appendix
17Estimated from 17 % of population as stated in the Global Hunger Index, IFPRI et al. (2014).
18The six countries are Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand.
430 I. Mujahid and L. Kornher
Ta
b
le
1
7
.8
C
or
re
la
ti
on
of
su
pp
ly
sh
or
tf
al
ls
fr
om
ta
rg
et
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
of
97
%
B
R
N
K
H
M
ID
N
L
A
O
M
Y
S
M
M
R
PH
L
SG
P
T
H
A
V
N
M
C
H
N
JP
N
K
O
R
B
R
N
1
K
H
M
0
.0
12
4
1
ID
N
0
.1
52
9
0.
05
34
1
L
A
O
0
.0
80
5
0
.0
61
4
0.
36
66
*
1
M
Y
S
0.
13
22
0.
15
05
0.
00
84
0.
15
1
M
M
R
0
.2
10
6
0.
06
89
0.
15
42
0.
11
15
0.
60
32
*
1
PH
L
0.
08
71
0
.0
51
4
0
.0
69
7
0.
08
25
0.
00
27
0
.1
11
1
1
SG
P
0
.1
47
7
0.
30
81
0
.1
21
1
0
.1
79
2
0
.1
11
7
0
.1
29
1
0.
06
38
1
T
H
A
0
.1
18
4
0
.1
69
9
0.
00
66
0.
00
13
0
.0
32
2
0
.0
35
6
0.
40
60
*
0.
37
21
*
1
V
N
M
0
.1
45
5
0
.1
26
3
0
.0
64
3
0
.1
13
9
0
.0
92
3
0
.1
02
8
0
.0
72
8
0.
01
42
0.
08
15
1
C
H
N
0.
46
17
*
0
.0
89
5
0
.0
63
5
0
.1
09
7
0.
20
73
0
.0
57
7
0
.0
72
0.
04
88
0.
12
12
0
.0
66
4
1
JP
N
0.
02
48
0
.0
49
4
0.
22
4
0.
50
26
*
0
.0
51
8
0
.1
37
3
0
.0
02
8
0
.1
39
7
0
.0
78
2
0
.0
89
7
0.
20
56
1
K
O
R
0.
29
39
0.
05
95
0
.0
64
2
0
.0
52
8
0.
56
80
*
0.
10
9
0
.0
37
4
0
.1
94
0
.1
07
1
0
.1
08
8
0.
55
60
*
0.
03
91
1
So
ur
ce
:
O
w
n
ca
lc
ul
at
io
n
ba
se
d
on
U
SD
A
PS
D
.
N
ot
e:
B
R
N
B
ru
ne
i
D
ar
us
sa
la
m
,
K
H
M
C
am
bo
di
a,
ID
N
In
do
ne
si
a,
L
A
O
L
ao
PD
R
,
M
Y
S
M
al
ay
si
a,
M
M
R
M
ya
nm
ar
,P
H
L
Ph
il
ip
pi
ne
s,
SG
P
Si
ng
ap
or
e,
T
H
A
T
ha
il
an
d,
V
N
M
V
ie
tn
am
,C
H
N
C
hi
na
,J
P
N
Ja
pa
n,
K
O
R
R
ep
.K
or
ea
*
re
pr
es
en
ts
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
le
ve
la
t9
5
%
17 ASEAN Food Reserve and Trade: Review and Prospect 431
Ta
b
le
1
7
.9
R
ic
e
su
pp
ly
,c
on
su
m
pt
io
n,
an
d
sh
or
tf
al
l1
98
0–
20
14
Su
pp
ly
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
Sh
or
tf
al
l
A
nn
ua
la
ve
ra
ge
(0
00
to
ns
)
R
eg
io
na
l
sh
ar
e
(%
)
A
nn
ua
la
ve
ra
ge
(0
00
to
ns
)
R
eg
io
na
ls
ha
re
(%
)
N
um
be
r
of
sh
or
tf
al
l
M
ax
im
um
sh
or
tf
al
l
(0
00
to
ns
)
M
ea
n
of
sh
or
tf
al
l
(0
00
to
ns
)
A
SE
A
N
B
ru
ne
i
3
1
:7
0.
01
3
1
:7
1
0.
01
1
4
7.
36
1.
27
C
am
bo
di
a
2
4
9
4
:6
3
0.
80
2
2
1
3
:0
9
1.
00
9
28
6.
61
36
.5
2
In
do
ne
si
a
3
7;
2
5
0
:6
9
11
.9
4
3
2
;7
6
5
:2
0
14
.8
4
3
34
4.
48
15
.5
7
L
ao
PD
R
1
0
8
9
:4
0
0.
35
1
0
5
7
:2
0
0.
48
9
11
3.
47
11
.3
5
M
al
ay
si
a
2
3
2
7
:6
0
0.
75
1
9
2
6
:3
7
0.
87
7
10
7.
68
6.
92
M
ya
nm
ar
1
0
;0
1
9
:8
0
3.
21
8
7
5
1
:6
6
3.
96
7
20
7.
31
19
.5
0
Ph
il
ip
pi
ne
s
1
0
;9
5
8
:8
3
3.
51
8
6
8
5
:1
1
3.
93
6
47
0.
13
23
.7
2
Si
ng
ap
or
e
2
7
1
:8
6
0.
09
2
6
8
:6
0
0.
12
1
1
62
.5
2
7.
09
T
ha
il
an
d
1
8
;7
3
7
:7
1
6.
01
9
0
7
9
:9
7
4.
11
6
78
0.
79
66
.2
8
V
ie
tn
am
1
9
;0
2
8
:0
9
6.
10
1
5
;1
3
5
:5
4
6.
85
3
81
9
39
.4
1
P
lu
s
T
hr
ee
C
hi
na
1
9
1
;9
7
9
:5
0
61
.5
6
1
2
6
;6
5
5
:2
0
57
.3
5
4
40
69
.6
1
18
0.
69
Ja
pa
n
1
1
;3
1
5
:5
1
3.
63
9
1
1
8
:1
4
4.
13
7
79
3.
68
50
.6
5
R
ep
.K
or
ea
6
3
5
2
:4
0
2.
04
5
1
7
1
:3
7
2.
34
6
35
8.
73
41
.6
0
To
ta
l
3
1
1
;8
5
7
:7
3
10
0
2
2
0
;8
5
9
:1
7
10
0
9
2
84
22
.3
0
50
0.
57
R
eg
io
na
l
3
1
1
;8
5
7
:7
3
10
0
2
2
0
;8
5
9
:1
7
10
0
3
1
47
25
.2
1
50
6.
43
So
ur
ce
:O
w
n
ca
lc
ul
at
io
n
ba
se
d
on
U
SD
A
PS
D
.N
ot
e:
R
eg
io
na
lr
ef
er
s
to
A
SE
A
N
Pl
us
T
hr
ee
co
un
tr
ie
s
as
a
re
gi
on
432 I. Mujahid and L. Kornher
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
Noncommercial 2.5 License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/) which permits any
noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s)
and source are credited.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included
in the work’s Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory
regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or
reproduce the material.
References
Abbott P (2010) Stabilization policies in developing countries after the 2007-2008 crisis. In: Global
forum on agriculture policies for agricultural development, poverty reduction and food security,
29–30 November, OECD, Paris
Anderson K (2012) Government trade restrictions and international price volatility. Global Food
Secur 1:157–166
Aquino A, Daquio CRO, Ani PAB (2013) National Food Authority: it’s role in price stability and
food security. Asia-Pacific Information Platform on Agricultural Policy
Arezki R, Brückner M (2014) Effects of international food price shocks on political institutions in
low-income countries: evidence from an international food net-export price index. World Dev
61:142–153
Arifin B (2008) From remarkable success stories to troubling present: the case of BULOG in
Indonesia. In: Rashid S, Gulati A, Cummings R Jr (eds) From parastatals to private trade:
lessons from Asian agriculture. IFPRI, Washington, DC
ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR). Available at http://www.apterr.org.
Accessed 23 Aug 2014
Block SA, Kiess L, Webb P, Kosen S, Moench-Pfanner R, Bloem MW, Timmer CP (2004) Macro
shocks and micro outcomes: child nutrition during Indonesia’s crisis. Econ Hum Biol 2:21–44
Briones RM, Durant-Morat A, Wailes EJ, Chavez EC (2012) Climate change and price volatility:
can we count on the ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve? ADB sustainable develop-
ment working paper series, 24
Cummings R (2012) Experience with managing food grains price volatility in Asia. Global Food
Secur 1:150–156
Cummings R, Rashid S, Gulati A (2006) Grain price stabilization experiences in Asia: what have
we learned? Food Policy 31:302–312
Dano E (2006) ASEAN’s emergency rice reserve schemes: current developments and prospects
for engagements. Women in action no. 3
Dawe D (2001) How far down the path to free trade? The importance of rice price stabilization in
developing Asia. Food Policy 26(2):163–175
Dawe D (2008) Can Indonesia trust the world rice market? Bull Indones Econ Stud 44(1):115–132
Dawe D, Timmer P (2012) Why stable food prices are a good thing: lessons from stabilizing rice
prices in Asia. Global Food Secur 1:127–133
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Statistic Division. FAOSTAT. Available at http://
faostat3.fao.org/download/T/*/E. Accessed 23 Aug 2014
Galtier F (2013) Managing food price instability: critical assessment of the dominant doctrine.
Global Food Secur 2:72–81
Gardner BL (1979) Optimal stockpiling of grain. Lexington Books, Lexington, MA
Gilbert C (2012) International agreements to manage food price volatility. Global Food Secur
1:134–142
Headey D (2011) Rethinking the global food crisis: the role of trade shocks. Food Policy 36:136–
146
17 ASEAN Food Reserve and Trade: Review and Prospect 433
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Weltungerhilfe and Concern Worldwide
(2014) Global hunger index: the challenge of hidden hunger. IFPRI, Washington, DC
Islam N, Thomas S (1996) Food grain price stabilization in developing countries: issues and
experiences in Asia. IFPRI, Food Policy Review Series, Washington, DC
Jha S, Srinivasan P (1999) Grain price stabilization in India: evaluation of policy alternatives. Agric
Econ 21(1):93–108
Kornher L, Kalkuhl M (2014) Cost and benefit assessment of regional storage cooperation. In:
ZEF-IFPRI workshop on food price volatility and food security, Bonn, October 2014
Kozicka M, Kalkuhl M, Brockhaus J (2015) Food grain policies in India and their implications for
stocks and fiscal costs: a partial equilibrium analysis. In: ECOMOD conference paper, Chestnut
Hill, MA, USA, 15–17 July 2015
Rashid S, Cummings RJ, Gulati A (2007) Grain marketing parastatals in Asia: results from six
case studies. World Dev 35(11):1872–1888
Timmer CP (1989) Food price policy: the rationale for government intervention. Food Policy
14:17–27
Timmer CP, Dawe D (2007) Managing food price instability in Asia: a macro food security
perspective. Asian Econ J 21(1):1–18
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Production, Supply and Distribution online.
Available at https://apps.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/. Accessed 23 Aug 2014
von Braun J, Tadesse G (2012) Global food price volatility and spike: an overview of costs, causes,
and solutions. ZEF discussion papers on development policy, 161
von Braun J, Torero M (2008) Physical and virtual global food reserves to protect the poor and
prevent market failure, June, IFPRI, Policy brief 4
Wright B (2009) International grain reserves and other instruments to address volatility in grain
markets. Policy research working paper 5028. World Bank, Washington, DC
18WhenDo Prices Matter Most? Rice, Wheat,and Corn Supply Response in China
Jan Brockhaus, Jikun Huang, Jiliang Hu, Matthias Kalkuhl,
Joachim von Braun, and Guolei Yang
18.1 Introduction
Unexpected high and volatile food prices during the 2007–2008 world food
crisis and thereafter have reemphasized the question of how countries can protect
themselves from supply shortages. In view of the various trade restrictions imposed
by some major exporting countries, governments tend once again to focus more on
self-sufficiency and food storage. Additionally, emerging economies like China aim
at increasing their yields. This is because the possibilities of expanding agricultural
land are limited, while population, total grain demand, and meat consumption are
rising.
The primary purposes of analyzing the supply response are threefold in this
chapter. First, this work aims to identify the different factors that can affect
production, such as market prices, biophysical conditions, and infrastructure. The
second objective is to analyze the differences in the effects of these factors on the
different crops. The third aim is to evaluate how the predictive power of prices
evolves over time and therefore to understand when farmers react most strongly
to prices. Hence, a clear understanding of the farmers’ planting and production
behavior is needed.
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In the context of empirical estimations, farmers’ decision-making is generally
modeled as a two-step process (Colman 1983): First, farmers choose the crop type
based on past weather conditions and decide their cropping area based on the prices
they expect to receive several months later. Second, after planting, they change their
farmland management measures according to market prices and weather condition
to achieve a high yield. We focus on the production response of winter wheat,
indica rice, and corn as these crops are the main staple foods in China. China is the
biggest producer of rice and wheat and one of the biggest producers of corn. The
results of the research can also be used as the basis for a short-term forecasting tool
for monitoring Chinese food security or as part of a worldwide food availability
monitoring tool. However, forecasting would require timely availability of data,
which usually is not possible for data from the Chinese Agricultural Yearbooks.
In China, early works in this field have focused on the roles of price and
marketing reforms in agricultural production (e.g. Lin 1991). Empirical studies
have found a positive impact of price changes on output during the first years of
reform (Lin 1992; Huang and Rozelle 1996). Lin (1992) found that 15 % of output
growth in 1978–1984 came from the rise in relative prices. Huang and Rozelle
(1996) showed about 10 % of rice output growth between 1978 and 1984 was
caused by price effects. The gains have also resulted from increased allocative
efficiency through market liberalization since the early 1990s. For example, de
Brauw et al. (2004) showed that increasing marketization had a positive effect on
crop allocation and productivity. The recent works have paid more attention to the
impacts of subsidizing agriculture after China shifted its agricultural policy from
taxing farming households to providing them with subsidies in 2004. While these
subsidies are given to all producers and are very high, even higher than in the USA
and the EU on a per unit area basis in 2012, they are quite low on a per household
or per farm basis as farms in China are mostly of small scale (Huang et al. 2013).
Except for subsidies for machinery, which influenced the purchase of machineries,
most other subsidies for grain, input, and seed were found not to influence farmers’
area allocation decisions (Huang et al. 2011). This finding provides the rationale
behind not explicitly including subsidies in this study. Increased grain outputs in
the later years were partly attributed to land reallocation to grain production (Yu
and Jensen 2010). With the help of a dynamic panel approach, acreage and yield
responses to output prices were analyzed in a case study for Henan (Yu et al. 2011).
Both area and yield were found to be price-responsive. However, evidence from
other provinces is missing, and the effects of high temperatures have not been
addressed. This chapter focuses on both of these issues. Furthermore, the role of
prices at different points in time is at the heart of this analysis. At the global
level, price volatility and therefore price risks were found to reduce the supply
response (Haile et al. 2016). However, as prices are comparably stable in China,
price volatility was not considered as an important factor in this study.
In the face of global warming, interest in its impacts on agriculture is increasing.
The impacts of climate change are expected to be huge and have already been
partly documented. The general findings include an expected decline of crop yields
in China, as in other developing countries (Tao et al. 2006). By employing farm-
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level data and the Ricardian method, the average impact of higher temperatures
was found to be negative, whereas the average impact of more rainfall was found
to be positive (Wang et al. 2009). Overall, weather conditions, market prices, and
infrastructures can be seen as the three most important conditions for agriculture
production. This study makes an important contribution to evaluating how such
weather-related variables, especially high temperatures, affect the production of the
considered crops at the province level. Furthermore, to our knowledge, this is the
first study which addresses the production response to prices at different periods in
time in order to analyze the farmers’ price expectation formation process.
The next four sections present the data, methods, results, and conclusions,
respectively.
18.2 Data Description and Usage
Data on acreage, production, output market prices, procurement prices, fertilizer
prices, rainfall, consumer price index (CPI), irrigated area, temperatures, sunshine,
effective irrigated area, and prices of competing crops were collected from the
Chinese agricultural and statistical yearbooks from 1996 to 2012. Province-level
data was used whenever possible, but whenever such data was scarce, national-
level data was used instead. Own crop prices were deflated by the CPI; other prices
were deflated by the own crop price, resulting in relative prices to take into account
any possible correlation. Table 18.1 provides an overview of the aggregation level,
frequency, and transformations of the data. The summary statistics of the variables
are presented in Table 18.2 for the individual crops.
A panel data set was created for each crop, whereby the province-wise production
of a crop was used as the dependent variable to be explained by the other variables.
The provincial production data, collected from the National Bureau of Statistics of
China, was collected from 1995 to 2012 and includes information on 20 provinces
planting winter wheat, 29 provinces planting corn, 13 provinces planting early and
late indica rice, and 15 provinces planting middle indica rice. For indica rice, data
from the early, middle, and (double) late seasons were pooled together to get more
observations and hence ensuring that the number of observations did not fall below
249. However, this came at the cost of not being able to detect any heterogeneity in
the response which cannot be captured by the fixed effects.
The planting season and complementing and substituting crops may differ
slightly among the different provinces. For winter wheat, the planting season is from
September to October, and its harvesting takes place in the late April or May of the
following year. The main substitute is rapeseed, followed by cotton, while corn is
a complementing crop. Corn is mainly planted from April to June and harvested
between August and October. The main substitutes are soybean and cotton, and
the main complementing crops are wheat and rapeseed. Based on the farmers’
production behavior, we focused on input and output prices, weather conditions,
and infrastructure. For crop prices, monthly wholesale prices were used. This is
because wholesale prices were more easily available than farm gate prices and also
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Table 18.1 Overview of the data used for the regression analysis
Data China : : : yearbook Scale Frequency Transformation
Production Rural statistic Province Yearly Logged
CPI Statistical Province Monthly Continuous CPI build
from yearly changes
Total farm crop area Rural statistic Province Yearly –
Irrigated area Water conservancy Province Yearly Divided by total farm
crop area and logged
Nonirrigated area – Province Yearly log(1-irrigated area/total
farm crop area)
Wholesale prices Grain National Monthly Divided by continuous
CPI and logged (for
competing crop prices:
divided by own crop
price)
Fertilizer prices Price National Monthly Divided by wholesale
price and logged
Rainfall Water conservancy Province Monthly Logged
Hours of sunshine 1 Province Monthly Logged
Lowest temperature 1 Province Monthly –
Average temperature 1 Province Monthly –
Highest temperature 1 Province Monthly –
Area affected by drought Water conservancy Province Yearly Divided by total farm
crop area and logged
Note: The second column shows the source, i.e., from which of China’s yearbooks the data is taken.
1 means that it is not taken from any yearbook but from the National Meteorological Information
Center of China
because of the high transmission from wholesale to farm gate prices, as reported in
the literature (Liu et al. 2012).
As land and labor are limited, planting behavior can be affected by the price
of competing crops. Fertilizer prices were chosen as the main input market price.
Wages, obtained from Bloomberg, were also included, but their time series is short
and as a result so is the number of observations. Due to this and the fact that they
turned out to be insignificant, they were not reported in this chapter but are available
upon request. The agricultural production system is sensitive to weather effects,
and there are very few measures available to farmers to compensate for weather
effects. Therefore, weather conditions, collected from the National Meteorological
Information Center of China, were a very important independent variable in this
analysis. The percentage share of cultivated area under irrigation can also be seen as
a measure of infrastructure and technology. Missing values for this variable, but not
for any other variables, were imputed. Irrigation also allows farmers to compensate
for insufficient rainfall and partly even droughts. As irrigation is typically used
in combination with the application of chemical fertilizers, it represents a higher
standard of agricultural infrastructure. However, irrigation relates to the cultivated
land area under irrigation and hence is not crop specific. As a result, only very
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Table 18.2 Summary statistics of the data from all provinces
Obs Mean SD Min Max
Corn
Production (1000 tons) 552 458:7 549:5 0:9 2675:8
June WSP (CNY/kg) 463 1:4 0:4 0:9 2:3
Irrigation (1000 ha) 552 1813:9 1385:8 144:2 5205:6
Rainfall @ growing (cm) 534 14:1 6:8 1:5 40:4
Average temp @ growing (ıC) 534 24:9 3:3 13:2 30:7
Drought area (1000 ha) 495 448:1 544:2 1:0 3133:0
Fertilizer price (CNY/kg) 492 1916:4 672:6 1186:0 3140:0
Winter wheat
Production (1000 tons) 360 464:3 686:8 0:2 3177:4
March WSP (CNY/kg) 301 1:5 0:4 1:0 2:2
April’s sunshine hours 360 5:6 1:8 1:7 9:4
Irrigation (1000 ha) 360 2041:9 1466:8 173:6 5205:6
Rainfall @ growing (cm) 360 6:0 4:8 0:2 22:4
High temp @ flowering (ıC) 360 26:0 4:1 16:6 37:3
Rainfall @ planting (cm) 360 2:9 1:6 0:1 11:7
Drought area (1000 ha) 321 399:5 482:9 1:0 2573:0
Fertilizer price (CNY/kg) 320 1897:8 665:3 1184:0 3000:0
Indica rice
Production (1000 tons) 707 406:1 433:0 0:0 2161:1
WSP @ planting (CNY/kg) 594 1:5 0:4 0:9 2:5
Sunshine hours @ planting 707 5:4 1:4 2:1 10:4
Irrigation (1000 ha) 707 1751:3 985:5 169:9 3929:7
Rainfall @ growing (cm) 707 11:4 4:3 2:6 26:2
Rainfall @ planting (cm) 707 3:8 2:6 0:1 19:5
High temp @ growing (ıC) 707 33:7 2:0 27:2 39:7
Drought area (1000 ha) 639 292:9 361:0 1:0 2250:0
Fertilizer price (CNY/kg) 632 1867:1 668:0 1126:0 3340:0
Note: Data which is only available on a national basis has been copied for all provinces and
therefore is shown to have more observations than it actually has on the national level. Data is
only reported if the value for production for that crop, year, and province is available. Unless the
month is indicated, the @ is used to specify time periods
limited conclusions can be drawn about how irrigation affects production. This is
discussed further in Sect. 18.4 and also applies to the drought area, which is also not
crop specific.
As some of the weather data has a high level of autocorrelation, it is not possible
to consider every month in the econometric analysis. Therefore, only the most
important month is included, except for rainfall, in which case the sum of the most
important months is calculated. The hypotheses to test in this chapter are as follows:
(1) A positive response to own output prices, and a negative response to competing
crop prices as well as fertilizer prices, at least if the crop has a higher fertilizer
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requirement than competing crops; (2) own output prices matter most in the time
period from shortly before to a few month after planting, during which farmers
make their decisions on areas and yields; (3) droughts and insufficient rainfall have
a negative effect on production; (4) irrigation has a positive impact and can reduce
the negative impact of insufficient rainfall or high temperatures.
This approach has some limitations. The biggest limitation might be the aggre-
gation level of data. Some price data were only available at a national level, but
as price transmission within China is high (Huang and Rozelle 2006), this might
not be a concern. For the biophysical variables, even though they were available at
the provincial level, this aggregation might be more problematic as rainfall, hours
of sunshine, and temperatures may vary in different parts of the same province.
Therefore, the influence of these biophysical variables is likely to be underestimated
due to this high level of aggregation. Furthermore, important variables may not be
considered which could be an issue if they fluctuate a lot in the short term. If they
mostly consist of a long-term trend instead, then they will be captured by orthogonal
deviations and lagged production and, as a result, will not cause any problems.
18.3 Methodology
Strictly speaking, a farmer’s decision-making process consist of two steps: the
area decision and the yield decision (Colman 1983). The considered determinants
are mostly the same but may differ slightly as, for example, competing crop
prices are not that important after the area decision was made. However, they
still may be important because they may affect how farmers allocate their inputs
such as fertilizers, pesticides, and water and other variables. On the other hand,
not all variables which influence yields also matter when allocating the area.
Unexpected rainfall shocks (or price shocks) after planting cannot be anticipated
and therefore cannot affect the area decision. However, these shocks may affect a
farmer’s fertilizer application and therefore yield. Therefore, modeling production
is a combination of the area and yield processes and can only be investigated by
considering the sum of both effects. Nevertheless, it is important to see the combined
effects as we are interested in the total production volume and want to know which
variables have an influence and how the variables influence. Another reason to look
at the combined effect on production is that statistical issues arise when looking
at area and yield separately. This is because area and yield influence one another,
and therefore this additional endogeneity has to be dealt with. For example, area
allocation decisions may affect yields in two different ways: High prices could cause
farmers to favor large planting areas, which should increase the expected yields,
whereas planting area expansion may negatively influence yields if the additional
crop areas are located on less-productive lands.
The Arellano–Bond difference GMM and system GMM estimators (Holtz-Eakin
et al. 1988; Arellano and Bond 1991; Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond
1998) were used for a number of reasons. First, the time period was rather short,
usually around 14 years, while the number of observations per time period was
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comparatively large: 20 for wheat, over 29 for corn, and around 40 for rice. The
difference GMM and system GMM estimators control for such dynamic panel bias.
Second, the production response is a dynamic process, i.e., current realizations
depend on past ones. Third, fixed effects allow for heterogeneity across groups,
namely provinces. Last, idiosyncratic disturbances may have individual-specific
patterns of heteroskedasticity.
For all three crops, four different specifications are shown in the tables in
Sect. 18.4, with the first three presenting different control variables for the difference
GMM estimator and the fourth illustrating the results for the last specification using
the system GMM estimator for comparison and robustness checks. While including
more variables allowed more factors to be controlled for, it also decreased the
degrees of freedom, the significance of variables which are correlated and most
importantly the number of observations (because many variables could only be
obtained for a limited number of years). Comparing the different specifications and
comparing the difference and system GMM results provide a further consistency
check. In general, we think that the difference GMM estimator is more appropriate
as it cannot be ruled out that the first differences of the instrument variables are
uncorrelated with the group fixed effects. Our findings support this hypothesis, as
will be shown in the next chapter. The Windmeijer finite-sample correction for stan-
dard errors was used (Windmeijer 2005). We used the xtabond2 command in Stata,
which was written by David Roodman, and followed the application guidelines in
his accompanying paper (Roodman 2009). Instead of first differencing, forward
orthogonal deviations were used (Arellano and Bover 1995; Roodman 2009), i.e.,
the average of all available future observations was subtracted. This procedure
removes fixed effects, just like differencing, but because lagged observations are not
used, these remain orthogonal to the transformed errors. This way, the number of
observations will not be reduced by gaps in the dataset. As suggested, time dummies
for all years were included in all model specifications (ibid).
For proper usage of the GMM techniques, a number of tests need to be run
to check the consistency of the estimations (ibid.; Efendic et al. 2009). The joint
significance of the variables was evaluated with an F-test, the p-value of which we
expected to be clearly below 0.1 (ibid.). While the first lagged residuals are expected
to be correlated, the twice lagged residuals must not (Arellano and Bond 1991).
Considering the null hypotheses, this means the p-value of the AR1 test in the result
tables was expected to be smaller than 0.1, while the p-value for the AR2 test should
be higher than 0.1 (for significance at the 10 %-level). Furthermore, the Hansen-J
test allows checking if the model specification and all over-identifying restrictions
are correct (Baum 2006). It is suggested that the p-value should be above 0.25 but
at the same time should not perfectly match 1 for this test (Roodman 2009). The
difference-in-Hansen test was used to investigate the exogeneity of instruments. The
null hypothesis is that they are exogenous. Hence, the respective p-values have to be
above 0.1 in order to not reject the null hypothesis. The number of instruments was
chosen to provide robust test statistics. There are no clear rules about the appropriate
number of instruments. However, the number of instruments should always clearly
be lower than the number of observations, which is the case for all our specifications.
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Furthermore, the coefficient of the lagged endogenous variable (production in our
case) should be less than one to obtain a steady state behavior (Roodman 2009),
which is the case in all of the presented models. Finally, the validity of the estimates
can be verified by examining if the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is
larger than the one obtained by a fixed effects model and smaller than one obtained
by using OLS (Bond 2002). This was the case for all specifications and the FE and
OLS estimates of the lagged dependent variables are reported in the tables.
All the test statistics were fulfilled in all specifications except for two instances:
(1) the first specification for winter wheat, which failed to reject the second order
autocorrelation at the 10 % level but nevertheless did so at the 5 % level; and (2)
the first specification for indica rice, which failed to reject the Hansen-J test and the
difference-in-Hansen test.
Apart from evaluating the production response using the price at a predetermined
point in time, this work aims at analyzing how production responds to prices at
different points in time. Therefore, the regressions were conducted with prices
at different months before and after planting, from 20 months before up to 20
months after planting, and how this changes the results is graphically illustrated.
For this analysis, the second specification is used for all crops as this specification
provides the maximum number of observations while fulfilling all test criteria
and while including the most important variables. This procedure allowed us to
analyze how farmers build their price expectations, in particular whether they used
previous year’s prices around planting or harvesting time or if they used the latest
prices which, under the assumption of efficient markets, incorporate all available
information about supply and demand.
For indica rice, data for the three different seasons were pooled together. Hence,
there is no fixed planting month, but the appropriate planting month was chosen
depending on the season instead. All the other variables were similarly chosen
relative to the month of planting for that season. This means, for example, that the
planting time price is April for early indica, May for middle indica, and July for late
indica rice. Similarly, rainfall during the growing season refers to April and May for
early indica, May and June for middle indica, and July and August for late indica
rice.
All variables were logged, and therefore the effects can be interpreted as
elasticities. The only exception are temperatures, which also exhibited negative
values and are more intuitive to interpret in their non-logged form.
18.4 Results
18.4.1 Basic Regression Results
The results for the production of corn are shown in Table 18.3, for winter wheat
in Table 18.4, and for indica rice in Table 18.5. The first row always shows the
lagged production. Wholesale prices are denoted by WSP followed by the month
or relative time period. The latter are always denoted by the @ symbol and refer to
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Table 18.3 Results for corn production response
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L. Production .807*** .772*** .902*** .956***
(.166) (.143) (.139) (.034)
WSP June .296*** .291*** .226*** .177***
(.077) (.055) (.065) (.05)
Irrigated .115 20.1** 16.8** 1.61
(.131) (8.12) (8.07) (6.65)
Rain @ growing .059 .013 .076 7.4e03
(.063) (.06) (.08) (.033)
A-Temp @ growing .029* .095*** .058* .014
(.015) (.026) (.029) (.024)
Drought area .032*** .033*** .035*** .014
(8.6e03) (9.1e03) (.01) (.013)
Nonirrigated X rain @ growing .077* .071* .066***
(.045) (.037) (.021)
Irrigated X A-temp @ growing .067** .052* 5.3e04
(.027) (.027) (.023)
Fertilizer @ planting .203** .231***
(.074) (.065)
Irrigated X fertilizer @ planting .182** .191***
(.068) (.058)
Substitute @ planting .018 6.3e03
(.027) (.017)
Constant 6.29
(6.9)
Estimator Difference Difference Difference System
Groups 29 29 29 29
Instruments 27 29 28 30
p:F-test 1.7e19 1.3e23 1.1e27 4.0e37
p:AR1 1.5e03 1.1e03 9.9e04 3.2e04
p:AR2 .919 .685 .949 .581
p:Hansen-J .291 .326 .286 .535
p:Diff-Hansen .812 .9 .436 1
OLS .988 .991 .985 .985
FE .741 .683 .747 .747
Observations 384 384 296 325
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. WSP: wholesale price; X indicates interaction terms;
A-temp: average temperature; specifications with different explanatory variables for the difference
GMM estimator (1–3); for comparison and robustness checks, the results of the last specification
are also shown for the system GMM estimator (4)
p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01
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Table 18.4 Results for winter wheat production response
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L. Production .951*** .951*** .96*** .964***
(.104) (.11) (.087) (.063)
WSP March .338*** .292** .255*
(.116) (.132) (.143)
H-temp @ flowering .043*** .044** .061 .037
(9.6e03) (.019) (.123) (.122)
Sun @ flowering .156 .081 .124 .196
(.092) (.205) (.207) (.293)
Rain @ planting .054** .045 .04 .047
(.021) (.026) (.042) (.037)
Rain @ growing 3.5e04 .045 .143 .133
(.032) (.037) (.099) (.091)
Irrigated .055 .344 31.9 .093
(.483) (.478) (37.2) (26.4)
Drought area .037** .026 .034 .026*
(.014) (.016) (.02) (.014)
Nonirrigated X rain @ growing .137 .177
(.135) (.165)
Irrigated X H-temp @ flowering .105 1.1e03
(.125) (.089)
Constant 10.3
(36)
Estimator Difference Difference Difference System
Groups 20 20 20 20
Instruments 26 25 27 29
p:F-test 1.4e13 2.0e12 2.0e14 1.8e22
p:AR1 8.8e03 .019 .012 .016
p:AR2 .053 .185 .173 .241
p:Hansen-J .595 .463 .805 .744
p:Diff-Hansen .949 .847 1 1
OLS 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.02
FE .865 .855 .863 .863
Observations 280 249 249 269
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. WSP: wholesale price; X indicates interaction terms;
H-temp: high temperature; specifications with different explanatory variables for the difference
GMM estimator (1–3); for comparison and robustness checks, the results of the last specification
are also shown for the system GMM estimator (4)
p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01
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Table 18.5 Results for indica rice production response
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L. Production .913*** .914*** .778*** .911***
(.07) (.055) (.112) (.081)
WSP @ planting .196*** .181*** .163** .241**
(.067) (.054) (.061) (.094)
Rain @ growing .053* .152 .115 .425
(.027) (.139) (.178) (.284)
Sun @ growing .174*** .167*** .142* .023
(.061) (.05) (.074) (.117)
H-temp @ growing .024** .026*** .039*** .019
(.01) (8.5e03) (.013) (.03)
Irrigated .356 .323 1.06
(.521) (.674) (.731)
Nonirrigated X rain @ growing .294 .262 .691
(.287) (.346) (.495)
Drought area 4.9e03 1.4e03 4.6e03
(8.8e03) (8.0e03) (.012)
Fertilizer @ planting .032 .048
(.078) (.058)
Substitute @ planting .018 .04
(.032) (.048)
Constant 4.51
(9.08)
Estimator Difference Difference Difference System
Groups 41 39 39 39
Instruments 20 23 22 24
p:F-test 2.8e16 3.2e20 1.2e15 1.0e22
p:AR1 .073 .098 .118 .096
p:AR2 .174 .171 .142 .138
p:Hansen-J .153 .341 .409 .24
p:Diff-Hansen .088 .102 .227 .569
OLS .997 .998 .994 .994
FE .727 .722 .551 .551
Observations 548 503 394 433
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. WSP: wholesale price; X indicates interaction terms;
H-temp: high temperature; specifications with different explanatory variables for the difference
GMM estimator (1–3); for comparison and robustness checks, the results of the last specification
are also shown for the system GMM estimator (4)
p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01
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the planting, growing, flowering, or harvesting season of the crop. Average and high
temperatures are written as A-temp and H-temp, respectively. Interaction terms are
indicated by an X, while the prices of competing crops are presented as substitute.
The bottom part of the tables shows which estimator was used; the test statistics;
and the number of groups, instruments, and observations.
The results for corn, illustrated in Table 18.3, show that all specifications seem
to be valid based on the provided test statistics. A significant amount of variation
in production can be explained by the previous year’s production (which also takes
into account unobserved variables). The coefficient ranges from 0.772 to 0.956 and
is significant at the 1 % level in all specifications. The wholesale price in June turned
out to be also always highly significant and had a major contribution, as evident in
its elasticity of around 0.2. This implies that a 1 % increase in prices will lead to
a 0.2 % increase in production, which seems reasonable and is comparable to the
results obtained by similar studies. The fraction of irrigated area is only significant
in two specifications but has a huge impact in both. However, it is only significant for
the difference GMM specifications that included the interaction terms, which could
possibly be attributed to collinearity in these variables (their correlation coefficient
is 0.79 for corn, 0.17 for wheat, and 0.46 for rice). In addition, the total effect of
irrigation is the elasticity of irrigation plus the interaction term of irrigation with the
average temperature. The interaction term takes the value of 20.69 at the sample
mean for the second specification, resulting in a combined marginal effect of 0.59.
Despite corn needing rainfall during the growing season, the rainfall variable did
not seem to have any significant effect on the corn production. However, corn needs
little water compared to other staples and in particular vegetables. As mentioned in
Sect. 18.2, the irrigation variable measures the total cultivated area under irrigation.
This may not be a good proxy for the actual irrigated crop areas; in particular, it
is not a measure of crop-specific irrigation. Furthermore, the quality of irrigation
is not reflected in this variable. Moreover, considering rainfall variability and water
availability, the quality of irrigation may change drastically over time. Therefore,
the influence of irrigation can only be approximated, and thus it is unsurprising that
no effect was found in many of the specifications (when compared with wheat and
rice).
High average temperatures during the growing season, which is in mid-summer,
have a small but significant negative impact. When interacted with the nonirrigated
area (i.e., the fraction of the agricultural area which is not irrigated), we found
that rainfall during the growing season became significant. As expected, rainfall
had a positive influence on production, albeit a small one. When interacted with
irrigation, high average temperatures are negative and significant for the difference
GMM specification. This differs from our expectations but might be explained by
the imprecise approximation of irrigation or by high temperatures offsetting the
benefits of irrigation. As expected, the drought area had a significant and negative
influence in all but the system GMM specifications. High fertilizer prices at planting
time reduced the total production; again, this effect seems to be more pronounced
in provinces with a high share of irrigated area. This may be attributed to the fact
that levels of fertilizer application are usually much higher on irrigated areas, which
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may therefore be over-proportionally affected. Prices of competing crops turned out
to be insignificant, despite testing various ways of including them in the analysis,
such as using the province-specific main competing crop only or a weighted average
of competing crops.
For winter wheat, presented in Table 18.4, the previous year’s production was
again the most important driver and consistently significant at the 1 % level.
Wholesale prices in March had a similar positive and significant effect, as for
corn. The elasticity is around 0.29, even slightly higher than for corn. The first
specification did not include any prices to ascertain if there are any changes when
more observations are included. This is because the number of observations for
winter wheat is relatively low compared with corn and rice. The amount of sunshine
at flowering (around two months before harvesting) is insignificant. From the
literature, wheat is expected to require much sunshine during this period (FAO
2015). Furthermore, much rain is needed during and shortly after planting as well
as during flowering and yield formation (ibid.). The positive influence of rainfall
during and after planting can be observed in the first specification only. Rainfall
during the growing season and its interaction term with the nonirrigated area are
always insignificant. This might be a result of data aggregation, as explained above.
The irrigated area seems to have no effect, but this may be attributed to the poor
approximation of irrigation, as explained above. The drought area has a significant
negative impact in two specifications, again albeit with a very small effect. The
expected negative effect of overly high temperatures during flowering time vanished
once the interaction term with irrigation is included. Then, both terms became
insignificant. Fertilizer prices and prices of competing crops had no significant effect
but reduced the number of observations significantly. Therefore, they are not shown
separately but are available upon request.
Similar to corn and wheat, lagged production was the most important driver of
indica rice production, as illustrated in Table 18.5. The effect of the wholesale price
is similar to the case of corn; it was always significant and had an effect size of
around 0.2. Rain during the growing season, a large amount of which is required
to flood rice paddy fields, was positive but only significant at the 10 % level in
one specification. But as explained before, this might be a result of aggregating
rainfall data across the provincial level. The results did not change when we included
squared rainfall. Even when interacted with the nonirrigated area, the rainfall stayed
insignificant. The irrigated area itself is insignificant, which, as detailed before,
might be attributed to the poor proxy used for irrigation. For sunshine, we found
that a 1 % increase in the number of hours of sunlight increased the production by
around 0.16 % in all the difference GMM specifications. Similarly, the damaging
effect of overly high temperatures during the growing season can be observed in all
difference GMM specifications. The drought area, fertilizer prices, and the prices of
competing crops all turned out to be insignificant. The underlying reasons might be
that the costs of switching crops from rice are relatively high and that rice needs a
comparatively small amount of fertilizer per unit of output.
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Overall, our results were mostly comparable to other similar studies. In a non-
crop specific analysis, Ghatak and Seale (2001) found that price elasticity was
between 0.174 and 0.394, which is similar to ours. Looking only at the national
level, own price elasticities of 0.23 for rice, 0.052 for wheat, and 0.164 for corn have
been reported (Haile et al. 2015). Our results for rice and corn were comparable,
whereas we found a higher price response for wheat. For Henan, Yu et al. (2011)
found no significant response for wheat but a surprisingly high elasticity of 0.737
for corn. However, according to the study, the elasticities of competing crop prices
were also high and significant. They also reported that rainfall increased winter
wheat production when considering the total effect on area and yield. For corn,
they found that rainfall had no effect, which is consistent with our results if only the
non-interacted rainfall is considered, as in the study by Yu et al.
18.4.2 Impact of Prices on Production During theMarketing Year
As explained in Sect. 18.3, one of the aims of this chapter is to analyze how
production reacts to prices at different points in time. Therefore, the regressions
with same specifications were run for prices at different months before and after the
planting time. For all other variables, the values used remain the same as before.
The results are depicted in Fig. 18.1 for corn, in Fig. 18.2 for winter wheat, and in
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Fig. 18.1 Explanatory power of the wholesale prices over time for corn production
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Fig. 18.2 Explanatory power of the wholesale prices over time for winter wheat production
Fig. 18.3 for indica rice. The figures show the coefficients and the 95 % confidence
intervals; the statistical significance of the response can be inferred from the figures.
The further the distance between the bars and the y D 0 line, the higher the level of
significance. If the y D 0 line is included in the bars, the coefficient is not statistically
significant at the 5 % level. The months before or after planting are depicted on the
x-axis of the graphs.
Prices far before or after planting did not have much explanatory power for all
crops; hence they do not influence production strongly. However, prices around
planting time are usually highly significant and, at least for corn and rice, also have
the highest coefficient. For rice, prices are significant in a few months far before
planting, which may be attributed to the high level of autocorrelation. Nevertheless,
both the level of significance and the coefficient increased and reached their highest
level around planting time. Both rice and corn have a relatively short growing time—
about 2–6 months—compared to wheat. This explains why prices during planting
period were very important as farmers chose their area and had only little time
afterwards to influence yields. Particularly for rice, the beginning of the growing
season is highly important and a lack of water cannot be compensated for at a later
stage. The finding of a decreased level of significance and lower coefficients a few
months after planting is therefore consistent with our expectations. For wheat, the
graph looks different: the level of significance as well as the size of the coefficient
increased even after planting and reached their highest levels around 6–8 months
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Fig. 18.3 Explanatory power of the wholesale prices over time for indica rice production
after planting. This can be explained by the different growing patterns, i.e., wheat
grows for about 7–9 months after it is planted. Furthermore, the most sensitive
phase of the crop is the flowering and yield formation period, whereby the wheat
plant is very sensitive to water and temperatures (FAO 2015). This period is around
65–15 days before the harvest. As a result, it is crucial how farmers take care of
their crops during this time period, while the establishment, tillering, and winter
dormancy periods are of minor relevance (ibid.). Considering this, it matches our
expectations that prices around 6 months after planting are very important for yield.
For area however, prices at planting time should be the crucial factor. Although
without making a distinction between area and yield, it is not possible to draw
further conclusions about this.
Comparing the different crops, we found that farmers seem to react earlier
to corn prices than the prices of winter wheat and indica rice. Rice showed the
lowest response to prices, which might be a result of relatively high costs of area
reallocation. For all crops, prices remained highly significant for a while after
planting. This indicates that not only area but also yield respond to prices, regardless
of whether it is due to fertilizer or pesticide application, irrigation, or other factors.
For prices at harvesting time and thereafter, this method suffers from endogeneity
problems as it is no longer clear if prices drive production or vice versa. Therefore,
this method is only robust for the time before harvesting.
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A clear result of this analysis is that farmers, at least on average, do not mainly
take into account previous year’s planting or harvesting prices but rather consider
current prices around planting time to be the more important. This is at odds with
naïve and Nerlovian price expectation models, which use lagged harvest prices for
estimating production decisions. Economically, it makes sense to use current prices
as they include more information about the demand and supply situation than last
year’s prices.
Additional graphs which show the significance (p-values) of the supply response
over time for all crops and both estimators are shown in the appendix (Figs. 18.4
and 18.5). For these and the subsequent graphs, model specification two was used
for all crops, and only the prices were varied over time while all other explanatory
variables were kept the same. As expected, these graphs show a U-shaped curve with
more or less distortions depending on the crop and estimator. Figures 18.6 and 18.7
show the same results for corn while also illustrating the results for other variables:
Fig. 18.6 for the difference GMM estimator and Fig. 18.7 for the system GMM
estimator. These graphs again support our hypothesis that the difference GMM
estimator performs better than the system GMM estimator. The fluctuations of the
system GMM results were much higher, particularly for winter wheat and indica
rice as shown in Fig. 18.5. Furthermore, the fluctuations of the non-price variables
were also much higher, as indicated in Fig. 18.7. In general, the period up to which
prices are significant extended further after planting for the difference GMM, while
in the case of winter wheat the period also started before planting.
This method of investigating prices at different points in time may also be used
for general model specification tests. For a robust model, we expect the significance
of the tested variables to consist of low-frequency components, which implies that
there are only slow and smooth changes. The occurrence of big fluctuations in
a specification, in particular if some variables constantly alternate between being
insignificant and significant, suggest that the specification is not robust. Figure 18.5
and in particular Fig. 18.7 accordingly indicate that the system GMM specification is
less consistent than the difference GMM specification. However, the system GMM
fluctuations may still be acceptable; for problematic specifications, much higher
fluctuations can easily be observed. Interestingly, prices around 2–5 months before
planting time seem to have such a high explanatory power in the case of the system
GMM that all other variables apart from the lagged production became insignificant
(Fig. 18.7). This is an indication that prices before planting might be the most
important factor influencing final production. Examining the area and yield response
separately could shed more light on this issue. Overall, the price response and the
response to other variables were consistent with our expectations, even though many
variables turned out to be insignificant.
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18.5 Conclusion
The corn, winter wheat, and indica production response for the main agricultural
provinces in China was analyzed using the difference GMM estimator and, for
comparison, the system GMM estimator. The major findings include the following:
(1) All crops strongly responded to prices at planting time. (2) The price response
of corn and wheat was higher than rice. (3) While prices shortly before and after
planting period had very high explanatory power, prices further away from planting
period had lower coefficients and were mostly insignificant. (4) Wheat was an
exception in the sense that its prices were highly significant long after planting
and showed large coefficients, which could be attributed to wheat’s long growing
period and the crop’s sensitivity 1–2 months before harvest. (5) High temperatures
negatively influenced production for all crops, which may become problematic in
the future due to climate change impacts. (6) Irrigation was measured poorly and
therefore may have limited the significance of the results; nevertheless the results
indicated that irrigation may partly help to mitigate a shortfall in rainfall but cannot
(fully) compensate for the negative effects of high temperatures. (7) Fertilizer prices
had a negative impact on corn production only.
In general, the difference GMM estimator seems to perform better than the
system GMM estimator. The presented method to analyze the importance of prices
at different points in time may also be used for general model specification tests if
data on explanatory variables is available at a sufficiently high frequency.
The mixed evidence regarding the role of weather events and irrigation in
affecting production could be due to the use of province-level data, which might be
too aggregated to study spatially differentiated weather impacts. On the other hand,
the panel data contained observations obtained over time, which is an important
advantage over cross-sectional farm-level data, in particular when studying the
role of determinants with little spatial dispersion (such as prices). The analysis of
prices for production, one of the main contributions of this chapter, could only be
undertaken with the help of a panel data set over multiple years. Not only do the
findings indicate that farmers use up-to-date price information when making their
production decisions, but the month-specific price elasticities also highlight when
the Chinese agricultural sector can best respond to price spikes and scarcities. As
the price elasticities ranged from 16 % (rice) to 34 % (wheat), increasing domestic
demand can be met to a substantial extent by supply expansion – provided that prices
are suitable signals about supply and demand conditions.
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Fig. 18.6 Significance (p-value) of the explanatory variables over time for the second corn
regression using the difference GMM estimator. Not all explanatory variables are shown to
maintain recognizability, and the prices are the only variables which were varied over time
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Fig. 18.7 Significance (p-value) of the explanatory variables over time for the second corn
regression using the system GMM estimator. Not all explanatory variables are shown to maintain
recognizability, and the prices are the only variables which were varied over time
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19.1 Introduction
Food prices have increased significantly in the past few years, with particularly sharp
spikes seen during the 2007/08 season (see Fig. 19.1). There is some agreement
on the causes of such price increases: (a) weather shocks that negatively affected
agricultural production; (b) soaring energy and fertilizer costs; (c) rapidly growing
income in developing countries, especially in China and India; (d) the devaluation
of the dollar against most major currencies; (e) increasing demand for biofuels;
and (f) changes in land use patterns. While there is no consensus on the relative
importance of each of these culprits, it is widely agreed that most of these factors
will further increase food prices in the medium and long run. Prices may become
more volatile as well, as evidenced by the subsequent food crisis in 2010. Climate
change will induce more weather variability, leading to erratic production patterns.
Moreover, the volatile nature of the market is likely to induce possible speculation
and exacerbating price spikes. Additionally, in an effort to shield themselves from
price fluctuations, different countries may implement isolating policies, further
exacerbating volatility.
Looking at the volatility at global level is important because, although the food
price spikes of 2008 and 2011 did not reach the heights of the 1970s in real terms
as shown in Fig. 19.2, price volatility—the amplitude of price movements over a
particular period of time—has been at its highest level in the past 15 years.
High and volatile food prices are two different phenomena with distinct implica-
tions for consumers and producers as detailed in Torero (2012). Finally, increased
price volatility over time can also generate larger profits for investors, drawing
new players into the market for agricultural commodities. Increased price volatility
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Fig. 19.2 Real price evolution. Index D 100 in 2015. Source: World Bank
may thus lead to increased—and potentially speculative—trading that in turn can
exacerbate price swings further.
This situation imposes several challenges. In the short run, the global food supply
is relatively inelastic, leading to shortages and amplifying the impact of any shock.
The poorest populations are the ones hit the hardest.1 As a large share of their
1There is a general concern that increasing food prices has especially adverse effects on the poor.
However, until recently, there was no rigorous evidence of this. On the one hand, there would most
probably be negative effects on poor urban consumers who spend a considerable portion of their
budget on food. But on the other, there are gains to farmers who benefit from increased prices for
their output. In general, this impact depends on whether the gains to net agricultural producers
are larger than the losses to consumers. Directly dealing with this issue, Ivanic and Martin (2008)
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income is already being devoted to food, the poor will likely be forced to reduce their
(already low) consumption. Infants and children may suffer lifelong consequences if
they experience serious nutritional deficits during their early years. Thus, the short-
term priority should be to provide temporary relief for vulnerable groups.
In the long run, the goal should be to achieve food security.2 The drivers that
have increased food demand in the last few years are likely to persist (and even
expand). Thus, there will be escalating pressure to meet these demand requirements.
Unfortunately, increases in agricultural productivity have been relatively meager
in recent years. In this line, “the average annual rate of growth of cereal yields
in developing countries fell steadily from 3 % in the late 1970s to less than 1 %
currently, a rate less than that of population growth and much less than the rise of
the use of cereals for other things besides direct use of food” (Delgado et al. 2010,
p 2).
There is a wide array of options to achieve these short- and long-term objectives,
and there are no one-size-fits-all policies. Most policies come with significant trade-
offs, and each government must carefully weigh the benefits and costs they would
face. For example, governments might try to make food more readily available by
reducing food prices through price interventions. While this policy might achieve
its short-term goal, it can potentially entail fiscal deficits and discourage domestic
farmers’ production. Other policies not only have domestic consequences but can
entail side effects for other countries. In their efforts to insulate themselves from
international price fluctuations, some countries might impose trade restrictions; if
a country is a large food exporter, the government might impose export taxes,
quantitative restrictions, or even export bans. Albeit increasing domestic supply and
lowering national prices, these policies would reduce the exported excess supply,
induce even higher international prices, and hurt other nations. In addition, the
“right” policies depend on the particular institutional development of a country.
Middle-income countries might already have safety networks for vulnerable popula-
tions which can trigger prompt aid to those most in need in times of crisis. However,
countries with lower incomes do not have such mechanisms readily available.
Finally, the effectiveness of different policies will vary depending on the market
characteristics of the commodity in which the government is intervening (i.e., the
market structure for wheat is very different from that of rice, which is different from
that of soybeans, etc.).
In this regard, this chapter describes some of the most important policies of
the International Organizations like the World Bank, IFAD, AFD, and the IADB
have prescribed to different countries during the food crisis of 2007/08. The
and Ivanic et al. (2011) find that the food crisis has led to significant increases in poverty rates in
developing countries.
2Food security is a situation in which “all people at all times have physical and economic access to
sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs, and food preferences for an active
and healthy life” (World Food Summit 1996). Even when increases in food production are not a
sufficient condition for food security, they are indeed a necessary condition thereof (von Braun
et al 1992).
460 M. Torero
understanding of such policies is important for at least three reasons. First, food
crises are very sensitive episodes that affect the basic needs of entire populations,
especially those of the world’s poorest countries. As such, they require timely and
sensible measures. Second, increasing food prices and price volatility are likely to
remain an important challenge in the medium and long run. Third, food policies are
usually complex; they need to be assessed to consider their domestic impact, the
trade-offs that they entail with respect to other objectives, their consequences for
other countries, and their feasibility in particular contexts.
This chapter is divided into five sections (excluding the introduction). The second
section analyzes a series of policies recommended by international organizations
during the 2007/08 crisis and the policies recommended at the G8 Meeting of
Finance Ministers in Osaka, June 13–14, 2008. The third section analyzes the
policy recommendations which came out after the 2007/08 crisis and which were
the result of research work done by the same international organizations. First,
some short-term policies are analyzed in which two mechanisms are emphasized:
support for the poor and price stabilization (with an emphasis on trade restrictions
and food reserves). Second, medium- and long-term policies to increase agricultural
productivity, through productivity gains and elimination of postharvest losses, are
discussed. The fourth section describes specific loans and policies prescribed for
selected countries during the 2007/08 food crisis. It analyzes their consistency
and cohesiveness when contrasted with the general policies that some International
Organizations formally recommended as well as with those policies that were rec-
ommended after 2008. The final section summarizes and presents some concluding
remarks.
19.2 Proposed Policies and the G8 Summit
In this section, a detailed description of the policies officially proposed and the
G8’s document prepared for the Ministers of Finance Meeting in 2008 (Table 19.1
presents a summary of all these policies) are presented. These policies can be
classified either as short-term policies or as medium- and long-term policies.
Specifically, within the short-term policies, we identify two groups of policies:
(a) short-term support for the poorest and (b) price stabilization policies.
19.2.1 Short-Term Policies (Social Protection and Trade Policies)
19.2.1.1 Short-Term Support for the Poorest
Governments’ short-term objective is to increase access to food, especially for the
most vulnerable shares of their population. In this sense, policies should provide
targeted short-term subsidies to those in the most distress. Countries that already
have Targeted Cash Transfer (TCT) and Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs
in place can scale them up and increase the subsidies they provide (World Bank
2008). TCTs provide additional income to poor households with children or disabled
or elderly members. CCTs provide the same benefits but are contingent on some
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conditionality (which usually encompasses an educational, nutritional, or health
requirement). These approaches of cash transfer constitute first-best responses for
several reasons: (a) they prioritize assistance for targeted groups, (b) they do not
entail additional costs of food storage and transportation, (c) they do not distort
food markets, and (d) in the case of CCTs, they explicitly prevent human capital
deterioration. However, there is an important shortcoming to these approaches:
countries with weaker administrative capacity—which are usually those most
affected by food crises—are less likely to have implemented any TCTs or CCTs.3
In this line, Delgado et al. (2010) argue that “it is essential that during noncrisis
years, countries invest in strengthening existing programs—and piloting new ones—
to address chronic poverty, achieve food security and human development goals, and
be ready to respond to shocks.”
When TCTs and CCTs are not available, governments may implement other
types of assistance programs. First, school feeding (SF) programs might be useful
to relieve child malnourishment. However, they are usually ineffective to combat
infant malnutrition (when adequate nutrition is most needed), unless food consumed
at school can be complemented with take-home rations for younger siblings.
Additionally, SF relies on geographic rather than household-specific targeting and
entails food storage and distributions costs. Food for Work (FfW) programs are a
second option. These are easier to implement and are (in principle) self-targeted:
they provide low wages so only poor people should be interested in participating.
However, in very poor regions, the vast amount of unemployed and underemployed
may lead to considerable leakages and distortions in the labor market (Wodon and
Zaman 2008). Also, only a portion of the funds allocated to these programs directly
cuts poverty. Beneficiaries leave other jobs to participate in them; thus, the benefits
of FfW are not the whole wages they provide, but only the differential income (with
respect to the previous job). These programs might create distortions in the labor
market. Finally, governments can also provide direct food aid. However, there is
no guarantee that this aid can be effectively targeted toward the most vulnerable
populations. Furthermore, food aid may become an entitlement and might result in
long-term fiscal problems.
19.2.1.2 Price Stabilization Policies
Support programs for the poorest might not be easily implemented during food
emergencies because they take time to be put into action. At the very least, they
require a distribution network and plenty of logistical coordination. This forces
governments to implement other policies to shield their population from food emer-
gencies. Moreover, even when technically sound schemes such as CCTs are readily
available during a crisis, some countries might still try to pursue more widespread
3For example, these policies might be more suitable for medium-income countries, such as in Latin
America. World Bank—LAC (2008, Table 8) documents 17 countries with CCTs and 18 countries
with Targeted Nutritional or Social Assistance Programs.
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measures for political reasons.4 Constituencies (and, in general, populations) are
very sensitive to food prices, and governments may fear opposition, turmoil, or
even being ousted. For example, Burkina Faso suspended import taxes on four
commodities after the country experienced riots over food prices in February 2008.
Other countries that experienced riots during the 2007/08 crisis were Bangladesh,
Cambodia, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Indonesia, Mauritania, Senegal, and
Yemen (Demeke et al. 2008).
In this light, many countries try to stabilize prices through trade policies and
management of food reserves. The specific trade-offs imposed by these mechanisms
will be discussed subsequently. In general, they are not first-best options: countries
use scarce resources to reduce general prices, effectively subsidizing both the poor
and the nonpoor5 and creating potentially pervasive market distortions. However,
countries with no other means or with politically unstable regimes may have few
other options to cope with food emergencies.
19.2.2 Medium- and Long-Term Policies
Short-term responses mainly deal with demand problems as consumers—and
especially the poor—are hard-hit. However, short-term policies that help consumers
might be detrimental for producers and for market development in the long run. For
example, export taxes on wheat in Argentina help decrease consumer prices, but also
disincentive production. As suggested by a newspaper article, “with scant incentive
to produce, farmers have slashed the land sown with wheat to a 111-year low, and
cereal exports from the rolling pampas of what should be a breadbasket country
have virtually halved over the past 5 years. Wheat farmers in Argentina have turned
to other crops, such as soybean, while some international investors, who are critical
to the flow of money into capital-intensive agriculture, have left the country and
turned to Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil”.6 While acknowledging the importance of
short-term responses to food crises, these responses should be chosen to minimize
any long-term adverse effects on agricultural supply.
4As suggested by HDN and PREM (2008), “effective nutritional and social protection interventions
can protect the most vulnerable from the devastating consequences of nutritional deprivation, asset
depletion and reductions in education and health spending. Policy responses need to balance
political economy considerations that call for measures to help a broad swath of the affected
population, with the urgency of protecting the very poor.”
5Wodon and Zaman (2008) posit the following argument: “Consider the share of rice consumption
in the bottom 40% of the population. This share varies from 11% in Mali to 32% in Sierra Leone.
This means that if one considers the bottom 40% as the poor, out of every dollar spent by a
government for reducing indirect taxes on rice, and assuming that the indirect tax cuts result in a
proportionate reduction in consumer prices, only about 20 cents will benefit the poor on average.”
6“Argentina’s farmers unable to fill the wheat gap,” Financial Times, August 10th, 2007. Link:
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/910f25ac-a4a8-11df-8c9f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1vXMMOjP5
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Long-term policies that expand food availability are becoming increasingly
important.7 Agricultural demand has experienced large expansions in recent years—
even above that regularly imposed by population growth—due to rapidly growing
incomes in developing countries (such as China and India) and rising demand of
food for biofuel production in developed countries.8 As these patterns are likely to
persist, there is a need to increase agricultural supply in order to keep up with the
additional demand.9
There are two main policies targeted toward increasing food production. The rate
of growth of the yields of major crops has been declining steadily since the 1970s.
Thus, on the one hand, there is the need to enhance the productivity and resilience
of major crops. Yet many challenges will make this a daunting task. Availability of
fertile land will be limited by increasing urbanization, salinization, erosion, and
degradation. Water will also become scarcer. Additionally, climate change will
most certainly have an adverse effect on agricultural production through erratic
rainfall, pest proliferation, and crop failure. Thus, any policy to increase agricultural
productivity should address these complex obstacles.
On the other hand, supply can also be expanded through the enhancement of
postharvest practices. Between harvest and consumers’ access to food, agricultural
production goes through many stages: product processing, storage, handling, trans-
portation, and distribution. In each of these phases, there are production losses. For
example, grains molder with improper storage technologies and facilities, as well as
poor roads, preventing food from reaching markets. Albeit complementary, even in
the absence of productivity gains, better postharvest practices can have a significant
impact on food availability.
19.3 Policies Recommended After 2008
19.3.1 Short-Term Policies
19.3.1.1 Trade Policies
When faced with increasing food prices, net food exporters can impose export
taxes or bans. While lower prices hurt local producers, these policies do benefit
7Examples of other policies in the long run are: production and price insurance for farmers;
provision of other public goods for rural areas (such as education and health services); policies for
water basin management; technology improvements for rainfed land (water capture infrastructure,
practices for water retention in soil, etc.); strengthening of producer organizations; etc. Certainly,
these are also important policies. However, for the sake of brevity, they are not mentioned here.
8Mitchell (2008) estimates that about 70–75 % of food price increases were due to rising food
demand for biofuel production.
9As suggested by the World Bank’s South Asia Region report (2010), “the food crisis is by no
means over : : : There is growing agreement that a two-track approach is required, combining
investments in safety nets with measures to stimulate broad-based agricultural productivity growth,
with major emphasis on major food staples.”
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domestic consumers and boost the revenue of governments enacting them. Thus, it
is not surprising that many food-producing countries enacted some form of export
restriction during the 2007/08 food crisis. Demeke et al. (2008) surveyed different
government policies in 81 developing countries and found that 25 of them either
banned exports completely or increased export taxes.
Analogously, net food importers can decrease their tariffs (or even subsidize
imports) to buffer the impact of rising international food prices. At least in the
short run, these policies are able to temporarily reduce internal prices; however, they
also have domestic side effects (see Table 19.1). Some argue that tariff reductions
might not have been effective in shielding importing countries from the 2007/08
food crisis. FAO et al. (2011) argue that “the scale of price increases was such that
for many countries reducing import tariffs had relatively modest impact because
the initial tariffs were low or the scale of the price increases was so large. In
any event, this instrument was quickly exhausted as tariffs were reduced to zero”
(p. 14). Additionally, tariff reductions diminish governments’ revenue, leaving them
with fewer resources with which to palliate the impact of food price increases.
The situation might be especially serious when there are few alternative sources
of revenue (e.g., weak tax collection, large informal sector, etc.). Eventually, this
could lead to serious fiscal deficits.
These strategies should not entail any consequences for international markets if
only small countries implement them. These countries’ food exports or imports are
not substantial relative to international trade, and they are mostly price takers on the
world markets. However, trade policies of large food exporters or importers do effec-
tively affect international supply or demand of a commodity. When large exporters
impose export restrictions during a food emergency, they tighten the already short
supply abroad and further increase international prices. In a similar fashion, as
large food importers reduce their tariffs, they increase internal consumption, fueling
global demand and generating further escalations of food prices in external markets.
If exporting and importing countries both follow these strategies, their efforts to
insulate themselves might cancel out each other’s efforts.
Martin and Anderson (2011) describe this phenomenon on the international mar-
ket for a certain commodity. Initially, there is excess supply from world’s exporters
and excess demand from importers. The authors then consider an exogenous shock
that reduces production in some exporting countries. In the absence of any trade
policy, this shock changes the balance between supply and demand. If a large
exporting country tries to avoid an increase in domestic prices and imposes a tax
on exports, this further reduces the excess supply and leads to higher international
prices. If a large importing country retaliates and reduces its tariffs to exactly
offset the trade policy imposed by the large exporter, this would increase global
excess demand. The final outcome in this scenario is that the traded quantity and
price in both countries would be the same as before either policy was enacted.
However, other countries around the world would be worse off, as the final price
on the international market would soar. This can eventually give other countries
the incentive to impose similar policies, leading to a trade war of import tariffs
and export taxes. As Martin and Anderson (2011) suggest, “insulation generates a
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classic collective-action problem akin to when a crowd stands up in a stadium: no
one gets a better view by standing, but any that remain seated gets a worse view.”
So to what extent should countries implement such policies and impose beggar-
thy-neighbor consequences upon others? There is no consensus in this respect. On
one hand, Timmer (2010) analyzes the implications of trade restrictions on rice
markets during the 2007/08 food crisis and finds that stabilizing domestic prices
using domestic border intervention could be an effective strategy to handle food
crises. Timmer argues that unstable demand and supply needs to be accommodated
somehow, and that passing this responsibility to the international market may be the
most fair and successful way to do so.
On the other hand, Anderson and Nelgen (2012) advise against any trade
restrictions, using a model of supply and demand for the market of a particular
commodity. Their results are presented in Tables 19.2 and 19.3. Table 19.2, not
surprisingly, shows that trade restrictions did boost international food price increases
between 2006 and 2008.10 Yet the results also suggest that everyone should take part
of the blame for this: the policies of both exporting and importing countries, and
both developing and high-income countries, fueled the price increases. Table 19.3
compares the changes in international prices that would have taken place without
trade interventions with effective domestic prices. All in all, their estimates show
that these policies had a very heterogeneous impact for different countries and
commodities. On average for all countries, domestic wheat prices increased more
than adjusted international prices. These policies were somewhat more effective for
other crops, but overall their effect was not large: 2 % for maize and 12 % for rice.
Anderson and Nelgen (2012) advise governments to refrain from imposing
insulating trade policies because they amplify price increases and, moreover, are not
always effective. Theoretically, small countries cannot affect international markets
individually by changing their trade policies. However, Anderson and Nelgen (2012)
claim that if many small countries do so simultaneously, it can have an aggregate
Table 19.2 Contributions of high-income and developing countries, and of importing and
exporting countries, to the proportion of the international price change that is due to policy-induced
trade barrier changes, 2006–08a
Total
proportional
contribution
High-income
countries’
contribution
Developing
countries’
contribution
Importing
countries’
contribution
Exporting
countries’
contribution
Rice 0.40 0.02 0.38 0.18 0.22
Wheat 0.19 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.12
Maize 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.07
aTaken from Anderson and Nelgen (2012), Table 7
10Their findings are qualitatively consistent with those of Bouët and Laborde (2010). Their
calculations are based on a multicountry general equilibrium model for wheat. They show how
price increases are amplified by both tariffs and export taxes.
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Table 19.3 Comparison of the domestic price with the rise in international grain prices net of
the contribution of changed trade restrictions; rice, wheat, and maize, 2006–2008 (% unweighted
averages)a
International price rise Domestic price rise
Incl. contribution
of changed trade
restrictions
Net of contribution
of changed trade
restrictions
All
countries
Developing
countries
High-income
countries
Rice 113 68 56 48 74
Wheat 70 56 77 65 81
Maize 83 75 73 62 82
aTaken from Anderson and Nelgen (2012), Table 8
sizeable impact. In this line, they argue that trade restrictions and reduction of import
tariffs should be discouraged across the board.
To analyze this last point, Table 19.4 shows the shares of imports and exports
for soybean, rice, wheat, and maize by region (following the World Bank classi-
fication)11 in 2004, before the food crisis. We posit that Anderson and Nelgen’s
results (in Tables 19.2 and 19.3) seem to hide very large disparities within their
“exporting,” “importing,” “developing,” and “high-income” labels. For example,
estimates in Table 19.2 show the impact of trade restrictions on the increase of the
international price of rice to be around 40 %; 38 % is from developing (with the
remaining 2 % from high-income countries) and 18 % is from importing countries
(and the remaining 22 % from exporting countries). From the export side, Thailand,
India, and Vietnam—which account for 65 % of all rice exports—imposed trade
restrictions. From the import side, important importers such as the Philippines and
other Asian countries were concerned about a potential shortage and reduced their
tariffs. Policies enacted by these large players exemplify how trade restrictions can
lead to significant price spikes. However, from the evidence presented in Tables 19.2
and 19.3, it is unclear if trade restrictions by smaller countries would entail serious
consequences for international markets. For example, Sub-Saharan Africa accounts
for 0.1 % of rice exports worldwide. Excluding Nigeria, South Africa, Côte d’Ivoire,
and Ghana, the share of all other Sub-Saharan African countries was only 10.7 %
of worldwide rice imports. It is reasonable to believe that, even if all nations in
this region changed their trade policies, there would not be a sizable impact on the
international rice market.
While economists tend to be more critical of the use of import barriers as creating
instability in world markets, they frequently applaud import barrier reductions
undertaken in the same context. There may be some basis for this support if the
reduction is believed to be permanent once undertaken. If, however, it is undertaken
purely on a temporary basis as a way to reduce the instability of domestic prices, the
effects on the instability of world prices are clearly quite symmetric. From a policy
11See http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups
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Table 19.4 Share of exports and imports by region and selected countries for soybeans, maize,
wheat, and rice (2004)
1.A: Soybean exports, 2004
Exports (US$, thousands) Share (%)
High income 7,563,204 48.5
United States of America 6,692,040 42.9
All others 871,164 5.6
East Asia & Pacific 161,858 1.0
Europe & Central Asia 17,518 0.1
Latin America & Caribbean 7,827,815 50.2
Brazil 5,394,910 34.6
Argentina 1,740,110 11.2
All others 692,795 4.4
Middle East & North Africa 315 0.0
South Asia 897 0.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 7144 0.0
Others 5101 0.0
Total 15,583,852 100.0
1.B: Soybean imports, 2004
Imports (US$, thousands) Share (%)
High income 8,035,760 41.0
Japan 1,774,620 9.1
Netherlands 1,504,200 7.7
Germany 1,129,570 5.8
All others 3,627,370 18.5
East Asia & Pacific 8,935,462 45.6
China 7,680,418 39.2
All others 1,255,044 6.4
Europe & Central Asia 252,591 1.3
Latin America & Caribbean 1,693,014 8.6
Mexico 1,107,990 5.7
All others 585,024 3.0
Middle East & North Africa 605,239 3.1
South Asia 36,913 0.2
Sub-Saharan Africa 10,572 0.1
Others 14,763 0.1
Total 19,584,314 100.0
(continued)
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Table 19.4 (continued)
2.A: Rice (milled) exports, 2004
Exports (US$, thousands) Share (%)
High income 1,324,307 18.0
East Asia & Pacific 3,534,287 47.9
Thailand 2,368,150 32.1
Vietnam 950,315 12.9
All others 215,822 2.9
Europe & Central Asia 18,692 0.3
Latin America & Caribbean 174,862 2.4
Middle East & North Africa 227,739 3.1
South Asia 2,076,696 28.2
India 1,448,460 19.6
Pakistan 627,240 8.5
All others 996 0.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 9500 0.1
Others 5479 0.1
Total 7,371,562 100.0
2.B: Rice (milled) imports, 2004
Imports (US$, thousands) Share (%)
High income 2,341,903 35.1
Saudi Arabia 534,327 8.0
United Arab Emirates 327,843 4.9
United States of America 257,666 3.9
All others 1,222,067 18.3
East Asia & Pacific 1,045,859 15.7
Philippines 274,585 4.1
China 268,003 4.0
All others 503,271 7.5
Europe & Central Asia 187,705 2.8
Latin America & Caribbean 408,097 6.1
Middle East & North Africa 713,678 10.7
Iran 294,853 4.4
Iraq 173,481 2.6
All others 245,344 3.7
South Asia 320,804 4.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 1,488,627 22.3
Nigeria 297,000 4.4
South Africa 202,605 3.0
Côte d’Ivoire 166,656 2.5
Ghana 108,412 1.6
All others 713,954 10.7
Others 170,998 2.6
Total 6,677,671 100.0
(continued)
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Table 19.4 (continued)
3.A: Wheat exports, 2004
Exports (US$, thousands) Share (%)
High income 15,522,857 80.4
United States 5,180,990 26.8
Australia 3,089,040 16.0
Canada 2,688,820 13.9
France 2,553,110 13.2
All others 2,010,897 10.4
East Asia & Pacific 116,505 0.6
Europe & Central Asia 1,463,350 7.6
Russian Federation 535,975 2.8
Kazakhstan 389,550 2.0
Ukraine 288,900 1.5
All others 248,925 1.3
Latin America & Caribbean 1,663,311 8.6
Argentina 1,365,480 7.1
All others 297,831 1.5
Middle East & North Africa 161,885 0.8
South Asia 328,790 1.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 49,506 0.3
Others 30 0.0
Total 19,306,234 100.0
3.B: Wheat imports, 2004
Imports (US$, thousands) Share (%)
High income 7,160,391 33.0
East Asia & Pacific 3,905,051 18.0
China 1,873,488 8.6
Indonesia 841,000 3.9
Rest 1,190,563 5.5
Europe & Central Asia 1,437,367 6.6
Latin America & Caribbean 2,864,681 13.2
Brazil 838,770 3.9
Mexico 617,765 2.8
Rest 1,408,146 6.5
Middle East & North Africa 3,644,814 16.8
South Asia 553,803 2.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 2,081,078 9.6
Nigeria 475,983 2.2
Sudan 209,055 1.0
Rest 1,396,040 6.4
Others 32,260 0.1
Total 21,679,445 100.0
(continued)
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Table 19.4 (continued)
4.A: Maize exports, 2004
Exports (US$, thousands) Share (%)
High income 8,568,195 73.3
United States 6,137,510 52.5
France 1,456,650 12.5
All others 974,035 8.3
East Asia & Pacific 522,558 4.5
Europe & Central Asia 311,766 2.7
Latin America & Caribbean 1,926,278 16.5
Argentina 1,193,810 10.2
Brazil 597,336 5.1
All others 135,132 1.2
Middle East & North Africa 13,878 0.1
South Asia 155,724 1.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 191,276 1.6
Others 774 0.0
Total 11,690,449 100.0
4.B: Maize imports, 2004
Imports (US$, thousands) Share (%)
High income 8,296,019 58.7
Japan 2,931,850 20.7
Korea 1,431,560 10.1
All others 3,932,609 27.8
East Asia & Pacific 1,433,257 10.1
China 818,609 5.8
Malaysia 330,943 2.3
All others 283,705 2.0
Europe & Central Asia 500,491 3.5
Latin America & Caribbean 2,138,720 15.1
Mexico 745,120 5.3
Colombia 332,085 2.3
All others 1,061,515 7.5
Middle East & North Africa 1,666,104 11.8
Egypt 364,819 2.6
Iran 335,092 2.4
Algeria 298,350 2.1
All others 667,843 4.7
South Asia 76,319 0.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 516,643 3.7
Others 26,016 0.2
Total 14,136,926 100.0
Source: FAOSTAT (http://faostat.fao.org/)
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viewpoint, this remains an important distinction because the multilateral trading
system has quite different rules in the two cases (see Bouët and Laborde 2010).
In addition, any of these policies may have important beggar-thy-neighbor
consequences and may fuel price increases of important commodities. Insulating
trade policies imposed by importers and exporters (as well as high-income and
developing countries) were indeed responsible for a considerable share of price
spikes seen during the 2007/08 food crisis. However, most of the turmoil was likely
caused by large exporters and importers. In this sense, policy recommendations
should distinguish between larger and smaller countries.
Finally, there is a key asymmetry between net exporters and net importers of
an agricultural commodity during a food crisis. Net exporters can benefit from
increases in world prices, but net importers are hurt and have no capacity to retaliate
efficiently. If large exporting and importing countries cooperate, then it is possible
for smaller countries to implement policies to reduce import tariffs and, in the
short term, reduce national prices. Clearly, however, any non-cooperation by large
importing countries implementing similar policies will neutralize this effect.
19.3.1.2 Food Reserves
Food reserves can be maintained in order to service emergency relief operations,
support public distribution of food to chronically food insecure shares of a coun-
try’s population, and reduce volatility in consumer and/or producer prices, thus
stabilizing prices. The basic idea is simple: accumulate food stocks when prices are
low (to prevent very low prices that would harm producers) and release them when
supply becomes tighter (to reduce very high prices that harm consumers). However,
international experience in the management and use of reserves is not clear and
is open to significant variation in policies under the Global Food Crises Response
Program (GFRP) operations because the so-called strategic grain reserves were not
clearly defined.
Timmer (2010) advises governments to hold rice buffer stocks to reduce volatility
in the domestic market. Rather than requiring governments to cope with the
consequences of food crises, reserves would ensure price stability and prevent acute
crises from taking place. However, Timmer’s recommendations should be taken
with caution, as his analysis is very specific to the rice market, which is much more
speculative than other markets.
Gouel and Jean (2012) argue that buffer stocks do not provide relief when there
are sharp increases in international food prices. Using a theoretical model for a small
open economy, the authors find that buffer stocks might help producers by keeping
prices from reaching low levels. However, such stocks do not protect consumers
from price spikes without further trade restrictions; this is because small economies
are price takers, so domestic prices will follow the international markets (adjusted
by transport costs). When prices are high on the international market and there are
no export restrictions in place, at least part of the reserves accumulated in buffer
stocks will be exported, given that there is no need for local distribution, and
will maximize the returns to the commodities being held, which need to rotate to
minimize operation costs. While these policies may increase governments’ revenues
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(exporting their stocks when international prices are high), they do not protect
consumers from high commodity prices.
Domestic buffer stocks posit other problems. First, as they aim to control general
prices, they are less effectively targeted toward the neediest shares of a country’s
population (Wright 2009). Second, storage can be expensive, and the poorest
countries (which are most vulnerable to food crises) are the ones least likely to
be able to afford expensive storage costs (Torero 2011). Third, poor management
renders buffer stocks ineffective in many cases. When controlled by parastatals
and other government agencies without strong accountability systems, they are
potentially subject to political use and mismanagement. Finally, buffer stocks
create market distortions; as perishable reserves have to be rotated, their cyclical
interventions in the market can send wrong signals to producers and consumers.
For most of these authors, national emergency reserves seem to be a better option
than domestic buffer stocks for price stabilization. While buffer stocks for price
intervention require considerable stockpiling and subsidize both the poor and the
nonpoor, emergency food reserves can more effectively provide aid to the most
vulnerable shares of a country’s population and entail smaller costs because they
require smaller reserves (see Wright 2009). Also, reserves are less likely to create
market distortions and disrupt private sector activities (FAO et al. 2011). These
mechanisms might prove especially useful for isolated or landlocked countries
where, in case of distress, sluggish transportation of food assistance can pose serious
threats to vulnerable shares of the population.
The extreme volatility observed during the 2007/08 food crisis suggests that
some mechanism of food reserves for price stabilization is necessary to ease the
effect of shocks during periods of commodity price spikes and high volatility.
(For further discussion of such mechanisms, see Chap. 6 of this book.) There
seems to be some consensus around this idea, but policymakers disagree about
which specific mechanisms to use to implement such food reserves. As in the case
of trade interventions, the most appropriate choices are likely to depend on the
characteristics of the specific market under intervention, each country’s capacity
to cope with crises, and the possibility of establishing international coordination
mechanisms. While it likely does not make sense to establish national buffer stocks
in most grain markets, Timmer’s (2010) support for them may be more valid in a few
cases. For example, rice markets might be more speculative than others; thus, price
stabilization through buffer stocks makes somewhat more sense in this case. On the
other hand, buffer stocks usually entail high costs and market distortions and are
prone to corruption. Thus, most countries—especially those with weak institutions
and scarce resources—should probably refrain from using stocks and should instead
establish emergency reserves for humanitarian reasons.
19.3.2 Medium- and Long-Term Policies
In this section, we summarize the major medium- and long-term policies proposed.
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19.3.2.1 Policies to Increase Agricultural Productivity and Resilience
There is a wide array of policies aimed at increasing agricultural productivity and
resilience; some of the most widely discussed include:
Input Subsidies
The World Bank (2008) argues that “while development of efficient agricultural
input market is a long-term process, this subcomponent (improving smallholder
access to seed and fertilizer) would provide rapid support to clients facing immedi-
ate and near-term constraints related to seed and fertilizer availability, distribution,
affordability and utilization” (p. 90). The plan envisages the implementation of a
market-smart approach, characterized by: (a) targeting poor farmers; (b) not dis-
placing existing commercial sales; (c) utilizing vouchers, matching grants, or other
instruments to strengthen private distribution systems; and (d) being introduced for
limited periods of time only.
While they provide a sensible rationale, it is unclear how these principles
would be implemented in practice. Poorer countries—which likely have the least
developed input markets—may find it difficult to target only those farmers in need.
Additionally, subsidy programs that would strengthen, rather than displace, the
private sector are likely to require complex mechanisms; institutional weaknesses
in poor countries may render these programs unfeasible.
Moreover, these programs usually entail significant fiscal costs. Zaman et al.
(2008) estimate that Malawi’s input subsidy program costs approximately 3 % of
GDP. Importantly, in recent years, rising fuel prices have considerably increased
fertilizer costs. If this trend continues in the future, the budget implications of these
policies would become even larger.
Finally, more evidence is required to assess the effectiveness of these policies.
Dorward et al. (2010) evaluate the 2005/06–2008/09 fertilizer subsidy program
in Malawi; their estimates of the benefit–cost ratios of the program range from
0.76 to 1.36, with a (rather small) mid-estimate of 1.06. Arguably, with recent
increases in fertilizer prices, a current benefit–cost ratio of the program may be
even smaller. Additional potentially adverse impacts of the displacement of private
sector operations still require more thorough evaluation and understanding.
Investment in Research and Development
The introduction of high-yield varieties was instrumental for increases in agricul-
tural supply during the 1960s and 1970s. The foreseeable worsening of climatic
conditions imposes new challenges, however. Currently, new strands of wheat,
maize, rice, and other crops are being developed to have enhanced resistance to
droughts, diseases and insects, salinity and other soil problems, extreme tempera-
tures, and floods. In addition, other developments promise enriched varieties with
higher nutritional content.
Such policies are highly profitable. Byerlee et al. (2008) find that “many
international and national investments in R&D have paid off handsomely, with an
average internal rate of return of 43 % in 700 R&D projects evaluated in developing
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countries in all regions” (p. 11). However, research and development (R&D) is a
typical public good and, as such, faces considerable underinvestment, particularly
in developing countries. Thus, governments must expand their expenditures in R&D
and must complement this budget increase with other policies. For example, the
sustainability of these programs requires private–public participation in the seed
industry to generate demand and supply coordination. It also requires strengthening
regulatory policies in seed markets, including variety release, seed certification, and
phytosanitary measures. R&D should also envisage extension services and other
mechanisms to facilitate diffusion and technology adoption by farmers.
Irrigation
Investment in irrigation should be a critical component of any strategy to increase
agricultural supply. Irrigation more than doubles the yields of rain-fed areas because
more crops can be harvested in any given year; it also at least partially promotes
resilience, protecting farmers against droughts. Delgado et al. (2010) estimate that
expansion of irrigation infrastructure to all land in developing countries “would
contribute about half of the total value of needed food supply by 2050.”12
Irrigation projects appear to exhibit high rates of return. Jones (1995) analyzes
208 World Bank-funded irrigation projects and finds an average rate of return of
15 %. Despite the importance and impact of such projects, the Global Food Crises
Response Program (GFRP) has determined that “under this emergency response
program, it is not anticipated that investment support would be provided for new
irrigation schemes, as this would be supported under the Bank’s regular lending
program.”13
19.3.2.2 Policies to Reduce Postharvest Losses
Developing countries face significant postharvest losses due to mishandling. For
cereals, these are estimated to be 10–15 % of harvest; when combined with
deterioration in storage (in farms and facilities) and milling, this number can reach
25 %. Poor (or nonexistent) roads compound these losses, as agricultural products
cannot reach consumer markets, and information failures impede supply from
reaching demand (or at least prevent it from reaching the most efficient markets).
Some of the policies discussed to reduce postharvest wastage include:
12This would require, however, 40 % more withdrawals of water for agriculture. Thus, these
policies should be complemented by increased productivity in existing irrigated areas.
13GFRP would limit their financing to: (i) support quick turnaround physical investments in
rehabilitation of existing irrigation (small-scale) schemes; (ii) finance investments in rehabilitation
or development of field drainage and collector drains to reduce problems of water logging and soil
salinity; (iii) finance training for water-user groups and others on operation and maintenance of
investments; (iv) finance assessments of groundwater or surface water hydrology and sustainable
water use; and (v) finance feasibility studies for medium-term irrigation investments.
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Improved Handling of Harvests and Storage Practices
Significant portions of agricultural production are lost due to postharvest mishan-
dling. One example comes from improper drying of crops. If crops are stored in high
humidity, they can be affected by mycotoxins and become unfit for consumption.
In addition to the risk of growing mold, production stored in improper containers
can also attract plagues, insects, and rodents, which can spoil the food. This is
only one example of postharvest mishandling in a process where any number of
small practices can potentially spoil food. Training in proper drying techniques and
building adequate infrastructure in this area can considerably reduce wastage and
improve food availability.
The implementation of extension services for postharvest losses should include:
(1) training and demonstration of low cost-on-farm storage; (2) technical assistance
and investment support for community-level food banks; and (3) training and
investment support for grain traders and millers in drying and sorting, as well as
fumigation equipment and upgrades in existing storage facilities. These should be
complemented with strengthening inspections and quality control surveillance to
prevent the spread of pests or diseases.
Information Systems
Imperfect information is especially pervasive in agricultural markets at both the
domestic and the international levels. In both cases, a lack of adequate and timely
information creates a mismatch between supply and demand. In many cases,
the consequence is the allocation of production to suboptimal markets, where
the demand is lower. In other cases, severe information constraints can result in
agricultural production not reaching any market at all and thus being wasted.
At the domestic level, many countries have implemented agricultural information
systems that can be accessed through internet portals, SMS on mobile phones,
kiosks, radio shows, etc. The challenge ahead is to find cost-effective mechanisms
to produce timely information that can be easily and widely accessed by producers
and traders.
At the international level, there is scarce reliable data on stocks and availability
of grains and oilseeds. Additionally, there is little monitoring of the state of
crops and short-term forecasts based on trustworthy technology (remote sensing,
meteorological information, etc.). FAO et al. (2011) proposed the creation of the
Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS), which involves major agricultural
exporters and importers, as well as international organizations with expertise in food
policy. It comprises two organisms: the Global Food Market Information Group
(to collect and analyze food market information) and the Rapid Response Forum
(to promote international coordination). While the specific details of its duties
and membership (and the political negotiations surrounding them) still need to be
addressed, AMIS is a first step in answering the need for global information and
coordination mechanisms.
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Rural Roads
Transport infrastructure plays an important role in the reduction of both the level and
variability of food prices. Without roads to transport their agricultural production,
some farmers cannot reach consumer markets; others have market access, but at
a very high cost. Delgado et al. (2010) argue that, in most cases, transport costs
represent 50–60 % of total marketing costs. Byerlee et al. (2008) estimate that
less than 50 % of the rural African population lives close to an all-season road.
Transport infrastructure can also help reduce price variability. Roads are useful
means to spread out regional shocks; if a certain region is hit by a shock (weather or
other), it can import food from another region. For example, during the food crisis,
regions with better infrastructure in Indonesia were not hit as hard as those poorly
connected.
19.4 Analysis of Consistency
The question that this section tries to answer is how consistent or inconsistent the
operational policy recommendations have been with respect to: (a) Proposals of
International Organizations and the G8’s document prepared for the Ministers of
Finance Meeting in 2008 and (b) the different policy recommendations proposed
by key researchers and analyzed in detail in the previous two sections. With this
objective in mind, we analyze as an experiment the portfolio of loans of GFRP
operations detailed in Table 19.5, covering operations in 13 developing countries.
Table 19.6 provides a detailed summary of all these World Bank operations which
have as their core objective the mitigation of the impact of the food crisis.
Table 19.5 Documents
analyzed for GFRP
operations
Country Project ID PAD ICR
Mozambique 107313  
Djibouti 112017  
Honduras 112023  N/A
Haiti 112133  N/A
Bangladesh 112761  
Sierra Leone 113219  
Madagascar 113224  
Rwanda 113232  N/A
Burundi 113438  
Philippines 113492  
Guinea 113625  
Mali 114269  N/A
Cambodia 117203  
Note: PAD is Project Appraisal Document
of the World Bank and ICR is the Imple-
mentation, Completion and Results Report
of the World Bank
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Table 19.7 Summary of operations
Official position of World Bank during
2007/08
Policies recommended by the World
Bank after 2008
Consistent Not consistent Consistent Not consistent
Mozambique X X
Bangladesh X X
Philippines X X X
Djibouti X X X
Honduras X X
Haiti X X X
Cambodia X X (export ban) X X
Mali X X X X
Guinea X X (export ban) X X
Burundi X X X
Madagascar X X X
Sierra Leone X X X X
Rwanda X X
Following an assessment of each of the specific operations for the 13 developing
countries, benefits are analyzed and summarized in Table 19.7:
(a) Mozambique: Overall, consistent with the policy recommendations in 2007/08
and after 2008. The government allowed a pass-through of international prices
while protecting vulnerable groups (expanding PSA program). In addition,
through the GFRP operation, the World Bank supported the implementation
of reforms to increase agricultural productivity through the provision of
infrastructure and public goods (technology adoption, construction of silos,
agricultural infrastructure, etc.).
(b) Bangladesh: Overall, consistent with the policy recommendations on trade
in 2007/08 but not consistent with later World Bank research after 2008.
Specifically, the GFRP operation was used in accordance with the GFRP
framework to support the reduction of import duties for rice and wheat, and
there was an increase of public food stocks (at least partially to act as price
buffers) from 1 to 1.5 million tons. On the other hand, it is important to mention
that the increased public targeting for aid programs was positive in terms of
performance of the program in identifying the proper beneficiaries. However,
most of it was untargeted and had severe leakages (e.g., large share of budget
allocated to open market sales).
(c) Philippines: The GFRP operation resulted in a combination of policies which
were consistent with the official World Bank policy recommendations in
2007/08 and were both consistent and inconsistent with the post-2008 rec-
ommendations. On the consistent side, as a result of the GFRP operation, the
government launched the Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction
(NHTS-PR) and introduced a CCT (Pantawid Pamilya). In addition, the NHTS-
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PR will become a targeting instrument for other social programs, and the Food
for School Program is prioritizing the poorest provinces and municipalities to
enhance targeting of the most vulnerable share of the population. Finally, the
government pushed for a regional rice reserve mechanism through ASEAN,
which is an emergency regional rice reserve to assure food security in the region
and which has a very clear trigger mechanism and governance. In addition, the
country was engaged in large rice import tenders, exacerbating increases in
international food prices, but the GFRP made the government commit, as part
of the loan, to change its tendering policy in a way that would reduce prices.
The government also agreed to withdraw a big tender that was going to increase
price pressure in the international market. Finally, bilateral rice deals were
established, reducing pressure on external markets. These policies, although
consistent in the short term with the GFRP framework, are inconsistent with
later World Bank recommendations. In the medium term, the government is
due to lift quantitative trade restrictions by WTO agreements, and there is a
medium-term plan to transfer rice trade to the private sector. However, currently
the National Food Authority (NFA) has the monopoly over rice imports. NFA
still concentrates a significant proportion of its food aid budget, which is poorly
targeted. NFA’s reserves act as a buffer stock for price stabilization.
(d) Djibouti: The GFRP operation resulted in a combination of policies which
were consistent in general with the official World Bank policy but which,
at the same time, were inconsistent with the policy recommendations after
2008. On the consistent side, when the crisis started, there were few social
protection mechanisms; the government was able to expand the WFP-operated
food assistance program in rural areas (one of the few existing) with GFRP
support. It also completed a population census as a first step to implement
direct and targeted protection mechanisms for the poor and provided support
for fisheries to boost food production. On the inconsistent side with the post-
2008 recommendations but consistent with the GFRP framework and official
policy of the World Bank, the government eliminated the consumption tax rates
on five basic staples; this policy was not effective in reducing consumer food
prices. Low pass-through rates were probably due to high concentration in the
food market (few importers and distributors) and security risks posed by pirates
in international waters.
(e) Honduras: Overall, consistent with the policy recommendations. The proposed
operation seems to be more oriented to releasing funds for the government to
aid the financial sector, given the government is concerned about the effect of
increasing food prices on households’ real income; therefore, the government
uses the resources as a buffer to mitigate the expected adverse effect on banks’
outstanding portfolio of consumer loans. However, the financial sector was not
the real target of the operation; it was just the fastest way to transfer cash to the
government for more general crisis response policies.
(f) Haiti: The GFRP operation resulted in a combination of policies which were
both consistent and inconsistent with the policy recommendations. On the
consistent side, as a result of the GFRP, a “Program of Action against the
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High Cost of Living” (with a focus on employment generation through labor-
intensive works and expansion of food assistance programs) was developed.
In addition, the government also implemented what they refer to in the GFRP
framework as a second best policy, i.e., subsidies to reduce the price of rice
between May and December 2008 (US$30 million). However, there are specific
circumstances that need to be met for the Bank to accept this type of policy
(see GFRP Framework document p.26, para. B2). Moreover, post-2008 these
policies were not supported.
(g) Cambodia: The GFRP operation resulted in a combination of policies which
were consistent with the GFRP framework and official position of the World
Bank. Despite the initial ban on rice exports in March 2008, they lifted this
ban in May 2008 and are currently seeking to promote rice production. The
main policy is to create price incentives by promoting exports (goal of one
million tons of milled rice exported by 2015). In addition, they expanded the
“Identification of Poor Households Targeting Program” to be applied to safety
nets, implemented food for cash and food for work programs, and boosted
credit for milling facilities which act as an interface between smallholders
and markets. In addition, consistent with the GFRP framework and official
World Bank position in 2008, the GFRP operation subsidized fertilizers by
the suspension of the VAT and by implementing a pilot for “smart subsidies”
using vouchers to be distributed to smallholders. However, this type of policy
was not recommended post-2008, given (as it has been shown in the case of
Malawi) that it bears the risk of significant fiscal deficit. Finally, the government
regulated the fertilizer market in principle to avoid adulteration; however, most
of the adulteration appears to happen in Vietnam (from where fertilizer is
imported) rather than in Cambodia.
(h) Mali: The GFRP operation resulted in policies which were both consistent and
inconsistent with the official policy recommendations of the World Bank and
with what was recommended after 2008. On the consistent side, the government
increased seed availability for locally produced rice varieties and improved
marketing channels to facilitate relationships between producer organizations.
Finally, a program of subsidies for equipment, access to water/irrigation, and
extension services was implemented. On the inconsistent side, the government
introduced 6 month VAT and tariff exemptions for rice, implemented a price-
stabilizing buffer stock through the Food Security Commission, introduced
subsidies on crop inputs which were not “smart subsidies,” and finally, despite
acknowledgement of weak safety nets, made no efforts to strengthen them.
(i) Guinea: The GFRP operation resulted in a combination of policies which
were both consistent and inconsistent with the official World Bank policy
recommendations and with the post-2008 recommendations. On the consistent
side, in both policies recommended in 2008 and after 2008, the government
implemented a safety net system to distribute take-home rations for children
of families of 5C members, an emergency school feeding and nutrition
support, and an emergency urban labor-intensive public works program. On
the inconsistent side, the country imposed a ban on agricultural exports in
19 Consistency Between Theory and Practice in Policy. . . 505
2007; although it was lifted in 2008 for most products, it was not lifted for
rice. Although the GFRP operation did not support this, the government could
have included a conditionality to be able to obtain the loan. In addition, and
consistent with the GRFP framework but not the post-2008 recommendations,
with support from the GFRP, the country was able to eliminate custom duties
for low quality rice between June 1 and October 31, 2008, and initiated plans
to build an emergency food reserve of 25,000 metric tons, although it is
not clear if this is for humanitarian or price-stabilizing purposes. Finally, the
government implemented the “Emergency Agricultural Productivity Support,”
which includes the distribution of subsidized seed and fertilizer packages to
70,000 smallholder farmers, although these were not the type of smart subsidies
proposed by the GRFP framework.
(j) Burundi: The GFRP operation resulted in a combination of policies which
were both consistent and inconsistent with the official World Bank policy
recommendations. On the consistent side, the government scaled up WFP’s
school feeding and nutrition program. However, funds allocation and the
number of beneficiaries fell short of initial goals. In addition, the government
supported the return of refugees to the country. Finally, and consistent with
the GRFP framework but inconsistent with post-2008 recommendations, the
government implemented exemption of transaction taxes and import duties
until July 2009.
(k) Madagascar: The GFRP operation resulted in a combination of policies
which were consistent with the official World Bank policy recommendations.
The government expanded the food for work and school feeding programs
and introduced a rice intensification campaign through producer associations.
This program aims to provide subsidies for selected agricultural technologies
through microfinance institutions. Finally, the government eliminated the VAT
for rice, which, although consistent with the GFRP framework, was not
consistent with post-2008 recommendations.
(l) Sierra Leone: The GFRP operation resulted in a combination of policies
which were both consistent and inconsistent with the official World Bank
policy recommendations. On the consistent side, the government protected
selected basic services from increasing costs of food and fuel (those for hospital
patients, lactating mothers, government’s boarding schools, etc.). In addition,
the tariffs for four products were reduced; this reduction is to be maintained
until prices return to precrisis levels. On the inconsistent side, the government
provided fully subsidized rice seed to farmers (71,000 bushes), which were not
targeted as the “smart subsidies” strategy recommended in the GFRP.
(m) Rwanda: The GFRP operation resulted in policies which were inconsistent
with both the official World Bank policy recommendations and the post-2008
recommendations. Specifically, the government implemented the Crop Intensi-
fication Program for food crops which included significant market intervention
by the government: (a) purchasing fertilizers in bulk in international markets;
(b) auctioning fertilizer to private traders; (c) promoting private microcredit for
smallholders; and (d) providing additional targeted subsidies through vouchers.
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This program has significant risks: mis-targeting, crop leakage (i.e., cannot be
used for export crops), collusion among traders, and an extremely low loan
recovery rate (during a pilot in 2008, recovery was only 4 %).
19.5 Final Remarks
The world faces a new food economy that likely involves both higher and more
volatile food prices, and evidence of both conditions was clear in 2007/08 and 2011.
After the food price crisis of 2007/08, food prices started rising again in June 2010,
with international prices of maize and wheat roughly doubling by May 2011. This
situation imposes several challenges. In the short run, the global food supply is
relatively inelastic, leading to shortages and amplifying the impact of any shock.
The poor are hit the hardest. In the long run, the goal should be to achieve food
security. The drivers that have increased food demand in the last few years are likely
to persist (and even expand). Thus, there is a significant role for the World Bank to
play in increasing the countries’ capacity to cope with this new world scenario and
in promoting appropriate policies that will help to minimize the adverse effects of
the increase in prices and price volatility, as well as to avoid exacerbating the crisis.
In this regard, this chapter describes some of the most important official policies
that the World Bank prescribed to different countries during the food crisis of
2007/08. In addition, it compares those policies to what was proposed by World
Bank research after 2008. The chapter focuses on the proposed short-term, medium,
and long-term policies. In terms of short-term policies, two mechanisms are
emphasized: support for the poor and price stabilization (with an emphasis on trade
restrictions and food reserves). In terms of medium- and long-term policies, we
focus on the recommendations linked to increasing agricultural productivity through
productivity gains and elimination of postharvest losses.
In support of the poor, Targeted Cash Transfers (TCT) and Conditional Cash
Transfer (CCT) programs already in place clearly constitute first-best responses for
several reasons: (a) they prioritize assistance for targeted groups, (b) they do not
entail additional costs of food storage and transportation, (c) they do not distort
food markets, and (d) in the case of CCTs, they explicitly prevent human capital
deterioration. When TCTs and CCTs are not available, governments may also
implement other types of assistance programs, although this could bring some
inefficiency. Therefore, in poor countries where TCTs and CCTs are not yet in
place (such as most Sub-Saharan Africa), it is essential that during noncrisis years,
countries invest in strengthening existing programs—and piloting new ones—to
address chronic poverty, achieve food security and human development goals, and
be ready to respond to shocks. Across the different GFRPs, we see these policies
implemented by the World Bank, specifically in the Philippines, Djibouti, Haiti,
Cambodia, Guinea, Burundi, and Madagascar.
In terms of short-term price stabilization policies through trade policies and
management of food reserves, we identify important inconsistencies in what was
recommended in the official position by the World Bank, through the GFRP
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framework document and in the G8’s document prepared for the Ministers of
Finance Meeting in 2008, and in post-2008 recommendations. Clearly, the official
recommendations in 2008 were more flexible, especially in regards to trade policies
and physical reserves, and in some cases allowed short-term interventions that could
end in pervasive market distortions. As a result, most of the operations under the
GFRPs were consistent with the official policy recommendations with the exception
of Cambodia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda (see summary in Table 19.7).
On the other hand, if we look at the post-2008 recommendations, all of them
will avoid any potentially pervasive market distortions. Even more, regarding
trade policies, most of the work of the World Bank will advise against any trade
restrictions (on both the import and the export side). In that sense, if we assess
ex post the GFRP operations, we find that in many of the countries, the policies
implemented as a result of the GFRP created additional trade restrictions other
than export bans, which was the only bad policy identified in the GFRP framework
document. This was the case for Bangladesh, Philippines, Mali, Guinea, Burundi,
and Sierra Leone.
Nevertheless, and as explained in Sect. 19.3, it is important to mention that what
the GFRP framework recommended in 2008 relative to what was recommended
post-2008 is in a certain way justifiable as a short-term measure given that all in
all, trade policies may be an effective instrument for short-term price stabilization
purposes in some nations: those facing considerable political unrest, lacking
adequate food distribution networks, with no safety nets available, etc. However,
they may have important beggar-thy-neighbor consequences and may fuel price
increases of important commodities. The 2007/08 food crisis—especially in the
case of rice—is quite illustrative in this respect. Insulating trade policies imposed
by importers and exporters (as well as high-income and developing countries)
were indeed responsible for a considerable share of price spikes. However, even
when the aggregate effect of the actions of these broad groups is quite large, most
of the turmoil was likely caused by large exporters and importers. In this sense,
if the argument is that such policies create further imbalances for others, policy
recommendations should distinguish between larger and smaller countries; from all
the countries where we see these inconsistencies, the Philippines is the only one
falling into the category of a significant importer of rice where the World Bank
should be clearly against import tenders and quantitative restrictions, given they
clearly helped to exacerbate international prices in the rice market.
With respect to food reserves, the discussion seems to highlight the need for food
reserves to ease the effect of shocks during periods of commodity price spikes and
volatility. There seems to be some consensus around this idea. The disagreement
stems from the specific mechanisms to implement food reserves. As in the case
of trade interventions, the most appropriate choices are likely to depend on the
characteristics of the specific market under intervention, the country’s capacity
to cope with crises, and the possibility of establishing international coordination
mechanisms. While it likely does not make sense to establish national buffer stocks
in most grain markets, it may be more valid in a few cases, such as in the rice
market. Again, however, regional reserves with strong governance and clear triggers
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are preferred. However, it is important to mention that the GFRP framework is not
extremely clear on this in difference to what was recommended post-2008. It is in
that sense that when analyzing the operational plans of the GFRPs, proposals can
be identified that promote country-level reserves as buffer stocks, as in the case of:
(a) Bangladesh where the stocks were increased from 1 to 1.5 million MT of rice,
(b) the NFAs in Philippines, and (c) the NFAs in Guinea. It could also be argued that
these reserves were consistent with the official position of the World Bank through
the GFRP framework, although clearly these types of policies are problematic in
countries where the necessary conditions for these reserves to work don’t exist.
Additionally, buffer stocks usually entail high costs and market distortions and are
prone to corruption. Thus, most countries—especially those with weak institutions
and scarce resources—should probably refrain from using buffer stocks.
Finally, with respect to the medium- and long-term policies, we see significant
investment in the GFRPs (e.g., the provision of infrastructure and public goods
in Mozambique, increasing seed availability in Mali, and the rice intensification
program in Madagascar). In addition, and as recommended in the GFRP framework
document, we also see the important presence of input subsidies similar to those
that have failed in Malawi with a fiscal cost of around 3 % of the GDP. These plans
envisage the implementation of a market-smart approach to input subsidies. Such a
strategy is characterized by: (a) targeting poor farmers; (b) not displacing existing
commercial sales; (c) utilizing vouchers, matching grants, or other instruments
to strengthen private distribution systems; and (d) being introduced for a limited
period of time only. Albeit outlining a sensible rationale, it is unclear how these
principles would be implemented in practice in poor countries like in the GFRPs in
Haiti, Cambodia, Mali, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda. Poorer countries—which likely
have the least developed input markets—may find it difficult to target only those
farmers in need. Additionally, subsidy programs that would strengthen, rather than
displace, the private sector are likely to require complex mechanisms. Institutional
weaknesses of poor countries may render them unfeasible, aside from the fiscal
costs.
It is important to note that in many countries, input markets are not well
developed, as they are hampered by various policy, institutional, and infrastructure
constraints that can only be overcome over time, while improvement in access
to inputs would provide substantial benefits in the short run, given the crisis
circumstances. It is in that sense that the “smart subsidies” proposed under the
GFRP framework could be conceptually justifiable even though as a short-term
measure they can also create fiscal problems as previously mentioned based on the
Malawi experience. Moreover, it is of central importance that any “smart subsidy”
policy includes the five key characteristics mentioned in the previous paragraph.
Furthermore, a long-time horizon is required to apply the “first-best” policies,
namely, the alleviation of constraints (such as infrastructure and missing credit
markets) which inhibit the development of efficient input markets.
Therefore, although this “second best measure” in the face of existing constraints
as stated in the GFRP framework document could be justifiable in the short term the
key is to assure all other needed elements are in place for its success; specifically,
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it has to be guaranteed that investments to alleviate the key constraints of the input
market are also started at the same time. All of these arguments are conceptually
valid, although their applicability in any given country cannot be taken for granted;
in most cases, applicability was not actually and explicitly verified in the assistance
programs funded under GFRP, and the key four characteristics of the proposed
“smart subsidies” strategies were not validated in advance.
In summary, when assessing the consistency of the specific loans and policies
prescribed officially by the World Bank for selected countries during the 2007/08
food crisis, we identify that (given the significant flexibility of the World Bank
official recommendations) most of the loans comply with what was proposed
in the GFRP framework. However, when analyzing the consistency of those
recommendations to the research results published by the World Bank post-2008,
we found significant inconsistencies, especially in short-term policies. As a result,
it is extremely important for the World Bank to carefully assess the risks and costs
of the implementation of the official, more flexible, recommendations of the GFRP
against what is currently being advocated at the Bank and to carefully assess how to
avoid these inconsistencies in the future.
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Part V
TheMicro-Economics of Price Risk, Volatility
and Price Shocks: Households, Firms
and Communities
20Access to Information and Price ExpectationErrors of Smallholder Farmers: Theory
and Empirics
Mekbib G. Haile and Matthias Kalkuhl
20.1 Introduction
Producers use different information when making decisions concerning their eco-
nomic activities. Past trends, outcomes in related markets, media reports, weather,
and published forecasts are some of the information that farmers use in their
resource allocation decisions (Just and Rausser 1981). The intrinsic feature of
agriculture—the lag between production decision and output realization—makes
these types of information indispensable to agricultural producers. Besides, agricul-
tural production is inherently stochastic due to weather shocks, pest infestations,
and other shocks, which affect the general market supply condition and therefore
prices. Farmers need to form their expectations of market prices and potential yield
for the upcoming harvesting season in order to make their production decisions.
They invest in accessing and processing price and other market information, which
they believe affects prices at harvesting time. This study assesses the information
sources relevant to smallholder farmers and how efficiently farmers utilize the
available information in their price expectation formations. This is important since
modeling price expectations is an integral part of any agricultural supply response
study (Moschini and Hennessy 2001).
In this study, we seek to empirically test the impact of access to information on
the level of investment in information acquisition. Access to information is used
synonymously with low costs of acquiring information to forecast future prices,
which is notably a continuous rather than a discrete concept. Whereas ownership
of information and communications technologies (ICT) and distance to markets
serve as a measure of access to information (or costs of acquiring information),
we use farmer realized price forecasting errors as a measure of the outcome
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variable of interest. In particular, we seek to address the research question whether
access to information (i.e., access to ICT and grain markets) results in a smaller
price forecasting error of smallholder farmers in rural Ethiopia. Analyzing the
distribution of smallholders’ price expectations relative to realized prices assists
policymakers in delivering information on price outlook and price risk management
strategies. The main findings indicate that smallholders who have access to ICT
and who reside closer to major grain markets are more likely to have smaller price
forecasting errors. Public investment in both information and physical infrastructure
that reduces the cost of accessing information is therefore vital for improving the
precision of farmers’ price expectations.
Several approaches have been applied to model expectations of agricultural
producers. These include naïve expectation (Ezekiel 1938), whereby expected prices
are assumed to be equal to the latest observed prices; adaptive expectation (Nerlove
1958), whereby farmers are assumed to revise their expectations depending on past
errors; and rational expectation (Muth 1961), which assumes that expectations are
consistent with the underlying market structure and that economic agents make
efficient use of all available information. Other research has focused on modeling
supply response using a quasi-rational price expectation (Holt and McKenzie 2003),
which is consistent with price prediction from a reduced-form dynamic regression
equation. Futures prices have also been used as proxies for price expectations
(Gardner 1976).
Acquiring information is a common and critical feature of all of these expectation
hypotheses. Because searching for and processing information are costly (Stigler
1961), it is unlikely that producers make use of all available information to form
their price expectations (Orazem and Miranowski 1986). This is even more so
in the context of subsistent smallholder farmers with limited access to credit and
capital. Farmers therefore gather and process price and other market information
that could potentially improve their price forecasts the most. A rational farmer
invests in acquiring market information to the extent that the expected marginal
benefit (in terms of more accurate price expectation) is greater or equal to the
marginal cost of investing in acquiring the information. Ownership of information
assets, such as a radio, a television, and a phone, and proximity to grain markets
could potentially reduce the costs of investing in acquiring information. The
government could also improve market efficiency by lowering the costs of access
to information by providing market information as a public good through organized
market information systems.
There is a large body of literature that investigates the effect of market infor-
mation systems (MIS) or ICTs on the economic performances of farmers, traders,
and consumers. Most of the existing empirical work has focused on the impact of
MIS or ICTs on price dispersion between markets and sellers (Aker and Fafchamps
2015; Jensen 2007), price asymmetry between traders and farmers (Svensson
and Yanagizawa 2009), traders’ search behavior (Tack and Aker 2014), farmers
bargaining power and selling prices (Mitchell 2011), consumption expenditures
(Labonne and Chase 2009), and farmers’ marketing choices (Tadesse and Bahiigwa
2015), among others (see Nakasone et al. 2014 for a recent review). The empirical
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evidence has been mixed regarding the effect of improved market price information
on prices at micro level. Yet, there seems to be little evidence arguing against
its positive effect on lowering price dispersion and search costs and improving
agricultural market performance at a macro-scale (Nakasone et al. 2014). Access
to better information through ownership of mobile phones, a radio, or a television
could potentially assist farmers in making a more informed price expectation. This,
in turn, helps them to make better decisions in terms of their crop choices, the
amount to plant, land management efforts, and the amount and type of investment
that they undertake in each cropping season. The present study therefore uses
primary data from smallholders in Ethiopia to empirically evaluate the impact of
access to information on farmers’ price expectations.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: The following section
presents a theoretical model that studies the importance of market information in
improving the price signal for farmers. Section 20.3 outlines the empirical model,
the data, and some descriptive statistics. Section 20.4 presents and discusses the
econometric results, and the last section concludes this chapter.
20.2 Theoretical Model
We employ a simple theoretical model to understand farmers’ decision behaviors
on production and information acquisition. The model consists of two stages: a
production decision (second stage) and a decision about investment in information
acquisition (first stage). The model is solved by backward induction. We therefore
start with the second stage.
Consider a farmer who decides on the output level y given a quadratic production
cost c.y/ D ˛y2. Crop prices are assumed to be random with mean 
 and variance
2. Because production costs accrue before harvesting, the farmer maximizes
discounted revenue from crop sales. With a discount rate of r (cost of capital), the
farmer maximizes expected profits:
maxy E

py
1C r  c.y/
	
D E Œ p y
1C r  c.y/: (20.1)
The first-order condition is EŒ p
1Cr D c0.y/ D 2˛y. With rational expectations (i.e.,
E Œ p D 
) the optimal production under uncertainty is given by y D 

2˛.1Cr/ .
Substituting y* into the expected profit function yields:
E Œv D 

1C r

1  1
2˛

C 

2
.1C r/2
1
4˛
; (20.2)
where the subscript v on v denotes profits under volatile prices. In case of no
ex-ante uncertainty about prices, E Œ p D p, the optimal production is y D p
2˛.1Cr/ ,
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and thus the expected profit c conditional on the fact that the farmer knows the
random price ex-ante is
E ŒcDE

p
1C r

1 1
2˛

C p
2
.1C r/2
1
4˛
	
D 

1C r

1  1
2˛

C E

p2

.1C r/2
1
4˛
:
(20.3)
With E

p2
 D 2 C 
2, we obtain
E Œc D E ŒvC 
2
.1C r/2
1
4˛
: (20.4)
Thus, farmers with access to perfect information on the harvest price are expected
to have on average higher profits than farmers with uncertainty. The discrepancy
increases with the magnitude of the uncertainty (variance 2).
In the first stage, the farmer chooses their level of investment in information
acquisition, which results in acquisition of a perfect price signal regarding har-
vesting prices with probability  or no signal with probability 1  . With the
probability 1  , the price remains as uncertain as it would be without any
investment in information acquisition (i.e., the farmer receives no signal regarding
harvesting prices). The cost of investing in information acquisition is given by a
twice differentiable function ˇk(), where k.0/ D 0; k0 > 0; k00 > 0; k.1/ D 1
and ˇ is a scaling factor. Hence,  measures the quality of the signal or the level of
investment to obtain a perfect signal. The information investment decision involves
choosing a  2 Œ0; 1 such that the expected profit—which is a weighted sum of
the expected profit with certainty EŒc and the expected profit with uncertainty
EŒv—is maximized after the costs of information acquisition are netted out, thus:
max2Œ0;1 E ŒcC .1  /E Œv  ˇk ./ : (20.5)
Given the profit in the second stage, the farmer chooses the optimal level of
investment in information * to maximize the expected profit in the first stage. After
substituting the expected profit from the second stage into Eq. (20.5), the first-order
condition is obtained as:
2
.1C r/2
1
4˛ˇ
D k0  : (20.6)
Proposition 1 The optimal investment in information * increases in 2 and
decreases in r, a and ˇ. Thus, investment in information acquisition increases with
price volatility, whereas it is negatively correlated with discount rates, costs of
acquiring information, and production costs.
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Proof Calculating the total derivative in each parameter gives: d

d2
D
1
.1Cr/2 4˛ˇ k00./ > 0,
d
d˛ D  
2
.1Cr/2 4˛2ˇ k00./ < 0,
d
dˇ D  
2
.1Cr/2 4˛ˇ2 k00./ < 0
and d

dr D  2
2
.1Cr/3 4˛ˇ k00./ < 0.
The magnitude of the forecasting error V of the price expectation formation of
the farmer can be measured by the expected squared deviations of the expected
prices pe from realized prices pr; thus V D E
h
.pr  pe/2
i
. The farmer’s expected
price pe, in turn, depends on the level of information acquisition  and is pe D
pr C .1  /
. It is the weighted sum of the realized price (revealed at probability
) and the unconditional mean
 of the random distribution of the price. Substituting
pe into V, we obtain V D E
h
..1  / .pr  
//2
i
D .1  /2E
h
.pr  
/2
i
, where
E
h
.pr  
/2
i
D 2 is the (unconditional) variance of the price.
Corollary 1 The magnitude of a farmer’s forecasting error V (measured as the
squared deviation of the farmer’s expected price conditional on the information
acquired from the realized price) is V D .1  /22. It increases with 2 and
decreases with .
One particular implication of the corollary is that in case of no information
acquisition, that is,  D 0, the forecasting error is just the unconditional variance
of the price series. For full information acquisition,  D 1, the forecasting error
will be zero. As V decreases with , the impact of the structural parameters on the
forecasting error in the optimum V* has a sign opposite to that of the impact of these
parameters on *. The exception is 2, which influences both the optimal * and
V* in opposite directions.1
This chapter employs empirical analyses to validate the theoretical model and
to determine the sign and magnitude of the impacts of the structural parameters
on the accuracy of price expectation formation. Because it is nearly impossible
to observe investment in acquiring information per se, we explain the size of the
price expectation error (or realized price forecasting error) with empirical data. The
structural model parameters are linked to our empirical data as indicated in the last
column of Table 20.1.
1Formally, @V

@2
D .  1/
h
.  1/C 2
2˛ˇ.1Cr/2k00./
i
after substituting d

d2 from proposition 1
into the derivative of V with respect to 2. As can be easily verified, @V

@2
> 0 for sufficiently small
values of 2 and @V

@2
< 0 for sufficiently large values of 2.
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Table 20.1 Impact of structural parameters on the quality of the price signal
Impact in optimum
Parameter in the
theoretical model
On the quality of the
signal 
On the forecasting
error V
Related explanatory variables
in empirical model
Cost of information ˇ  .ˇ/ < 0 V .ˇ/ > 0 Ownership of ICT, years of
schooling, distance to market,
distance to extension agents’
office
Discount rate r .r/ < 0 V.r/ > 0 Discount rate, years of
schooling
Production costs ˛  .˛/ < 0 V .˛/ > 0 Distance to market, distance to
extension agents’ office,
family labor
Volatility 2 

2

> 0 V

2

≷ 0 Crop price volatility, crop
and/or village fixed effects
20.3 Methods
20.3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Data for this study were obtained through a household survey. A random sample
of 415 rural smallholders were selected from seven villages out of four different
districts of Ethiopia, namely Kersa, Shashemene, Ada’a, and Debre Birhan Zuria.2
Adele Keke is a kebele3 selected from Kersa district and households in this village
trade with the adjacent towns of Dire-Dawa, Harar, and Aweday. Smallholders in
this kebele produce staple crops, typically corn and sorghum, and cash crops, like
chat4 and potato. We also interviewed households from four neighboring kebeles
at the Debre Birhan Zuria district, which is 120 km northeast of Addis Ababa.
The town of Debre Birhan is a nearby market for their grain production, which
typically consists of barley, wheat, and horse beans, among others. Sirbana Godeti
is a kebele that was selected in the Ada’a district and it is the major supplier of
teff to the surrounding and Addis Ababa markets. Having relatively fertile soil,
smallholders in this area also produce several leguminous crops and vegetables.
2The households in our sample were those selected for the widely used Ethiopian Rural Household
Survey (EHRS), and detailed information on sampling techniques can be found from Dercon and
Hoddinott (2004).
3A kebele is the smallest administrative unit in Ethiopia.
4Chat is a perennial cash crop and a mild stimulant that is commonly used in the southern and
eastern parts of Ethiopia.
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Finally, we interviewed households from Turfe Ketchema, which is located about
12 km northeast from the town of Shashemene, where most of their marketing are
conducted. The main crops that the smallholders in this survey area produce include
potatoes, corn, wheat, barley, and teff.
The survey was conducted in April and May 2013, which was immediately before
or at the onset of planting for the main “meher” season of 2014. This helped us
obtain good information on planting time prices. Furthermore, the dataset provided
detailed information on household demographics, asset holdings, production and
consumption, purchases and sales, seasonal prices, information sources, among
others. Data on sowing time prices from the nearby grain markets were obtained
from the central statistical agency (CSA) of Ethiopia. Grain prices for the then
upcoming harvesting prices, which were not known at the time of our survey, are
obtained from three different enumerators who travelled to the respective markets
to collect price information.
Following the liberalization of markets in Ethiopia in the early 1990s, prices
have not only served as an incentive for farmers to produce more, but they have
also become less predictable. Consequently, recent food price volatility has posed
additional challenges to farmers in their production decisions. Information regarding
input and output price developments, weather conditions, and input availability
are hence crucial for the farmer to make a better production decision. Based on
the survey data, most of the smallholder households perceive prices as highly
unpredictable. About 85 % of the households reported that output prices were likely
to increase in the next one year, whereas the other 11 % indicated that prices would
have declined. Although most of the farmers (87 %) reported that changes in output
prices (in a year) were more likely to range from a decrease by half to an increase by
twice of the amount they predicted, the remaining households reported that prices
could be outside this range.
Farmers form their price expectations based on information that they have access
to. We asked the respondents two similar but subtly different questions regarding
their sources of price information. First, we wanted to know the major sources
of information for the market prices of their crops. Second, we asked them a
more specific question with regard to what information they observe to predict the
harvesting time price of the crop they chose to cultivate. Figure 20.1 shows the major
responses. There are three main sources of price information for rural households
in Ethiopia. Most of the smallholder farmers (54 %) visited close-by markets to sell
or buy products and thereby gather price information for the commodities they are
interested in, whereas about 45 % of them got price information from their fellow
farmers. About two-thirds of the households owned either a radio (57 %) or a mobile
phone (66 %), or a television (8 %), and about a quarter of the rural households
reported using these ICT tools as their sources of output price information. The
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Neighbors (other farmers)
Radio or television or phone
Close-by market
Relatives
Farmer cooperatives
Private traders
Ethiopian commodity exchange
Proportion of households (%)
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Previous-harvest season prices
Current prices
Central wholesale prices
International prices
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Weather condition
Non-agricultural commodity Prices
Proportion of households %)
Fig. 20.1 Primary sources of price information (left) and relevant information for price expecta-
tion formation of smallholders (right) Note: respondents were allowed to give multiple responses
descriptive statistics also indicated that the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX)
has not done enough to reach out rural smallholder farmers with price information.5
An interesting observation is that about half of the smallholders form their har-
vesting time price expectations based on the currently available price information.
About a fifth of the respondents also considered prices from the past harvesting
period in forming their price expectation. This may suggest that these households
form their price expectations in line with the adaptive or naïve price expectation
formation hypothesis. This is consistent with Chavas (2000), which indicated that
close to half of the US beef markets were associated with the naïve expectation
hypothesis. Nevertheless, other information such as weather, input prices, and
central wholesale prices were reported by the smallholder farmers in our sample
as relevant information in forming price expectation.
Subject to their access to information and their ability in data processing, farmers
make their price predictions for the next harvesting period. The better the access
farmers have to relevant price information, the more precise their price predictions
are expected to be. This, in turn, results in a more efficient allocation of production
resources. Table 20.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the smallholders in our
sample, highlighting household characteristics, asset holdings, and other variables
that could potentially affect farmers’ data gathering and processing abilities that, in
turn, influence their price expectation formations.
The summary statistics in Table 20.2 show a lot of similarities among the
households from the four survey districts. On average, the household heads were
in their mid-50s, and greater than two-third of them were married and male. The
average family size (6.1) is slightly greater than the average household size in rural
Ethiopia, which is 5.1 according to the household consumption and expenditure
survey in 2010/2011 (CSA 2012). Although about 55 % of the overall household
5Established in 2008 as a partnership between market actors, members of the exchange, and the
government, the ECX is a marketing system that, among other things, aims to disseminate real-time
market information to all market players.
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heads had some literacy skills through formal or informal education, the average
family head had completed only the second grade. The smallholders in the sample
had relatively large discount rates (46 %), which indicate severe liquidity problems.
We measured discount rate using a survey question that elicits the minimum amount
of money that a household head would have to be given in 6 months time in order
to make them no different relative to a fixed amount given to them today.
The total land owned by the average smallholder was about 1.68 ha: smallholders
in Debre Birhan district had, on average, slightly greater than 2 ha of land, whereas
those in Kersa had slightly less than a hectare of land. The average per capita farm
size was less than half a hectare. Besides, ownership of information assets such as
mobile phone, radio, and television are very important in obtaining market, rainfall,
and other information that could improve households’ production decisions. The
data showed that about 80 % of the smallholders owned at least one ICT tool.6
Other indicators of access to market and information include distances from
basic facilities. For instance, smallholder farmers are located on average 3 km away
from an all-weather road and 10 km from a nearby grain market. Thus, the average
farmer needs to walk about 1 and 2 h to access these facilities, respectively. As
agriculture is the main activity in all districts, it is not surprising that off-farm
income contributes less than 10 % of the households’ incomes. The degree of
commercialization (market share of grains), as measured by the share of output
sale from total production, is negligible in Kersa and Debre Birhan districts. This is
mainly because chat is the main cash crop in Kersa, and sale of livestock is common
in the latter.7
20.3.2 Empirical Model
We employed an econometric model to test part of the above theoretical model with
the described household survey data. More specifically, we empirically assessed fac-
tors that determine the quality of the price signal, for example, whether households
with better or cheaper access to information have more accurate price expectations.
Our presumption was that a better price signal, as explained in the theoretical model,
implies a more precise price expectation. To this end, we identified relevant variables
that affect the precision of smallholders in their expectation formation. We obtained
data on smallholders’ expectations of harvesting season prices at planting time. This
6In this chapter, ICT ownership is the same as ownership of any of the three ICT assets, namely
radio, television, or mobile phone.
7We calculated the market shares based on total sale and production of the six crops, namely teff,
wheat, corn, sorghum, barley, and horse beans to be consistent with our empirical analysis.
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allowed us to compute a deviation of farmers’ expected prices (pe) from realized
harvesting period output prices .pr or ptC1/ and use the deviation as a proxy for
the quality of the price signal (i.e., as a measure of investment into information
acquisition). Suppose PE denotes a measure of the price signal quality (henceforth
prediction error), which is related to the variable V in the theoretical model. A
simple model to explain prediction error for a typical farmer i can be specified as:
PEi D ˛ C  ICTi C Mi C X0ˇ C !i; (20.7)
where PE is the deviation of each farmer’s expected prices from the realized market
prices—the outcome variable of interest; and the cost of information acquisition
is captured by the two key variables of interest ICT and M. While ICT refers to
ownership of information assets (radio, television, and phone), M refers to distance
to markets. Both variables capture costs of acquiring information. X refers to a
vector of all other explanatory variables that could potentially affect investment in
information acquisition (and thus the level of precision in price expectation), such
as household characteristics, discount rate, farm size, household wealth, and years
of schooling; !i is an error term; and ˛,  ,ˇ are parameters to be estimated.
As noted in footnote 6, we used ownership of the abovementioned ICT tools as
one of the proxies for access to information. In other words, we expect farmers to
use their radios, televisions, or phones to access better information on variables that
influence harvest-time prices, suggesting beneficial effect on their price forecasting
ability. There are at least two concerns with this assumption. First, it is possible
that farmers use the ICT tools for purposes other than accessing information (e.g.,
for luxury purposes). Richer farmers, who tend to have more of these information
assets, can have better price forecasts based on other channels. Second, there is a
possibility that farmers who do not own these information assets share common
intrinsic characteristics, such as poor farming skills and management abilities,
which are unlikely to be affected by having better market information.
We have taken a few measures to account for these issues. First, we controlled
for covariates, such as the level of education, age, wealth proxy variables, and
other farmer characteristics, to take into consideration farming experiences and
management abilities. Second, we controlled for a variable that captures access to
price information, which is an interaction between ownership of ICT and whether
farmers use any of the ICT tools as a source of price information. It is worth noting
here that farmers may (and are expected to) use their information assets to access
more than just price information. This in turn may affect their price prediction.
Therefore, ownership of ICT tools remains our main explanatory variable of interest
that serves as a proxy to “access to information.” Lastly, we calculated household-
specific average crop yield for our sample farmers using data from previous rounds
of the Ethiopian rural household survey (ERHS). We specifically computed the
average crop yield from the crop seasons of the ERHS data collected in 2004,
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2009, and from our survey in 2013. If ownership of a radio, television, or mobile
phone is systematically related to farming or management skills and ability, then
we would expect farmers without these tools to have relatively low crop yields.8
We included the average yield variable to control for these innate characteristics of
farmers, which may also affect their price prediction error.
20.3.2.1 Measuring Prediction Error9
We used four alternative, but related, measurements as proxies for smallholders’
price prediction errors (or accuracy). Suppose t and t C1 refer to the current sowing
and the upcoming harvesting periods, whereby the former refers to the time of
production decision. Therefore, t refers to the time when farmers form their price
expectations for the period tC1. Suppose also that e denotes expectation; subscripts
c, i, and v denote crop-, farmer-, and village-specific prices, respectively; n is the
number of crops that a farmer grows and for which they report price expectations.
The alternative measures of a farmer’s price prediction error are defined as follows.
(a) Absolute mean price prediction error (AMPPE)
We measured the AMPPE as the absolute mean deviation of the farmer’s
expected prices from the realized prices in the respective grain markets for n
crops that the farmer grows
AMPPEi D 1
n
nX
c
ˇ
ˇpc;tC1  peic;t
ˇ
ˇ

:
(b) Relative mean price prediction error (RMPPE)
This is similar to the above measure except that we took the relative mean devi-
ation of farmer’s price expectations from the realized prices in the respective
grain markets—instead of the absolute deviation.
RMPPEi D 1
n
nX
cD1
ˇ
ˇpc;tC1  peic;t
ˇ
ˇ

pc;tC1
:
The above two measurements assume that a farmer gives equal weight to each
crop in his price expectations. However, a farmer may invest more in acquiring
better information regarding a crop that he produces for a market compared
to a crop that he produces for home consumption. This, in turn, affects his
price prediction accuracy of the respective crops. To take this into account,
we calculated the deviation of market share-weighted expected prices from
8A simple linear regression of ownership of assets on past average crop yield supports this
statement: ownership is strongly and positively correlated with crop yield.
9In this study, we refer to the quality of farmers’ price expectations—that is, the deviation of
farmers’ expected prices from realized prices—alternatively as price prediction error (accuracy),
forecasting error (accuracy), and expectation error (precision).
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similarly weighted realized prices. We used the market share of each crop to
calculate price indices for each farmer and district. Using the farmers’ reported
and expected prices for sowing and harvesting periods, we obtain price indices
for the respective seasons. Village-level price indices were similarly calculated
using observed prices in the respective nearby grain markets. Furthermore, we
normalized (both farmer- and district-specific) harvesting time price indices
by the respective sowing time indices in order to consider the general trend
of grain prices. Accounting for such price trends is important to overcome
endogeneity in the estimation that may arise due to heterogeneities in the
farmers’ understanding of the overall inflation or deflation on their price
predictions. Analogous to the two measures of prediction error mentioned
above, we calculated the absolute and relative index price prediction error for
each smallholder farmer.
(c) Absolute index price prediction error (AIPPE)
We calculated the AIPPE as an absolute deviation of indices of farmers’
expected prices from the realized price indices in the respective markets/villages
as
AIPPEi D
ˇ
ˇNPIv;tC1  NPIei;t
ˇ
ˇ ;
where NPIt D
Xn
c
˛cpc;t
Xn
c
˛cpc;t1
refers to the normalized price index—where the
denominator (sowing period price) is normalized at 100—for each village v or
for each household i. ˛c refers to the market share of each crop.
(d) Relative index price prediction error (RIPPE)
RIPPE is calculated as the relative deviation of indices of farmers’ expected
prices from the realized price indices in the respective markets/villages.
RIPPEi D
ˇ
ˇNPIv;tC1  NPIei;t
ˇ
ˇ

NPIv;tC1
Figure 20.2 illustrates how we measured PE using self-reported prices for the
crops of interest in this study. The area in the dotted circle refers to realized
.ptC1/ and expected (pe) prices of the new harvesting period. The latter are price
expectations of farmers made at sowing time, t. The graph in the right panel is a
replication of the corn example for better illustration. The vertical distance between
the realized and expected price, indicated by the red arrow line, is the prediction
error.
The above measures of price prediction error combine multiple crops that a
farmer grows. This might result in an “averaging-out” effect if a farmer who has
a large expectation error for one crop tends to have a small error for the other.
In other words, these measures are inadequate if a farmer’s price forecasts have
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Fig. 20.2 Illustration of prediction error using self-reported prices
Table 20.3 Consistency of
farmers’ prediction errors
between crops
Crop-to-crop errors Reg. coef. Corr. coef.
Barley and wheat 0.49*** 0.38***
(0.10)
Corn and sorghum 0.82*** 0.47***
(0.16)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses
** denotes statistical significance at the 1 % level or less
large discrepancies across different crops. In order to shed some light on this,
we computed regression and correlation coefficients between the magnitudes of
individual farmer’s forecasting errors for corn to that of sorghum and for wheat
to that of barley.10
The coefficients in Table 20.3 illustrate a significant degree of consistency in
prediction errors between crops for the same farmer. The farmers who made large
errors in their corn price prediction also tended to make large errors for sorghum.
This is also true for the expectation errors of farmers growing both wheat and barley.
This hinted that the mean deviation would not cause the error for one crop to be
offset by the error for another, suggesting also that crop diversification would not
lead to any better resource allocation for the farmer.
Moreover, the data showed that the crop-specific price forecasting (prediction)
errors, on average, range between 19 and 20 % with comparable standard errors.
This provided an additional clue for the absence of any large systematic difference
in the difficulty of forecasting prices of different crops. There is also an economy of
scale advantage for a farmer to invest in acquiring information on multiple crops.
10We chose these crops because of the larger number of farmers producing the respective crop
pairs.
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Variable Original IHS Transformed
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
AMPPE 141.84 (80.74) 5.38 (1.00)
AIPPE 18.73 (13.28) 3.28 (0.97)
RMPPE 0.18 (0.10) 0.18 (0.10)
RIPPE 0.17 (0.12) 0.17 (0.12)
21
Fig. 20.3 Summary statistics and distribution of the dependent variable
20.3.2.2 Estimation Technique
The nature of the dependent variable (price prediction error), an absolute value of
a narrowly dispersed variable, requires paying special attention to the estimation
method used. Because the prediction error has a zero lower bound, it has a positively
skewed distribution (Fig. 20.3, Panel 1). This variable has a relatively small range,
0–0.6 with a mean close to zero, in the relative measures. As measured by RIPPE,
for instance, the magnitudes of the prediction error made by smallholder farmers
in our sample ranges from 0 % to as far as 60 %, with a mean value of 17 %
(Fig. 20.3, Panel 2). This indicates that some farmers forecasted prices correctly,
and the dependent variable has natural zero values. A quasi-maximum likelihood
(QML) Poisson estimator would be appropriate in such situations (Cameron and
Trivedi 2010; Nichols 2010; Wooldridge 2010). In fact, Santos Silva and Tenreyro
(2006) argued that QML Poisson regression is preferred to an ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression on a log-linear equation regardless of a count or a continuous
dependent variable.11 Because the mean and the variance of our dependent variables
are not equal—that is, the distribution is not Poisson—we needed to use the robust
sandwich standard errors (Cameron 2009).
An OLS estimation can be used if the residuals are normally distributed. We
transformed the alternative dependent variables using the inverse hyperbolic sine
(IHS) method to get residuals that are approximately symmetrically distributed.12
We favored using IHS over logarithmic transformation as some households in our
sample have zero prediction errors, the log of which is not defined.13 The IHS
is a logarithmic-like transformation that retains zero and negative values, unlike
11We refer to an interesting Stata Blog post by Bill Gould about using a Poisson regression model
(http://blog.stata.com).
12The IHS transformation of variable x can be given as: ihs.x/ D ln
D
x C 2x2 C 11=2
E
and the
scale parameter  is assumed to be unity in most applications.
13Because the dependent variable (when measured in relative terms) is not a proportion where
values above one are infeasible, a logit transformation is not needed for an OLS estimation.
20 Access to Information and Price Expectation Errors of Smallholder. . . 529
logarithmic transformation, and has been applied in several studies (Bellemare et al.
2013; Burbidge et al. 1988; Moss and Shonkwiler 1993). This transformation allows
us to interpret the OLS estimated coefficients as semi-elasticities. The marginal
effects should be interpreted in percentage points in the case of the relative measures
of the dependent variable (RMPPE and RIPPE).
20.4 Results and Discussion
Table 20.4 presents the estimation results of the maximum-likelihood Poisson
regression model, specified as a generalized linear model (GLM) with a log-link
function. The four columns differ in terms of the alternative measurements of
prediction error, as discussed above. Although results are mostly consistent across
the different specifications, we discuss the results from our preferred measure
of prediction accuracy: the RIPPE. Besides accounting for the general grain
price trend, this measure also weights crop prices with their respective market
shares.
Controlling for access to ICT and grain markets, and other confounders, the
estimated coefficients indicated that female-headed households had more accurate
price expectations than male-headed households. Moreover, as expected a priori,
households with an older (more experienced) head had statistically significant
smaller forecasting errors. Not surprisingly, the precision of smallholders’ price
expectations was closely linked with the self-reported proxy for time preference
(i.e., the discount rate). The results in Table 20.4 show that smallholders with higher
discount rates, who tend to undervalue future gains and who therefore invest less in
production but also information acquisition, have larger forecasting errors. This is
consistent with the implication of the theoretical model.
As expected a priori, smallholders who had access to ICT such as radios, televi-
sions, or mobile phones were more likely to make more precise price expectations
than those who do not own any of these assets. Ownership of these assets enables
them to access additional information on prices cheaply. More specifically, access
to ICT was associated with about a 10 % decrease in the conditional mean of a
smallholder’s prediction error (100  e0:11  1, in column [4] of Table 20.4).
This means that the prediction error made by smallholder farmers who own any
of the ICT tools was smaller by a factor of 0.89 than those who did not own any
ICT tools, ceteris paribus. Smallholders who followed price information through
radio or television or mobile telephony tended to forecast prices more accurately.
This finding supports the theoretical model that indicates a negative impact of large
information costs on the quality of the price signal. The interaction variable (ICT
ownership and source of price information, ICT  InfoSource) is not statistically
significant in all specifications. This indicates that information assets might have
improved a farmer’s price prediction accuracy mainly through access to non-price
information, such as weather.
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Table 20.4 Factors that affect price prediction accuracy of smallholders
Dependent variable: relative mean/index price prediction error
Variables AMPPE AIPPE RMPPE RIPPE
Male head 0.0328*** 0.1089** 0.0353 0.1090**
(0.0120) (0.0460) (0.0300) (0.0430)
Age of head 0.0004 0.0027** 0.0007** 0.0026***
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0010)
Family size 0.0108*** 0.0054 0.0112*** 0.0067
(0.0030) (0.0110) (0.0020) (0.0100)
Head’s years of schooling 0.0049 0.0001 0.0052*** 0.0008
(0.0030) (0.0060) (0.0020) (0.0050)
ICT 0.0240 0.1117*** 0.0557** 0.1074***
(0.0300) (0.0410) (0.0280) (0.0260)
ICT  InfoSource 0.0344 0.0885 0.0207 0.0724
(0.0660) (0.0610) (0.0470) (0.0620)
Past average crop yield 0.0090 0.0525 0.0028 0.0478
(0.0310) (0.0600) (0.0230) (0.0370)
Share of farm income 0.0822 0.0667 0.0587 0.0429
(0.0990) (0.1690) (0.1830) (0.1810)
Market share 0.0929 0.2323 0.1631*** 0.2591
(0.0850) (0.1460) (0.0530) (0.1700)
Per capita livestock value 0.0177*** 0.0185*** 0.0158*** 0.0185***
(0.0040) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050)
Per capita farm size 0.0307 0.0061 0.0043 0.0034
(0.1320) (0.1440) (0.1490) (0.1340)
Dist. to grain market 0.0047 0.0301*** 0.0029 0.0296***
(0.0030) (0.0040) (0.0070) (0.0050)
Dist. to extension agents’ office 0.0042 0.0207 0.0032 0.0198
(0.0130) (0.0150) (0.0100) (0.0190)
Discount rate 0.0350*** 0.0227*** 0.0378*** 0.0201**
(0.0080) (0.0070) (0.0060) (0.0090)
No. of crops 0.0706 0.1092*** 0.1038*** 0.1042***
(0.0430) (0.0350) (0.0220) (0.0260)
Constant 4.7818*** 3.9814*** 1.7674*** 0.8357**
(0.2980) (0.6110) (0.2040) (0.3950)
District dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 400 400 400 400
Notes: Standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered in seven kebeles (villages)
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively
We included two proxy variables for wealth, per capita value of livestock and
farm size, to take into account any possibility that richer smallholders may have
had better price forecasts using information from channels other than the afore-
mentioned information assets. The results confirmed that (regardless of ownership
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of information assets) wealthier farmers have better price forecasts, as indicated
by the statistically significant and negative estimated coefficient of the per capita
value of livestock value. The lagged historical crop yield variable, which captures
poor farming skills and management ability of farmers, turned out to be statistically
insignificant. Although farmers who do not own ICT may share such common
farmer characteristics, these innate characteristics did not have a causal effect on
their price forecasting accuracy.
Another important factor which determines the cost of access to information is
the proximity of households to major local grain markets. The empirical finding is
consistent with the theoretical model: the costs of acquiring information were higher
for households located farther away from grain markets. All other factors remaining
constant, halving the “effective” distance to a nearby grain market reduces the
forecasting error of a farmer who is located at an average distance away from
the market by about 14 % (100  e4:730:03  1). This is consistent with the
descriptive statistics as most households reported that they had usually visited
nearby grain markets to obtain price information. In contrast, access to extension
services—measured by distance from extension service offices—did not appear to
be effective in providing information that helps smallholders improve their price
forecasting performance. This may be partly explained by the training level of
extension agents and the extent to which farmers trust the information they receive
from agents.
We measured “access to ICT” by ownership of any of the information assets,
namely radio, television, or mobile phone. It may, however, be necessary to
investigate the differential impacts (if any) of each ICT. Table 20.5 presents the
results using an exclusive ownership of mobile phone (column 2) and radio (column
3) as alternative measures of access to information.14 Column (1) in this table is
the same as the last column in Table 20.4, and the dependent variable is RIPPE
in all cases. The results suggest that mobile telephony alone played a statistically
significant role in improving the price forecasting accuracy of farmers. However,
the marginal effect of exclusive ownership of mobile phones is smaller than the
effect of our preferred measure of information access (an estimated coefficient of
0.05). Smallholders may use the information assets as a substitute or complement
depending on several factors. The results also highlighted that ownership of a
radio alone did not have a statistically significant effect on price prediction errors
(column 3).
The last column in Table 20.5 controlled for interaction terms to test if the effects
of access to ICT is conditional on some of the covariates (e.g., age and distance
to market). Older household heads have more experience and are more likely to
have better price forecasts, whereas younger heads do better if they have access to
ICT. More specifically, the estimated coefficient of the interaction term of ICT and
age of the head was positive (Column 4). The positive estimated coefficient of the
14Since only less than 10 % of our sample owns a television (8 %) or all three assets (7 %), we
only consider exclusive ownership of a mobile or a radio as alternative proxies for access to ICT.
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Table 20.5 Differential impacts of access to ICT on price prediction (RIPPE)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Male head 0.1090** 0.0937** 0.0973* 0.0957***
(0.0430) (0.0440) (0.0520) (0.0370)
Age of head 0.0026*** 0.0026*** 0.0025* 0.0092***
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
ICT  Age 0.0088***
(0.002)
Family size 0.0067 0.0036 0.0032 0.0054
(0.0100) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060)
Head’s years of schooling 0.0008 0.0019 0.0013 0.0021
(0.0050) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040)
ICTa 0.1074*** 0.0513** 0.0249 0.4494***
(0.0260) (0.0230) (0.0430) (0.1540)
ICT  InfoSource 0.0724 0.0727
(0.0620) (0.0600)
Past average crop yield 0.0478 0.0554 0.0521 0.0378
(0.0370) (0.0640) (0.0700) (0.0700)
Share of farm income 0.0429 0.1386 0.1236 0.0027
(0.1810) (0.1690) (0.1090) (0.1510)
Market share 0.2591 0.2433 0.2406 0.2594
(0.1700) (0.1930) (0.1590) (0.1630)
Per capita livestock value 0.0185*** 0.0182*** 0.0174*** 0.0199***
(0.0050) (0.0030) (0.0050) (0.0060)
Per capita farm size 0.0034 0.0222 0.0219 0.0036
(0.1340) (0.1530) (0.1060) (0.1260)
Dist. to grain market 0.0296*** 0.0296*** 0.0296*** 0.0417***
(0.0050) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0060)
ICT  dist. to market 0.0145*
(0.008)
Dist. to extension agents’ office 0.0198 0.0164 0.0175 0.0218*
(0.0190) (0.0100) (0.0170) (0.0120)
Discount rate 0.0201** 0.0184*** 0.0184*** 0.0204***
(0.0090) (0.0060) (0.0070) (0.0070)
No. of crops 0.1042*** 0.1078*** 0.1109*** 0.0970***
(0.0260) (0.0280) (0.0290) (0.0370)
Constant 0.8357** 0.7023 0.7423 0.6864
(0.3950) (0.5420) (0.6500) (0.6620)
District dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 400 400 400 400
Notes: Standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered in seven kebeles (villages)
*, **, *** denote statistical significance a 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively
aAccess to ICT is measured as ownership of either a phone, radio, or TV in (1 & 4), only a phone
in (2), only a radio in (3)
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interaction term indicates that ownership of ICT tools has larger impacts on price
prediction accuracy for households headed by younger farmers. This can be due
to better knowledge of younger farmers with regard to using ICT tools and better
understanding of the transmitted information.
Another interesting finding is that proximity to grain markets did not provide any
more advantage in terms of predicting future prices as long as farmers have access
to ICT. The estimated coefficient of the interaction term of ICT and distance from
nearby grain markets was negative and statistically significant. In other words, the
beneficial impact of ICT on price forecasting is stronger for smallholders located
farther away from grain markets. Based on the estimated coefficients, the beneficial
impact of access to ICT on price forecasting accuracy outweighs the detrimental
impact of access to grain markets for farmers located as far as 15 km away
from grain markets. This is because the interaction term indicates that prediction
error increased by a factor of e0:03 D e0:040:01 D 1:03 for every kilometer
increase in distance to markets (an increase by this factor for every 15 km is
approximately equal to the decrease in prediction error because of ownership of
ICT). This suggests that ownership of information assets can serve as an alternative
way to gain access to market information for farmers residing far away from
grain markets but not for those located more than 15 km away. Ceteris paribus,
simultaneously providing access to ICT and halving the “effective” distance to
nearby grain markets, improved the prediction accuracy of farmers by as much as
45 % (100 ef0:45C.4:730:03/g  1/.
20.4.1 Robustness Checks
We estimated Eq. (20.7) using an OLS method on the IHS-transformed variables.
The results are reported in Tables 20.7 and 20.8 in Appendix. The OLS results were
largely consistent with the ML Poisson estimation results.15 The control variables
in our empirical model explained only a small but significant proportion of the vari-
ation in the farmers’ forecasting errors.16 Ethiopia is one of the countries in which
agricultural commodity prices have experienced significant variability in recent
years (Rashid 2011; Tadesse and Guttormsen 2011). High price volatility reduces
the accuracy of producers’ and consumers’ forecasts of crop prices (Binswanger
and Rosenzweig 1986), even though the impact is ambiguous in our theoretical
model. Given the stochasticity of output prices, a lucky farmer gets his expected
15Note that comparison of OLS and Poisson regression coefficients is inappropriate as they are
interpreted differently. One can calculate the average marginal effects,
X
i
@E

yi
ˇ
ˇ
ˇxi

@xij
D ybˇj, after
the GLM regression and compare them with the corresponding OLS coefficients.
16The coefficients of determination, computed as a square of the correlation coefficients of the
respective fitted and actual prediction error values, are comparable to the reported R-square in the
OLS regression results.
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price close to the actual value. Thus, the ‘luck factor’ could probably explain some
of the remaining variation of smallholders’ forecasting errors. There also appears
to be a widespread exchange of price and other information among households,
thereby suggesting that the private information of a farmer who has the most timely
and relevant information could be open to the public domain.
As a further robustness check, we employed a maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE) technique with normal distribution to simultaneously estimate the mean
price and its heteroskedastic variance term. In the mean equation, the realized
price was estimated using the (farmer-reported) expected price.17 The residual
"i 	 N

0; 2i

is the difference between expected and realized price. The variance
of the residual is household-specific and normally distributed; it measures the
forecasting error of the household. In the variance equation, the log variance was
estimated conditional on the same set of explanatory variables X as before. Hence,
the maximum likelihood regression reads:
pic;tC1 D ˛ C ˇpeic;t C "i; (20.8a)
ln i D ac C X0: (20.8b)
The maximum likelihood estimation results are reported in Table 20.6. We first
observed that farmers have unbiased price expectations (at least in the year of our
survey) as ˛ was not statistically different from zero. Furthermore, the results for
the variance regression were mostly consistent with both the QML Poisson and
OLS estimation results.
20.5 Conclusions
A time lag between production decisions and output realization is intrinsic in
agriculture; therefore, price expectations play a crucial role in the production,
marketing, and agricultural technology adoption decisions of a farmer. The literature
widely explores the effect of access to information—in particular access to market
information systems, and to information and communication technologies—on a
variety of economic variables, at both a macro and a micro level. The current study
complements the existing literature by investigating the role of access to information
on the precision of smallholders’ price expectations. Producers invest money and
time in searching for price and other information, which they believe would improve
their price expectations. This process is costly for an individual farmer. The cost of
information is therefore crucial for farmers in deciding on their level of investment
17This approach relies on empirical tests for unbiased or rational expectations, as typically used
for assessing efficiency on commodity markets. See, e.g., Algieri and Kalkuhl (2014). Rational
expectations are usually tested against ˛ ¤ 0 and ˇ ¤ 1.
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Table 20.6 Factors that affect price prediction accuracy of smallholders, MLE
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Equation 1: Observed market price (ln) is the dependent variable
Farmer expected price (ln) 1.0076***
(0.0009)
Constant 0.0048
(0.0039)
Equation 2: Ln (sigma) serves as a proxy for the natural log of prediction error
Male head 0.0649* 0.0560* 0.0563* 0.0712**
(0.0338) (0.0335) (0.0335) (0.0343)
Age of head 0.0024** 0.0023** 0.0022** 0.0034*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0019)
ICT  age 0.0011
(0.0022)
Family size 0.0073 0.0118* 0.0126* 0.0107
(0.0071) (0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0072)
Head’s years of schooling 0.0055 0.0051 0.0056 0.0045
(0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0057)
ICTa 0.0882** 0.0664** 0.0265 0.0946**
(0.0432) (0.0302) (0.0442) (0.0409)
ICT  InfoSource 0.0198 0.1682
(0.0343) (0.1842)
Past average crop yield 0.0227 0.0230 0.0234 0.0281
(0.0324) (0.0321) (0.0324) (0.0384)
Share of farm income 0.0653 0.0402 0.0207 0.0713
(0.2000) (0.1004) (0.1002) (0.1126)
Market share 0.0591 0.1112 0.1129 0.0882
(0.1069) (0.1055) (0.1052) (0.1099)
Per capita livestock value 0.0120** 0.0140** 0.0135** 0.0154**
(0.0061) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0062)
Per capita farm size 0.0326 0.0129 0.0115 0.0296
(0.0644) (0.0624) (0.0626) (0.0658)
Dist. to grain market 0.0080* 0.0084* 0.0087* 0.0336***
(0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0125)
ICT  dist. to market 0.0277**
(0.0129)
Dist. to extension agents’ office 0.0075 0.0047 0.0067 0.008
(0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0065)
Discount rate 0.0304 0.0222 0.0243 0.0246
(0.0187) (0.0170) (0.0171) (0.0174)
No. of crops 0.2656*** 0.2668*** 0.2603*** 0.2670***
(0.0159) (0.0161) (0.0157) (0.0159)
(continued)
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Table 20.6 (continued)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 2.3036*** 2.2150*** 2.2116*** 2.8668***
(0.3390) (0.2726) (0.2747) (0.3285)
District dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald chi2 test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 2394 2400 2400 2394
Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance a 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively
aAccess to ICT is measured as ownership of either a phone, radio, or TV in (1 & 4), only a phone
in (2), only a radio in (3)
in information acquisition. In this study, we employed access to ICT and distance
to markets as measures of costs of acquiring information. The theoretical model,
which has been explained in Sect. 20.2, unambiguously showed that the level of
farmer’s investment in acquiring information is negatively influenced by the costs
of accessing information.
Using a primary survey dataset that elicits smallholders’ price expectations for
the next harvesting period, we empirically evaluated the impact of access to ICT
and grain markets and other variables of interest on smallholders’ price prediction
accuracy. The findings suggest that farmers who have access to ICT and who
reside closer to grain markets have smaller forecasting error margins, supporting
the implications of the theoretical model. This calls for improving the information
and physical infrastructure in rural areas of the country in order to reduce costs
of obtaining information. The beneficial effect of access to ICT was larger for
households that reside farther away from grain markets and for those headed by
relatively younger farmers. From a policy perspective, these differential impacts are
compelling as younger farmers and farmers living farther away from grain markets
are among the households that hold larger potential for increasing agricultural
productivity in the country. This is because farm plots that are located very close
to markets are highly degraded, and older farmers are less willing to adopt new
technologies.
In agreement with the theoretical model, the empirical findings showed that
farmers with higher discount rates were more likely to have larger forecasting errors.
This has implications for assisting farmers in reducing future price and income
uncertainties, and for enhancing their risk-management strategies. There are some
institutions such as the Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise (EGTE), the Ethiopian
Commodity Exchange (ECX), and the Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA)
that could potentially improve smallholders’ access to market information in the
country. These institutions may assist farmers in providing and disseminating
reliable and timely central wholesale prices.
Access to extension agents did not have any statistically significant contribution
to improving price prediction accuracy of farmers in our sample. Extension agents
in Ethiopia serve more as a source of credit and inputs rather than a source of
information on optimal input use and market information (Spielman et al. 2012).
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Extension service, with agents who have valuable market information and better
knowledge of how to use inputs than rural farmers, is important for improving
the production decision of smallholders. However, past research has shown that
Ethiopian extension agents have little practical experience and poor communication
skills (Belay and Abebaw 2004). This could explain why farmers may not trust
extension agents and hence do not adopt their advice. Because the Ethiopian
government is expanding the extension service program throughout the country, it is
important to consider disseminating reliable price and market information through
extension services in the country to farmers with limited access to such information.
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Appendix. OLS Estimation Results
Table 20.7 Factors that affect price prediction accuracy of smallholders
Dependent variable: relative mean/index price prediction error
Variables AMPPE AIPPE RMPPE RIPPE
Male head 0.1121** 0.1590** 0.0059 0.0186***
(0.0551) (0.0622) (0.0037) (0.0043)
Age of head 0.0009 0.0039* 0.0001 0.0004**
(0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Family size 0.0068 0.0029 0.0020*** 0.0009
(0.005) (0.008) (0.0006) (0.0008)
Head’s years of schooling 0.004 0.0168*** 0.0012*** 0.0004
(0.0085) (0.0060) (0.0004) (0.0006)
ICT 0.0682*** 0.0435 0.0102** 0.0182***
(0.0245) (0.1080) (0.0043) (0.0068)
ICT  InfoSource 0.0474 0.0176 0.0028 0.0123
(0.0757) (0.1569) (0.0097) (0.0092)
Past average crop yield 0.1102* 0.0194 0.0003 0.0085
(0.0613) (0.1254) (0.0064) (0.0089)
Share of farm income 0.1538 0.0625 0.0085 0.0092
(0.2139) (0.2765) (0.0275) (0.0298)
Market share 0.1091 0.0273 0.0308*** 0.0328
(0.1015) (0.1788) (0.0116) (0.0315)
(continued)
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Table 20.7 (continued)
Dependent variable: relative mean/index price prediction error
Variables AMPPE AIPPE RMPPE RIPPE
Per capita livestock value 0.0132*** 0.0079 0.0031*** 0.0026***
(0.0051) (0.0097) (0.001) (0.0007)
Per capita farm size 0.0044 0.0264 0.0001 0.0009
(0.1041) (0.1234) (0.0245) (0.0254)
Dist. to grain market 0.0158** 0.0261** 0.0005 0.0054***
(0.0076) (0.0130) (0.0006) (0.0012)
Dist. to extension agents’ office 0.0111 0.0268 0.0008 0.0039
(0.0151) (0.0432) (0.0022) (0.0033)
Discount rate 0.1011*** 0.0376*** 0.0072*** 0.0031***
(0.0184) (0.0109) (0.0014) (0.0010)
No. of crops 0.1169** 0.1324** 0.0208*** 0.0169***
(0.0484) (0.0520) (0.0057) (0.0060)
Constant 6.1571*** 4.2603*** 0.1646*** 0.3296***
(0.4752) (1.1827) (0.0623) (0.0925)
District dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald chi2 test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Root MSE 0.912 0.913 0.095 0.111
Adjusted R-square 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.20
N 400 400 400 400
Notes: Standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered in seven kebeles (villages)
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively. Note that
since the dependent variable is either IHS-transformed (APPME & AIPPE) or expressed as a ratio
(RMPPE & RIPPE), the coefficients can be considered as economically relevant
Table 20.8 Differential impacts of access to ICT on price prediction
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Male head 0.0186*** 0.0164** 0.0169*** 0.0171**
(0.0043) (0.0070) (0.0062) (0.0087)
Age of head 0.0004** 0.0004*** 0.0004** 0.0017***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
ICT  age 0.0016***
(0.0002)
Family size 0.0009 0.0005 0.0004 0.0008
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0014)
Head’s years of schooling 0.0004 0.0006 0.0005 0.0000
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0005)
ICTa 0.0182*** 0.0082* 0.0047 0.0851***
(0.0068) (0.0045) (0.0050) (0.0233)
(continued)
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Table 20.8 (continued)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Past average crop yield 0.0085 0.0092 0.0086 0.0070
(0.0089) (0.0106) (0.0080) (0.0105)
Share of farm income 0.0092 0.0263 0.0241 0.0046
(0.0298) (0.0284) (0.0205) (0.0284)
Market share 0.0328 0.0326 0.0324 0.0332
(0.0315) (0.0285) (0.0270) (0.0212)
Per capita livestock value 0.0026*** 0.0026*** 0.0025*** 0.0028***
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0009)
Per capita farm size 0.0009 0.0022 0.0019 0.0012
(0.0254) (0.0259) (0.0155) (0.0249)
Dist. to grain market 0.0054*** 0.0054*** 0.0054*** 0.0075***
(0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0015)
ICT  dist. to market 0.0026**
(0.0013)
Dist. to extension agents’ office 0.0039 0.0033* 0.0035** 0.0042**
(0.0033) (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0021)
Discount rate 0.0031*** 0.0029*** 0.0029** 0.0031***
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0010)
No. of crops 0.0169*** 0.0174*** 0.0179*** 0.0156**
(0.0060) (0.0048) (0.0061) (0.0061)
Constant 0.3296*** 0.3473*** 0.3419*** 0.3666***
(0.0925) (0.0926) (0.0784) (0.1150
District dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald chi2 test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Root MSE 0.111 0.111 0.111 0.111
Adjusted R-square 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.21
N 400 400 400 400
Notes: Standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered in seven kebeles (villages)
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively
aAccess to ICT is measured as the ownership of either a phone, radio, or TV in (1 and 4), only a
phone in (2), only a radio in (3)
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21Coping with Food Price Shocksin Afghanistan
Anna D’Souza and Dean Jolliffe
21.1 Introduction
Elevated global food prices have eroded the purchasing power of households
throughout the developing world, many of whom spend the majority of their income
on food. Given the potential implications for poverty, health and nutrition, and the
outbreak of food riots, the short- and long-term impacts of high food prices are of
much concern to governments, nongovernmental organizations, and aid agencies.
During the 2007/2008 food price crisis, many households were pushed into or kept
in poverty (World Bank & International Monetary Fund 2012) and were forced
to reduce the quantity and quality of food they consumed (International Fund for
Agricultural Development 2008; Sanogo 2009). Field observations by the World
Food Programme found that households also used nonfood coping strategies, such
as migrating, selling assets, taking children out of school, begging, and selling land
(Ruel et al. 2010).
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Much of the literature has emphasized the impact of food price increases on
poverty rates. A smaller set of literature has examined the impact on nutrition-
related outcomes, such as undernourishment rates, calorie levels, and dietary
diversity. Until now, little has been done to look at the implications of high food
prices or food price increases on nonfood outcomes, such as nonfood expenditure
or school enrollment. For the most vulnerable populations, living at or near
subsistence levels, reducing the quality and quantity of food consumed, or cutting
back on human capital investment (e.g., health and education expenditure) can have
both immediate (e.g., wasting, increased illness) and long-lasting (e.g., stunting,
intergenerational transmission of poverty) implications. More specifically, even
short stints of poor nutrition can be detrimental to those with high nutritional needs
like children, lactating and pregnant women, and the elderly (UNICEF 2009); and
pulling children out of school could lead to long-term reductions in human capital
accumulation since children are less likely to return to school after beginning to
work (Guarcello et al. 2010).
In this chapter, we present evidence on household coping strategies from a
nationally representative household survey collected in Afghanistan before and
during the 2007/2008 food price crisis. These unique data come from the 2007/2008
National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) and cover over 20,000 house-
holds. During this period, due to a confluence of domestic (drought), regional
(export bans), and international (food price crisis) factors, the price of wheat
flour (the dietary staple) doubled. This represented a serious shock to Afghan
households, who spend about 60 % of their budget on food and who derive over
half their calorie intake from wheat. We look at how Afghan households adjusted
their expenditure patterns on food and nonfood items. We look at changes in
various dimensions of food security, including calorie, dietary diversity, and nutrient
intake. The last two indicators reflect the quality of food consumed and are related
to “hidden hunger,” a term that refers to micronutrient deficiencies which have
serious implications for long-term human capital formation. And we look at the
purchase of food on credit, the sale of productive assets, school enrollment, and
migration.
We found strong evidence that the wheat flour price increases affected the
well-being of Afghan households, who reduced both their food and nonfood
expenditures. The reductions in the value of food consumed were reflected in
reductions in the quantity and quality of food consumed, including reduced nutrient
intake. Households reduced their nonfood expenditures across several categories,
including health, clothing, grooming, communication, transportation, cigarettes and
tobacco, and culture. And households purchased food on credit more frequently. We
failed to find changes in educational expenditure or school enrollment, the sale of
productive assets, or migration.
Since much of food security policy is concerned with those living at or below
subsistence levels, it is important to allow for the possibility that the behavioral
responses of vulnerable households differ from other households in ways that are
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policy relevant. Therefore, the food security analysis allows for differential price
effects based on a household’s food security level. We used the UQR estimator,
proposed by Firpo et al. (2009b), to identify price effects for households located at
specific points on the unconditional distributions (such as the 20th or 80th quantiles)
of the food security indicators.
The evidence indicated that Afghan households, across the distribution,
experienced a decline in the quantity and quality of food consumed as a result of the
2008 wheat flour price increases. We found disparities in the behavioral responses
of households with respect to where the household lies on the unconditional
distribution of the particular food security measure of interest. Households at the
top of the calorie distribution, who can afford to cut back, experienced the largest
declines in per capita daily caloric intake. The most vulnerable households—that
is, those at the bottom of the calorie distribution—cannot afford to make substantial
cuts to their caloric intake since they are close to or below the minimum daily
energy requirements; accordingly, we found no statistically significant decline in
their caloric intake.
Households at the bottom of the dietary diversity distribution—often very poor
households—experienced very large declines in dietary diversity as a result of the
wheat flour price increases (although even households at the top of the distribution
experienced substantial declines). The bottom households are likely unable to make
major cuts to caloric intake and thus must adjust the compositions of their diet
to maintain energy levels. Such declines can exacerbate already high levels of
malnutrition in Afghanistan.
This chapter is an extended version of the study by D’Souza and Jolliffe (2014). It
provides an additional analysis of nonfood-based coping responses (i.e., adjustments
to nonfood expenditures and behaviors). For completeness, we included the main
results from D’Souza and Jolliffe (2014), which examined food-based household
coping responses. Our work contributes to the understanding of how the people of
Afghanistan were affected by and how they coped with staple food price shocks,
providing a rare insight into the short-term coping mechanisms in a poor, conflict
country. Such analysis is particularly crucial in conflict countries, which may be
most susceptible to shocks but for which usually very little quantitative data are
available.
In the next section, we provide details on Afghanistan during the study period.
We then discuss the evidence regarding food-based and nonfood-based household
coping responses. Thereafter, we describe the household data, the variables of
interest, and our sample. We then present the empirical specifications and estimation
techniques. We next discuss the results and conclude the chapter in the final section
with a discussion of the major implications.
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21.2 Background: Afghanistan Circa 2007/2008
After decades of external and internal conflicts,1 along with prolonged droughts, the
landlocked Afghanistan has one of the poorest, least well-nourished populations in
the world. Despite strong growth, with real GDP growth averaging approximately
10.8 % per year between 2003 and 2009, nearly 30 % of the Afghan population did
not meet the minimum daily food requirements of 2100 kilocalories per person in
2008 (MoE Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the World Bank Economic Policy
and Poverty Sector 2010). The IMF (2009) estimated that the gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita in Afghanistan was $350 in 2007 and $457 in 2008 (current
US$).2 Based on a broader set of development indicators used in the UNDP Human
Development Index (e.g., health, education, living standards), Afghanistan ranked
181 out of 182 countries in 2008 (UNDP 2009). Approximately 60 % of children
under five suffered from chronic malnutrition (stunting), and 8 % suffered from
acute malnutrition (wasting) (Johnecheck and Holland 2007).
The Afghan economy is largely based on agriculture; major crops include wheat,
rice, maize, barley, vegetables, fruits, and nuts. Approximately 70 % of cultivated
crop area is devoted to wheat, and about 15 % is devoted to rice, barley, and maize
(Chabot and Dorosh 2007). Wheat is both a major production crop and the main
staple of the Afghan diet, contributing to 54 % of the total caloric intake. Due
to violence and large fluctuations in weather, however, wheat production is highly
volatile, and the country is dependent on its trading partners to meet any shortfalls.
Pakistan is Afghanistan’s major supplier of wheat (mostly in the form of flour) due
to close historical ties and a shared 1600 km border; Pakistan’s share of the Afghan
wheat and wheat flour import market is estimated to range from 59 % (Chabot and
Dorosh 2007) to 79 % (Maletta 2004).
Levels of food insecurity vary greatly across the country, which is not surprising
given Afghanistan’s diverse terrain, climate, and agricultural zones. Seasonality
plays an important role in food security in Afghanistan. Temperatures can vary
dramatically across seasons, with hot summers and frigid winters, and the climate in
the highlands varies with elevation. In many cases, severe winter conditions affect
transportation, and in high mountainous areas, roads are often blocked throughout
the winter due to heavy snow accumulation.
According to the World Food Programme, Afghanistan is among the world’s
most vulnerable countries in terms of absorbing food and fuel price shocks; such
1Afghanistan has a long history of conflict involving both intra- and interstate groups; for an
overview of the conflict over the past 30 years, see Giustozzi and Ibrahimi (2012). In this chapter,
we do not distinguish between different actors; rather we define conflict based on incidents of
violence in which there are fatalities and/or casualties; more details are provided in the data section.
2In a country like Afghanistan though, where the drug economy is large, the official National
Income Accounting data are likely to significantly understate GDP. UNODC (2008) estimates that
in 2007 the farm gate value of opium cultivation was US$1 billion, but this dropped to US$730
million in 2008. The potential export value in 2007 of opium, morphine, and heroin at border prices
in neighboring countries was $4 billion (or, in per capita terms, about $160).
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countries have consistently high levels of food insecurity, are heavily dependent
on food and fuel imports, and have large populations of poor people who spend
significant shares of their income on food (Sanogo 2009). Also, mountainous terrain
and poor infrastructure, coupled with weak governance, insecurity, and corruption,
have limited the government’s ability to manage its food distribution and supply
networks.
International prices of food commodities increased substantially in 2007
and rapidly in early 2008, peaking around May–July 2008. During this period,
Afghanistan experienced several shocks that led to a disruption of its food supply
network, causing prices to soar throughout the country. Due to drought and early
snow melt, the 2008 wheat harvest of 1.5 million metric tons was the worst since
2000 (Persaud 2010). The price impact of the large shortfall in wheat production
was magnified by export bans in Pakistan and rising international food prices. In
February 2008, the Afghan government eliminated import tariffs on wheat and
wheat flour (tariffs had been set at 2.5 %), but due to export bans in Pakistan, Iran,
and Kazakhstan, the action brought about little downward effect on prices. Between
fall 2007 and summer 2008, the prices of domestic wheat flour increased by over
100 %; Figure 21.1 displays retail wheat flour prices from 2002 to 2013 for four
major urban centers collected by the FAO Global Information and Early Warning
System (GIEWS).
In 2007/2008, total inflation was largely driven by the surge in food prices;
Figure 21.2 depicts the consumer price indices (CPI) for food and nonfood
items in urban areas from 2005 to 2011.3 During the survey time frame
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Fig. 21.1 Retail wheat flour prices, 2002–2013. Source: FAO GIEWS (2014)
3The indices were constructed by the Afghan Central Statistics Organization and are based on data
from six urban areas.
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Fig. 21.2 Consumer price indices, 2005–2011
(August 2007–September 2008), the urban food CPI increased by nearly 60 %,
while the nonfood CPI increased by only 10 %. Our calculations using price data
collected in the NRVA also indicated a 60 % increase in food prices in urban areas
during this period, with an overall increase of 40 % at the national level.
21.3 Household Coping Strategies
In response to price shocks or, more generally, negative shocks (e.g., income shocks,
drought or natural disaster, death of main income earner), households employ a
variety of coping strategies or responses. They may rely on family assistance, sell
off assets, work more, borrow money, or—in the most desperate cases—reduce
intake of food and nutrients. Such responses can be characterized as nonfood
based or food based, and families can employ one or both of them (FAO 2008).
Increases in food prices represent a decline in purchasing power for households.4
Nonfood-based coping strategies to deal with the reduced purchasing power include
increasing time spent working for adults (and, in some cases, children); reducing
expenditure on health, education, and other nonfood items; and changing household
composition (e.g., migrating or sending children to live with relatives). In some
instances, households remove children from school to save on school fees and to
use the children as labor (at home, on the farm, or in the marketplace). Food-
based coping strategies include changing the type and quantity of food a household
consumes and the people who consume the food in a household. Households may
4Below we discuss the potential income effect of increasing food prices for households that are net
sellers of food.
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reduce the quantity (e.g., smaller meals, less frequently), quality, and diversity of
foods consumed by moving toward cheaper food groups and cheaper foods within
food groups.
Some of these strategies are reversible; for example, if prices decline, households
can go back to purchasing higher-quality food. But other strategies are irreversible;
for instance, after selling off productive assets, households may not be able to
repurchase them even when food prices decline (Hadley et al. 2012). Furthermore,
some of these responses can have long-term consequences for health and human
capital development. For example, disinvesting in children (with respect to nutrition
and/or schooling) can perpetuate the intergenerational transmission of poverty.
Moreover, with over two billion people estimated to be suffering from mineral
and vitamin deficiencies worldwide (Micronutrient Initiative and UNICEF 2009),
further reductions in nutrition can have deleterious effects on households living
below or near subsistence levels.
In this section, we discuss the current literature on food-based and nonfood-
based coping responses to high food prices. (See Ruel et al. (2010) for a more
detailed review of the literature on the effects of economic crises on well-being,
and see Compton et al. (2010) for a thorough review of the literature on the
impacts of the 2007/2008 food price crisis.) Most recent studies on high food prices
examined the implications for poverty rates rather than specific household coping
responses. The studies often relied on data collected during periods of relatively
stable prices and used the limited variation in prices to estimate price elasticities.
Then these studies used simulation models to estimate the short-run effects of
larger price shocks on measures of household welfare, primarily poverty rates, with
many studies focusing on differences between outcomes for rural and urban areas.
Examples of such studies include Wodon et al. (2008), who examined 12 African
countries; Ivanic and Martin (2008), who examined nine low-income countries; Ul
Haq et al. (2008), who examined Pakistan; Simler (2010), who examined Uganda;
Robles and Torero (2010), who examined four Latin American countries; and De
Hoyos and Medvedev (2011), who examined 73 low- and middle-income countries.
In those studies, the magnitude of the impact of the crisis varied greatly among
households and countries, and it depended on several factors, including the degree
of price transmission, dependence on food imports, whether staple foods are traded
internationally, whether the household is a net buyer or a net seller of food, and
the household’s reliance on staples. But the general finding was similar: national
poverty rates increased, with urban areas on average suffering larger increases.
With this chapter, we are contributing to a smaller set of literature that examines
the impact of recent high food prices on nutrition-related outcomes. Using data
from eight developing countries, Anríquez et al. (2013) simulated the effects of
staple food price increases on household undernourishment (defined as falling below
daily calorie thresholds) for the average household, for urban and rural households,
and by expenditure decile. The study showed that mean calorie levels generally
declined with increasing staple food prices; however, countries varied in terms of
the people who were the most negatively affected (e.g., poorest or middle quintiles,
rural or urban populations) and in terms of the household-level determinants of the
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nutritional responses. Tiwari and Zaman (2010) also found that undernourishment
rates increased across all major developing country regions assuming minimal levels
of price transmission from international to domestic markets. Brinkman et al. (2010)
looked at the impact of high food prices (and the global financial crisis) on food
consumption, nutrition, and health outcomes for specific developing countries as
well as several developing regions. Bibi et al. (2009) found that food poverty and
undernourishment increased among children in Mali. In a study of rural Bangladesh,
Torlesse et al. (2003) found that as rice prices fell, households reduced rice
expenditure and increased non-rice food expenditure, thereby improving the quality
of their diets. Klotz et al. (2008) provided a more nuanced view that households
are likely to reduce the quality of food consumed before reducing the quantity
of food consumed, and for this reason, individuals will experience micronutrient
deficiencies before weight loss.
We are also contributing to the literature (including qualitative and quantitative
studies) that examines nonfood-based coping responses (often in addition to food-
based ones) to increases in food prices. Compton et al. (2010) examined the
literature and summarized the variety of nonfood-based coping strategies, which
include reducing nonfood expenditure, pulling children out of school and increasing
child labor, planting more food crops, increasing labor, increasing migration, selling
nonproductive or productive assets, going into socially unacceptable livelihood
activities (such as begging), and receiving increased aid from the government or
nongovernmental organizations. Tandon and Landes (2014) found that in response
to food price increases, Indian households decreased dietary diversity and delayed
the purchases of health-related goods, clothing, and durable goods.
Sulaiman et al. (2009) showed that households in Bangladesh cut back on the
number and quality of meals when food prices increased; they also found that
households reduced expenditure on clothing, health, transportation, and cooking
fuel. Looking at households in Somalia, Holleman and Moloney (2009) found
reductions in nonfood expenditure (including money spent on medicine), increases
in financial assistance (e.g., remittance, cash gifts, loans, credit purchases), and a
drop in school enrollment. They also found that households switched to cheaper
foods, for example, from imported rice to locally produced sorghum. And finally,
Hadley et al. (2012) provided qualitative evidence from urban Ethiopia that
increases in food prices can have an impact on important cultural practices, such
as funerals, because households can no longer afford standard cultural practices at
their socioeconomic level.
In studies based on simulation models, it is largely impossible to identify
separately the extent to which the simulated estimates resulted from actual changes
in household well-being or from modeling assumptions. Most studies have focused
on the short run, assuming that (1) households and producers have no behavioral
responses to the price increases, (2) there are no changes in input prices or
wage rates, and (3) the proportional changes in consumer and producer prices are
equivalent. In a recent contribution, Minot and Dewina (2013) demonstrated the
sensitivity of poverty results to these standard assumptions.
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The need to simulate the welfare effects of a price increase is driven (partially) by
a lack of comparable data before and after the price increase. Our study represents
one of a handful of empirical analyses that have overcome the need to simulate
welfare effects by using nationally representative household data collected prior
to and during a significant price shock. Friedman et al. (2011) used nationally
representative data from Pakistan to estimate reductions in calorie availability due
to the 2008 food price spike and found an 8 % reduction between 2006 and the
first half of 2008. They also found that rural households with access to agricultural
land fared better than urban households. Examining the same price spike and using
nationally representative rural household data from Bangladesh, Balagtas et al.
(2012) found an increase in poverty rates and demonstrated that the determinants
of poverty change over time. And using nationally representative data from South
Africa, Jacobs (2010) found that household hunger levels increased as a result of
the food price and financial crises of 2007–2009. These studies employed various
other methodologies and focused on different household-level outcomes, but like the
present chapter, they were all able to observe (and estimate) behavioral responses to
large increases in food prices (given the available data) rather than through modeling
assumptions or simulations.
21.4 Data
Our primary data are from the NRVA 2007/2008, which was conducted by
Afghanistan’s Central Statistics Organization and Ministry of Rural Rehabilita-
tion and Development. The survey was administered between August 2007 and
September 2008 and covered over 20,500 households (over 150,000 individuals)
in 2572 communities in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan. The long time frame made
it possible to obtain seasonally representative estimates of household food security
and allowed for the coverage of conflict areas.
The sample was selected based on a stratified, multistage design. The survey
was stratified explicitly, geographically, and implicitly over time.5 The 11 provinces
with the most populous provincial centers were each stratified into urban and rural
areas. The remaining provinces were treated as separate rural strata, and the nomadic
Kuchi population was treated as a separate stratum. The stratification resulted in 46
domains or strata. In the first stage of selection, 2441 primary sampling units (PSU)
from urban- and rural-settled populations and 131 PSUs from Kuchi populations
were drawn. In the second and final stage, eight households were selected from
each PSU.
The implicit stratification over time was a key element of the survey design.
The population frame was sorted both spatially and temporally to ensure that
(with a systemic interval selection) the selected sample would be seasonally
5The population frame is based on a 2003–2005 national household listing.
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representative.6 Thus each quarterly sample of the NRVA survey is representative at
the national level. In a country where agriculture is an important form of livelihood,
seasonal variations in consumption patterns are to be expected; thus it is critical to
capture nationally representative measures of household food security throughout
the year. Appendix Table 21.10 displays key demographic, educational and health,
and infrastructure indicators across the four quarters. While we observed some
statistical differences in means across quarters, there is little evidence of systematic
differences in the samples based on these generally time-invariant characteristics.
Another key feature of the survey was the yearlong fieldwork, which allowed for
coverage of conflict-affected areas. The enumerators informally secured permission
from local leaders in conflict areas, and when a primary sampling unit (PSU)
was considered too dangerous to interview at the scheduled time, it would be
reconsidered at a later date within the quarter, instead of being replaced immediately.
This flexible design helped to ensure a low replacement rate. While the majority of
replacements were due to security issues, only 68 PSUs were replaced from the
planned 2441 PSUs in the sample design (less than 3 % replacement rate).7 It is
often difficult to obtain reliable data from conflict areas; thus the current analysis
provides a rare insight into the relationship between food insecurity and conflict.
The household survey module includes 20 sections—6 administered by female
interviewers to female household members and 14 administered by male interview-
ers to the male household head. The enumerators traveled in teams of two (one male
and one female) since females are not able to travel by themselves in Afghanistan
and because it is important that interviews be conducted between individuals of the
same sex due to the strong cultural norms regarding separation between the sexes
outside the family. Households were asked questions about consumption, demogra-
phy, housing infrastructure and access, maternal and child health, education, income
sources, agriculture and livestock, migration and remittances, and assets and credit.
To collect data on nonfood expenditure, respondents (male and female, depend-
ing on the category) were asked about the amount of afghani spent on various items
or categories of items over the past month or year (depending on the category).
Below we describe how we constructed the nonfood expenditure measures; in the
caveats section, we discuss potential biases that could result from the various recall
periods.
The food consumption data include the frequency and quantity of consumption
of 91 food items over the previous week, including food bought on the market,
produced, or obtained through other methods like food aid or gifts. The NRVA’s
broad coverage of foods, including seasonal varieties, allows for better calculation
of caloric and nutrient intake than surveys which take fewer items into account.
Household consumption data do not typically account for food wastage, and thus
estimates of food intake may be larger than actual values. We assume that in a poor
country like Afghanistan, wastage is relatively small and therefore not a significant
6See Kish (1965, pp. 235–236) for a discussion of implicit stratification.
7Replacement PSUs were primarily selected from the nearest secure district.
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source of bias. Generally, in low-income countries like Afghanistan, much less
food is wasted at the consumer level than at early and middle stages of the food
supply chain (FAO 2011). A potentially more challenging concern is if wastage is
correlated with price volatility. If the amount of food wasted is negatively correlated
with food prices (as might be expected), then the coefficients of the price of wheat
flour in the regressions that examine food consumption and caloric intake will have
positive biases.8 However, we maintained the assumption that wastage is low and
any potential bias is small.
The price data were obtained from a district price survey, which included
prevailing prices of the food items included in the consumption section as well as
domestic and imported grains and fuel. The local price data were important for
obtaining accurate estimates of price effects in a mountainous country with poor
infrastructure, where transportation and transaction costs vary greatly.
Finally, we also used confidential geo-coded conflict data obtained from the
United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) that cover the survey
time frame from August 2007 to September 2008. The UNDSS collects information
on fatalities, injuries, and, in general, violent incidents. According to the official
UN definition, violent incidents include the following: abduction, air strike, armed
clash, arrest, assassination, finding a weapons’ cache, confrontation/dispute, crime,
demonstration, IED (improvised explosive device) detonation, finding an IED,
information, intimidation, mine/UXO (unexploded explosive ordnance) incident,
narcotic incident, standoff attack, suicide attack, and others. Over the survey year,
there were 506 violent incidents across the country, with 421 associated fatalities
and 322 associated injuries.
21.4.1 Measures of Nonfood-Based Coping Responses
Our main measures of nonfood-based coping responses were nonfood expenditures.
We constructed a measure of real per capita monthly nonfood expenditure, total
expenditure, and expenditure for eight major categories: health, education, clothing
(including shoes), grooming (including laundry fees), tobacco and cigarettes, trans-
portation, communication, and culture.9 We also constructed several complementary
measures: recent migration of household members, selling of livestock (which are
productive assets), enrollment of children in school (at the individual level), and a
categorical variable denoting the frequency with which households report buying
food on credit (1–4: never, sometimes, often, and always). We classified the last
8The sign of the bias is determined by the product of the correlation coefficients of (1) food waste
and wheat flour prices and (2) food waste and food expenditure or caloric intake. If both correlation
coefficients are negative, then their product, and thus the sign of the bias, is positive.
9The recall period for grooming, tobacco and cigarettes, and communication expenditures is the
past 30 days. The recall period for health, education, clothing, and culture expenditures is the past
12 months.
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measure as nonfood based because it relates to credit and debt rather than changes
in actual food consumption. Alternatively, one could classify this measure as a food-
based coping strategy. In this chapter, however, we adopted the FAO categorization,
in which food-based coping strategies correspond to changes in the quantity or
quality of food consumed (FAO 2008). To convert nominal values into real values,
we used the nonfood price index from the Consumer Price Index for Afghanistan.
The index accounts for temporal, but not spatial, differences in prices.
21.4.2 Measures of Food-Based Coping Responses
We constructed three main measures of household food-based coping responses
for use as dependent variables in the regression analysis: food consumption, per
capita daily caloric intake, and household dietary diversity. The first, real monthly
per capita food consumption is an informative measure of household well-being
and a core component of poverty indicators. It has been used as a measure of food
security in the literature as well; for an early example, see Green and Kirkpatrick
(1982). The second is a widely used measure of health and undernourishment. And
the third has been shown to be linked to the nutritional status of children and adults
(Arimond and Ruel 2004; Ruel 2003; Steyn et al. 2006) and has been lauded as
a cost-effective, quick, informative measure of food security (Headey and Ecker
2013; Tiwari et al. 2013). Although much of the economics literature has focused
on caloric intake as a nutritional measure and a measure of food security, there
is a growing recognition of the importance of dietary quality to short- and long-
term health, cognition, and productivity outcomes; therefore, we incorporated and
highlighted measures of dietary quality in our work.
The real value of food consumption (in afghani) is calculated by combining
quantity data from the consumption module with price data from a district price
survey. Food consumption data include food which was bought, produced, or
obtained through other methods, e.g., food aid and gifts. Weekly values were
multiplied by 4.2 to get monthly values. Prices were matched by month, item, and
district. Since not all food items were available in all district markets at all times of
the year, we imputed the missing elements to obtain a complete price matrix.10 We
calculated average prices for domestic and imported varieties separately to account
for differences in price and quality between domestic and imported wheat and
rice.11 The value of the expenditure on food away from home was included in the
10The imputation process filled in missing values using the first-feasible methodology according to
the following order: (1) median of the 20 nearest neighboring districts of that month, (2) province
median of that month, (3) national median of that month, (4) median price of 20 neighboring
districts of the quarter, (5) province median of that quarter, and (6) national median of that quarter.
11The survey includes questions about the percentages of imported wheat and rice consumed; these
percentages were used to calculate the total expenditure on these items.
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calculation of food consumption, but it was not included in the calculation of caloric
intake since quantity data on such food were not collected.
We adjusted the food consumption estimates to take into account spatial and
temporal variation in prices in order to identify correctly those households that fall
below the food poverty threshold (described below) and, in the regression analysis,
to estimate the impact of the price increases on real values. We used a Laspeyres
price index estimated by quarter for each region. The food price index was based on
a reference bundle of goods consumed by relatively poor households; the reference
bundle was constructed to reflect regional diversity in consumption patterns. There
are eight regions in Afghanistan, as defined in Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and
World Bank (2011). Real food consumption is relative to the chosen base: urban
areas in the Central Region in quarter 1; the capital, Kabul, is located in the Central
Region.
We used the FAO Food Composition Tables for the Near East to convert daily
food quantities into kilocalories; we then divided the daily caloric intake by the
effective household size to get the per capita daily caloric intake.12 The effective
number of household members incorporates guests eating meals within the home
and decreases when household members do not regularly take meals at home.13 The
effective number of household members is greater than the household size for the
richer households and lower for the poorer households.
To measure household dietary diversity, we used the food consumption score
(FCS), which is developed by the World Food Programme (WFP) and used in
food security assessments throughout the world. It is a weighted sum of the
frequencies with which households consume foods within eight food groups over
the previous week.14 The food groups include grains, pulses, vegetables, fruit,
meat/fish, milk/dairy, sugar, and oil/fat. Higher scores denote a more varied diet
and are suggestive of a higher-quality diet with a potential for higher micronutrient
intake.
It is challenging to account for food consumption and expenditure on meals away
from home. The survey asked how many meals were eaten away from home by
household members over the past 7 days and the value of food and drinks consumed
outside the home over the past 30 days; however, there was no information on
12Spices, water, and “other” foods do not contribute to total calories. USDA sources were used for
a few items that were not available in the FAO tables.
13Some studies use household size to calculate per capita amounts, but the prevalent custom of
sharing meals in Afghanistan makes it important to account for guests eating meals from the
household cooking pot. We do not use equivalency scales to account for differences in consumption
of adults and children when calculating measures of well-being but rather opt to include variables
for household composition directly into the regression model to control for such differences.
14Weights for the food groups range from 0.5 to 4 based on nutrient density. Condiments receive
zero nutritional weight. Frequencies are truncated at 7 for each food group. The measure ranges
from 0 to 112.
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what food is consumed outside the household.15 Therefore, we did not include
any calories from food eaten away from home in the caloric intake calculation, and
food consumed away from home also did not impact the food consumption score.
These measures may not accurately capture all food consumed by members of the
household. Without detailed food diaries however, it is difficult to obtain sufficient
information. Note that food away from home constituted about 2 % of total food
expenditure on average; it accounts for less than half a percent for the poorest 20 %
of the population and about 4 % for the richest 20 % of the population.
21.4.3 Summary Statistics
The effective sample size of our analysis was 20,483 households.16 Table 21.1
displays the population means of key household characteristics for the full sample
over the survey year. On average, households had 8.6 members living in about
3.6 rooms (or tents for the Kuchi population). A typical household consisted of
2.1 men, 2 females, and 4.5 children (under 16). The head of a household was on
average about 45 years old; nearly all were married, and most of them were illiterate.
Approximately 80 % of the households resided in rural areas. Very few households
reported having members who migrated or reported selling livestock recently (over
past year). Finally, about 16 % of the households reported that they were often or
always purchasing food on credit; the remainder of the households reported that they
had never (27 %) or sometimes (57 %) purchased food on credit. Approximately
59 % of the households reported borrowing money over the prior year; and
70 % of those households reported that the money was used mainly to purchase
food.
Table 21.2 displays the population means for the total nonfood and the total food
expenditure as well as caloric intake and dietary diversity by quarter and for the
survey year. The raw data revealed the instability of household food security in
Afghanistan; we observed large declines in food expenditure, caloric intake, and
dietary diversity, with the worst levels observed in quarters three and four. Changes
in nonfood expenditures were less stark, although the nonfood expenditures on
many categories declined over the survey year. Overall, these patterns lend support
to the evidence that the poverty rate had increased, as reported by the Government of
15We use the questions on meals eaten outside the home and the value of food and drinks consumed
to calculate average expenditure on food away from home for each household, which is included
in the total value of food consumption.
16The household response rate was 99.8 %, and the PSU replacement rate was 3 %. Thirty-two
households were dropped due to missing female questionnaires; all of these households were
located in four communities, suggesting a relatively small systematic error in field operations.
Fifty-two households were dropped due to missing consumption data, and seven households were
dropped due to missing asset data. Information on household size was missing for one household,
and therefore, the household was dropped because per capita measures of consumption and food
security could not be calculated.
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Table 21.1 Household characteristics
Age of household head 44.87
Number of males 2.09
Number of females 2.01
Number of children under 16 years 4.51
Share of households with married head 0.95
Share of households with literate head 0.32
Share of agricultural households 0.57
Share of households in rural areas 0.80
Share of households in plain areas 0.74
Share of households in plateau areas 0.22
Share of households in mountainous areas 0.39
Share of households with recent migrant 0.08
Share of children between 8 and 16 years in school 0.95
Share of households purchasing food on credit often or always 0.16
Share of households that sold live livestock recently 0.03
Total observations 20,483
Source: NRVA 2007/2008. Note: Estimated population-weighted means. Share of children in
school is derived from individual child-level data set with 35,893 observations
Table 21.2 Population statistics by quarter and over survey year
Real per capita monthly expenditure
(afghani)
Quarter 1
(fall)
Quarter 2
(winter)
Quarter 3
(spring)
Quarter 4
(summer)
Survey
year
Total 2022.00 1718.78 1519.39 1477.69 1672.31
Food 1201.19 961.47 789.45 797.60 928.65
Nonfood 586.91 549.62 496.20 462.06 521.01
Health 80.70 74.38 77.32 81.41 78.44
Education 7.38 5.56 5.18 5.27 5.80
Clothing 98.17 90.19 89.11 90.85 91.90
Grooming 77.81 60.11 49.86 54.15 59.97
Tobacco and cigarettes 9.49 8.25 8.09 8.22 8.48
Transportation 94.59 79.92 79.48 81.86 83.63
Communication 28.67 26.09 23.60 23.49 25.35
Culture 109.86 96.04 91.27 91.47 96.73
Daily per capita caloric intake 2885 2725 2446 2387 2601
Food consumption score 68 61 58 58 61
Source: NRVA 2007/2008. Note: Population-weighted means. Real values reflect adjustments for
spatial and temporal price differences, covering 13 months of field work. Food expenditure includes
the value of home production, gifts, and food aid; see text for details
Afghanistan; the official poverty rate increased from 23.1 % in fall 2007 to 46 % in
summer 2008 (MoE Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the World Bank Economic
Policy and Poverty Sector 2010).
To further explore how the food security status of the most vulnerable households
was affected by the wheat flour price increases, we controlled for heterogeneous
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Table 21.3 Population statistics across the distribution and across the survey year
Quantile 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th Mean
Full survey year
Real per capita monthly food
consumption 474 572 650 727 810 903 1026 1198 1514 929
Daily per capita caloric intake 1695 1937 2113 2279 2441 2629 2861 3166 3688 2601
Food consumption score 34 42 49 56 61 66 71 78 88 61
Quarter 1
Real per capita monthly food
consumption 552 685 818 937 1058 1201 1371 1585 2020 1201
Daily per capita caloric intake 1740 1992 2236 2452 2679 2938 3240 3628 4262 2885
Food consumption score 40 50 57 64 69 74 79 86 95 68
Quarter 2
Real per capita monthly food
consumption 492 600 684 771 855 954 1083 1264 1566 961
Daily per capita caloric intake 1764 2030 2234 2414 2589 2780 3022 3322 3835 2725
Food consumption score 34 41 47 55 60 66 72 80 92 61
Quarter 3
Real per capita monthly food
consumption 446 528 594 653 720 794 880 1004 1190 789
Daily per capita caloric intake 1663 1899 2062 2217 2351 2499 2678 2937 3311 2446
Food consumption score 32 40 47 53 58 63 69 75 83 58
Quarter 4
Real per capita monthly food
consumption 458 545 614 674 735 806 884 998 1195 798
Daily per capita caloric intake 1610 1873 2023 2144 2279 2426 2617 2861 3263 2387
Food consumption score 33 42 49 55 59 63 67 71 79 58
Source: NRVA 2007/2008. Note: Population-weighted estimates at each decile and at the mean,
for the survey year and by quarter
price effects on household food security based on a household’s level of food
security. In Table 21.3, we present the mean of real per capita monthly food
consumption, daily per capita caloric intake, and household dietary diversity at each
decile (for the survey year and by quarter).
Nearly 30 % of the Afghan households failed to meet the conventional nutritional
benchmark of 2100 calories per day, while those at the top of the calorie distribution
were well above the threshold. The mean per capita daily caloric intake was
approximately 2601.17 This estimate is in line with worldwide calorie estimates
obtained using macroeconomic data; between 2007 and 2009, the average daily
calories per capita were 2810 in the world, 2670 in developing countries, and 2380
17We assumed the figure has been slightly overestimated due to some food waste and telescoping.
For example, Deaton and Kozel (2005) noted that in the case of India, a 7-day food recall period
produces higher daily food estimates than a 30-day recall period.
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in South Asia (excluding Afghanistan and Bhutan) (FAO 2012).18 The estimate is
also in line with the estimates obtained using nationally representative household
data for the region; daily calories per capita was between 2392 and 2593 in Pakistan
during the period from 2005 to 2008 (Friedman et al. 2011), and this figure was
2536 in Nepal in 2010/2011 (National Planning Commission and Central Bureau of
Statistics 2013).
The mean food consumption score was 61, ranging from 34 at the bottom
decile to 88 at the top decile. The WFP uses 48 as a cutoff for an acceptable
diet in countries like Afghanistan where most households consume staples and
oil every day. Under this categorization, approximately 80 % of the population
in Afghanistan has acceptable diets, which is consistent with the food security
assessments conducted by the WFP on several other developing countries in recent
years. Based on their assessments, the percentages of households with acceptable
diets are as follows: Uganda, 78 % in 2013; Rwanda, 79 % in 2012; Malawi, 75 %
in 2010/2011; Cambodia, 81 % in 2008; and Pakistan, 82 % in 2008.19 Recent
work has suggested that the cutoff points of the FCS classifications may be too
low, for example, when compared with estimates of calorie deficiency (Weismann
et al. 2009).
Households at the top of all three distributions experienced the largest declines
in food security in percentage terms, while those households at the bottom of the
distributions experienced smaller declines in food security. It is important to note
that the most food-insecure households were consuming relatively poor diets, and
even small declines in quantity and quality of food consumed could have major
repercussions on the short- and even long-term nutrition of children in their early
development stages.
21.4.4 Price Data
Our analysis focused on the price of domestic wheat flour, the form of wheat most
commonly purchased by households. Most wheat is consumed in the form of naan, a
type of local unleavened bread that is prepared by households after purchasing either
refined wheat flour or whole grain wheat (Chabot and Dorosh 2007). Wheat and
other grains constituted 48 % of food expenditure and 70 % of calories consumed.
Table 21.4 displays the mean price of domestic wheat flour by quarter and over
the survey year; it also includes other important commodities that we used in the
18FAOSTAT provides estimates of dietary energy supply (in kilocalories per person per day),
averaged over 3 years and weighted by population. These estimates were calculated using
macroeconomic supply data and may be less reliable than estimates derived from household survey
data.
19Estimates were drawn from WFP reports, available at http://www.wfp.org/food-security/
assessment-bank.
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Table 21.4 Average prices by quarter and over the survey year
Quarter 1
(fall)
Quarter 2
(winter)
Quarter 3
(spring)
Quarter 4
(summer)
Survey
year
Price of domestic wheat flour 18:09 23:52 34:19 36:51 28:45
Price of vegetable oil 64:81 76:93 88:90 91:70 81:16
Price of domestic rice 33:93 33:99 46:16 55:29 42:77
Price of lamb 182:34 186:20 189:28 180:27 184:44
Price of milk 23:44 25:66 27:23 30:75 26:94
Price of kerosene 43:15 45:77 46:82 55:48 48:12
Source: NRVA 2007/2008. Note: Population-weighted means. Prices are in afghani per kilogram
or liter
regression analysis to control for simultaneous price increases.20 The NRVA price
data showed patterns which are similar to the FAO GIEWS data in Fig. 21.1, with
a marked increase in prices in quarter three of the survey. We chose milk, lamb,
rice, and vegetable oil because they (1) represent several key food groups and (2),
along with wheat flour, make up a large percentage of monthly household food
expenditure; for example, the relatively poor (20th to 50th quantile of the total
consumption distribution) spend 80 % of their food expenditure on these five food
items. We included kerosene because it is the most commonly used cooking fuel.
A major limitation of this analysis is that we could not disentangle the impacts
of the price increases due to three different sets of conditions: the 2007/2008
global food crisis, the 2008 poor harvest, and seasonal variations due to weather
and harvest quality. Therefore the results below identify the effect of overall
price changes on household food security. If food prices follow a cyclical pattern,
dropping in the months after harvest (September–October) and slowly increasing
throughout the year as stocks deplete, then we would expect that the price increases
were due to the global food crisis and compounded by the cyclical domestic
pattern. However, we do not believe that seasonality was a major driver of the price
increases. (Recall that Fig. 21.1 displays the retail prices of wheat flour in four
major urban centers from 2002 to 2013.) The 2008 price spike was larger than the
observed seasonal variation in prices by orders of magnitude. In fact, there is little
evidence that monthly prices fluctuate drastically throughout the harvest calendar.
Because of transportation costs, it is likelier that prices in remote areas experience
greater fluctuations. However, if seasonal wheat flour price patterns were indeed
very significant in Afghanistan, we would have observed them in these major urban
areas in the years prior to the 2008 spike, but we do not.
The ability to disentangle the causes of the price changes from each other
would presumably alter the approach to policy prescription. For example, if the
price changes are local rather than global, the policy response would be more
20Prices were aggregated to the stratum level in order to mitigate potential measurement error in
district-level prices. Strata are based on urban and rural designation within provinces.
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targeted, such as releasing grain from reserves to the affected area. If the price
changes are global, then the appropriate policy response may be more oriented
toward macroeconomic and trade policies. If the price changes are due to anticipated
seasonal variations, policies aimed at helping households to smooth consumption,
such as improved grain storage, might be desirable. Whereas if the price change is
due to a fully unanticipated price shock, which we believe to be largely the case, then
the policy response might be more oriented toward short-run safety net programs
that focus on nutrition.
21.5 Methodology
We estimated the following reduced-form model of the impact of the wheat flour
price increases on measures of household nonfood-based and food-based coping
responses:
ihs .resph/ Dˇ0 C ˇ1 log

price wheat flourapq
C  log pricesapq

C ˛HHh C ıDISTdq C  log

conflictqp
C˘p C "h
(21.1)
where h denotes household, a denotes area (urban or rural), d denotes district, p
denotes province, and q denotes quarter. resp represents one of the household coping
responses described above. Prices represent a vector of commodity prices, HH
represents a vector of household characteristics, DIST represents a vector of district-
level variables,˘ denotes province dummy variables, and " is an idiosyncratic error
term.
Instead of transforming the dependent variable by taking the logarithm (with or
without adding some arbitrary small value to the zero values), we used the inverse
hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation, which reduces the importance of extreme
observations (similar to taking logs) but has the additional benefit of being well
defined at zero values. The IHS transformation, first proposed by Johnson (1949),
was introduced to econometrics by Burbidge et al. (1988).21 It has been used as
an alternative to log transformations for the dependent variable (Burbidge et al.
1988; MacKinnon and Magee 1990) and for explanatory variables (Layton 2001)
with variables that can take on zero or negative values. Results can be interpreted in
percentage terms, as in log models.
In order to isolate the effect of changes in wheat flour prices, we controlled for
simultaneous price increases in other important commodities since (1) household
purchasing decisions are based on relative price movements, and (2) omitting such
21The IHS function is defined as sin h1 D log

x C x2 C 1 12

:
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variables could bias our coefficient of interest.22 The price vector includes the prices
of milk, lamb, rice (a potential substitute for wheat flour, though not commonly
consumed in Afghanistan), vegetable oil, and kerosene for reasons mentioned
above.
We included the following household characteristics: dummy for agricultural
households (households who report owning or operating agricultural land); log
values of durable assets, housing, and livestock; age of household head; dummy for
households in which heads are literate; dummy for households in which heads are
married; and, separately, the numbers of men, women, and children. We included
the agricultural household dummy because these households are able to produce
their own food and are thus less reliant on the market. Furthermore, some of these
households could benefit from increased wheat flour prices if they are net sellers of
wheat. We included the household composition variables to control for differences
in consumption requirements between children and adults and for economies of
scale in consumption.23
The asset values were intended to control for wealth effects and were assumed to
be quasi fixed in the short run. Poorer and richer households may have different
constraints on their abilities to cope with price increases. For example, richer
households have more assets to sell in order to smooth consumption. In a recent
contribution, Carter and Lybbert (2012) showed that poorer households are unable
to smooth total consumption as well as richer households when responding to
weather shocks.24 Additionally, richer households may have more food-based
coping strategies available since they usually consume a more diversified diet of
more expensive foods; they then have the option to move toward cheaper foods and
food groups as prices increase.
The value of durable goods was estimated based on a detailed inventory of
household assets; it accounted for depreciation and the opportunity cost of the funds
tied up in the good. The value of housing was estimated using a hedonic model based
on characteristics of the structure, as well as the location, to derive an imputed rental
value from this.25 All values are in real afghani.
22Given that food prices are often positively correlated with each other and negatively correlated
with some of the dependent variables, like food expenditure and caloric intake, omitting the other
food price variables would lead to a negative bias on the coefficient of the log of wheat flour price.
23An alternative approach to account for such differences employs equivalency scales that take into
account nutritional requirements based on age and, sometimes, gender when calculating per capita
measures. For an early example, see Buse and Salathe (1978).
24It is often assumed the poorer households smooth consumption in the face of shocks; however,
using a poverty trap model, Carter and Lybbert (2012) show that below a critical wealth level,
poorer households smooth (or protect) assets rather than consumption due to high marginal values
of assets and the potential of future-negative shocks.
25The estimated housing value is the log of imputed, monthly rental value based on a hedonic
model of the housing structure. The log value of assets is a self-assessed valuation based on a list
of 13 assets including items such as stoves, refrigerators, radios, sewing machines, and bicycles.
For details of the estimation, see Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Central Statistics Organization
(Islamic Republic of Afghanistan et al. 2011).
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At the district level, we included dummies for topography—plateau and moun-
tainous areas (plains areas make up the excluded category). Topographical char-
acteristics are related to both agricultural yields and access to markets and thus
can affect a household’s level of food security. At the province-quarter level, we
included a measure of conflict since the level of conflict can be correlated with food
prices, as well as household coping responses.26 We used the ratio of the number
of individuals killed or injured in each province during each survey quarter to the
province population (in tens of thousands) as our measure of conflict. Finally we
also included province dummy variables to control for observable and unobservable
time-invariant province-level factors, which could confound the results.
21.5.1 Model Estimation
We used two estimation techniques. For the nonfood-based coping responses, we
estimated the parameters above using ordinary least squares (OLS), a commonly
used estimator that provides the marginal effect for the mean household. For the
food-based coping responses, we estimated the model using both OLS and the
unconditional quantile regression (UQR) estimator proposed by Firpo, Fortin, and
Lemieux (2009b, hereafter referred to as FFL). The UQR estimator allows the
marginal effects to vary based on a household’s location on the unconditional
distribution of the dependent variable.27 From a policy perspective, we were
interested in heterogeneous price effects on vulnerable households (e.g., those at
the bottom of the calorie distribution); we were less interested in how the price
effects vary for those who spend a lot or a little on, for example, clothing, and thus
we limited the UQR analysis to the food-based coping responses.
For our OLS estimates, we used a standard Huber–White correction to estimate
the sampling variance, which allows for the correlation of the residuals within PSUs.
The standard errors are also corrected for stratification. For the UQR estimates, we
used a PSU-level bootstrap (1000 replications) that accounted for the correlation of
the residuals within the PSUs but did not account for the stratification.
26In D’Souza and Jolliffe (2013), we examined the relationship between food security and conflict
in Afghanistan. We found strong evidence of a negative relationship, as well as evidence that
households in provinces with more conflict experience muted declines in food security as a result
of wheat flour price increases. We posited that the latter result is because those households were
more disconnected from markets (and may have had better coping mechanisms).
27By construction, OLS estimates are constant over the entire distribution of the dependent variable
and thus cannot elucidate heterogeneous effects for subsets of households. Ex ante, we do not
know whether the UQR estimator will provide qualitatively different information than OLS. There
is some evidence that the conditional quantile regression estimator provides substantively different
estimates. For example, Koenker and Bassett (Koenker and Bassett 1982) show that in the presence
of a heteroskedastic error distribution, the quantile estimator will typically differ from the OLS
estimator.
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The UQR estimator was proposed in 2009 and is becoming a more commonly
used tool in policy analysis. The UQR estimator is based on influence functions,
which were introduced by Hampel et al. (1988) as a tool in robust estimation
techniques.28 Using notation (largely) defined by FFL, consider some distributional
statistics, (Fy), such as the median, inter-quantile range, or any quantile. The
influence function, IF(Y; , Fy), represents the influence of an individual observation
on the distributional statistic,  (Fy), where Y is the dependent variable. A key
innovation by FFL is that they added (Fy) to the influence function to center it.
This new function is called a recentered influence function (RIF). By design, the
expectation of the RIF is the value of the distributional statistic, or more formally,
E(RIF(Y; , Fy)) D  (Fy).29
FFL defined m (X) D E(RIF(Y;  , Fy) j X) as the unconditional quantile regres-
sion model.30 The RIF regression parameter estimates are unconditional quantile
marginal effects (UQME) or partial derivatives with respect to the price of wheat
flour, as described by the following expression:
@Qfs ./
@price wheat flour
(21.2)
where Qfs is the unconditional quantile function of our food-based coping response
measures, and  represents quantiles of the unconditional distribution. For our
analysis, we estimated the marginal effects at all deciles (10th, 20th, : : : , 90th)
of the food-based coping response distributions while controlling for the covariates
in our model specification. The large observed variations in our food-based coping
response measures (Table 21.3) suggested that the UQME could differ for house-
holds at the bottom and top of the distributions.
An alternative to the UQR is the conditional quantile regression (hereafter
CQR) estimator (Koenker and Bassett 1978), which allows behavioral responses
to vary across the distribution of the dependent variable after conditioning on the
observed covariates (e.g., see Chamberlain 1994). This estimator is based on the
conditional population distribution; however, policy questions are typically phrased
28Robust statistics are statistics and estimators that are not influenced heavily by deviations from
model assumptions nor influenced by single observations. Influence functions provide a formal
way of measuring the extent to which a particular estimator is affected by a single observation in
the sample.
29This is in contrast, for example, to the least absolute deviation (LAD) estimator, whereby the
expectation of the LAD is not equal to the median.
30FFL provided an estimation method based on transforming the dependent variable into the RIF
and subsequently using OLS estimation. FFL have shown that this approach yields a consistent
estimator of the average marginal: effect, E[d Pr[Y > j X]/dX], if Pr[Y > j X D x], is linear in x.
In order to estimate the standard errors, we followed the methodology proposed by FFL (Firpo et
al. 2009b) and used a bootstrap estimator of the sampling variance. For readers who are interested,
FFL (Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux 2009a) derived the asymptotic properties of the estimator and
provided the analytical standard errors.
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in the context of the unconditional distribution.31 For example, policymakers may
be interested in knowing how price shocks affect the caloric intake of households at
the bottom 20th percentile of the calorie distribution of the total population but not
the conditional 20th percentile. A key distinction between the two is that the bottom
of the unconditioned distribution consists of those who have very low caloric intake,
whereas the conditioned distribution need not have low caloric intake (just low
caloric intake conditional on their attributes, such as education level). The estimated
marginal effects based on the unconditioned distribution can be valuable in targeting
vulnerable people for safety net and poverty alleviation programs and in allocating
resources in general. The results were robust to using this estimation technique; the
observed signs and significance of the results were similar to those of our main
results, although with some differences in the magnitudes.
21.6 Results and Discussion
The empirical analysis demonstrated that Afghan households employed both
nonfood- and food-based coping strategies in response to the rapid increase in
wheat flour prices in 2007/2008. We observed large reductions in real household
expenditure across nearly all nonfood categories (Table 21.5). 32 In response to
increasing wheat flour prices, households reduced the amount spent on health,
clothing, grooming, tobacco and cigarettes, transportation, communication, and
cultural activities and practices. (They also reduced food expenditure, which we
discuss in more detail below.)
The largest reduction was observed in health expenditure. Such reductions
can have serious implications, but we have to be cautious when drawing strong
inferences from these results since health expenditures are particularly challenging
to interpret. In particular, a decline in health expenditure could indicate either a
reduction in the need to treat health problems (i.e., better health) or a failure to
take appropriate actions to treat an illness, which would lead presumably to much
worse health outcomes. We argue that it is unlikely that a food price shock would
be positively correlated with better health outcomes in a food-insecure country like
Afghanistan; therefore, we assumed that food prices are either independent of or
negatively correlated with health outcomes. In such cases, the observed reduction
in health expenditures would indeed represent a coping behavior, whereby health
needs are sacrificed to mitigate the shock to food consumption.
In the development literature, there is evidence that household behavior differs
with respect to adult goods and child goods (Deaton and Paxson 1998). Expenditure
31As an exception to this assertion, Buchinsky (1994) provides an example in which the question
posed is best answered by the CQR estimator and not something akin to the UQR. He examined
the distribution of wages in the USA and, using the CQR estimator, provides insight into how wage
inequality within groups (i.e., conditional on being in a specific group) changes over time.
32The tables display the coefficients of interest. Full results are available upon request.
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Table 21.6 Effects of wheat
flour price increases on real
per capita expenditure
Adult clothing Children’s clothing
0.113** 0.092
[0.051] [0.074]
Note: Coefficients and standard errors
are from separate, population-weighted
regressions. The dependent variable is
real per capita expenditure for each
group (listed at the top of the columns),
transformed by the inverse hyperbolic
sine (IHS) function. Control variables
are listed in the text. Total observa-
tions: 20,483. Standard errors are clus-
tered bootstrap estimates
*, **, and *** denote significance at
10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively
Table 21.7 Effects of wheat flour price increases on other nonfood-based coping responses
Sold livestock Member migrated Child in school Purchased food on credit
0.014 0.007 0.0028 0.084**
[0.010] [0.022] [0.018] [0.043]
Note: Coefficients and standard errors are from separate, population-weighted regressions. The
dependent variable is indicator variable for action listed at the top of the column except for
the last column; purchased food on credit is a categorical variable ranging from 1 (never) to 4
(always). Control variables are listed in the text. Total observations in column 1 and 2: 20,483;
total observations in column 3: 15,924 (in the child-level regression). Standard errors are clustered
bootstrap estimates
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively
on grooming and on tobacco and cigarettes is typically categorized as adult goods,
in addition to alcohol (not solicited in the NRVA survey) and adult clothing. The
NRVA data allowed us to distinguish between clothing and shoes for adult and
child. As shown in Table 21.6, we observed that households reduced the amount
spent on adult clothing but did not make adjustments to child clothing expenditure.
Furthermore, we did not find any effect of the price increases on education, which
is a children’s good. We interpret these results as evidence of Afghan households
prioritizing—to a certain extent—child goods over adult goods in their nonfood-
based coping responses.
We did not find evidence of the use of other nonfood-based coping responses,
with the exception of an increase in frequency at which households purchase food on
credit (Table 21.7).33 We failed to find evidence of changes in the sale of livestock, in
the migration of household members, and in school enrollment. Selling productive
assets and migrating are extreme responses and could be potentially irreversible;
33The variable for purchasing food on credit is categorical, with values ranging from one to four.
The displayed coefficient comes from an OLS model; however, the results are qualitatively similar
to the coefficient from an ordered probit model.
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therefore, it is not surprising that households chose other coping strategies in lieu
of these. As with educational expenses, households might have chosen to protect
the investment in children by keeping them enrolled in school. Given the substantial
decline in purchasing power, it is not surprising that households purchased food
on credit more frequently; incurring even small amounts of debt could encumber a
household and perpetuate the cycle of poverty.
Our nonfood-based coping response findings are consistent with the qualitative
evidence presented by Lautze et al. (2002), who examined the coping strategies
employed during times of drought in Afghanistan using focus groups across the
country. In addition to reducing the quality, quantity, and frequency of their meals,
Afghan households reported taking on debt and decreasing cultural celebration
expenses related to Qurbani Eid. They also found that households sold off assets,
increased migration, and increased their reliance on remittances.
For the food-based responses, we estimated the price effects for the mean house-
hold using OLS and for households at each decile of the unconditional distribution
of the dependent variable using the UQR estimator (Table 21.7). For the mean
Afghan household, we observed a large decline in real per capita food consumption
and relatively smaller declines in calories and dietary diversity. We interpreted
these results as a trade-off between quality and quantity that the household made
in order to maintain energy levels in the face of declining purchasing power. More
specifically, the mean Afghan household adjusted the composition of its diet in order
to buffer the price shock to a certain extent (i.e., calories and diversity decline less
than food expenditure).
Additionally, in the regressions above, we allowed the price effects to vary
based on whether the household owned or operated agricultural land (the results
are available in D’Souza and Jolliffe 2014). During periods of high food prices,
these households may not be hurt as much as other households because they are
able to produce their own food and are less dependent on the market. Furthermore,
if they produce more food than they consume (i.e., net sellers), they can sell the
food on the market and profit from the high prices. The NRVA data did not allow
us to identify net sellers of wheat, and so we used a dummy for agricultural
households. We did not find any strong systematic patterns that were consistent
with the literature (i.e., agricultural households are better able to cope with the price
increases). Nevertheless, the severe drought of 2008 would have limited the number
of net sellers of wheat in Afghanistan at that time. The drought was the worst in the
ten preceding years, with losses reported on both rainfed and irrigated wheat crops
(Foreign Agricultural Service 2008).
The UQR estimates showed that increases in the wheat flour prices were asso-
ciated with statistically significant declines in these food-based coping responses
across much of the respective unconditional distributions. We observed the largest
percentage decline in food consumption and calories for the Afghan households
at the top of the respective distributions, with smaller declines observed as one
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moves lower on the distributions.34 At a very basic level, these households had more
to give as they are well above food poverty thresholds and daily energy (calorie)
requirements; they also hosted more guests and ate more away from home, on
average, than poorer households.35
Households at the first decile of caloric intake were living below the threshold
of energy requirements (with average daily per capita caloric intake of 1670) and
presumably were unable to cut back on calories without suffering serious nutritional
consequences. Accordingly we found no evidence of a decline in their caloric
intake. Even those at the second decile experienced negligible changes, equivalent
to less than a third of a standard naan (one piece of Afghan bread). Sulaiman et al.
(2009) found that Bangladeshi households at the third and fourth income quintiles
experienced more wasting than the poorest households in the case of food price
increases. Furthermore, there has been some empirical evidence that by moving to
cheaper foods and employing nonfood-based coping strategies, households may be
able to maintain energy levels despite food price increases. For example, Jensen
and Miller (2008) found no reduction in calories among poor households in China’s
Hunan province and a very small reduction in calories among poor households in
Gansu province (indistinguishable from typical seasonal declines) when food prices
increased in 2006. They also found evidence of consumers moving away from more
expensive foods and a slight reduction in nonfood expenditure.
The strong pattern of the price effects on food consumption and calories stands
in contrast to the standard result in the literature that poorer households have
larger food price elasticities.36 The standard result hinges on the fact that richer
households devote a much smaller share of their budgets to food and thus are not as
affected by food price increases as poorer households. In Afghanistan, however,
food (in particular, wheat) makes up a large portion of the budget for rich and
poor households alike. Over 80 % of the population spends more than half of their
total budget on food. Those in the bottom quintile of the income distribution spend
approximately 66 % of their budget on food (44 % on wheat flour); even those
in the top quintile spend approximately 49 % of their budget on food (20 % on
34We note here the standard caution that the regression coefficients represent estimated effects from
small, marginal price changes. This caution against using estimated marginal effects as a basis
for simulating large, non-marginal price changes is particularly warranted in the case of quantile
estimators where different estimated effects across the distribution of the dependent variable imply
a changing shape of this distribution due to price changes. Variation in the estimated marginal
effects at different points on the distribution can readily imply re-rankings of observations (in
terms of the dependent variable) with large enough simulated changes. But this exercise would be
nonsensical as one would expect that as the shape of the distribution changes, so too would each
of the estimated marginal effects.
35For example, households in the top quintile of the calorie distribution spend nearly double
on food away from home than households in the bottom quintile, and they provide more meals
(approximately two per week) to guests.
36The elasticities are not completely comparable since we looked at calorie-price elasticities based
on where the household lies on the calorie distribution, and in the literature the analyses often focus
on demand for food based on a household’s income quintile.
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Table 21.8 Effects of wheat flour price increases on food security across the distribution
Quantiles 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th
Real per capita monthly 0.131** 0.199*** 0.268*** 0.338*** 0.431***
food consumption [0.0521] [0.0448] [0.0440] [0.0446] [0.0475]
Daily per capita calorie 0.00531 0.0724** 0.120*** 0.156*** 0.192***
intake [0.0439] [0.0296] [0.0277] [0.0258] [0.0268]
Food consumption score 0.239*** 0.242*** 0.241*** 0.181*** 0.168***
[0.0575] [0.0520] [0.0479] [0.0369] [0.0302]
Quantiles 60th 70th 80th 90th OLS
Real per capita monthly 0.505*** 0.590*** 0.706*** 0.721*** 0.423***
food consumption [0.0486] [0.0546] [0.0660] [0.0759] [0.036]
Daily per capita calorie 0.225*** 0.266*** 0.313*** 0.377*** 0.187**
intake [0.0287] [0.0335] [0.0372] [0.0477] [0.0243]
Food consumption score 0.152*** 0.151*** 0.188*** 0.185*** 0.183**
[0.0309] [0.0300] [0.0334] [0.0329] [0.0270]
Note: Coefficients and standard errors for the log of wheat flour prices are from separate,
population-weighted regressions. The dependent variable is transformed using the inverse hyper-
bolic sine function and is listed in the first column. Control variables are listed in the text. Total
observations: 20,483. UQR standard errors are clustered bootstrap estimates. OLS standard errors
are corrected for clustering and stratification
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively
wheat flour). Given the importance of food in the budget of Afghan households, it is
plausible that even those households at the top of the distributions could have been
affected significantly by the wheat flour price increases.
The estimates from the FCS regressions revealed that Afghan households had
to make large concessions in dietary quality as a result of the food price increases
(Table 21.8). In the case of Haiti, Brinkman et al. (2010) found similar declines
in the FCS when rice prices increased. These findings indicated that households
changed the composition of their diets, perhaps by cutting back on more expensive,
nutrient-rich foods and moving toward cheaper foods. Since the UQR coefficients
are related to a specific quantile of a specific distribution, we could not establish
a link between the results for the three food-based coping responses. That is,
households in a certain quantile on one distribution do not necessarily fall in the
same quantile on another distribution; therefore, each set of coefficients must be
interpreted separately. While we acknowledge that households may be giving up
quality for quantity, we could not provide direct evidence using the UQR.
Our overall findings on food security are consistent with the literature on the
impact of economic shocks on nutritional outcomes. For example, Klotz et al. (2008)
argued that during times of economic crisis and when households cannot increase
the amount that they spend on food, they are forced to cut back on expensive,
micronutrient-rich foods to maintain their consumption of core staples. Therefore,
economic shocks will lead to micronutrient deficiencies before weight loss. Jensen
and Miller (2008) similarly found that in the face of food price inflation, poor urban
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households in China substitute more expensive foods with cheaper foods. Diagana
et al. (1999) also found decreases in the level of dietary diversity and changes in
food consumption patterns after the 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc using data
from West Africa.
Our results also highlight the importance of moving beyond price effects on mean
households when conducting policy analysis; in some instances, we observed stark
differences between the coping responses of the average household and households
at other points on the distributions. Figure 21.3a and b depict the UQR and OLS
point estimates and the 95 % confidence intervals for the food consumption and
calorie regressions, respectively.
There are substantial differences between the UQR and OLS estimates for the
food consumption and calorie regressions. OLS overestimated the responses of
those at the lower portion of the distributions and underestimated the responses of
those at the upper portion of the distributions. This could have policy implications.
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Fig. 21.3 (a) Food consumption-price effects (with 95 % confidence intervals). (b) Calorie-price
effects (with 95 % confidence intervals)
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For example, if policymakers consider solely the OLS results for calories and then
assume that all households, including the most vulnerable, reduce their caloric
intake in response to the price increases, this could lead to blunt policy responses
which focus on the provision of staple foods alone. These sorts of policies would not
only exacerbate the price shock by shifting up the demand for staple food (through
government purchases), but they are likely to be a relatively more expensive safety
net option (given that price increase of the staple). More importantly, the UQR
results showed that the most vulnerable households do not cut back on calories,
and thus other policies may be more beneficial. It is likely that some of these
households were forced to make other concessions, such as moving to lower quality
and/or less nutritious foods; in this case, interventions like nutrient supplementation
programs or the fortification of staple foods could address better the needs of those
households.
21.6.1 Supplemental Results
To explore further the impact of the price increases on food security, we looked at
several supplemental indicators of diet quality to examine the potential nutritional
consequences of dietary changes. We examined three essential micronutrients
(retinol, beta-carotene, iron) and the three macronutrients (protein, carbohydrates,
fat). Retinol and beta-carotene are forms of vitamin A, an important nutrient for
vision and immune system functions. Iron is critical for growth and development,
immune system functions, and overall metabolism. Both vitamin A and iron
deficiencies are ubiquitous in developing countries and have been recognized as
major public health challenges (Dufour and Borrel 2007; Fanzo and Pronyk 2010;
Ramakrishnan 2002). The three macronutrients provide energy (or calories) to the
body and are essential—in large quantities—for survival. Similar to the food-based
coping response regressions above, we used the inverse hyperbolic sine function to
transform these dependent variables and used the UQR estimator to estimate the
price effects based on a household’s position on the unconditional distribution of
the respective nutrient intake variable.
We observed declines in nutrient intakes as a result of the wheat flour price
increases (Table 21.9). The results differed by the type of nutrient as well as the
position of a household on the distribution of nutrient intake. We found declines in
the intake of iron, retinol, and beta-carotene for most households, with the lowest
deciles of the distributions being an exception (and for beta-carotene, those in the
top deciles as well). The general declines are consistent with the findings of Ecker
and Qaim (2011), who found negative staple food price elasticities (at population
means) for iron and vitamin A (and protein) in Malawi.
In terms of macronutrients, we found a decline in the intake of protein, fat, and
carbohydrates; the intake of the first two macronutrients showed larger declines, as
may have been expected since protein and fat are more expensive sources of calories
than carbohydrates. We found that households at the lower end (e.g., first and second
deciles) of these distributions did not experience statistically significant declines.
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We further separated protein-based food into two categories: animal-source foods
and nonanimal-source foods. Higher animal-source and nongrain food expenditures
have been linked to lower levels of malnutrition as measured by child stunting (Sari
et al. 2010). We found that the expenditure on animal-source protein declined much
more than nonanimal-source protein when food prices increase; the former is a
more expensive source of calories than the latter. The largest change overall was
the decline in protein from animal sources for those consuming at the lowest decile.
Across each of the deciles, the negative elasticity of protein from animal sources was
the largest change of the macronutrients. These findings are consistent with the fact
that as purchasing power declines, households move away from more expensive and
often nutritious calories, such as meat, to cheaper less nutritious ones, such as pulses
and beans. The findings are also consistent with previous literature on economic
shocks. Martin-Prevel et al. (2000) and Block et al. (2004) found reductions in
maternal and child nutritional status following a currency devaluation and a financial
crisis.
21.7 Conclusion
Unique household and price data collected before and during the 2007/2008 food
price crisis provided a rare opportunity to examine empirically nonfood-based and
food-based coping strategies used by households in Afghanistan in response to sharp
increases in the price of wheat flour, their dietary staple. In a country where decades
of conflict, political instability, and recurring drought have led to a precarious state
of food insecurity and poverty, understanding how households cope with price
increases and other economic shocks can provide vital information to policymakers
and aid organizations tasked with creating and implementing programs and policies
to address acute and chronic food insecurity and poverty in Afghanistan.
In response to wheat flour price increases, we found that Afghan households
reduced food expenditure and also expenditure on health, grooming, commu-
nication, transportation, cigarettes and tobacco, and culture. The reductions in
health expenditures are of particular concern, especially in a country that ranks
at the bottom of many development, health, and nutritional rankings. Such coping
responses could have long-term consequences if they represent reductions in
important medical care or health investments.
We did not find changes in educational expenses, school enrollment, or child
clothing, which can be categorized as child goods. The reductions in expenditures
on grooming, adult clothing, and cigarettes and tobacco suggest Afghan households
were more willing to reduce spending on adult goods than child goods. While we did
not observe any increase in the sale of productive assets (livestock) or in migration,
we did find an increase in the frequency at which households used credit to purchase
food.
The food price increases also led Afghan households to employ several food-
based coping strategies. Households reduced the real per capita monthly value of
food consumed and as a result experienced reductions in daily per capita caloric
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intake and household dietary diversity. Rather than reducing calories by the same
amount as the reductions in the value of food consumed, households adjusted the
types of foods they ate; most likely, they switched to lower quality, cheaper foods,
or food groups.
We further analyzed the food-based coping responses by examining the dif-
ferences in the behavioral response of a household based on its location on the
distribution of the respective food-based coping response indicators. Those wishing
to target policies and programs at vulnerable, food-insecure households may be
interested in knowing the unique set of trade-offs that these households face.
Households at the bottom of the caloric intake distribution made very small to no
reductions in caloric intake. Households living near caloric-subsistence levels are
vulnerable to many adverse health effects and need to find ways to absorb the price
shock without further reducing calories. These vulnerable households may have
limited options in buffering food price shocks; while we know that food purchases
make up the vast majority of their total consumption, they cannot easily scale back
on calories. Whereas we found that households at the top of the distribution did
experience significant declines in caloric intake. Similarly, households at the top
of the food consumption distribution experienced larger declines than those at the
bottom of the distribution, though unlike in the calorie regressions, even those at
bottom experienced significant declines. Such differences in behavioral responses
show that a quantile estimator (or any estimator that allows marginal effects to
vary across the distribution) can reveal important information, particularly when
examining welfare-related outcomes.
We also found evidence of declines in dietary diversity across the entire
distribution of households in Afghanistan, underscoring the vulnerability of Afghan
households to food price increases. Long-run policy solutions recognize that
vulnerable households are likely to be disproportionately hurt by negative shocks.
Antipoverty programs aimed at increasing the income of the poor and improving
access to infrastructure and education could better protect people from price shocks
by providing them with better coping strategies (e.g., drawing down savings rather
than decreasing health expenditure).
A long-run approach alone can, however, leave the population vulnerable to
shocks in the short and medium run. Short-run interventions can play a potentially
important role in protecting the population from long-run adverse effects of food
price shocks. As an example, our analysis demonstrated that dietary quality (dietary
diversity, as well as nutrient intake) declined significantly during a period of
high food prices. Examples of interventions that focus on diet quality include
micronutrient supplementation programs (such as “sprinkles”), expansion of the
fortified school biscuit program, wheat flour fortification (e.g., with iron, folic
acid, or vitamin A), and biofortification of staple crops. Such interventions play
a relatively small role in food assistance programs. For example, between 2005 and
2009, more than 1.12 million metric tons of food aid was delivered to Afghanistan
to provide emergency food relief and nutritional support to vulnerable and acutely
food-insecure households; more than three-fourths of this aid was comprised of
wheat products. It is important to note that our findings do not argue against the
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provision of calories through the release of staple crop reserves. Even though we
found that those whose calorie consumption is at the margin of basic caloric needs
are not reducing their caloric intake during an adverse price shock, this does not
mean that the provision of some form of calories will not be of help to them. The
receipt of a staple crop could very well be a useful transfer, allowing the household
to supplement the staple crop with a more diverse diet or purchase necessary
nonfood items. The standard response to food crises—increasing the distribution
of grains—is useful because it essentially increases the ability of a household to
consume a more diverse diet. The key findings in this analysis, though, put more
emphasis on the importance of enhancing the current standard policy response with
interventions aimed directly at addressing dietary diversity through micronutrient
interventions, such as fortification of grains or nutrient supplementation.
Another policy implication related to the monitoring of a population’s vulner-
ability to food insecurity. In their guidelines for assessing household-level food
security, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the World
Food Programme (2009) suggested the construction of a food consumption score,
food expenditure estimates, and caloric intake. The guidelines have been written
to provide assistance to on-the-ground teams which assess whether action needs
to be taken to address the potential problems of food insecurity. The guidelines
are intended to be practical responses to data-poor environments and suggest that
information on any of these indicators could be informative, but our findings are
less optimistic about the informativeness of calories as a proxy for food security in
the short run. Our findings indicated that calories are relatively insensitive (at least in
the short run) to adverse shocks, while dietary diversity is more sensitive to shocks.
This is consistent with the findings of Ruel (2003), who found that dietary changes
can be detected before changes in micronutrient status. The key point is that policies
designed to be triggered by a decline in caloric intake to below the subsistence level
will fail to detect the onset of food insecurity in a timely way.
Finally our findings shed some light on the costs and benefits of collecting data
on diversity and calories. Household survey consumption modules often include
questions about the quantity of food consumed and food expenditure, but questions
about the frequency of food consumption are seldom asked. Given its low cost, it
may be beneficial to consider augmenting household surveys by adding such ques-
tions, particularly for populations that are vulnerable to food insecurity. Measures of
dietary diversity are a useful tool when detailed food journals or anthropometric data
are not available. A common view is that there is a trade-off between different mea-
sures, such as the food consumption score and calorie measures. Calorie data is time
consuming to collect, but it is presumably a better indicator of food security, while
dietary diversity data is easier to collect, but it is a cruder, less informative measure.
Alexander and Thomson (1992) discussed the importance of collecting frequency
data in addition to quantity intake data. They demonstrated that both the quantity and
frequency of food intake are important determinants of diet-induced diseases, and
they argued that looking solely at quantity data could be misleading. Our findings
suggest that using dietary diversity indicators may be the best approach to measuring
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the onset of food insecurity. This view is supported by recent literature comparing
various measures of food security (Headey and Ecker 2013; Tiwari et al. 2013).
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Appendix
Table 21.10 Key indicators across quarters
Quarter 1
(fall)
Quarter 2
(winter)
Quarter 3
(spring)
Quarter 4
(summer) All
Demographic Indicators
Average household size* 8:7 9:0 8:4 8:5 8:6
Average age (years) 20:6 20:4 20:7 20:5 20:6
Household members %, age <15) 47:9 48:7 48:4 48:7 48:5
Age dependency ratio 131:6 134:2 133:6 134:0 133:4
Education and health indictors
Full Immunization (%, age 12–23
months)*
33:0 41:1 34:8 37:6 36:7
Literate household head (%)* 34:4 28:8 28:4 29:5 30:1
Ever attended school (%, age >18)* 21:7 21:3 18:9 21:6 20:9
Education level of persons (age >18) 2:0 1:9 1:6 1:9 1:9
Access to services and infrastructure
indicators
Sanitary toilet (% households) 5:9 5:6 4:5 4:0 4:9
Electricity (% households) 40:9 42:2 41:5 39:8 41:1
Source: NRVA 2007/2008. Note: Population-weighted means
* denotes estimates that are statistically different at 10 % across quarters in some cases
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22Hedging Seasonal Food Price Risks:The Impact of Cereal Banking in the Gambia
Raymond Jatta
22.1 Introduction
In rural communities of the Gambia, as in the case of most other arid and semiarid
countries in the world, cereal banking is a common practice to store food at harvest
for use during lean periods. It is a community-based strategy of making food
available throughout the year and managing seasonal food price dispersions by
maintaining physical food reserves (Beer 1990). It aims at managing price and
climate risks.
Rainfall variability and food price volatility are some of the most important
risk factors that affect lives and livelihoods of poor rural households in import-
dependent countries such as the Gambia (Vicarelli 2011, p. 2; Wright and Cafiero
2009). This is due in part to their primary sector-based economy (which is sensitive
to climate conditions), their reliance on food imports, and their low levels of human
development and food accounting for a major part of their income and expenditure
(Kalkuhl et al. 2013; Wheeler and von Braun 2013; FAO 2011). These factors
account for high human costs resulting from climate and market shocks (FAO 2011;
von Braun and Tadesse 2012; Ivanic and Martin 2008).
In this chapter, we assess how cereal banking can be used as a viable option in
rural communities to enhance food and livelihood security in the face of climate
and price risks. In spite of cereal banking’s popularity in most of the arid and
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semiarid rural communities (Basu and Wong 2012; Bhattamishra 2012), the practice
has received little empirical scientific research.
22.2 Context
Our study was conducted in 134 rural communities, in a total of 13 districts from
three of six rural regions in the Gambia. 78 % of the active population in the
Gambia is engaged in rain-fed subsistence farming as a source of income and
food. Households in rural areas are generally larger (>12 members) and poorer,
with 48 % of the households below the national poverty line of $1.08 a day (GoG
2010). The traditional land tenure system allows for small land holdings inequitably
distributed among men and women (von Braun et al. 1989; Carney 1992). In
addition to other socioeconomic factors—such as urbanization, population growth,
inadequate input supply and the use of crude technology—rainfall variability has
an important multiplier effect on the ability of households to feed themselves.
The Gambia’s climate is Sahelian semiarid. Its location has been described as a
hotspot for climate change and food insecurity (Ericksen et al. 2011). The climate
consists of two seasons: a 4-month rainy season (June–September) and an 8-month
dry season. Because the rainy season is short, only a single cropping season is
feasible for rain-fed agriculture1 (Ceesay 2004). Only about 50 % of the country’s
food needs is produced locally (WFP 2011). The Gambia is thus regarded as a
food-deficit, import-dependent country. Inter-annual variations in food production
generally follow rainfall trends and variability.
Figure 22.1 shows an almost perfect positive correlation between rainfall vari-
ability and cereal production variability. Variability in Fig. 22.1 is a measure of
dispersion of each annual rainfall or production figure from their mean between
1991 and 2012, normalized by their standard deviation.
Figure 22.2 shows the gap between domestic consumption and production.
Rainfall variability has the potential to reduce domestic production. When coupled
with a global food crisis and a price hike, it could cause food prices to rise
drastically, eroding purchasing powers and resulting in poverty and malnutrition
among many Gambians (Kalkuhl et al. 2013). Given the country’s dependence on
food imports2 (60 % estimated by Tadesse et al. 2013), any changes in global food
availability and food prices will definitely affect foreign exchange rates, causing
inflationary pressures on food and non-food imports.
Food production, affordability, and consumption in rural areas of the Gambia
follow the agricultural cycle (Barrett 1996), as in most developing countries. During
harvest season, food is in abundance, and most households become net suppliers
of food. In the Gambia, the harvest season spans from October to February. Food
supplies tend to move from rural to urban areas because of higher prices (a
1Irrigated area is less than 6 % of arable land.
2WFP (2011) estimates 81 % dependence on rice imports, the country’s staple food.
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consequence of higher demand) in the urban areas (Barrett 1996). However, food
is usually in short supply when approaching the rainy season (FAO 2011). Rural
households and communities become net buyers and often have to rely on imported
food from the urban areas. The reversal of food flow begins driving upwards food
586 R. Jatta
prices in rural areas. Production constraints, exacerbated by the absence of large
storage schemes and credit constraints, tend to worsen the price changes and the
spatial and temporal food availability (Barrett 1996). The transition in terms of the
duration of the food gap is influenced by rainfall patterns, among other things.
In years with low rainfall, inter-seasonal food price dispersion can be as high
as up to 400 % (von Braun et al. 1999). This dynamic affects rural households
and communities more—eroding incomes and causing seasonal food and nutrition
insecurity (WFP 2011). As a result, the problem of food insecurity is more seasonal
than chronic in rural areas of the Gambia. Every year, poor households in the rural
areas face the “hungry season,” a period of 3–4 months between July and September,
when household food stocks are low or depleted (FAO 2011). The Comprehensive
Food security and Vulnerability Assessment Report (WFP 2011) observed that in
the months of August and September, about 80 % of the rural households reported
food-insecure conditions, while only 10 % reported being food insecure between
December and April. Similar studies on seasonal food security programs in East
Indonesia and Bangladesh (Basu and Wong 2012; Khandker 2009 respectively)
observed similar seasonal food insecurity dynamics.
22.3 Methodology
Our methodology is based on a large scale randomized control trial (RCT) imple-
mented in the Gambia called the Community Driven Development Project (CDDP).
The project, funded by the World Bank, was implemented in the Gambia from 2008
to 2011. Using a poverty index as a basis for stratification, 930 out of about 1800
villages were eligible, and of the 930 eligible villages, 495 were randomly chosen
for the CDDP intervention (Arcand et al. 2010). 35 of the 495 villages chose cereal
banking from a wide range of possible projects based on the needs and aspirations
of their communities.3
We note that while selection for CDDP intervention was randomized, the
choice of subprojects such as cereal banking was not. It was likely influenced
by endogenous village characteristics. Evaluating the impact of such subprojects
requires the use of quasi-experiments (Abebaw and Haile 2013).
Subsequently, we have to investigate the determinants making these villages
choose cereal banking for their subproject. These factors must be controlled to
minimize selection bias and fulfil the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA)
(Heckman et al. 1997; Angrist and Pischke 2008).
3Participatory project identification methods were used; villagers chose the subproject at village
meetings.
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22.3.1 Propensity-Score Matching
In propensity-score matching (PSM), researchers try to balance groups by matching
treatment and control units based on the characteristics that affected their probability
of receiving treatment—which, in this case, is cereal banking (Heckman et al. 1997;
Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). PSM ensures that at baseline and on average, groups
are identical in terms of observed characteristics (Heckman et al. 1997; Caliendo and
Kopeinig 2008). The method requires finding a control group which bears similar
characteristics as the treatment group in all respects; however, the control group does
not receive treatment. If a treated group and a potential control group have matching
propensity scores, then the difference between outcomes of the two groups is an
unbiased estimator of the treatment effect (Heckman et al. 1997; Ravallion 2007;
Abebaw and Haile 2013). However, this assumption becomes invalid if there are
important unobservable factors that affect treatment and outcomes (Caliendo and
Kopeinig 2008). The method can be improved by using fixed effects which captures
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneities (Olken 2012).
We estimate the propensity of a community participating in a cereal banking
scheme using a nonparametric logit model:
P .CB/ D ˇVc.i/C ".i/; (22.1)
where P(CB) is the probability of participating in a cereal bank; ˇ represents
parameters that must be estimated; Vc(i) is a vector of a village’s preexposure
level of social, economic, livelihood, natural, and market characteristics; and " is
an error term. On the basis of the CDDP assignment, we conducted PSM using two
subsamples:
• Matching cereal banking villages with CDDP-funded villages that opted for
subprojects other than cereal banking (partial control group)
• Matching cereal banking villages with villages that neither benefitted from the
CDDP funding, nor had cereal banking schemes (pure control group)
22.3.2 The Propensity-Score Matching Results
Data for the PSM were obtained from the 2003 National Population Census data and
National Agricultural Sample Survey 2007. From a total of 827 villages in all the six
rural regions in the Gambia, 22 pretreatment village variables were generated for our
PSM. Relative to the sample size of the treatment group (35), the large sample size
of possible control villages (780) ensures that the pretreatment mean differences
between the treated and their matched counterfactuals converge to zero (Chabé-
Ferret 2010), thus reducing sample selection based on observables (Baker 2000;
Heckman et al. 1997). A one-to-one nearest-neighbor matching algorithm without
replacement was employed as it enhances efficiency and reduces biases (Caliendo
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and Kopeinig 2008, p. 9). It also matches each treatment village to a unique village
from the pure control and the partial control groups.
The results of our PSM indicate the variables that influenced the villages to
choose cereal banking. Overall, the R2 indicates that our PSM model [Eq. (22.1)] has
strong explanatory power for the probability of a village choosing cereal banking.
Out of the 22 variables, 13 were statistically significant at 10 % significance level,
while 9 were statistically significant at 5 % significance level. Our coefficients are
expressed in odd ratios and not in marginal effects, but the p values indicate the level
of significance for each of the variables (Table 22.1).
The PSM results provide the following insights:
• Coefficient of variation of the prices4 (Huchet-Bourdon 2011) of the main food
crops in a village market, or in the market closest to the village,5 indicates price
dispersion and price risk. Our results show that communities facing high price
risk tend more to choose cereal banking. This is in agreement with existing
studies (Bhattamishra 2012; Cortès and Carrasco 2012).
Table 22.1 Results of propensity-score matching
Partial control PSM Pure control PSM
Variable Coefficient P> jzj Coefficient P> jzj
Coefficient of variation (rainfall) 13.8706 0.286 16.076 0.246
Coefficient of variation (price) 660.3531 0.006** 681.091 0.018*
Poverty 7.2494 0.035* 2.695 0.408
Availability of fruit trees 0.0512 0.033* 0.043 0.102
Millet grown 0.00134 0.004** 0.001 0.009**
Proportion of crop farmers 46.2541 0.029* 32.713 0.053
Average HH size 0.7248 0.209 0.283 0.501
Prop of Hhs without daily market 0.1836 0.046* 0.152 0.058
Prop of Hhs without improved trans. 0.5373 0.009** 0.476 0.038*
Dominant ethnicity gr. 3 14.6823 0.003** 7.953 0.09**
Dominant ethnicity gr. 2 7.4451 0.004** 3.842 0.113
Connected and lowland villages 1.1066 0.109 1.618 0.039*
Distance to market 0.5274 0.038* 0.446 0.033*
Proximity of the LGA 33.20208 0.024* 33.592 0.02**
Proximity of the district 2.873271 0.021* 3.023 0.016*
Cov_Price2 1128.559 0.004** 1157.499 0.016**
No. of observations 451 422
R2 0.4549 0.3947
*P< 0.05, **P< 0.01
4See Huchet-Bourdon (2011).
5The price data is collected from 28 markets in the Gambia on a monthly basis.
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• Access to market is measured by the distance from a village to the closest
weekly market. The availability of improved transport systems indicates if a
village is connected or remote. The more isolated a community is, the higher
the probability that it will choose cereal banking. This is similar to findings of
existing studies (Afrique Verte 2010; Bhattamishra 2012). A great distance to
markets may motivate communities to store food because households in these
villages may incur high transaction and transportation cost, Daviron and Douillet
2013).
• The probability of choosing cereal banking is significantly different between
communities with food surplus and those with food deficit (Bhattamishra 2012;
Cortès and Carrasco 2012). Lowland villages, which are in close proximity to the
River Gambia—a source of fresh water for irrigation—often have more favorable
environment for farming (Ceesay 2004; von Braun et al. 1989). In most cases,
they produce more food crops, especially rice, relative to the villages located in
the upland. A review of the choice of subprojects for the CDDP show that most of
the communities in the lowlands opted for production enhancement equipment,
access to fields, and gardening, rather than cereal banking (Arcand et al. 2010).
In general, the results of the PSM show that villages that are poor, remotely
located, and susceptible to rainfall and price volatility are more likely to choose and
maintain a cereal banking schemes (Cortès and Carrasco 2012; Bhattamishra 2012).
This highlights the importance of targeting the right villages when implementing a
program since not all communities equally need, or can sustain, a cereal banking
schemes.
The T-test (in Annex on Table 22.5 below) shows that before matching, some
significant differences between treated and non-treated villages were observed.
However, after matching, there are no significant differences between the two
groups. Unlike earlier researches that used PSM, our method gives superior results
because the PSM is built on both stratification and randomization (Arcand et al.
2010; Abebaw and Haile 2013). Using propensity-score nearest-neighbor matching,
we were able to generate a control group similar enough to the treatment group, so
that the impacts of cereal banks can be evaluated.
22.4 Impact Evaluation
Based on the PSM results, 134 villages were selected for the survey. Then
we randomly selected 10 % of the households in each village (a total of 460
households). Using this cross-sectional data (Olken 2012), we estimated the average
treatment effect (ATE) and the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET). Our
analysis focuses on indicators of food security, nutrition security, and livelihood
security. Taking our cue from recent literatures about the conceptualization and
measurement of food and nutrition security (Hoddinott 1999; Pangaribowo et al.
2013; Pieters et al. 2013; Laborde Debucquet et al. 2013; Kalkuhl et al. 2013;
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von Braun and Tadesse 2012), we considered various aspects of food security:
availability, accessibility, utilization, and stability.
22.4.1 Empirical Strategy
In the first set of analysis, we compared the mean outcomes to determine if there
are any differences in DIM between the treatment, pure control, and partial control
groups. This is to determine if any of the effects can be reasonably attributed to the
treatment. Since the pretreatment characteristics of villages were considered in the
matching process, any differences in the outcomes can be attributed to the treatment
(Ravallion 2007). Therefore, the DIM indicates the ATE.
22.4.2 Comparison ofMeans: Treated and Control Villages
As in the PSM, we found that most of the villages remained unchanged in their
physical and socioeconomic features 4 years after implementing the project. This
further validated our PSM. However, among villages, there are also some important
DIM, some of which indicate the ATE of the program (Becker and Ichino 2002).
The households had a food gap of more than 2.5 months on average. The food
gap, also called the lean period or hungry season (FAO 2011), represents the number
of months a household reports not having adequate food stocks or money to buy
food. The households often need to hire out their own labor for money or to take out
a loan. We observed significant differences in the length of lean period among the
households sampled.6 While households in treated villages experienced an average
2.1 months of food gap, the pure control group experienced almost 3 months of food
gap, and the partial control group 2.5 months. Comparing the treated group and the
pure control group, cereal banking reduces the length of lean period by 25 %.
The results for the selling prices of cash crops (groundnut at harvest) and the
buying prices of food crops (millet and maize during the lean period) also indicate
a significant difference between the treatment and control villages. The price effect
is more significant when comparing treated villages and partial control villages.
This indicates that variations in food and cash crop prices is higher in partial
control villages than in the other two groups, suggesting that in the absence of a
food storage, households may produce more food and yet achieve lower incomes.
Variation is defined as the difference between prices of food crops (rice, maize, and
millet) reported in August (lean period) and price of cash crops (groundnut) reported
in December (harvest period) minus the yearly average prices of the same crops.
Figure 22.3 shows that at harvest, when most rural households are net sellers, the
selling prices of excess production are 16 % lower in control villages than treated
villages. In contrast, during the lean period, when most rural households are net
6The lean period or hungry season in the Gambia often starts in July–September.
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buyers, the buying prices of cereals are significantly lower in control villages than
treated villages (about 15 % lower). This implies selling farm produce at lower
prices and buying food at higher prices for households in control villages compared
to those in treatment villages, contrary to conclusion in Kent (1998).
The following may explain the differences in prices and price variability:
• Households in treated communities reported higher dependency on their own
production for food than those in control group. Thus, treated communities sell
less of their food crops at harvest and buy less food during the lean period,
signifying that they become net buyers of food much later than the control group.
• Cereal banking schemes disincentivize speculative arbitrage, often carried out by
middlemen, moneylenders, and input lenders (Cortès and Carrasco 2012; Kent
1998). As shown in the DIM in Table 22.2, middlemen are more active in control
villages than in treated villages. In the Gambia, middlemen and moneylenders
lend food or inputs to households. Similar to the findings of other empirical stud-
ies in this field (Cole et al. 2012; Morduch 1995; Cortès and Carrasco 2012), it
was observed that when risk management strategies or one form of credit scheme
are in place, there will be less demand for other forms of credit (Gilbert 2012).
• Similar to other research findings, inter-seasonal price changes are more
significant for domestically produced food (millet and maize). Compared to other
similar studies (Afrique Verte 2010; von Braun et al. 1999; Bhattamishra 2012),
this study found a slightly lower, but nonetheless significant, inter-seasonal price
change between harvest and lean seasons: 53 % in treated villages and 84 % in
control villages. The treated villages showed a 31 percentage point reduction in
inter-seasonal price variation.
Table 22.2 Mean outcomes—treated and control villages
Treated Pure control Test Partial control Test
Food gap 2.170 2.830 0.000** 2.490 0.047*
Price cash crop—harvest 726.470 625.000 0.003** 587.230 0.000**
Price food crop—lean 918.570 1057.970 0.002** 959.780 0.177
Variationa in cash crop
prices—harvest
178.180 192.910 0.350 246.660 0.026*
Variation in food crop
prices—lean
114.280 262.640 0.000** 238.630 0.000**
Price of imported rice 1159.14 1155.850 0.775 1153.640 0.639
Self-help groups 1.9 1.6 0.665 1.7 0.872
Ward Development
Committee membership
2.645 1.927 0.894 1.979 0.895
Moneylenders/middlemen 1.4 1.72 0.025 1.68 0.482
Number of villages 35 48 55
*P< 0.05, **P< 0.01
aVariation in cash crops at harvest and food crops at the lean period are the difference of the price
at harvest/lean minus the mean price during the year
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Our study also found that there are more local self-help groups in the treated
villages than the control villages. This indicates that when compared to the control
villages, the treated villages are likely to have created more internal networks and
have better capacity to initiate, implement, and sustainably manage their self-help
projects. The treated villages are also significantly more socially connected, having
much more representation in ward- and district-level organizations, such as the Ward
Development Committee (WDC).
In addition, households in the treated villages tend to be more effective at
adapting to changes (Maxwell and Smith 1992) than their counterparts in the control
villages. For example, treated communities were more likely to introduce new
varieties of crops and use extensive production systems (although the latter is not
always sustainable), and their population less likely to migrate.
22.4.3 Estimating Treatment Effect on the Treated
To evaluate the impact of the cereal banking scheme, we conducted a regression
analysis to estimate the actual ATET or the intention to treat (ITT) (Arcand et al.
2010; Duflo et al. 2007).
Our regression model at village level can be described using the equation:
Y.i/ D ˛.w/C V.i/C ˇT.i/C ".i/; (22.2)
where Y(i) is the outcome variable of village i, ˛ represents baseline village
characteristics which allows for estimation with and without fixed effects (w), V(i)
is a vector of village level characteristics, T is the cereal bank dummy (T D 1 if
treated, 0 otherwise), and "(i) is the error term. ˛ is the baseline outcome, and  and
ˇ are parameters that need to be estimated. The dummy T is included in Eq. (22.2) to
assess the impact of the CDDP treatment on treated and partial control villages. We
also estimate the models using fixed effects, comparing the treated villages with the
pure control and partial control villages. The combination of fixed-effect estimation
and propensity-score matching reduces the selection bias caused by time-invariant
missing variable endogeneity or selection on unobservable bias (Duflo et al. 2007).
Two main indicators are identified after reviewing current literature on food and
nutrition insecurity.
Food Gap Effects
The food gap, a proxy for food availability, is the number of months in a year
households report having inability to satisfy their food needs (Maxwell and Smith
1992). Households and communities in the Gambia with food deficit experience
food gap because of the unavailability or high cost of food during the lean period.
This affects food and micronutrient intakes as well as farm investments and yields.
We therefore use the food gap as a measure of household food availability.
Comparing with pure control and partial control villages, villages with cereal
banks saw a significant reduction in food gap, with and without fixed effects
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(Table 22.3). Middlemen reduce the food gap as well, even though the extent of
their influence is debatable. The distance of a village to a main road, which is a
proxy for market access, is positively correlated to the food gap.
The further away a village is from lowland areas, the larger the food gap is. This
is understandable since lowland areas have higher crop-growing potentials and can
allow for off-season gardening (Ceesay 2004). Some of the lowland villages are also
able to practice double cropping of rice (von Braun et al. 1989; Carney 1992).
The prices of food crops during the lean period (July–September) also signif-
icantly increased the food gap in all cases. Thus, managing inter-seasonal prices
could be an effective way of shortening the lean period in rural areas of the Gambia.
Although the CDDP intervention reduced food gap, it does not significantly
shorten the lean period. This is because the CDDP had various other community
subprojects, some of which may not have a direct and immediate impact on food
production and smoothing consumption. Using fixed effects is important because it
increases the precision of our model, evident in the R2 and the standard error values
of our treatment variables.
Price Variability
Inter-seasonal changes in prices of the three major crops in the Gambia7 is a proxy
for food accessibility. In Amartya Sen’s book Poverty and Famines written in 1981,
he argued that the problem of hunger or food insecurity is not only about food
availability, but there could also be structural, cultural, or economic circumstances
that deny some people access to food, even when food is available. Thus, some
of the key indicators of food insecurity include household income, food prices,
and household expenditure (von Braun 2011). High food prices during the lean
period inhibit food-deficit poor households from buying and consuming adequate
amount of food (Gilbert 2012). When food prices are high, poor households in
rural areas often adopt various strategies to alleviate the situation. These strategies
include reducing frequency and quantity of food intake, foregoing other basic needs,
and taking out loans or working to purchase food. The strategies can, however,
further exacerbate their indebtedness and poverty (Action Aid 2011). To capture
the changes in inter-seasonal price variability, we constructed a price variability
model:
Log .Pl–Ph/ D ˛.w/C V.i/C ˇT.i/C ıCDDP .i/C ".i/; (22.3)
where Pl and Ph are prices of food crops during lean period and harvest period
respectively.
Our results in Table 22.4 show that cereal banking leads to a significant reduction
in the inter-seasonal food price deviation between harvest and lean period. The
7Rice, millet, and groundnut
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coefficient on the treatment indicates that cereal banking reduced inter-seasonal
price changes by an average of 41 %.
Similar to findings in another study (Oguoma et al. 2010), our results show
that the speculative behavior of middlemen increases inter-seasonal food price
variability. The influence of middlemen on the market, prices, and food security at
the local level is debatable; most evidence indicates that middlemen exploit farmers
and erode profits. Oguoma et al. (2010) argued that the intervention by middlemen
increases buying prices for consumers and reduces selling prices for producers,
lowering the farmers’ profit margins. Often the middlemen engage in temporary
arbitrage (Kent 1998), which may also cause the food prices to increase further.
This negatively affects the food security of farmers, who shift from being net seller
at harvest to net buyers during the lean periods (Bhattamishra 2012).
The district dummies in the fixed-effect model highlighted the importance of
double cropping, a practice applicable to district 9 (Fulladu East). In contrast to
district 1, district 9 saw a reduction in the inter-seasonal price deviation and food
gap.
Other social indicators are changes in demographic characteristics, population
growth, and membership in Ward Development Committee (WDC)—a proxy for
social capital (Jaimovich 2012). The cereal banking scheme provides a platform for
debates about community actions, and gives members an opportunity to organize
and manage a program for their community. Over time, the social interaction within
a community may enhance intra-village social relations and build the capacity of
the community to participate and contribute to other development initiatives.
22.5 Conclusion
The results support the hypothesis that cereal banking is an important part of
enhancing the food and nutrition security of communities by improving food
availability, accessibility, and stability. Cereal banking could reduce food price
variability and food gap by more than 25 %. This can be attributed to communities
having sufficient food during the lean periods, thus reducing speculations.
While community cereal banking schemes may be effective in addressing inter-
seasonal price variations and idiosyncratic risks, they are less effective against
covariate risks, especially climate risks. In addition to the risk of embezzlement,
there is a high failure rate during periods of poor rainfall.
The results of the propensity-score matching analysis emphasize the need to
target a program at appropriate villages based on village characteristics, which
influence the choice, sustainability, and impact of the program.
Compared with food aid or humanitarian aid, cereal banking is a more engaging
solution that helps vulnerable communities to secure their livelihood and build
up their resilience. It empowers affected households to participate and take up
ownership. Thus, it could be an effective and participatory channel for food aid
delivery during drought. This is very important because price and climate risks are
reoccurrences (Cortès and Carrasco 2012).
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While food reserves at the macro level require more careful management and
present a large logistical and financial challenge, cereal banking at the community
level has the unique advantage of being less cumbersome—the closer proximity
to vulnerable communities results in lower transportation and administrative costs
(Coulter 2009).
Appendix
Table 22.5 Test of differences (matched treated and control villages)
Variable Sample Treated
Partial
control T-stat Treated
Pure
controls T-stat
Coefficient of
variation—price
Unmatched 0:2647 0:2428 2:92 0:264 0:247 1.68
Matched 0:2644 0:2625 0:19 0:264 0:266 0.18
Poverty index Unmatched 0:7061 0:6543 2:7 0:7061 0:6604 2.262
Matched 0:7061 0:732 1:23 0:7061 0:705 0.053
Millet grown Unmatched 227:289 148:82 2:15 227:29 170:247 1.41
Matched 227:289 221:77 0:08 227:29 178:034 0.8
Availability of
fruit trees
Unmatched 4332:19 5795:61 1:61 4332:191 5281:032 1.13
Matched 4332:19 3811:68 0:76 4332:191 3165:702 1.83
Pp of crop farmers Unmatched 0:9657 0:921 4:14 0:966 0:927 3.76
Matched 0:96574 0:9681 0:41 0:966 0:97 0.83
Av. HH size Unmatched 11:419 11:12 0:62 11:419 11:245 0.35
Matched 11:419 11:64 0:33 11:419 11:71 0.44
No daily market Unmatched 81:476 62:65 4:24 81:477 66:731 3.46
Matched 81:47 82:54 0:27 81:477 80:683 0.2
Distance from
market
Unmatched 43:308 41:83 0:55 43:309 40:949 0.9
Matched 43:3 45:168 0:77 43:309 44:634 0.53
HHs without
improved
transport
Unmatched 98:22 91:72 3:43 98:23 92:968 3.06
Matched 98:229 97:668 0:54 98:23 97:415 0.72
Remote and
upland villages
Unmatched 0:5106 0:4108 1:31 0:5546 0:4208 1.88
Matched 0:5106 0:5106 0 0:5546 0:55 0
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23Stocks and Storage Behavior of Tradersin Ghana: Insights from a Trader Survey
Lukas Kornher and Felix A. Asante
23.1 Introduction andMotivation
Grain markets in many African countries exhibit large price volatility which is
driven by strong seasonality. Seasonal production and limited storage are identified
as major causes of intra-annual price variation (Jones 1972; Sahn and Delgado
1989). Price spikes often occur as a consequence of stock-outs at the end of the
marketing season (Shively 2001; Osborne 2004; Tadesse and Guttormsen 2011).
The adverse consequences of seasonal hunger and poverty are well acknowledged,
and functional markets are recognized as a prerequisite to resolve these problems
(Vaitla et al. 2009; Maxwell 2013; van Campenhout et al. 2015).
The structure and efficiency of markets have been improving since the liberal-
ization process in the 1980s. But the price surges and international food crisis in
2007/2008 brought grain marketing and public intervention back on the agenda of
policymakers around the world (Kaminski et al. 2014). This is partly driven by the
lack of confidence in free markets and the competitive behavior of traders (Osborne
2005; Sitko and Jayne 2014) and a growing fear for the political economy of food
prices (Arezki and Brückner 2011; Brückner and Ciccone 2011). Governmental
interventions in the form of price stabilization programs and trade policies are
often made without profound knowledge of the marketing system. “Under these
circumstances, [...] interventions [are likely to] impair the functioning of the system
more than they improve it” (Jones 1972, p. 4). Thus, evidence-based research is
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indispensable to endow policymakers with adequate information so that they can
design successful agricultural policies aimed at enhancing food security.
In this study, Ghana is chosen as a country case study as it is a typical
sub-Saharan African country in many respects. Although the country has made
considerable progress in poverty alleviation and the fight against hunger over the
past 20 years, food price volatility in the country remains among the highest in the
world, and seasonal food insecurity prevails in many parts of the country, especially
the north (Quaye 2009). On the other hand, Ghanaian markets are at a crossroad.
Wheat and rice imports are becoming more important with a growing free-spending
middle class. Poultry and fish farming as well as increasing demand for processed
food items shifts market shares toward the industrialized food sector. These changes
will undoubtedly make an impact on the traditional marketing system.
The empirical literature on grain markets in Ghana is divided. On the one
hand, time series econometrics approaches are used to explain the dynamics and
variability of wholesale market prices (Alderman and Shively 1996; Shively 1996,
2001) and spatial market integration (Badiane and Shively 1998; Abdulai 2000). All
of the above-mentioned studies focus on maize, the most important domestic crop
in Ghana. On the other hand, market analyses based on survey data stress the role of
the various actors in the value chain. Much of these studies are of qualitative nature
and give insights on marketing channels, spatial trade patterns, and transaction costs
(Alderman 1992; Armah and Asante 2006).
None of the existing studies examine storage behavior of larger wholesale traders
and companies in order to predict national stocking trends, which is the main
objective of this chapter. This is of particular importance since wholesale traders
play a key role in guaranteeing sufficient food supply throughout the year. The
present work fills this gap in the literature by evaluating primary data collected
from July to November 2013. This contains quantitative data from a survey among
wholesale traders with significant storage capacity on their operation in spatial trade
and intertemporal storage. Qualitative interviews were conducted with processing
companies, market experts, and other relevant stakeholders. The information is put
into context and policy implications are deduced. In doing so, the findings can also
be seen as a starting point and input for future research.
23.2 Price Instability and Trade Patterns
There is a natural imbalance between the production and consumption of agri-
cultural commodities. More specifically, consumption is primarily stable, while
production is highly volatile, in particular in rainfed agricultural systems, which are
the predominant type of agricultural system in many African countries. Therefore,
commodity prices are subject to natural instability. Besides, the seasonality of
production requires intertemporal arbitrage and causes a deterministic price gap
between harvest and lean season, owing to the costs arising from storing food
between the seasons.
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Ghana is no exemption in this respect. In order to distinguish irregular price
variability from the fixed seasonal trend, we applied an Unobserved Component
Model to market-level wholesale price data. The average seasonal price trend for
locally produced grains is shown in Fig. 23.1.
Seasonal price instability is highest for maize, with a seasonal gap of more than
40 %, followed by millet and sorghum, with around 10 %. As proposed by the theory
of storage, the inter-seasonal price gap is solely attributed to the cost of storage,
since market demand and supply equate prices between two periods. (Williams and
Wright 1991). Alternatively, market failures, such as the lack of insurance markets
to hedge against price risks, are identified as the reason for limited storage, causing
inadequate supply (Newbery and Stiglitz 1981). In line with this, wholesale market
prices exhibited at least three major price spikes during the last 15 years. All these
spikes were transitory and persisted for 1–2 months only. This hints at temporal
supply shortage at the end of the marketing year as a consequence of traders’ stock-
outs (Shively 2001).
Generally, markets within Ghana are found to be well connected, but high
transportation costs (due to poor infrastructure) impede full market integration
(Abdulai 2000; Quaye and Ameleke 2008; Cudjoe et al. 2010) and link asymmetric
adjustment between prices in the central and local markets to inventory adjustment
of traders. Therefore, storage decisions are made by taking into account the current
and future prices at distant markets, which affect stocking decisions via spatial and
temporal arbitrage conditions, as illustrated in Fig. 23.2.
In addition to this, prices are driven by annual domestic production levels
and the prospect of speculative exports to neighboring countries (Shively 1996).
International prices are likely to have limited impact on domestic price dynamics,
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Fig. 23.2 Schematic representation of equilibrium price equations. Source: Adapted from
Roehner (1995). Note: T denotes transport costs between market 1 and market 2, while C1 and C2
are costs of storage in both markets. In theory, spatial and intertemporal arbitrage take place only
when price differentials exceed costs. The equilibrium price conditions induce interdependencies
between current and future prices in different markets
which is related to the minor relevance of international and regional imports
(Conforti 2004; Cudjoe et al. 2010).1 By contrast, domestic rice production makes
up only about 30 % of the total national supply, causing local rice prices to follow the
price dynamics of imported rice without noticeable seasonality (Amikuzuno et al.
2013). A 20 % import tax (10 % for wheat) is imposed on all food commodities;
the import duty was suspended for rice in 2008 and 2009. In addition to that, port
charges further increase the price of imports and limit the linkage to international
prices (Minot 2011).
Last, food markets in Africa are often publicly regulated by national food
companies that are also involved in food marketing. Historically, Ghana’s agricul-
tural sector has been characterized by large state involvement by the Ghana Food
Distribution Cooperation (GFDC) and the Grain Warehousing Company (GWC).2
After a short period of complete market liberalization, the National Food Buffer
Company (NAFCO) was founded in 2010 to manage the country’s emergency
and intervention stock. Public stocks are accumulated through market purchases
at predetermined prices, while distribution is arranged when market prices exceed
target thresholds. Benin et al. (2012) review the operations of NAFCO but are unable
to assess its impacts on price dynamics. The main problem is the non-transparency
in the operational decision-making by NAFCO. However, target stock levels only
represent a small portion of the annual production, and thus NAFCO’s purchase
and release decisions are unlikely to influence market prices directly.3 In contrast,
the determination and public announcement of the minimum guaranteed price (paid
1Food prices are also affected by high inflation pressure, which is considered the major challenge
to macroeconomic stability. After a short period of single-digit inflation, the growth rate of the
consumer price index has returned to a level of above 10. In accordance with this, the Ghana Cedi
(GHS) has depreciated greatly since 2013. The exchange rate is free-floating since 2006, while a
redenomination was implemented in 2007 by canceling four digits (1 GHS D 10,000 GHC). GHC:
Ghana Cedi; GHS: New Ghana Cedi.
2See Sijm (1997) for a comprehensive overview.
3NAFCO stock levels are (1) operation stocks, maize (30,000 mt), rice (15,000 mt), and soybeans
(1000 mt), and (2) emergency stocks, maize (10,000 mt), rice (10,000 mt), and soybeans (1000 mt).
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to farmers) have an impact on markets because they can strengthen the bargaining
position of farmers in negotiations with traders.
The differences between rice and the three other food commodities—maize,
sorghum, and millet—are also reflected in the characteristics of their respective
value chains, which are depicted in Fig. 23.3. The distribution of imported rice
differs substantially from the marketing of locally produced crops. A few large
importing companies divide the majority of the market among themselves (Kula
and Dormon 2009). They sell their rice stocks to wholesale traders and supermarkets
around the country through their wide local distribution network, but they also run
their own outlet stores. Their business activities are highly industrialized and include
the operation of large warehouses around the country.
In contrast, the locally produced rice is usually marketed via two distinct
channels: first, through aggregators and local wholesalers/processors for sales in
rural markets; second, via larger wholesale traders to markets in urban centers. For
small and medium size farmers, rural assemblers act as collectors who aggregate
surpluses and then sell them to wholesalers in larger towns. Then, wholesale traders
sell the produce not only to processors, millers, and retail traders but also directly to
consumers. In contrast, larger farmers tend to sell their produce directly to wholesale
traders. Maize, sorghum, and millet also pass through the hands of the food industry
on their way to becoming final consumer goods; the proportion of formal trade for
maize is substantially higher than for millet and sorghum.
Since no value is added to the commodity by having multiple agents involved
in the value chain, farmers earn higher profits when selling to wholesale traders
directly (Sitko and Jayne 2014). Furthermore, the literature acknowledges that
traders play an important role in the functioning of markets in that they provide
farmers with inputs and credits (Antons 2010; Sitko and Jayne 2014). There is also
little evidence that the market structure of domestic grain trading is noncompetitive,
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apart from the high concentration among few large rice-importing firms (Abdulai
2000; Swinnen et al. 2010; ACET 2014). It is to note that retailers in urban centers
usually organize themselves into associations. In doing so, market queens, the
elected heads of these female retail trader groups, have manifested themselves as
an influential counterpart to wholesale traders (Langyintuo 2010).
Transporting commodities from surplus regions in the middle belt and the
northern part of the country to consumption and industrial centers is the major
challenge for a long-distance trader. Poor road infrastructure is reflected in the
long travel times needed for a relatively short distance. Compared with the well-
understood structure of the value chain, research about how marketing and trade
flows change in the course of a year is still lacking. In other words, it is clear
how grain finds its way from producers to consumers, but little is known about
how the grain gets from harvest to lean season. Precisely, the agent who stores the
grain and the amount and time frame of storage are still unknown. Furthermore, the
heterogeneity among wholesale traders is not well considered.
To understand both the spatial distribution and seasonal patterns of storage
behavior, it is crucial to start by examining the marketing behavior of farmers.
Without providing exact figures on the quantities, farmers’ sales of all types of
grains exhibit strong seasonality, with a peak after harvest (GSS 2007; Chapoto
et al. 2014). From past surveys, it is well known that only a portion of production is
formally traded (Armah and Asante 2006; EAT 2012). Therefore, the actual share of
stocks held by traders is presumably low (Jones 1972; Alderman 1992). In contrast,
the observed increment in the market purchase made by farmers indicates that
commodities must be stored somewhere and then sold back to farmers at the end
of the marketing year (GSS 2007; Chapoto et al. 2014).
Moreover, there are also massive changes happening in Africa’s food marketing.
On the one hand, the introduction of modern telecommunication technologies
drastically reduces transaction costs (Overa 2006; Tack and Aker 2014) and also
eases market access for farmers and small traders. On the other hand, food
markets are becoming increasingly industrialized. The number of supermarkets is
growing, and with it comes an increasing demand for processed final consumer
goods. For this reason, food processing companies are increasing their production
volume and claiming a larger share of marketed production. This has wide-ranging
consequences on grain marketing. First, the industrialized sector prefers to make
purchases in large quantities in order to reduce transaction costs. Second, quality
standards gain importance, and this presents challenges to proper handling by value
chain actors. Third, retail companies will affect the whole market structure and
are likely to occupy a prominent position in the market. The trading sector will
be compelled to adjust to these developments in order to preserve its role in the
marketing system.
23 Stocks and Storage Behavior of Traders in Ghana: Insights from . . . 609
23.3 Storage Behavior
23.3.1 Description of the Data
The analysis of storage behavior in Ghana is largely based on a trader survey which
provides quantitative data on grain storage and trade. The survey was undertaken
as a joint research between the Center for Development Research (ZEF) and the
Institute for Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER) at the University of
Ghana, Legon, and was held at major market sites in Ghana between August and
November 2013. Subsequent to the survey, follow-up telephone interviews were
conducted in April and May 2014. Qualitative information from a baseline survey
in 2012 and from consulting experts during August and November 2013 enrich and
underpin the quantitative data.
First, there are no business directories for traders in Ghana. The lists of traders
identified during the research contained invalid phone numbers and information
about companies that no longer exist. Therefore, randomization-based sampling
techniques were inapplicable. Second, the total number of traders who engage in
intertemporal arbitrage is not large, and a larger sample size is considered to be
better. For this reason, the sampling was conducted with the intention to create
a sample that is representative of the aggregate market behavior. Traders were
identified using two unofficial lists: a list of NAFCO contractors published on
its webpage and the business directory of Ghana Web, an online news platform.4
Contact information of traders was also obtained from governmental publications
and other publicly available documents. Furthermore, snowball sampling was used
in order to increase the number of respondents.
Generally, traders were contacted by phone and asked about their willingness
to participate in the survey. In this way, the response rate was close to 100 %.
For the follow-up telephone interviews, the respondents of the first survey were
contacted. The interviews were structured as follows: First, general information on
the enterprise was collected. The second part of the interview aimed at obtaining
a general overview of grain trading activities. The heart of the questionnaire was
the section about storage activities; in this section, respondents were asked to state
their purchases and historical inventory levels during the prior marketing year,
that is, 2012/2013. Third, respondents were asked to evaluate specific statements
to deduce their perception of risk associated with storage. Last, the interview
ended with a survey on the traders’ expectations of future price changes, and
this section also assessed the traders’ market knowledge of tariff rate and historic
rainfall and geographical production patterns. Moreover, the telephone interview
also asked traders to evaluate specific factors that influence price dynamics and
induce market risk. The interview also attempted to obtain information on different
cost components.
4Available at http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/telephone_directory/.
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In total, 36 traders were surveyed in the first round. Only 20 traders were
ready to answer to the telephone questionnaire. Several qualitative interviews
were also conducted; most notably are interviews with processing companies and
practitioners. Since farmers hold a substantial amount of stocks, it is essential to
incorporate their behavior into the analysis. The Ghana Living Standard Survey
(GLSS) contains an exhaustive section on agriculture, including a section on the
seasonality of sales and market purchases. Nevertheless, a few qualitative interviews
with farmers and farmer associations were conducted. The ZEF-ISSER Trader
Survey is different from most existing trader surveys in two respects. First, this
survey focused on interviewing traders who engage in intertemporal arbitrage rather
than spatial arbitrage or retailing. Second, related to the first point, intertemporal
arbitrageurs who own or rent warehouses are sometimes large companies which are
also involved in other businesses. Consequently, the average storage capacity of the
respondents is around 10,000 metric tons (mt), and roughly 60 % of the traders had
at their disposal storage facilities of 500 mt and above. Apart from inference about
the aggregate storage behavior of the market, information on individual stocking
trends and trader characteristics allows individual trading behavior to be analyzed
in more detail. For this reason, the presentation of research findings from the survey
is divided into these two aspects.
23.3.2 Motives for Trader Storage
23.3.2.1 Speculative Storage
As predicted by the economic theory, the most prominent motive for storage is the
speculation on a future price increase. Speculation is defined as the engagement
in risky transactions to benefit from fluctuation in market values. The supply of
storage model is extensively discussed in the literature and widely accepted as best
way to describe the price dynamics of storable commodities. In brief, storers would
choose to provide additional storage as long as the marginal costs of storage do not
exceed the expected return from storage in the subsequent period. Generally, it is
possible to hedge against any risk associated with storage by trading future contracts
or through informal forward contracting. In this way, the price risk is transferred to
another institution. However, commodity exchanges and forward contracting are
uncommon in most developing countries. Anticipated stocks are a special variant
of speculative stocks. They are not held for speculation of higher prices but in
anticipation of changes in demand (Minner 2000). Rice traders in Ghana reported
keeping anticipated stocks by increasing their stocks before Christmas and Easter to
satisfy the increase in demand (ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey 2013).
Speculative storage should not be confused with hoarding, which food traders
are often accused of in times of scarcity in the market. The literature defines
hoarding as excessive speculation. In theory, hoarding can only arise from imperfect
competition (Osborne 2005) or overestimation of price changes (Ravallion 1985).
Under the intertemporal arbitrage condition, two major determinants of storage
quantity are price expectations and storage costs. Storage costs are high in many
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developing countries due to high interest rates. Ghana is no exemption in this respect
(Armah and Asante 2006). Therefore, the amount of stocks in Ghana is likely to be
substantially lower than in industrialized countries. Commodity prices in Ghana
remain largely driven by seasonality (with the exception of rice), as discussed in
the previous section. For this reason, speculative returns are unlikely to be realized
from interannual storage. The only justification for speculative stocks at the end
of the marketing year is given by uncertainty about the timing of the next harvest
(Peterson and Tomek 2005). In contrast, high seasonal price variation generates a
great opportunity for traders to benefit from intra-annual price changes. In theory,
everyone who possesses stocks can participate in speculation. In reality, however,
because speculation binds capital for a longer period, mostly larger and highly liquid
enterprises are capable of speculative storage. Indeed, the survey reveals that traders
who speculate also diversify their risks by being involved in spatial trading to realize
low-risk profits. The respondents also noted that stocks need to be depleted before
the end of the marketing year because of an anticipated decline in market prices
(ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey 2013). In a typical marketing year, speculative stock
levels are expected to be highest when prices are lowest. However, traders prefer
to store grain stocks at lower moisture levels. For this reason, maize harvested in
August/September in the southern parts of Ghana is usually not kept for long, and
existing stocks are depleted again before the next harvest comes in.
23.3.2.2 Safety Stocks
Safety stocks are mainly known from the logistic and supply chain management
literature. They are describe as extra stocks that are carried to moderate the risk
of stock-outs and associated incapability to satisfy demand. The need for safety
stocks arises from uncertainty in demand and supply (Guide and Srivastava 2000).
Since inventory holding is costly, safety stocks should be kept at a minimum.
Optimal safety stocks are chosen depending on uncertainty in demand, supply,
and processing time (Minner 2000). In contrast to speculative stocks, safety stocks
are not related to expected future prices but rather to the quantity demanded
from the enterprise. In the context of Ghana, two types of market participants are
likely to carry safety stocks: processors and animal feed manufacturers and traders,
especially retailers. A trader survey conducted during October 2013 by the World
Food Program (WFP) found replenishment times of the vast majority of retailers and
wholesale traders who responded to be below 1 week (WFP 2014). This indicates
that the retailers and wholesale traders attempt to possess sufficient stocks at all
times. An explanation may be the high importance of maintaining a continual
business relationship by fostering confidence through short-term deliveries. This
is evident in that 19 out of 36 respondents ranked “the risk of losing business
partners when stopping to supply for 3 month” as a high risk (28/36 as medium
or high risk) in the ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey, in particular those traders who are
less likely to hold speculative stocks. Retailers hold safety stocks to foster long-
term relationship with customers. Consumers who are unable to find what they
want in a retail shop will presumably buy the goods elsewhere and are less likely to
return to the shop because they expect not to find the goods there again. Fafchamps
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(2004) emphasizes contractual risk in many African countries as the cause of traders
keeping large inventories. The risk of late delivery and poor-quality goods drive
firms that experience late delivery to hold more than two times more stocks than
firms that do not encounter late delivery. Processing firms in Ghana stated that they
have enough inventories to sustain production for 1–2 months (ZEF-ISSER Trader
Survey 2013). The rise of supermarkets in many African countries in the past years
has changed the agro-food system dramatically, causing a shift toward a greater
variety of products. Van Donk (2001) projects that the level of safety stocks will
increase in order to satisfy the demand for multiple food products at the same time.
By definition, safety stock levels are roughly constant throughout the year and will
never fall to zero since they are independent of current market prices. However,
stock levels are likely to increase by the end of the marketing year as low availability
makes input supply uncertain.
23.3.2.3 Aggregation Stocks
The literature on grain marketing in developing countries emphasizes the impor-
tance of small-scale traders at village and town level. They play an important
role when many farmers do not have access to markets or the costs of traveling
to the market are prohibitively high (Sitko and Jayne 2014). As described above,
these assembly traders sell their goods to larger wholesale traders, who transport
commodities across the country. The aggregation of stocks is an artifact of the
characteristics of the value chain. Wholesale traders are likely to collect only larger
quantities from village- and town-level markets. Thus, assembly traders aggregate
stocks in order to ensure that the transaction process with their trading partners
remains efficient. The aggregation of stocks can also occur at central markets when
wholesale traders are asked to aggregate large quantities of stocks (more than
1000 mt) for industrial consumption or purchases made by NAFCO and the WFP,
as reported in the survey. This form of stock aggregation is usually performed only
when the purchase of the aggregated stocks is guaranteed or even pre-financed. The
nature of this form of trade means that stocks will be totally depleted when the
target quantity is reached and the goods are delivered to the contractee. There are
no reasons for traders not to repeat the procedure several times in the course of a
year, yet traders make sure that their stocks are depleted before stocks from the new
harvest comes in.
23.3.3 Operational Costs
The profitability of storage depends on the costs of operation. Traders incur direct
costs from marketing, transport, and storage (Angelucci 2012). Cleaning, drying,
and packaging are usually done at the farm level before the produce reaches the
market. The main challenge of proper handling is to reduce the moisture content of
fresh crops for storage to decrease the incidence of discoloration (Armah and Asante
2006). In some instances, traders support farmers in this process by providing drying
facilities or functional bags for adequate storage (Antons 2010).
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Table 23.1 Transport costs on selected roads in May–June 2011
Route Bag (kg) Price/bag Price/mt Distance Cost mt/km
Kumasi-Accra 50 2.31 46.28 272 0.17
Kumasi-Tamale 50 2.9 57.83 382 0.16
Kumasi-Ejura 50 3 60.16 98 0.61
Kumasi-Nkoranza 50 3 60.16 150 0.4
Kumasi-Wenchi 50 2.31 46.28 155 0.29
Accra-Tamale 50 4.04 80.98 654 0.12
Wenchi-Sunyani 130 6.94 53.39 97 0.56
Wenchi-Techiman 130 4.63 35.59 29 1.23
Wenchi-Accra 130 11.57 88.98 427 0.21
Source: World Bank (2012). Note: Prices converted to GHS with the market exchange rate of 1.74
GHS/USD
The postharvest losses of traders are substantially lower than the losses incurred
when produce is kept on-farm since traders usually have at their disposal proper
storage facilities and information about appropriate handling. On the other hand,
traders have to take additional costs into account. First, storage in warehouses
and the treatment of stored commodities are costly. In addition, traders incur the
opportunity cost of capital. Last, traders usually bear the costs of transporting goods
to their storage facilities and, after storage, to their customers; this includes the
loading at point of departure. Exact estimates of transport and storage costs are
difficult to obtain and also vary by orders of magnitude and in terms of quality
(ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey 2013).
Table 23.1 presents the surveyed transport costs for frequently used destinations
in Ghana in 2011. The unit cost of transporting over short distances is more
expensive than transporting over standard trade routes between the urban centers
Tamale, Kumasi, and Accra. Generally, the transport costs are significant when
measured against the wholesale price of a mini bag of maize (50 kg; 30–35 GHS)
and maxi bag (130 kg; 40–80 GHS) at that time. During the field survey, loading
costs were reported to be 1 GHS for a maxi bag.
The per-unit storage costs cannot be easily calculated.5 Therefore, in the
interview, traders were asked how much they need to add to the purchase price
in order not to make any losses (1) if they buy and immediately sell and (2) if they
buy, store for 3 months, and then sell. In the latter case, the reported amount should
yield the sole costs of storage without the trader’s markup, while in the former case,
the reported amount captures mainly the transport costs and also the fixed costs of
administration and marketing. The results are reported in Table 23.2.
Transport and administrative costs reported are in gross accordance with the costs
estimated by the World Bank (2012). Large firms in Accra and Kumasi reported the
smallest amount of storage costs, which is unsurprising. Conversely, it is striking
5Due to the large share of fixed costs
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Table 23.2 Transportation and storage costs from trader survey
Description Reported costs
Large firms in urban centers Storage costs: 12–18 GHS per ton
Transport and admin costs: 25–30 GHS per ton
Traders in Brong-Ahafo Storage costs: 1–1.5 GHS per 50 kg
Transport and admin costs: 1–2 GHS per 50 kg
Traders in the Northern Region Storage costs: 2–8 GHS per 100 kg
Transport and admin costs: 5–12 GHS per 100 kg
Source: ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey (2013). Note: Differences across crops could not be observed,
but the sample size for rice and soybeans was small; traders choose their preferred unit to report
the costs
that the transport and administration costs are much higher than the storage costs
for 3 months.6 A comparable proportional relationship between the transport and
storage costs can also be found in other studies (e.g., Angelucci 2012; EAT 2012;
Angelucci et al. 2013). From our own survey, it can be deduced that the total
operational costs constitute between 5 and 50 % of the purchase price.
In Ghana and elsewhere, it is generally observed that storage facilities are built to
exploit economies of scale (Monterosso et al. 1985) or the proximity to processing
companies in urban centers (EAT 2012). Benirschka and Binkley (1995) explain
this phenomenon by the presence of opportunity costs that decrease with distance
to the producing market. In consequence, market supply takes place in a sequential
manner. Firms located far away from the market release their stocks only after those
firms located closer to the market have fully released their stocks. This implies that
as soon as grain supply in production regions is exhausted, grains will be transported
back from urban centers to rural markets. In this way, transport costs are incurred
twice: initially when grain is shipped from rural to urban areas after harvest and
subsequently in the reverse direction during the hunger season (Barrett 1996).
Taking into account the high costs of transport, traders need to increase their sales
price in order to break even. In light of this, seasonal price changes of around 50 % in
selected years appear quite reasonable, and thus transport costs are a potential driver
of the high seasonality of prices. Conversely, the costs of storage alone (excluding
transportation costs) cannot account for the strong seasonality in prices.
23.3.4 Aggregated Results: Seasonality in Storage and Trade
The aggregated turnover of the survey respondents represents a significant portion
of the total quantity marketed for rice and maize only.7 The figures presented in
Table 23.3 suggest that sorghum, millet, and soybeans pass through the hands of
6The figures should be interpreted cautiously with respect to the total size of the cost reported.
7Turnover is the total purchase of a trader within one marketing year.
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Table 23.3 Stylized facts of grain markets and survey
Maize Rice Sorghum/millet Soya
National consumption 2013 (FAO GIEWS) 1,700,000 950,000 450,000 150,000
National production 2013 (FAO GIEWS) 1,800,000 300,000 470,000 150,000
Industrial use 20 n.a n.a. 70
%—formally traded 50 >80 <20 85
No. of traders in sample 29(C2) 14(C8) 3 11
Turnover captured by the survey 94,000 377,000 – 7400
Note: Figures for soya are from MoFA (2013). The quantities for soybeans refer to raw
commodities. Instead, soybean cake and oil are also imported. Estimates on industrial use are
taken from EAT (2012). () indicate number of traders that purchase yellow maize and imported
rice, respectively
wholesale traders less often than maize and rice. In addition, soybeans are used
for human consumption only to a small extent. The figures indicate that processing
firms, rather than traders, are largely involved in the storage of sorghum, millet, and
soybeans. Therefore, the subsequent discussion is limited to maize and rice.
The sample cannot be considered representative with regard to the composition
of the traders. Large wholesale companies are overrepresented, while the portion
of traders with a capacity of a few dozen bags was relatively too small. The
respondents of the survey purchase and sell commodities to different market actors.
While the vast majority of the respondents buys their commodities from farmers
or aggregators, about half of the respondents also purchases from other wholesale
traders. With respect to sales, only seven respondents sell to consumers directly. In
contrast, the vast majority interacts with other wholesalers, processing companies,
and retail traders (ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey 2013).
The first indication of the seasonal variability of stocks is shown in Fig. 23.4,
which illustrates the best time to stock in and to release stocks as specified by
the survey respondents. For maize, stocking-in mostly takes place from August
to September and November to January. This largely corresponds to the time of
harvest, and thus the time of the year at which prices are lowest. Interestingly, some
traders continue to build stocks throughout the year. In line with this, stock releases
also occur throughout the year. Nevertheless, most traders prefer to sell their maize
stocks from April to June in order to benefit from higher prices at that time. Results
for rice are different. Stocks of imported rice exhibit less intra-annual variation
apart from the fact that stocks are built before Christmas to satisfy the increasing
demand. In contrast, traders stock up local rice between November and January
with the intention to sell the local rice between March and June; this exemplifies the
seasonality of rice prices.
Seasonal variation of actual stocks is deduced from the survey in the following
way. First, stock levels of respondents are interpolated in order to fill gaps in
the questionnaire. Second, estimated stock levels are aggregated by commodity.
In doing so, large wholesale traders carry over-proportional weight, while stocks
of smaller traders hardly change aggregated stock level. Figure 23.5 shows the
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Fig. 23.4 Best time to stock in and stock out (no. of respondents). Source: ZEF-ISSER Trader
Survey (2013)
seasonality of the observed stocks within the survey period. The estimates are in
accordance with the preferred time of stocking-in and releasing stocks.
For maize, this is an increasing function until February/March. Maize stocks
were accumulated in the course of the year and distributed toward the new harvest
season. Over the survey period, maize stocks vary significantly between 10,000 and
45,000 tons. It seems that on-farm stocks dominate at the beginning of a marketing
year, and trader stocks take over only in the last few months before the next harvest.
This observation is different from what is known about traders’ storage pattern
in other countries, whereby stocks are usually highest after harvest and decline
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Fig. 23.5 Aggregated stock trend (in 1000 mt). Source: ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey (2013)
throughout the year.8 From the qualitative interviews, we know that the safety stocks
of maize processing companies are able to sustain their total production for 1–2
months. With the knowledge that 20 % of the total national consumption is used for
industrial use, the level of stocks held by processors is estimated to be 40,000 mt.
Similarly, we can estimate the amount of stocks held by retail traders from the daily
consumption needs of the market.9 Assuming that retailers hold enough stocks for
5 days, the national aggregate for retail trader stocks would be around 12,000 mt.
Therefore, even if the survey respondents represented a large share of the market,
wholesale traders would still carry the largest amount of maize stocks compared to
other market participants.
Unlike maize, rice stocks did not show a similarly strong seasonality. Imported
rice stocks were built up before Christmas and Easter and declined as a result of
releases during festival time. Local rice stocks did not exhibit similar peaks around
Christmas and Easter. On the contrary, the stock level reached its lowest point in
June, and before that, rice was constantly accumulated. Similar to maize, local rice
is processed, and millers are expected to also hold stocks throughout the year. The
8For example, see private stock data on South Africa by South African Grain Information Service
(SAGIS).
9This is achieved by dividing the amount of maize marketed (850,000 mt) by 365 days.
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same applies to both the imported and local rice stocks of retail trader. However,
wholesale rice traders carry by far the largest amount of stocks throughout the whole
year. Due to imports constituting a large share of the total rice stocks, rice stored by
farmers is not important for rice.
23.3.5 Micro Results: Heterogeneity of Traders
Seasonal patterns of storage provide interesting insights into the market behavior on
the national scale. The diversity of storage motives, as elaborated earlier, suggests
heterogeneity in storage strategies among traders or groups of traders. In this
section, we assess whether these differences are actually observable and discuss
possible explanations. Individual stock-holding patterns by traders are shown in
Figs. 23.6, 23.7, and 23.8.
A single common storage strategy cannot be observed among maize traders. By
contrast, similarities in the behaviors of imported rice traders can be observed. None
of the traders have entirely depleted their stocks in the course of the observation
period. Furthermore, all traders tended to increase their stock level toward the end of
2013. Like maize, heterogeneous patterns can be observed in the stock level of local
rice, apart from an increase in the stock level between September and December
2013, which is common for all traders. Overall, there are similarities between the
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Fig. 23.6 Stocks by respondent (white maize). Source: ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey (2013)
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stocking trends of maize and local rice, while storage of imported rice seems to be
determined by other factors.
From the discussion about storage motives, we recognize two distinct types of
traders: aggregators, who accumulate predetermined amounts of stocks for delivery
to their customers on a mutually agreed date; and speculators, who hold stocks
to benefit from seasonal variation in prices. By contrast, we do not observe any
stock trends which imply that stocks are held purely as safety stocks. This could
be because the sample includes large wholesale traders but not retailers. However,
it may also be because parts of the grain stocks, in particular of imported rice, are
safety stocks that are held with the intention of guaranteeing continuous distribution.
To further analyze stocking patterns, we use a simple approach to differentiating
stocking strategies. We distinguish between a U-shape and a reverse U-shape storage
curve. A reverse U-shape curve represents the holding of stocks until mid 2013,
which hints at a speculative strategy. Conversely, a U-shape curve implies purchases
in late 2012 including more or less immediate sales and restocking in late 2013. The
latter better describes the stocking pattern of an aggregator.10
Extrapolating on the stocking strategy from the seasonal variation in stocks only
rests on fragile foundations. Instead, it is critical to understand what drives traders to
follow a particular strategy that maximizes their profits or expected utility. In other
words, what makes a trader a speculator and what makes them an aggregator or
distributor. In this study, we will not go into detail on this, but we will briefly outline
possible explanations, as illustrated in Fig. 23.9. Further research is necessary to
validate the explanations.
Stockholding
Strategy
Operational Costs
Risk Attitude
Access to Credit/ 
Interest Costs
Price Expectation
Formation
Search Costs
Company Profile
Fig. 23.9 Determinants of the stock-holding strategy. Source: Authors’ illustration
10In total, we identify (U shape/reverse U shape) for maize (9/15), local rice (5/3), and soya (8/1).
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The profile of a trading company includes characteristics like the field of
business, legal status, and the size of the company. Many trading companies
maintain other businesses besides their grain storage activity. These businesses can
be closely related to storage, but this is not a sufficient condition for commodity
trading activities. For instance, many rice importers in Ghana also engage in
importing a variety of other goods (e.g., motorcycles). Other than that, commodity
trading is considered to be an investment which yields a return on asset, like buying
shares of a company. The main challenge of concentrating solely on grain trading
is the cyclical nature of business earnings, which makes it particularly difficult
for small traders to move into intra-annual speculations because returns are only
realized at the end of the season. On the other hand, a trader in a company owned
by many shareholders does not have the pressure to generate continuous revenue to
make money for living. On the same account, large firms are more likely to have
at their disposal sufficient financial resources to survive one or multiple years with
limited business success.
Transportation and storage costs usually are the main components of operational
costs. Theoretically, one would expect aggregators to have a comparative advantage
in minimizing loading and transportation costs since they generate revenue from
the collection and transportation of commodities only. This involves having dense
networks of suppliers at village level. On the other hand, speculators are expected
to face lower costs in storage activities, including the access to capital and the
interest costs incurred when borrowing money to buy grains in bulk after the harvest.
Differences in transportation and storage costs incurred by traders could also be
attributed to traders owning warehouse structures and/or vehicles for transportation.
In this case, traders are relieved of paying interest to the banks and face lesser costs
of storage.
Most definitely, risk attitudes play a prominent role in business activities.
Stocking commodities over a longer time period with uncertainty about future prices
is riskier than spatial trading, and risk aversion will result in the reduction of storage
levels when futures markets do not exist (Sarris 1984). Conversely, traders inclined
to taking risks are more likely to engage in speculation without being fully certain
about future prices. The heterogeneity of risk attitudes of traders has not been
extensively discussed in the risk literature, which has mainly focused on farmers
and small-scale traders. However, the diversity of the ownership structure of trading
companies is likely to be correlated with and implies the presence of heterogeneous
risk preferences.
Apart from storage costs, the classical supply of storage model links stocking
decisions to expectations of future prices (Williams and Wright 1991). The tradi-
tional version of the competitive storage model is built on the rational expectation
hypothesis, which implies that market actors perfectly process all available informa-
tion that is relevant for the formation of prices. All associated errors are therefore
considered to be random (Gustafson 1958; Muth 1961). However, the literature
on economic behavior of agents identifies at least four different types of price
expectations: naive, adaptive, quasi-rational, and rational expectations. The types of
price expectations differ by the amount of information which is taken into account
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to predict the future price. The heterogeneity in expectation formation processes
among traders yields a variety of views on what the future will bring and may
explain why traders carry different amounts of stocks at any given time.
Furthermore, Chavas (1999) argues that gaining market information is costly
and heterogeneous expectations are caused by the costs and benefits specific to an
individual. On the same account, the search for price information itself can be costly.
These costs reflect a trader’s specific ability to process market information or the
degree the trader is interlinked with other value chain actors in the marketing system,
which makes it easier for him to collect information. Lower search costs allow a
trader to undertake a higher investment in searching, resulting in the trader finding
the best deal (Stigler 1961). In the context whereby prices are dispersed and market
information is not easily accessible due to limited quality of market information
systems or digital infrastructure, variation in knowledge ability is possible and might
explain the different storage strategies used by traders to maximize profits or utility
from their storage operations (Jensen 2007; Tack and Aker 2014).
23.4 Discussion and Policy Implications
In this chapter, the intertemporal storage behavior of wholesale traders is analyzed
and discussed. Unlike earlier studies, traders are found to hold a substantial
amount of grain stocks, especially toward the end of the marketing year. With the
exception of imported rice, most of these stocks are held by traders for speculative
reasons, with the intention of profiting from the seasonal increase in prices. Other
wholesalers accumulate stocks in large quantities for sale to industrial clients. Due
to the likely decline in prices with the incoming harvest in July/August, traders
attempt to deplete their stocks before prices drop. However, this is often not possible
in a bumper crop year. Carrying stocks over to the next marketing year is usually
associated with losses. Thus, annual carry-over stocks are kept at a minimum.
In contrast to maize and local rice, imported rice stocks exhibit less variation
throughout the year. These stocks are built up in anticipation of demand peaks. Apart
from trader storage, safety stocks are carried by industrial producers to guarantee
that their production can be maintained even when facing delivery problems. Safety
stocks are also held by retailers to satisfy market demand throughout the year.
An additional finding of the survey is the heterogeneity of storage strategies
among traders. In other words, the respondents’ individual stocking trends did not
show a uniform pattern. Several explanations have been discussed based on the
theory of storage, including heterogeneity in risk attitudes, operational costs, firm
characteristics, and price expectations. Future research may consider verifying the
relevance of these explanations in the context of Ghana.
It is not within the scope of the study to give a definite answer as to why price
dynamics in Ghana are characterized by strong seasonal variation and occasional
price spikes. The price spikes at the end of the marketing year may be attributed
to trader stock-outs induced by the high risk of making losses if stocks are carried
into the next year. High seasonal price increases often reflect high real transaction
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costs that are related to physical infrastructure, and the increases also explain price
dispersion across space and time. In particular, if storage structures are located far
away from production markets, then commodities will have to be transported over
large distances when storing stocks as well as when releasing stocks (Barrett 1996).
Hence, effectively mitigating seasonal price variability appears to be a challenge.
In particular, it is important to bear in mind that seasonal price increases are
also necessary to make storage profitable, given the high costs of storage and
transportation. However, the large share of stocks held by private traders suggests
that their behavior can affect the market dynamics. Understanding the drivers of
their behavior can be helpful in employing the right tools to enhance private storage.
Private storage could be enhanced by investing in infrastructure and storage facilities
located close to production areas or by providing a warehouse receipt system that
enables traders and farmers to store relatively small quantities without the risk of
their goods deteriorating. Alternatively, better and cheaper access to market infor-
mation and facilitating hedging against price risk through organized commodity
exchanges may potentially incentivize investments in commodity storage.
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